McCORMACK, J.
Trevelle J. Taylor was convicted in Douglas County District Court of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. He was sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment on the murder conviction and a consecutive term of 10 years' imprisonment on the weapon conviction. Taylor appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse, and remand for a new trial.
Justin Gaines was shot and killed outside his residence on September 19, 2009. The gunshot entered Gaines' back and fatally penetrated his lungs and heart. Taylor was arrested nine blocks from the scene of the shooting. He was tried before a jury and convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The following evidence was adduced at trial:
In the early afternoon on September 19, 2009, Gaines was driving near his residence on Curtis Avenue in Omaha, when he noticed his friend, Catrice Brysen, standing near her car, which was parked in his driveway. Gaines parked his car in the driveway behind Brysen's and spoke with Brysen through his open driver's-side window while he remained in his car. Gaines asked Brysen to write down her telephone number, and she walked to her car to retrieve a pen. Brysen then heard numerous gunshots before she was able to return to Gaines' car. She observed two men shooting guns at Gaines, who remained seated in his car. Brysen retreated toward the residence and heard Gaines yell that he had been shot in the back. Brysen then observed the two men run from the scene in opposite directions.
Brysen described the two suspects she witnessed at the scene. She described the first suspect as an African-American male, "[s]kinny with a brush cut in a brown shirt with orange on it," and holding a gun. Brysen described the second suspect as an
At the scene of the crime, near the end of the driveway where Gaines' car was parked, the police collected 16 spent shell casings from a 9-mm handgun. Local residents told police that they heard the sounds of two different guns. Police also eventually recovered a 9-mm handgun near the area of the shooting. A neighbor told police that the day of the shooting, he heard the gunshots and witnessed a black male run through the area where the 9-mm handgun was found.
At trial, several local residents testified as to what they witnessed on September 19, 2009. One such witness testified that, prior to the shooting, she was standing on her porch when she witnessed a black male jog past her house wearing a white T-shirt and baggy denim shorts and that the man had long braids and a goatee. The man proceeded, alone, toward 45th Street and Curtis Avenue. The witness went inside her home and then heard a series of gunshots coming from the area near Gaines' residence. The witness identified a photograph of Joshua Nolan as the man she saw jogging past her house.
Another such witness testified that she heard the gunshots from her residence near 44th Street and Curtis Avenue. She went outside when she heard the shots, and then witnessed a black male running east on Curtis Avenue, then north through the yards of homes across the street from her. She described the man as wearing a brown T-shirt and having a "brush cut" hairstyle.
A third such witness also testified that she witnessed a black male running east on Curtis Avenue, and through her yard. She testified that the man was wearing a brown T-shirt and blue shorts.
A fourth witness testified that she was driving home at the time of the shooting. She witnessed a man run past her car and huddle behind some bushes. The man was wearing a tan shirt and blue shorts, and she overheard him speaking on a cellular telephone, telling someone to "come get [him]." The witness identified Taylor as the man she saw that afternoon.
Officer Joel Strominger was on duty on the afternoon that Gaines was shot. Strominger heard a broadcast regarding the shooting which described the suspects' vehicle as a small, white four-door car without hubcaps. Strominger observed a parked white vehicle matching this description in the area of 40th Street and Redick Avenue. A black male was sitting in the driver's seat, and a black male wearing a white T-shirt and black shorts was standing outside the car, holding what appeared to be a brown T-shirt. Strominger then observed the driver make a U-turn and drive west on Redick Avenue, while the individual outside the car walked east on Redick Avenue. Strominger followed the car, ran a license plate check and determined the car was stolen. He then stopped the car, which was being driven by Joshua Kercheval.
Officer Jarvis Duncan had also responded to the broadcast regarding the shooting, and on his patrol of the area, he came upon a black male running north on 37th Street near Redick Avenue. Duncan and his partner witnessed the individual throw a brown shirt to the ground. Duncan and his partner ordered him to stop, arrested him, and took his cellular telephone into possession. The individual was later identified as Taylor. Strominger identified Taylor as the man he observed standing outside of the car driven by Kercheval. Taylor was transported to the Omaha Police Department's headquarters,
Nolan was stopped by police for a traffic violation 8 days after the homicide. The car Nolan was driving was registered in his name. Nolan was in possession of a.44-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, with a laser sight, which was hidden in his waistband. Nolan was arrested, and his car was impounded and searched by police. The search produced four spent 9-mm shell casings.
