BERNSTEIN, J.

This case requires the Court to address whether plaintiff's tort claims against individual principals of a law firm fall within the scope of an arbitration clause that mandates arbitration for any dispute between the firm and a former principal. Generally speaking, a company may only act through its agents. In this case, plaintiff, a former principal, challenges actions the individual defendants performed in their capacities as agents carrying out the business of the firm. Therefore, this is a dispute between the firm and a former principal that falls within the scope of the arbitration clause and is subject to binding arbitration.

Accordingly, we reverse that part of the Court of Appeals' opinion holding that this matter was not subject to arbitration. We vacate the remaining portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion, which relates to plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1993, plaintiff Dean Altobelli began working as an attorney for Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. ("the Firm"), a professional limited liability company formed under the Michigan Limited Liability Company Act (MLLCA), MCL 450.4101 et seq. Upon joining the Firm, plaintiff signed the "Miller Canfield Operating Agreement" ("Operating Agreement"), a document governing the Firm's internal affairs. The Operating Agreement provides that members of the Firm are referred to as "principals." All principals sign the Operating Agreement. The introductory section of the Operating Agreement states that the document "by and between the [Principals] ... evidences the following agreement between them[.]" In a subsequent section, the principals further acknowledge that the "covenants and agreements herein contained shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto[.]"

The Operating Agreement delegates particular responsibilities and powers to certain individuals within the Firm. A principal must devote "his or her full time and best efforts to the success of the Firm except as otherwise approved in writing by the CEO with the approval of the Managing Directors." Principals may "voluntarily withdraw from the Firm at any time" and shall involuntarily withdraw in the event of a two-thirds vote of the senior principals. Senior principals are principals who have been granted equity ownership in the Firm. Five senior principals, called the "managing directors," are invested with "[s]ole, full and complete power and authority to manage ... the Firm...." Managing directors have the authority to designate a Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), who has, "with binding effect on the Managing Directors, the power and authority of the Managing Directors with respect to the day-to-day administration of the business and affairs of the Firm."

The Operating Agreement also contains a mandatory arbitration agreement:

By January 2006, plaintiff had become a senior principal at the Firm.1 However, in late May or early June 2010, plaintiff decided he wanted to pursue a new opportunity as an assistant coach for the University of Alabama football team. Plaintiff proposed a 7-to 12-month leave of absence from the Firm to defendant Michael Hartmann, the Firm's CEO, and defendant Michael Coakley, who was the head of the Firm's litigation group but was not a managing director. Plaintiff suggested that the Firm permit him to maintain his ownership interest and return to the Firm as a senior principal any time before June 1, 2011.

Plaintiff avers that Hartmann initially promised plaintiff that he could spend as much time at the University of Alabama as he wanted and still receive certain allocated income from his clients. Hartmann disputes this, claiming that although he told plaintiff that he could "probably" return to the Firm, plaintiff knew Hartmann had no authority to make a formal commitment. Plaintiff contends that, in reliance on Hartmann's assurance, he moved to finalize his agreement with the University of Alabama in June 2010. Plaintiff claims he also spent many hours preserving his clients and business for the Firm.

Plaintiff alleges that Hartmann then withdrew his support, suddenly rejecting the proposed leave of absence and instead suggesting that plaintiff voluntarily withdraw from the Firm without any assurance that he would be reinstated. In response, on July 10, 2010, plaintiff sent an e-mail to the managing directors seeking approval of the job opportunity with the University of Alabama, and an exception to the section of the Operating Agreement obligating a principal to devote his or her full time to the Firm. Plaintiff claims he informed the managing directors that he had no plans to relinquish his principal status or compensation. On July 20, 2010, plaintiff submitted a statement to defendant Coakley detailing his past and projected contributions to the Firm. Plaintiff asserts that Hartmann informed plaintiff the next day that the managing directors had decided to terminate his equity ownership, effective July 31, 2010. In an e-mail response, plaintiff demanded a vote of the principals, asserting that the managing directors lacked the authority to terminate him under the Operating Agreement. On July 22, Hartmann replied: "I did not say the Firm had terminated your position. I told you that since you had voluntarily accepted a full time position at Alabama and had already started there, the Firm will consider you to have withdrawn from the partnership as of July 31, 2010." Plaintiff disputes this, contending that he did not voluntarily withdraw from the Firm, that he was improperly terminated, and that the Firm shorted plaintiff's 2010 income as a result.2

