TIMMONS-GOODSON, Justice.
In this case we consider whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for summary judgment based upon governmental immunity. We take this opportunity to restate our jurisprudence of governmental immunity and, in light of our restatement, we vacate and remand the decision of the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In reaching our conclusion, we express no opinion whether defendants in this case, Pasquotank County and the Pasquotank County Parks & Recreation Department, are entitled to governmental immunity.
Erik Dominic Williams drowned at a public park on 10 June 2007. The park, Fun Junktion, was owned by defendant Pasquotank County and maintained and operated by defendant Pasquotank County Parks & Recreation Department. Williams's estate filed a claim against defendants alleging that, as a result of defendants' negligence, Williams drowned in the "Swimming Hole," an area rented out to private parties at Fun Junktion. On 9 December 2008, defendants answered plaintiff's complaint denying any negligence and alleging the affirmative defenses of governmental immunity, sovereign immunity, and contributory negligence. On 4 September 2009, defendants made a limited motion for summary judgment, contending that Williams's allegations were barred by the doctrines of governmental and sovereign immunity. The trial court denied defendants' limited motion for summary judgment, concluding that they were not entitled to governmental immunity because "defendants charged and collected a fee" "for the use of the Fun Junktion park, and defendants were providing the same type of facilities and services that private individuals or corporations could provide."
A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. The panel reasoned that governmental immunity applies to counties and municipalities acting in the performance of governmental, rather than proprietary, functions. See Estate of Williams v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Rec. Dep't, ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 711 S.E.2d 450, 452 (2011). To determine whether a function is governmental or proprietary, the Court of Appeals articulated a four-factor test considering: (1) whether an undertaking is one traditionally provided by local governments; (2) if the undertaking is one in which only a governmental agency could engage, or if any corporation, individual, or group of individuals
The Court of Appeals then applied these four factors, concluding that: (1) public parks have traditionally been provided by local government; (2) public parks could be provided by private, as well as public, entities; (3) defendants charged a fee ($75.00) for the use of Fun Junktion, though (4) defendants did not make a profit as a result of charging this or other rental fees for Fun Junktion. Id. at ___, 711 S.E.2d at 453-54. The Court of Appeals again opined that "the second factor is the most important" and concluded that "defendant was involved in a proprietary function in the operation of the party facilities at Fun Junktion." Id. at ___, 711 S.E.2d at 454. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. at ___, 711 S.E.2d at 454.
In this case we review the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment "shall be" granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo. E.g.; Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, ___ N.C. ___, ___, 723 S.E.2d 744, 747 (2012); Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004).
Our jurisprudence has recognized the rule of governmental immunity for over a century. See Moffitt v. City of Asheville, 103 N.C. 191, 203-04, 103 N.C. 237, 254-55, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889) (adopting the doctrine of governmental immunity); see also Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 519, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1972) (emphasizing that "[t]his Court has not departed from the rule of governmental immunity adopted in the year 1889 in the case of Moffitt v. Asheville"). Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, a county or municipal corporation "is immune from suit for the negligence of its employees in the exercise of governmental functions absent waiver of immunity."' Evans ex rel. Horton v. Hous. Auth., 359 N.C. 50, 53, 602 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2004) (quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 104, 489 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1997)); Moffitt, 103 N.C. at 203, 103 N.C. at 254-55, 9 S.E. at 697 (stating a city or town "incurs no liability for the negligence of its officers" acting under authority conferred by its charter or for the sole benefit of the public).
This principle is derived from English law and is based on the premise that, as the creator of the law, "the king could do no wrong." Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 592, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971). While we have acknowledged that this rationale is not as persuasive as it once was, this Court has declined to abrogate the common law doctrine of governmental immunity. Instead, we have reasoned that any change in our common law is more properly a task for the legislature.
More specifically, this Court has expressed the following:
Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 312, 222 S.E.2d 412, 418-19 (1976).
Nevertheless, governmental immunity is not without limit. "[G]overnmental immunity covers
We have long held that a "governmental" function is an activity that is "discretionary, political, legislative, or public in nature and performed for the public good in behalf of the State rather than for itself." Britt v. City of Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 450, 73 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1952) (citing Millar, 222 N.C. at 341, 23 S.E.2d at 44). A "proprietary" function, on the other hand, is one that is "commercial or chiefly for the private advantage of the compact community." Id.; see also Evans, 359 N.C. at 54, 602 S.E.2d at 671 (describing the test set forth in Britt as our "one guiding principle").
Our reasoning when distinguishing between governmental and proprietary functions has been relatively simple, though we have acknowledged the difficulties of making the distinction. Evans, 359 N.C. at 54, 602 S.E.2d at 671 ("The difficulties of applying this principle have been noted." (citations omitted)). "When a municipality is acting in behalf of the State' in promoting or protecting the health, safety, security, or general welfare of its citizens, it is an agency of the sovereign. When it engages in a public enterprise essentially for the benefit of the compact community, it is acting within its proprietary powers." Britt, 236 N.C. at 450-51, 73 S.E.2d at 293.
Our case law demonstrates that a number of factors are relevant when ascertaining whether action undertaken by a county or municipality is governmental or proprietary in nature. First, in deference to our tripartite system of government, the appellate courts of this State should consider whether our legislature has designated the particular function at issue as governmental or proprietary. For example, in Evans ex rel. Horton v. Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh we considered the Housing Authorities Law, codified at N.C.G.S. §§ 157-1 to -39.8 (2003), in holding that a housing authority was protected by governmental immunity against allegations of lead paint-based injuries. 359 N.C. at 55-56, 602 S.E.2d at 671-72.
Specifically, we noted that in enacting the Housing Authorities Law at issue, the General Assembly provided
Id. at 55, 602 S.E.2d at 672 (alterations in original) (citing N.C.G.S. § 157-2(a) (2003)). We considered the emphasized language a significant "statutory indication that the provision of low and moderate income housing is a governmental function." Id.
We therefore conclude that the threshold inquiry in determining whether a
Defendants contend that N.C.G.S. § 160A-351 is dispositive in this case because it asserts that "the operation of public parks is a proper governmental function."' North Carolina's Recreation Enabling Law, codified in section 160A351, gives municipalities the power to create, fund, and maintain recreation facilities. Section 160A-351 states the following:
N.C.G.S. § 160A-351 (2011) (emphasis added). Here the Court of Appeals made a passing reference to section 160A-351, which is clearly
We recognize that not every nuanced action that could occur in a park or other recreational facility has been designated as governmental or proprietary in nature by the legislature. We therefore offer the following guiding principles going forward. When the legislature has not directly resolved whether a specific activity is governmental or proprietary in nature, other factors are relevant. We have repeatedly held that if the undertaking is one in which
Given this reality, when the particular service can be performed both privately and publicly, the inquiry involves consideration of a number of additional factors, of which no single factor is dispositive. Relevant to this inquiry is whether the service is traditionally a service provided by a governmental entity,
Analysis of the factors listed above when considering whether the action of a county or municipality is governmental or proprietary in nature is particularly important in light of two points we have previously emphasized.
Sides v. Cabarrus Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 287 N.C. 14, 21-22, 213 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1975) (citations and emphases omitted). Consequently, the proper designation of a particular action of a county or municipality is a fact intensive inquiry, turning on the facts alleged in the complaint, and may differ from case to case.
Here, it appears that the decision of the Court of Appeals that defendants were not entitled to governmental immunity, turned solely or predominantly upon the fact that the services defendants provided could also be provided by nongovernmental entities. As noted, this distinction lacks the utility it once had. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the decision of the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Again, in so doing, we express no position
This case is vacated and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for additional proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.