Kercheval testified at trial. He stated that on the morning of the shooting, he was at his home when Taylor and Nolan arrived in a white car. Kercheval had never seen the car before, and the three agreed to ride around for a while with Kercheval driving. They drove to the area of 45th Street and Curtis Avenue, and Kercheval noticed a man sitting in a parked car talking to a woman in a driveway. Taylor told him to stop the car and said, "There's the weedman." Kercheval pulled over and parked near 45th and Vernon Streets.
Kercheval testified that he remained in the car at all times, but that Taylor got out of the car on 44th Street and that Nolan got out of the car after it was parked on 45th Street. Kercheval then heard a series of gunshots, and he started to leave when he noticed Nolan running up the street. Nolan entered the car, and the two men drove east toward 42nd Street. Nolan then jumped out of the car, and Kercheval made a U-turn and was then stopped by Strominger. Kercheval did not see Taylor between the time Taylor exited the car and when the police brought Taylor to where Strominger had stopped Kercheval in the car.
Kercheval was in custody during his testimony, which he gave only after his arrest on a bench warrant for failure to appear when subpoenaed to testify earlier in the trial. Kercheval stated that he received a telephone call from Taylor the Friday prior to the scheduled trial date. During that telephone call, Taylor told Kercheval not to come to court, and Kercheval testified that he subsequently failed to appear because he felt threatened. The telephone call from Taylor to Kercheval was recorded by a system at the jail. A recording of the call was received into evidence and played for the jury. During the call, Taylor stated, among other things: "leave this shit alone"; "don't let me go out like this"; "if I don't come home, man, this shit is gonna go places where it don't even need to go, man"; and "make sure you stay out [of] the way." Prior to receiving the telephone call, Kercheval had told the prosecutor on two separate occasions that he would appear and testify.
The firearm and toolmark examiner employed by the Omaha Police Department, Daniel Bredow, examined the 9-mm handgun found near the scene of the crime. Bredow determined that 14 of the 16 9-mm shell casings found at the scene were fired from that gun. The other two casings were consistent with that weapon, but did not provide conclusive results because of damage to the casings. Bredow also determined that two of the four 9-mm casings found in Nolan's vehicle were fired from the 9-mm gun found near the scene. Additionally, Bredow examined the spent bullet retrieved from Gaines' body at the hospital and determined that it was fired from a .44-caliber weapon. Bredow could not determine whether it came from the weapon found on Nolan because of damage to the bullet.
The State also called Preston Landell as a witness. Landell is a customer operations
The district court overruled Taylor's foundational objection on the basis of this court's opinion in State v. Robinson,
Finally, the State called Allison Murtha, a forensic scientist employed by a "materials analysis company" with a forensics department which analyzes gunshot residue and other trace evidence. Murtha had examined the swabs taken from Taylor to test for gunshot residue. Taylor objected to Murtha's entire testimony on the ground of Neb. Evid. R. 403.
Murtha testified that gunshot residue leaves traces of three elements, lead, antimony, and barium; that all three elements together form gunshot residue; and that when a gun is fired, particles of any of the three elements may fuse together. Murtha stated that if analysis produces particles composed of only one or two of the three elements, she could not definitively conclude that they came from the discharge of a firearm.
The testing instrument utilized by Murtha did not yield particle results containing all three components comprised by gunshot residue. However, upon performing a manual examination of the particles, Murtha identified a particle which was composed of all three gunshot residue components. The particle was found on the back of Taylor's left hand. In Murtha's opinion, the presence of the particle indicated that Taylor either "discharged a firearm," "was in proximity when a firearm was discharged," or "came into contact with an area or an environment that contained gunshot residue." However, Murtha was unable to form a conclusive opinion as to whether Taylor fired a gun.
Prior to submitting the case to the jury, the court instructed the jury on the material elements of first degree murder and its lesser-included offenses of second degree murder and manslaughter in jury instruction No. 4. Taylor objected to the step instruction included in instruction No. 4 because it did not conform to NJI2d Crim. 3.1. Taylor argued that the instruction
Instruction No. 4 included three sections, each of which spelled out the material elements for the three grades of homicide. Each section of the instruction then stated that if the jury found the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the material elements set out in that section was true, the jury should find Taylor guilty of that crime. The first section went on to state: "If, on the other hand, you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the material elements in this section..., it is your duty to find [Taylor] not guilty of the crime of murder in the first degree." The second and third sections contained similar directives concerning second degree murder and manslaughter respectively, and the first two sections then directed the jury to "proceed to consider" the specified lesser-included offense in that event.