Plaintiff initially sought resolution through the direct settlement and mediation process provided for in the Operating Agreement. In November 2011, when these efforts failed, plaintiff filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association, as outlined in the Operating Agreement. Plaintiff's arbitration demand contested his last five years of compensation and the managing directors' decision to treat his departure as a relinquishment of his equity ownership status. Plaintiff alleged bad-faith discrimination in the allocation of income, bad-faith violations of the Operating Agreement, bad-faith misrepresentation, bad-faith conspiracy to improperly exclude him from the Firm, and shareholder oppression in violation of MCL 450.4515.

Despite having set the arbitration proceeding in motion, and while the parties were in the process of selecting arbitrators, plaintiff turned the tide by filing the instant case in the Ingham Circuit Court. Plaintiff did not name the Firm itself as a defendant in the suit. Instead, plaintiff named seven individual principals of the Firm: Hartmann, Coakley, and the five managing directors (collectively, "defendants").3 In his circuit court complaint, plaintiff presented claims substantially similar to those he had alleged in arbitration, essentially repackaging them as tortious conduct: breach of fiduciary duty, illegal shareholder oppression contrary to MCL 450.4515, conversion, bad-faith misrepresentation, tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, and civil conspiracy.

In the circuit court, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and a motion to compel arbitration under MCR 2.116(C)(7). In the motion to compel arbitration, defendants argued that plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of the Operating Agreement's mandatory arbitration clause, and that the circuit court was therefore compelled to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff countered with a motion for partial summary disposition with respect to his claims of shareholder oppression, conversion, and tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy. The circuit court denied defendants' motions, concluding that the dispute did not fall within the ambit of the arbitration clause. The circuit court granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition, finding as a matter of law that plaintiff did not voluntarily withdraw from the Firm under MCL 450.4509(1)4 or the Operating Agreement, and that defendants had improperly terminated plaintiff's ownership interest without authority.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration, but reversed the circuit court's order granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition. Altobelli v. Hartmann, 307 Mich.App. 612, 640, 861 N.W.2d 913 (2014). With respect to the motion to compel arbitration, the Court of Appeals determined that the central question was whether plaintiff could sue the Firm's managers in their individual capacities or whether plaintiff was instead required to arbitrate his claims against them. Id. at 626, 861 N.W.2d 913. After examining the plain language of the arbitration clause, the Court of Appeals concluded that the provision only mandates arbitration of disputes between "the Firm" and "a Principal." Id. at 628, 861 N.W.2d 913. The Court of Appeals rejected defendants' argument that this was in essence a dispute between plaintiff and the Firm, noting that plaintiff's claims were asserted against defendants in their individual capacities and sought to hold them personally liable for their actions. Id. at 630-631, 861 N.W.2d 913. With respect to plaintiff's motion, the Court of Appeals found that MCL 450.4509(1) permits voluntary withdrawal if a firm's operating agreement allows for such withdrawal, even without specifying a particular method. Id. at 631-636, 861 N.W.2d 913. The Court of Appeals then found that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the Firm, thus concluding that summary disposition was unwarranted. Id. at 636-640, 861 N.W.2d 913.

In this Court, defendants challenged the Court of Appeals' ruling on the motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff filed a cross-appeal, challenging the Court of Appeals' findings on plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment with respect to the motion to compel arbitration and vacate the remaining portions of the Court of Appeals' decision relating to plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition.5

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a circuit court's decision on a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Fane v. Detroit Library Comm., 465 Mich. 68, 74, 631 N.W.2d 678 (2001). Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), summary disposition is appropriate if a claim is barred because of "an agreement to arbitrate[.]" Whether a particular issue is subject to arbitration is also reviewed de novo, In re Nestorovski Estate, 283 Mich.App. 177, 184, 769 N.W.2d 720 (2009), as is the interpretation of contractual language, Morley v. Auto. Club of Mich., 458 Mich. 459, 465, 581 N.W.2d 237 (1998).

