MARKMAN, J.
This case presents a fundamental question that appellate courts often confront: whether to afford relief on the basis of a claim of error not raised in the trial court. As a general rule, appellate courts will not grant relief on belated claims of error unless the proponent establishes, among other things, that the unpreserved error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Defendant here, who raised for the first time on appeal a claim that the trial court gave the wrong juror's oath, has failed to meet this burden. Our review of the record reveals that the jurors were conscious of the gravity of the task before them and the manner in which that task was to be carried out, the two primary purposes served by the juror's oath. Thus, we cannot say that the error here of failing to properly swear the jury seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals' order holding to the contrary and reinstate defendant's convictions and sentences.
On February 28, 2012, Ashley Conaway and Abreeya Brown were abducted, tortured, and murdered. A month later, their bodies were found buried in a shallow grave, and defendant Brandon Cain and four others were charged in connection with the victims' deaths.
There was no objection to the failure to administer the proper oath, although no one disputes that the oath given was incorrect.
A lengthy trial followed, at the end of which the jury convicted defendant as charged. He was sentenced to mandatory terms of life in prison without parole for the murder convictions and various lesser term-of-years sentences for the remaining convictions. On appeal, defendant raised for the first time a challenge to the trial court's failure to properly swear the jury. Defendant's appellate counsel filed a motion for peremptory reversal of his convictions, which the Court of Appeals granted in an order, stating, "The failure to properly swear the jury is a structural error requiring a new trial. People v. Allan, 299 Mich.App. 205, 829 N.W.2d 319 (2013)." People v. Cain, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 2, 2014 (Docket No. 314342). The Court remanded "for a new trial with a properly sworn jury." Id.
The prosecutor then sought an appeal in this Court, and we granted leave to appeal on the following question:
Whether the failure to properly swear the jury, even in the absence of a timely objection, requires that the defendant be afforded a new trial is a question of law, and such questions are reviewed de novo. People v. Chenault, 495 Mich. 142, 159, 845 N.W.2d 731 (2014).
Defendant did not object to the trial court's failure to properly swear the jury. His claim on appeal and the Court of Appeals' decision to afford relief therefore implicate the general and longstanding rule in Michigan that "issues that are not properly raised before a trial court cannot be raised on appeal absent compelling or extraordinary circumstances." People v. Grant, 445 Mich. 535, 546, 520 N.W.2d 123 (1994). The essential justification for this rule is fairness, both to litigants, who are best equipped to respond to alleged errors at the time they occur, and to the public, which must bear the cost of new trials that could have been avoided with a timely objection. See People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 764-765, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999) ("[A] contemporaneous objection provides the trial court `an opportunity to correct the error, which could thereby obviate the necessity of further legal proceedings and would be by far the best time to address a defendant's constitutional and nonconstitutional rights.'"), quoting Grant, 445 Mich. at 551, 520 N.W.2d 123. As this Court recently explained in People v. Vaughn, 491 Mich. 642, 653-654, 821 N.W.2d 288 (2012): "This Court `has long recognized the importance of preserving issues for appellate
The United States Supreme Court has also long recognized the importance of preserving issues for appellate review. As it has explained:
This is why the United States Supreme Court and this Court adopted the plain-error test in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735-737, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), and Carines, 460 Mich. at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130, respectively, and why Vaughn, 491 Mich. at 655, 821 N.W.2d 288, held that "[a]lthough the violation of the right to a public trial is among the limited class of constitutional violations that are structural in nature," a defendant is still not entitled to relief unless he or she can satisfy the four requirements set forth in Carines.
Appellate courts may grant relief for unpreserved errors if the proponent of the error can satisfy the "plain error" standard, which has four parts (the "Carines prongs"). The first three Carines prongs require establishing that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was "plain" — i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the error affected substantial rights — i.e., the outcome of the lower court proceedings was affected. Carines, 460 Mich. at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130. If the first three elements are satisfied, the fourth Carines prong calls upon an appellate court to "exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse," and (4) relief is warranted only when the court determines that the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or "`"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings"....'" Id. (citation omitted; first alteration in original). While "[m]eeting all four prongs is difficult, `as it should be,'" Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, the plain-error test affords defendants sufficient protection because, as Vaughn, 491 Mich. at 655 n. 42, 821 N.W.2d 288, explained:
In the present case, the parties generally agree that the trial court's failure to properly swear the jury constitutes a plain error that satisfies the first and second Carines prongs.