The court also instructed the jury on the definition of premeditation in jury instruction No. 8, which stated: "`Premeditated' is defined as forming the intent to act before acting. The time needed for premeditation may be so short as to be instantaneous provided that the intent to act is formed before the act and not simultaneously with the act." Taylor objected to jury instruction No. 8 on the ground that it did not conform to the statutory definition of premeditation under Neb. Rev.Stat. § 28-302 (Reissue 2008). The court overruled Taylor's objection on the ground that the instruction conformed to the Nebraska pattern jury instruction at NJI2d Crim. 4.0.
The district court also gave jury instruction No. 9 over Taylor's objection. That instruction provided:
The jury found Taylor guilty of murder in the first degree and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Taylor was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction and a consecutive term of 10 years' imprisonment on the weapon conviction. Taylor appeals.
Taylor assigns, renumbered and restated, that the district court erred in (1) giving jury instruction No. 9, regarding an inference of guilt; (2) giving jury instruction No. 4, a step instruction regarding the lesser-included offenses; (3) giving jury instruction No. 8, regarding the definition of premeditation; (4) receiving expert opinion testimony regarding the presence of gunshot residue on Taylor's hands, in violation of rule 403; and (5) admitting cellular telephone records purporting to prove contacts between Taylor and his codefendant Nolan, on the basis of insufficient foundation.
Whether jury instructions are correct is a question of law, which an appellate
In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only when the rules make such discretion a factor in determining admissibility.
The exercise of judicial discretion is implicit in the determinations of relevancy under rule 403, and a trial court's decisions regarding them will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
A court must determine whether there is sufficient foundation evidence for the admission of physical evidence on a case-by-case basis. Because authentication rulings are necessarily fact specific, a trial court has discretion to determine whether evidence has been properly authenticated. We review a trial court's ruling on authentication for abuse of discretion.
Taylor assigns as error the giving of jury instructions Nos. 4, 8, and 9. Whether jury instructions are correct is a question of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the lower court's decision.
The district court gave jury instruction No. 9 over Taylor's objection. The instruction provided:
Taylor argues that because the instruction did not explain to the jury that it had the option of not drawing the specified inference, it created an improper presumption of guilt.
The State argues that State v. Thorpe
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that jury instructions which create mandatory presumptions are improper, but that those which create merely permissive presumptions are allowed.
In Nebraska, instructions as to presumptions in criminal cases must also conform to the requirements of Neb. Evid. R. 303(3),
Here, the challenged instruction is based on a common-law inference rather than a presumption. However, we have previously determined that references to "presumptions" in rule 303 necessarily include "inferences" in criminal cases as well.
In State v. Parks,
In Parks, the jury might have interpreted the instruction as conclusive that the State had proved one element of the crime charged. But here in Taylor's case, in the context of the "conscious guilt" doctrine, the instruction allowed the jury to presume that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged. Here, the district court included the requirement that the inferred fact must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but the instruction failed to specify that the jury was not required to make the inference of guilt. Rule 303(3) is couched in mandatory terms. The instruction, as given in Taylor's case, failed to inform the jury that it was not required to draw the inference of guilt. This omission in the court's instruction No. 9 is fatal to the constitutional validity of that instruction.
Having found reversible error, we must determine whether the totality of the evidence admitted by the district court was sufficient to sustain Taylor's convictions. If it was not, then concepts of double jeopardy would not allow a remand for a new trial.
The court instructed the jury on the definition of premeditation in jury instruction No. 8, which stated: "`Premeditated' is defined as forming the intent to act before acting. The time needed for premeditation may be so short as to be instantaneous provided that the intent to act is formed before the act and not simultaneously with the act."
Taylor objected to jury instruction No. 8 on the ground that it did not conform to the statutory definition of premeditation under § 28-302. The court overruled Taylor's objection on the ground that the instruction conformed to the Nebraska pattern jury instruction at NJI2d Crim. 4.0.
The definition of "premeditation" in jury instruction No. 8 is nearly identical to the definition provided in NJI2d Crim. 4.0. However, § 28-302(3) provides: "Premeditation shall mean a design formed to do something before it is done." Thus, NJI2d Crim. 4.0 includes the statutory definition of premeditation contained in § 28-302(3), but adds the sentence "The time needed for premeditation may be so short as to be instantaneous provided that the intent to (act) is formed before the act and not
This court has consistently determined that no particular length of time for premeditation is required, provided that the intent to kill is formed before the act is committed and not simultaneously with the act that caused the death.