III. ANALYSIS

"Arbitration is a matter of contract." Kaleva-Norman-Dickson Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. Kaleva-Norman-Dickson Sch. Teachers' Ass'n, 393 Mich. 583, 587, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975). Accordingly, when interpreting an arbitration agreement, we apply the same legal principles that govern contract interpretation. See F J Siller & Co. v. City of Hart, 400 Mich. 578, 581, 255 N.W.2d 347 (1977). Our primary task is to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement, which we determine by examining the language of the agreement according to its plain and ordinary meaning. See Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr., Inc., 495 Mich. 161, 174, 848 N.W.2d 95 (2014). In considering the scope of an arbitration agreement, we note that "[a] party cannot be required to arbitrate an issue which [it] has not agreed to submit to arbitration." Kaleva, 393 Mich. at 587, 227 N.W.2d 500. "The general policy of this State is favorable to arbitration." Detroit v. A W Kutsche, 309 Mich. 700, 703, 16 N.W.2d 128 (1944). The burden is on the party seeking to avoid the agreement, not the party seeking to enforce the agreement. McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, PC, 428 Mich. 167, 184, 405 N.W.2d 88 (1987). In deciding the threshold question of whether a dispute is arbitrable, a reviewing court must avoid analyzing the substantive merits of the dispute. Kaleva, 393 Mich. at 594-595, 227 N.W.2d 500. If the dispute is arbitrable, "the merits of the dispute are for the arbitrator." Id. at 595, 227 N.W.2d 500.

Applying these principles, we must consider whether the language of the arbitration clause in the Operating Agreement is intended to cover the instant dispute between plaintiff and the individually named defendants. The critical portion of the agreement reads:

To resolve this issue, we must analyze two aspects of this provision. First, we must determine who the parties intended to include in the phrase, "between the Firm... and ... [a] former Principal." Second, we must determine whether the subject matter of the instant dispute is covered by the arbitration clause.

With respect to who is included, it is undisputed that plaintiff is a former principal. Therefore, this question turns on whether "the Firm" was meant to include the individually named defendants. Here, we must consider the concept of agency. Although no Michigan court has explicitly applied agency principles when interpreting an arbitration clause, it is well established that "corporations can only act through officers and agents." Attorney General v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 182 Mich. 99, 111, 148 N.W. 420 (1914). See Junius Ten Eyck v. Pontiac, Oxford & Port Austin Railroad Co., 74 Mich. 226, 232, 41 N.W. 905 (1889) ("The directors of a corporation are its agents."); Mossman v. Millenbach Motor Sales, 284 Mich. 562, 569, 280 N.W. 50 (1938) ("Where a corporation has intrusted a manager with the general supervision of a particular branch of its business, it invests him with the power of a general agent....").6 This reflects the fact that a company is not a physical being capable of taking its own actions or making its own decisions. Indeed, a firm cannot act on its own behalf. Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap PC v. Boyce Trust 2350, 497 Mich. 265, 275, 870 N.W.2d 494 (2015). Therefore, "the acts of officers and agents of a corporation, within the scope of their employment, are the acts of the corporation[.]" Nat'l Cash Register, 182 Mich. at 111, 148 N.W. 420.7

Not only is this particular concept of agency ingrained in our caselaw, the statutory scheme governing the Operating Agreement also incorporates this principle. Under the Operating Agreement, the Firm is a limited liability company formed under the MLLCA. MCL 450.4401(a) states that if the management of a limited liability company is delegated to its members, "[t]he members are considered managers for purposes of applying this act, including section 406 regarding the agency authority of managers...." (Emphasis added.) MCL 450.4406, in turn, states: "A manager is an agent of the limited liability company for the purpose of its business...." (Emphasis added.) MCL 450.4402(4) adds: "If the articles of organization delegate management of a limited liability company to managers, the articles of organization constitute notice to third parties that managers, not members, have the agency authority described in section 406." (Emphasis added.) The MLLCA explicitly refers to agency authority and the ability of individuals to act as agents for limited liability companies, which further supports the application of agency principles to interpret the instant arbitration clause.