The fourth Carines prong embodies the general rule that an appellate court will not correct errors that a party failed to raise below. Reversal is required only in the most serious cases, those in which the error contributed to the conviction of an actually innocent person or otherwise undermined the fairness and integrity of the process to such a degree that an appellate court cannot countenance that error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 ("[T]he discretion conferred by [the fourth prong of the plain-error standard] should be employed in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A recent example of this Court's application of the fourth Carines prong can be found in Vaughn. In Vaughn, this Court addressed an unpreserved claim that the trial court violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when it closed the courtroom before jury voir dire. Agreeing with the defendant that his claim satisfied the first three prongs of the Carines test, we nonetheless concluded that reversal was not appropriate under the fourth Carines prong because the underlying purposes of the public-trial guarantee were alternatively maintained. Vaughn, 491 Mich. at 664-669, 821 N.W.2d 288. These goals, at least in the context of jury voir dire, included "ensuring a fair trial" and "reminding the prosecution and court of their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their functions[.]" Id. at 667, 821 N.W.2d 288. With these goals in mind, this Court reviewed the transcript of the proceedings and concluded "that both parties engaged in a vigorous voir dire process, that there were no objections to either party's peremptory challenges of potential jurors, and that each party expressed satisfaction with the ultimate jury chosen." Id. at 668, 821 N.W.2d 288. We also observed that the presence of the jury venire, which was derived from and representative of the public, helped to ensure that the proceedings were subject to a substantial degree of continued public review. Id. From our intensive review of the record, we could not conclude that the erroneous closure "seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings," id. at 668-669, 821 N.W.2d 288, and therefore declined to grant relief.
Consistently with Vaughn, we must first discern the purposes and goals of the juror's oath. The language of the juror's oath reads:
The oath imposes on the jurors three duties: (1) to "justly decide the questions submitted," (2) to "render a true verdict," and (3) to do these things "only on the evidence introduced and in accordance with the instructions of the court." Of course, the oath is more than a mere laundry list of juratorial duties. Instead,
Our review of the record in this case reveals that the error of failing to properly swear the jury did not undermine the proceedings with respect to the broader pursuits and values that the oath seeks to advance.
One of the primary purposes of the oath — to impart to the members of the jury their duties as jurors — was alternatively fulfilled in large part by the trial court's instructions prescribing the particulars of the jurors' duties. Immediately before the swearing of the oath, the trial court instructed the jurors, "I will now ask you to stand and swear to perform your duty to try the case justly and to reach a true verdict." Following the oath, the court instructed the jurors that it was their responsibility to decide the facts of
We recognize that the value of the oath as a whole is probably greater than the sum of its individual parts. The juror's oath involves a conscious promise to adopt a particular mindset — to approach matters fairly and impartially — and its great virtue is the powerful symbolism and sense of duty it imbues the oath-taker with and casts on the proceedings. That virtue, however, was not lost in these proceedings. Each juror took a solemn oath to answer questions truthfully during voir dire, and each stated that he or she could be fair and impartial. In addition, before the start of the trial, the trial court told the jurors, "I will now ask you to stand and swear to perform your duty to try the case justly and to reach a true verdict." The jurors then stood and the court clerk asked, "You do solemnly swear or affirm that you will true answers make to such questions as may be put to you touching upon your qualifications to serve as jurors in the cause now pending before the Court?" to which the jurors collectively replied, "I do." Then, as discussed earlier, the trial court thoroughly explained to the jurors their duties and responsibilities. Finally, at the end of trial, the court reminded the jurors, "Remember that you have taken an oath to return a true and just verdict based only on the evidence and my instructions on the law." Although this was not a perfect substitute for the oath required by MCR 2.511(H)(1), we have no reason to believe that the jurors in this case as a result of these alternative efforts to inculcate in them a proper sense of their obligations did not understand the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings.
The same is true of the instant case. The record indicates that the jurors were conscious of the gravity of the task before them and the manner in which that task was to be carried out; the jurors each stated under oath that they could be fair and impartial, and the trial court thoroughly instructed them on the particulars of their duties. Just as with the constitutional right to a public trial in Vaughn, we require the oath for a reason; however, if the larger purposes served by requiring the oath in the first place are achieved by alternative means, the only reason for reversal would be a preference for an error-free trial, a preference only rarely achieved in the judicial annals. We rejected that concept in Vaughn by declining to grant relief for the defendant's deprivation of a public trial because the objectives served by that right were otherwise served, albeit imperfectly. In this case, the objectives served by the oath were also achieved by other means, albeit imperfectly. Therefore, we cannot say that the absence of the oath seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings in this case.