The court instructed the jury on the material elements of first degree murder and its lesser-included offenses of second degree murder and manslaughter in jury instruction No. 4. Taylor objected to the step instruction included in instruction No. 4 because it did not conform to NJI2d Crim. 3.1. Taylor argued that the instruction required the jury to "acquit first" when considering the sequential order of first degree murder and its lesser-included offenses. The court overruled Taylor's objection.
Taylor argues that the step instruction given erroneously required the jury to acquit Taylor of the greater charge and that this is not in conformity with our law because Nebraska is not an "acquit first" jurisdiction. Taylor also asserts that the instruction was given in error because it does not conform to the pattern instruction found at NJI2d Crim. 3.1.
Whenever an applicable instruction may be taken from the Nebraska Jury Instructions, that instruction is the one which should usually be given to the jury in a criminal case.
In State v. Goodwin,
Instruction No. 4 included three sections, each of which spelled out the material elements for one of the three grades of homicide. Each section of the instruction then stated that if the jury found the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the material elements set out in that section was true, the jury should find Taylor guilty of that crime. The first section went on to state: "If, on the other hand, you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the material elements in this section ..., it is your duty to find [Taylor] not guilty of the crime of murder in the first degree." The second and third sections contained similar directives concerning second degree murder and manslaughter respectively, and the first two sections then directed the jury to "proceed to consider" the specified lesser-included offense in that event. The State argues that instruction No. 4 conforms to our decisions in State v. Bormann
The step instruction given in this case did not prevent the jury from considering Taylor's theory of defense; nor was his counsel restricted from arguing that Taylor did not have the intent to kill and should therefore be found guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter. Further, Taylor fails to argue that he was prejudiced in any manner by the step instruction given. He instead rests his argument on the instruction's failure to conform to NJI2d Crim. 3.1. We determine that Taylor was not prejudiced by jury instruction No. 4. However, as we have previously noted, NJI2d Crim. 3.1 provides a clearer instruction, and we once again urge trial courts to use the pattern jury instruction in the future. And on remand, any step jury instruction given should conform to NJI2d Crim. 3.1.
Taylor argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present Murtha's testimony, over Taylor's rule 403 objection, that one particle of gunshot residue was found on a swab of Taylor's hands. Taylor argues that because jurors place elevated trustworthiness on expert testimony, the risk of unfair prejudice and jury confusion outweighed any probative value the evidence might
In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only when the rules make such discretion a factor in determining admissibility.
The exercise of judicial discretion is implicit in determinations of relevancy under rule 403, and a trial court's decisions regarding them will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Taylor's arguments on appeal largely focus on the weight that the gunshot residue evidence should be given. The weight and credibility of an expert's testimony are a question for the trier of fact.
Finally, Taylor argues that the cellular telephone records received by the district court were erroneously admitted, due to a lack of foundation. Taylor bases his foundational argument on the requirement of authentication provided by rule 901 of the Nebraska Evidence Rules. Because authentication rulings are necessarily fact specific, a trial court has discretion to determine whether evidence has been properly authenticated. We review a trial court's ruling on authentication for abuse of discretion.
Rule 901(1) states, "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Rule 901 does not impose a high hurdle for authentication or identification. A proponent of evidence is not required to conclusively prove the genuineness of the evidence or to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity.
Taylor is incorrect in suggesting that Landell lacked the knowledge required
Landell, a customer operations coordinator for a cellular telephone company, testified that his duties included keeping records for that company, including "caller-detail records." Landell testified that he was familiar with how the company, during the course of its business, created and kept records of cellular telephone calls. This process involved little more than the recording of information about a call on a hard drive of the company's computer servers. The telephone records made and saved included the number of the caller, the destination of the caller's number, where the call came from, and the time and length of the call. Landell further testified that the computer servers where the records are stored are serviced and tested by the company on a regular basis to make sure they are accurate. We determine that Landell's testimony provided sufficient authentication to support the admission of the cellular telephone records. Taylor's arguments to the contrary are without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court committed reversible error in giving jury instruction No. 9. Accordingly, we reverse, and remand the cause for a new trial. On remand, any step jury instruction given should conform to NJI2d Crim. 3.1, as discussed above.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.