When interpreting an arbitration clause, other jurisdictions have similarly applied agency principles. In Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1122 (C.A.3, 1993) (citation omitted; alteration in original), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that a corporation "`can only act through its employees, and an arbitration agreement would be of little value if it did not extend to [them].'" In Arnold v. Arnold Corp.-Printed Communications for Business, 920 F.2d 1269, 1281 (C.A.6, 1990), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that if a plaintiff could "`avoid the practical consequences of an agreement to arbitrate by naming ... signatory parties in their individual capacities only, the effect of the rule requiring arbitration would, in effect, be nullified.'" (Citation omitted.) The First Circuit agreed:

For the above reasons, we hold that agency principles apply in determining who is included within the scope of the arbitration clause.

Next, we must consider whether the arbitration clause encompasses the subject matter of the dispute at issue in this case. Generally speaking, to ascertain whether the subject matter of a dispute is of the type that parties intended to submit to arbitration, we again begin with the plain language of the arbitration clause. See Miller-Davis, 495 Mich. at 174, 848 N.W.2d 95. We then consider whether a plaintiff's particular action falls within that scope. We note that the gravamen of an action is determined by considering the entire claim. See Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 135, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). We look beyond the mere procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim. Adams v. Adams (On Reconsideration), 276 Mich.App. 704, 711, 742 N.W.2d 399 (2007). This is to avoid "artful pleading." Maiden, 461 Mich. at 135, 597 N.W.2d 817.

IV. APPLICATION

Turning to the instant case, we first consider who is included within the scope of the arbitration clause in the Operating Agreement, and we next consider whether the subject matter of the instant dispute is covered by the clause. With respect to who is included, we begin with the plain language of the clause, asking whether the parties to the Operating Agreement intended to include these particular defendants within the meaning of "the Firm." See Miller-Davis, 495 Mich. at 174, 848 N.W.2d 95. Here, we note that the Operating Agreement clearly recognizes the agency principles previously discussed. The Operating Agreement, signed "by and between" plaintiff and defendants as an "agreement between them," delegates authority to certain individuals to carry out the Firm's business and manage its internal affairs. Managing directors are invested with the "[s]ole, full and complete power and authority to manage ... the Firm...." The CEO has, "with binding effect on the Managing Directors, the power and authority of the Managing Directors with respect to the day-to-day administration of the business and affairs of the Firm." Thus, the language of the Operating Agreement evidences the parties' understanding that a company cannot act on its own, but instead depends on the actions of agents to carry out its business. See Nat'l Cash Register, 182 Mich. at 111, 148 N.W. 420.8 By signing the Operating Agreement and accepting the arbitration clause, plaintiff was aware that certain individuals would be operating on the Firm's behalf.9

Under the facts of this case, defendants are those individuals operating on the Firm's behalf. Defendants are the five managing directors, the CEO, and the head of the Firm's litigation group. The Operating Agreement explicitly endows them with complete power and responsibility for managing the affairs of the Firm.10 As officers, managers, and directors entrusted with carrying out the Firm's business, defendants are agents of the Firm. Junius Ten Eyck, 74 Mich. at 232, 41 N.W. 905; Mossman, 284 Mich. at 569, 280 N.W. 50; MCL 450.4406. Their acts are acts of the company. Nat'l Cash Register, 182 Mich. at 111, 148 N.W. 420. Because it is axiomatic that the Firm cannot act on its own, Fraser Trebilcock, 497 Mich. at 275, 870 N.W.2d 494, and because these particular defendants are clearly endowed with agency authority to administer the Firm's affairs, the individually named defendants must be included within the meaning of "the Firm" in the arbitration clause.11

Next, we turn to whether the arbitration clause covers the subject matter of the dispute at issue in this case. The arbitration clause covers "[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim ... between the Firm ... and [a] former Principal ... of any kind or nature whatsoever (including ... compensation, or the payment or non-payment of any bonus ...)." (Emphasis added.) At the outset, we emphasize the extremely broad and inclusive language of this provision. The plain language of the arbitration clause indicates that "any dispute" must be between the Firm and a former principal. Therefore, we consider more specifically whether the subject matter of the dispute reflects actions taken by the individual defendants as agents of the Firm.