The error of the Court of Appeals in arriving at the opposite conclusion stems from its failure to conduct a case-specific and fact-intensive inquiry under the fourth Carines prong. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142, 129 S.Ct. 1423. It does not suffice under this prong to simply state that an error "require[s] a new trial." In truth, this error stems from the Allan decision, which, after concluding that the failure to swear the jury satisfied the first three Carines prongs, did not take a case-specific approach to the fourth prong. Rather, Allan reasoned:
The problem with Allan's analysis is that it could apply to every case in which the jury is improperly sworn. In Allan, and in this case as well, courts should have engaged in a fact-intensive and case-specific inquiry under the fourth Carines prong to assess whether, in light of any "countervailing factors" on the record, Puckett, 556 U.S. at 143, 129 S.Ct. 1423, leaving the error unremedied would constitute a miscarriage of justice, i.e., whether the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings was seriously affected.
The failure to provide the correct oath was an error, but not one that would result in manifest injustice if left unremedied here. We do nothing to diminish the value of the juror's oath to say that its absence in this case did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. It is but one component — as important and as symbolic as it may be — in a larger process of fair and impartial adjudication. Because the record before us indicates that defendant was actually ensured a fair and impartial jury, we conclude that his constitutional rights were upheld and reversal is not warranted. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals' order and reinstate defendant's convictions and sentences. We remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining claims on appeal. Finally, we caution the trial court in this case, as well as other trial courts in this state, to take particular care that the error that occurred in this case be avoided in the future.
YOUNG, C.J., MARY BETH KELLY, ZAHRA, and BERNSTEIN, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J.
VIVIANO, J. (dissenting).
The issue in this case is whether the juror's oath, which for centuries has been thought of as the very essence of the jury, may be dispensed with as nothing more than a hollow incantation. There are few, if any, social customs more fundamental to a well-ordered society than the act of swearing an oath. Oaths are invoked in the most solemn occasions in civic life, including when citizens are called to sit in judgment of their peers. Today, the Court holds that the failure to administer the juror's oath does not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of this criminal case. I cannot agree with this conclusion because it renders meaningless the requirement — in existence since the very origin of the jury trial — that those who judge another person's guilt or innocence do so under the solemn obligation
Because defendant did not preserve his claim that the trial court failed to swear the jury, this issue is reviewed under the plain error standard.
As discussed below, I would hold that the failure to swear the jury amounted to a literal deprivation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
The first question — one that the majority does not address — is whether the trial court committed an error in failing to properly swear the jury. The prosecution concedes that the trial court erred by failing to give the oath required by court rule and statute.
The language of the Sixth Amendment reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...."
For as long as the institution we know as "trial by jury" has existed, juries have been sworn. Oaths were already a deeply embedded custom in civic society when the jury trial emerged as the accepted mode of criminal trial.
The essence of the jury is, and always has been, the swearing of the oath.
That the Framers understood the word "jury" to necessarily include a requirement that the decision-making body swear an oath finds support in a contextual reading of the Constitution, particularly the provision granting the Senate the power to try all impeachments.
This passage is striking for two reasons. First, Story's early account of the content
Finally, it bears mentioning that numerous courts have similarly concluded that the oath is part of the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury.
"Whatever else it may mean in addition, the defendant's constitutional right [to trial by jury] means, always and everywhere, at least what it explicitly says: the [right to be tried by a `jury']."
Having established that the error of failing to swear the jury was of constitutional magnitude, I turn now to assess under the second Carines prong: whether the error was "plain, i.e., clear or obvious."
The third prong of the plain error standard requires a defendant to establish that the plain error affected his or her substantial rights, which typically means that it affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.
Structural errors comprise a small subset of constitutional errors that "affec[t] the framework within which the trial proceeds," rather than "simply an error in the trial process itself."
The number of constitutional errors labeled "structural" is quite limited.
The right to a sworn jury — the jury guaranteed by the Constitution — is a "`basic protectio[n]' whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function."
This Court has stated that our caselaw "suggests" that structural errors satisfy the third Carines prong.
I come now to where the majority began its analysis: the fourth Carines prong. Once a defendant has established that a "forfeited error is `plain' and `affect[s] substantial rights,'" an appellate court has discretionary authority to correct the error, but is under no obligation to do so.
This area of the law is not a model of clarity, and little has been said on how exactly a defendant goes about carrying his or her burden under the fourth prong, especially when the error is structural.
It is undisputed that "a plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy the [fourth Carines prong], for otherwise the discretion afforded by [the plain error test] would be illusory."
In the context of structural errors, however, the analysis under the third
This recognition of how structural error analysis relates to the fourth Carines prong yields an approach to unpreserved structural errors that clarifies and better harmonizes the caselaw in this area, both in theory and in practice.
