UNPUBLISHED
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA) appeals by right the trial court's order denying in part its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) and (C)(10) (genuine issue of material fact). We reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff had resided at 15745 Quincy in Detroit (the property), since the early 1960s. Despite plaintiff's belief that he had paid delinquent taxes on the property, a tax foreclosure occurred and, allegedly unbeknownst to plaintiff, title to the property was eventually transferred to DLBA in 2014,1 although plaintiff continued to reside at the property without incident. DLBA is a Michigan public body created under the Michigan Land Bank Fast Track Act, MCL 124.751 et seq., that is responsible for disposing of abandoned, vacant, or blighted property within the City of Detroit. After plaintiff learned of DLBA's interest in the home, he contacted numerous state and local officials about his occupancy of the property, and claims to have been assured by DLBA's Director of Public Affairs that the property would not be demolished. Nonetheless, DLBA's contractor, defendant Rickman Enterprises Group, removed all of plaintiff's belongings from the home and demolished the residence in July 2016.
In August 2016, plaintiff filed suit against DLBA, the City of Detroit, Rickman Enterprises Group, and John Does #1 and #2,2 in part raising claims against DLBA for unlawful eviction, conversion, violation of procedural due process and unconstitutional search and seizure under the Michigan Constitution, violation of due process and unlawful search and seizure under the United States Constitution and 42 USC 1983, gross negligence, and respondeat superior liability for the actions of other defendants. Eventually,3 DLBA moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), arguing in part that it was immune from liability for plaintiff's gross negligence and respondeat superior claims and that plaintiff's federal constitutional claims were deficient because plaintiff had failed to allege or otherwise establish that the alleged violation of his rights was the result of an official custom or policy of DLBA.
The trial court denied DLBA's motion on those claims,4 stating:
[DLBA] filed a [motion for summary disposition] claiming [plaintiff] failed to establish [an] exception to governmental immunity as to . . . count seven, gross negligence, and count 8 responde[a]t superior. . . . So [plaintiff] is left with count[s] 3, violation[] of due process; count 5, unlawful search and seizure; count 7, gross negligence and count 8, responde[a]t superior. With respect to count 3, the violation of due process and count five[,] the unlawful search and seizure, the Court is going to respectfully deny [] summary disposition based on . . . the cases of [Fuentes v Shevin, 407 U.S. 67; 92 S.Ct. 1983; 32 L Ed 2d 556 (1972), and Flatford v City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162 (CA 6, 1994)]. As to count seven, gross negligence, this Court finds plaintiff has submitted evidence that could establish gross negligence[.] * * * [W]hether a governmental employee's conduct constituted gross negligence that proximately caused the complain[ed] of injury under MCL 691.1407[] is generally a question of fact, but[,] if reasonable minds could not differ[,] the Court may grant summary disposition. . . . Count 8[,] which alleges that [DLBA] is liable for [defendant] Rickman's action under the the[ory] of responde[a]t superior, the Court is also going to deny [DLBA's] motion. Questions related to the existence and scope of an agency relationship are questions of fact, not law. . . .
The trial court then entered an order on January 8, 2018 consistent with its ruling. This appeal followed.
II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
The parties agree that the trial court erred by not dismissing plaintiff's claims of gross negligence and respondeat superior liability as to DLBA under MCR 2.116(C)(7). We also agree. "[C]laims of governmental immunity under MCR 2.116(C)(7) present a question of law, which we review de novo." Cannon Twp v Rockford Pub Sch, 311 Mich.App. 403, 414; 875 N.W.2d 242 (2015).
Under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., a governmental entity is immune from tort liability if it is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. MCL 691.1407(1). While a governmental employee may be held liable for gross negligence under certain circumstances, a governmental entity maintains its immunity "when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function unless the plaintiff establishes the existence of a statutorily created exception to that immunity." Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich. 459, 478; 760 N.W.2d 217 (2008) (citation and quotations omitted).
Here, plaintiff did not plead an exception to governmental immunity that applied to DLBA; moreover, none of the exceptions found in the GTLA applicable to governmental entities encompass gross negligence or respondeat superior liability for the gross negligence of its alleged agents.5 Therefore, under the GTLA, DLBA, a governmental entity, is immune from suit based on gross negligence and respondeat superior liability for the acts of its alleged agents. As the parties agree, the trial court erred by focusing its analysis on the standard applicable to governmental employees as opposed to governmental entities. In sum, because DLBA was engaged in a governmental function and plaintiff did not plead a statutory exception to governmental immunity and none would be applicable, we agree with the parties that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss those claims as to defendant DLBA.
III. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
DLBA also argues that the trial court erred by denying its summary disposition motion as to plaintiff's federal constitutional claims. It asserts that the trial court applied the incorrect legal framework applicable to determining municipal liability for federal constitutional violations and 42 USC 1983. We conclude that in this appeal of right we lack jurisdiction to review the trial court's determination as to these claims.
This Court has jurisdiction of an appeal of right of a final judgment or order. MCR 7.203(A)(1). DLBA timely filed its claim of appeal of right of the trial court's January 8, 2018 order, citing MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v). MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v) defines "final judgment" or "final order" to include "an order denying governmental immunity to a governmental party, including a governmental agency, official, or employee under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or an order denying a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) based on a claim of governmental immunity."
MCR 7.203(A)(1) further provides that where the appeal of right derives from the denial of a summary disposition motion based on governmental immunity (under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v)), the appeal is "limited to the portion of the order with respect to which there is an appeal of right." MCR 7.203(A)(1). Governmental immunity under the GTLA does not protect a governmental agency from claims that it, by custom or policy, violated the state or federal constitution. See Monell v Dep't of Social Serv, 436 U.S. 658, 690; 98 S.Ct. 2018; 56 L Ed 2d 611 (1978); Mack v City of Detroit, 467 Mich. 186, 195; 649 N.W.2d 47 (2002); Jones v Powell, 462 Mich. 329, 336; 612 N.W.2d 423 (2000).
Indeed, DLBA does not argue otherwise, but rather encourages us to exercise our discretion to consider this issue as on leave granted.6 We decline to do so in light of factual issues, such as whether DLBA's agents acted under an official custom or policy, that are best resolved in a final judgment or order of the trial court before our consideration of them on appeal. See Waait & Sons Elec Co v Dehko, 230 Mich.App. 582, 585; 584 N.W.2d 372 (1998); citing Guzowski v Detroit Racing Ass'n, 130 Mich.App. 322, 325-327; 343 N.W.2d 536 (1983).
Reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.7 We do not retain jurisdiction.