In considering the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint, we examine the entire claim, looking beyond procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim. Maiden, 461 Mich. at 135, 597 N.W.2d 817; Adams, 276 Mich.App. at 710-711, 742 N.W.2d 399. The result of this inquiry indicates that the instant dispute falls within the wide expanse of "any dispute" between the Firm and a current or former principal. To begin, in the factual recitation section of his complaint, plaintiff states that he initially approached defendants Hartmann and Coakley to propose a leave of absence that might have put him at odds with the section of the Operating Agreement obligating a principal to devote his or her full time to the Firm. In doing so, plaintiff acknowledged that his request was subject to the rules established in the Operating Agreement, and also that he believed Hartmann and Coakley had the authority to sanction his proposal. Similarly, when Hartmann appeared unreceptive, plaintiff informed the managing directors that he did not intend to relinquish his equity status or compensation, again informing the Firm's decision-makers that he sought protection under the Operating Agreement. Plaintiff subsequently demanded the requisite two-thirds vote of the principals before his membership could be terminated, as outlined in the Operating Agreement. Believing that the managers ultimately terminated his ownership without this necessary vote, plaintiff now requests economic damages, particularly the "fair allocation of income (salary and bonuses)." Thus, the essence of plaintiff's allegations is that defendants' actions deprived plaintiff of the compensation and bonuses to which he was entitled. The arbitration clause explicitly encompasses a dispute involving "compensation, or the payment or non-payment of any bonus[.]" (Emphasis added.) This alone places plaintiff's dispute squarely under the mantle of the arbitration clause.

Examining plaintiff's individual claims further entrenches this dispute within the scope of the arbitration clause. Plaintiff first alleges breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff substantiates this claim with numerous factual allegations which inextricably tie defendants' actions as agents of the Firm to the deprivation of plaintiff's rights under the Operating Agreement. "Bad-faith" allegations against defendants include "refusing to disclose information relevant to the affairs of the Firm," "excluding [plaintiff] from involvement in significant Firm committees," "isolating [plaintiff] from discussions about a client," and "terminat[ing plaintiff's] ownership position without a vote of the Firm's owners." All of these alleged actions reflect decisions made by defendants in their capacities as the Firm's agents, employing powers provided to them under the Operating Agreement and agency principles. See Mossman, 284 Mich. at 569, 280 N.W. 50 ("Where a corporation has intrusted a manager with the general supervision of a particular branch of its business, it invests him with the power of a general agent....") (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also MCL 450.4401; MCL 450.4402(4). Therefore, this particular claim involves a dispute between the Firm and plaintiff, and is thus covered by the arbitration clause.

Likewise, to substantiate his claims of illegal shareholder oppression under MCL 450.4515, tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, and civil conspiracy, plaintiff asserts that defendants improperly terminated plaintiff's ownership in contravention of procedures established by the Operating Agreement. Plaintiff's conversion claim maintains that defendants "deprived [plaintiff] of his property without due process required by law — the process required by the Operating Agreement." Plaintiff's claim alleging bad-faith misrepresentation avers that defendants intentionally duped plaintiff in order to secure the Firm's business for themselves and other principals. Thus, in each individual claim, plaintiff takes issue with defendants' actions as agents making decisions for the Firm, which plaintiff believes interfered with his financial entitlements under the Operating Agreement.

In sum, plaintiff's dispute falls within the scope of the mandatory arbitration clause in the Operating Agreement. A company can only act through its agents, the individual defendants are agents of the Firm, and plaintiff's claims inextricably tie defendants' actions as agents to the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's rights under the Operating Agreement. Plaintiff's dispute is subject to binding arbitration.

V. CONCLUSION

We reverse the part of the Court of Appeals' opinion regarding the motion to compel arbitration and instead hold that this case is subject to binding arbitration under the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement. Accordingly, the lower courts should not have reached the merits of plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition, as the motion addresses substantive contractual matters that must be resolved by the arbitrator. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion related to plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

YOUNG, C.J., and MARKMAN, ZAHRA, McCORMACK, VIVIANO, and LARSEN, JJ., concurred with BERNSTEIN, J.