In practice, this formulation of the fourth prong analysis is nothing new. Rather, I believe it accurately describes how courts have been applying the plain error standard to structural errors all along. In cases in which a court affirms a conviction despite a structural error, the court conducts a fact-intensive, case-specific inquiry to conclude that the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation. Most notably, this is how the Court decided People v. Vaughn.
These cases are entirely consistent with the approach laid out in this opinion, which presumes that the fairness of the trial proceedings is seriously affected, but allows the prosecution to identify elements in the record that mitigate or rebut the notion — inherent in the very occurrence of a structural error — that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.
Allan is not alone. For instance, in United States v. Floresca, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit approached the fourth prong analysis by stating:
The court in Floresca ultimately exercised its discretion to reverse the defendant's convictions, and in doing so never identified any additional, specific facts on the record establishing the fourth prong. Instead, reasoning in the abstract about the effect the structural error has on proceedings generally, the panel simply concluded: "We do not hesitate to say that convicting a defendant of an unindicted crime affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of federal judicial proceedings in a manner most serious."
Allan and cases like it illustrate one simple fact: structural errors, by their nature,
To be clear, the foregoing does not mean that structural errors automatically, necessarily, or always satisfy the fourth Carines prong.
But the case is just that: presumptive. The prosecution then has the opportunity, as it always has, to identify parts of the record showing that, in fact, the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the proceedings were not seriously affected. In some cases, the court will find instances in the record that mitigate the unfairness and unreliability that presumptively flow from a structural error — after all, not all structural errors are created equal, and even the same structural error can be committed in a variety of different ways.
The foregoing is entirely consistent with the basic mode of analysis in the majority opinion today. Agreeing with the points made by the prosecution on appeal, the majority identifies several aspects of the trial record that, in its view, show that the underlying purposes of the juror's oath were otherwise satisfied and, therefore, that the absence of the oath did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in this case. By approaching the question from the negative to conclude that relief is not warranted, it is perfectly consistent with the approach I have outlined above.
I also agree with the majority that our decision in Vaughn is instructive, though I believe it provides weak support for the majority's conclusion in this case. In Vaughn, the Court relied on three countervailing considerations to hold that the fourth Carines prong was not satisfied: the closure of the courtroom was temporary, it was not complete in that the venire members were present, and both sides expressed satisfaction with the end result of voir dire.
Moreover, I disagree with the majority that the aspects of the record it identifies are sufficient to show that the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the proceedings were not seriously affected. The majority holds that one of the primary purposes of the oath — to convey to the jury members their responsibility as jurors — was satisfied by the trial court's preliminary instructions. The majority's reliance on the trial court's instructions is misplaced and actually serves to illustrate just how fundamental the oath is to the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. The instructions are meaningful substitutes only if we presume that jurors follow their instructions. The law does make such a presumption, but only because jurors have taken an oath to do so.
The other trial feature that, according to the majority, compensated for the oath's absence was the fact that the potential jurors stated under oath during voir dire that they could be fair and impartial. Again, I agree with the majority's general method of assessing the record. But having previously determined that the error in this case was structural, I start from the premise that the absence of the juror's oath rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. From this perspective, I disagree that statements given under oath regarding a juror's ability to be fair and impartial provide sufficient support for the conclusion that the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings were not seriously affected in this case.
Promising to be fair and impartial is only one component of the juror's oath. The juror's oath also calls on prospective jurors to render a "true verdict" and to decide the case based solely on the evidence introduced at trial and the law as it is given to them by the trial court.
Admittedly, the inquiry under the fourth Carines prong is difficult. But where I differ from the majority is in my assessment of the record as it relates to the negative consequences flowing from the structural error in this case. The right to a sworn jury is a "`basic protectio[n]' ... without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function[.]"
Lacking in this case is a sufficient indication on the record that the jury was, from the perspective of the defendant and the public, a reliable vehicle by which to judge defendant's guilt or innocence. I agree with the majority that the record in a given case could, nonetheless, contain evidence that the jurors, in fact, undertook and followed the obligations that would be imposed by the oath. However, statements by jurors touching on only one aspect of the juror's oath, though given under oath, are insufficient to show that the failure to swear the jury did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.
Nor is it sufficient to say, "Although the court clerk indisputably read the wrong oath to the jury, the jury was nevertheless sworn."
In this case, a majority of defendant's jury did not otherwise expressly assume the solemn obligations imposed by the juror's oath. Without this additional support in the record, I am persuaded that the trial court's failure to administer the juror's oath, which deprived defendant of the jury guaranteed to him by the Constitution, seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the proceedings in this case. I would therefore hold that reversal is warranted under the fourth Carines prong.
Nothing in this opinion is intended to, or should, diminish the hard work and dedication of those who served as jurors in this case, and who, by all outward appearances, conducted themselves in an appropriate manner throughout the trial. Rather, the origin of this error lies with the trial judge, who failed to perform one of the more routine tasks required in the conduct of a trial. Nor do I take lightly the social costs to the victims' families and others involved in the trial or the public expense associated with a new trial. However, I cannot ignore the cost to society of diminishing the importance of the juror's oath and the harmful consequences that will follow from the subtle undermining of the right trial by jury reflected in today's majority opinion. "Formal requirements are often scorned when they stand in the way of
Appellate courts may no longer be "impregnable citadels of technicality,"
McCORMACK, J., concurred with VIVIANO, J.
Although we need not reach the issue of whether the error here was a structural constitutional error, we would be remiss in light of the dissent's analysis not to point out the following:
In addition, MCL 768.14 states:
Although we are in no way suggesting that the oath that was administered here was even "substantially" the oath required by MCR 2.511(H)(1) or the oath required by MCL 768.14, we would nevertheless be remiss not to note that the precise language of the oath set forth in MCR 2.511(H)(1) is not necessarily required. The dissent is correct that "[f]or as long as the institution we know as `trial by jury' has existed, juries have been sworn." See 5 Kurland & Lerner, The Founders' Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 256 ("`When the trial is called on, the jurors are to be sworn....'"), quoting 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, p. *352; 1 Few, In Defense of Trial by Jury (American Jury Trial Foundation, 1993), p. 25 ("The preamble to a statute in the 15th year of the reign of Henry VI recites that `the trial of the life and death, lands and tenements, goods and chattels of every one of his subjects ... touching matters of fact ... is to be ... made by the oaths ... of 12 men duly summoned in his courts.") (citation omitted); id. at 102 ("[T]he first ordinance adopted by the Plymouth Colony in 1623 was one declaring, among other things, that `all criminal facts' should be tried `by the verdict of twelve honest men to be empaneled by authority, in the form of a jury upon their oaths.'") (citation omitted); id. at 169 (stating that in 1774, the First Continental Congress adopted a resolution that stated "neither life, liberty nor property can be taken from the possessor, until twelve of his ... countrymen ... shall pass their sentence upon oath against him"). However, the dissent overlooks that the precise language of the oath used to swear the jury has never been a "fixed constant," as is evidenced by the fact that our own court rule, MCR 2.511(H)(1), and statute, MCL 768.14, contain differently worded oaths. Relatedly, we believe that the dissent incorrectly characterizes this case as a "failure to swear the jury" case or a case in which the "defendant [was] tried by an unsworn jury." Although the court clerk indisputably read the wrong oath to the jury, the jury was nevertheless sworn. They rose and solemnly swore to be truthful. Although the court rule and statute clearly required the jury to swear to something more than simply being truthful, we nevertheless believe that the dissent errs by giving no weight whatsoever to the imperfect oath-swearing process that did occur here. Although once again we acknowledge the substantial imperfections of the process, there was a very real oath-swearing that occurred, real in terms of both its substance and the dignity and solemnity of the process.
Even if Williams's functional approach governed, I would have no difficulty concluding that the oath serves an indispensable function in service of the greater purposes of the constitutional right to a jury trial. To fulfill their role, jurors must "have the duty" to deliberate. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-411, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) (stating that the purpose of the jury trial is fulfilled "as long as [the jury] consists of a group of laymen representative of a cross section of the community who have the duty and the opportunity to deliberate, free from outside attempts at intimidation, on the question of a defendant's guilt") (emphasis added). And the oath imposes that duty. Without it, those acting as jurors serve without solemn obligation or sanction, and the essential purpose of the jury trial is left unfulfilled. 2 Story, Commentaries, p. 541 (stating that the core function of trial by jury cannot be achieved but "by the firm and impartial verdict of a jury sworn to do right, and guided solely by legal evidence and a sense of duty"). Moreover, the oath's directive to conscientiously deliberate and examine the evidence impartially counters the threats of complacency and overzealousness that are more apt to be found in a single, professional arbiter or prosecutor, the two evils the jury was intended to ward off. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 100, 90 S.Ct. 1893 (the purpose of the jury is "to prevent oppression by the Government" by providing a defendant "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge") (quotations omitted). Finally, the oath serves as the very benchmark for determining whether a defendant was afforded an impartial jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (stating that an impartial jury consists of nothing more than "jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts"). In sum, under the Williams functional approach, the oath serves an indispensable role in the constitutional right to a jury trial.
