JOSEPH F. BATAILLON, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on Lucky Iromuanya's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The parties do not dispute the trial court's factual findings. Facts relevant to Iromuanya's claims, as recounted in Iromuanya I & Iromuanya II
In the early morning hours of April 25, 2004, Lucky Iromuanya and a friend, Aroun Phaisan, attended a party at the shared residence of Jenna Cooper and Lindsey Ingram in Lincoln, Nebraska. Iromuanya I, 719 N.W.2d at 273. At some point after Iromuanya and Phaisan's arrival, a dispute arose over a missing collection of shot glasses that belonged to Cooper or Ingram. Id. at 274. After Cooper became aware of the missing shot glasses, she followed an unidentified individual outside and said she wanted the shot glasses returned. Id. Iromuanya and Phaisan were standing near the shot glass collection before it went missing. Id. Apparently Iromuanya and Phaisan were concerned they would be accused of the theft, so they left the residence. Id. Outside, Ingram observed Iromuanya and Phaisan leaving the house "very quickly" and she told the two men no one could leave until the items were returned. Id. Shortly thereafter, Nolan Jenkins exited the residence. Id. Jenkins grabbed and pushed Iromuanya, and inquired whether Iromuanya was responsible for the missing glasses. Id. After a brief scuffle between Jenkins and Iromuanya, several bystanders intervened and separated the two men. Id. During this intervention, Iromuanya punched Jenkins in the back of the head. Id.
After the physical altercation, Iromuanya became visibly agitated. Iromuanya I, 719 N.W.2d at 275. Several individuals, including Cooper, approached Iromuanya in an effort to calm him down, but their attempts were unsuccessful. Id. Iromuanya remained agitated and fixated on Jenkins. Id. Iromuanya eventually calmed down, but only briefly; after Cooper asked Iromuanya about the shot glasses, Iromuanya became upset again and denied taking them. Id. Approximately five minutes after the initial altercation, Jenkins walked back across the yard toward Iromuanya. Iromuanya I, 719 N.W.2d at 275. Jenkins walked at a normal pace and "some witnesses testified that [Jenkins'] hand was outstretched, as if he intended to shake hands with Iromuanya. Jenkins testified that [that] was his intent." Id. One witness "observed that Iromuanya appeared to become more upset as Jenkins approached. . . ." Id. Once Jenkins came within one step of Iromuanya, Iromuanya shoved Jenkins in the chest with both hands, knocking Jenkins backward. Id. Several individuals stepped-in between Jenkins and Iromuanya. Id. At that point, Iromuanya removed a handgun from his pants pocket, pointed the weapon at Jenkins, who was approximately five feet away, and fired one round. Iromuanya I, 719 N.W.2d at 276. "It was later determined that a single bullet entered Jenkins' left temple and exited above his left ear. The bullet then pierced Cooper's neck, causing her death." Id.
In 2004, a jury convicted Iromuanya in the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska, of Count I, attempted murder in the second degree, Count III, murder in the second degree, and Counts II and IV, using a weapon to commit a felony. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-201, -304, and -1205.
The same counsel represented Iromuanya at trial and on direct appeal. Iromuanya II, 806 N.W.2d at 418. On direct appeal, Iromuanya made no claims regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and he made only one assignment of error regarding jury instructions. Iromuanya I, 719 N.W.2d at 277. Iromuanya claimed the trial court erred in giving jury instruction No. 8, which pertained to the element of intent.
After the conclusion of Iromuanya's direct appeal, he filed a petition for postconviction relief. New counsel represented Iromuanya during his postconviction proceedings.
On appeal, Iromuanya argued that the district court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on all his claims pertaining to ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel.
Additionally, Iromuanya argued "the [district] court erred in failing to find that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) properly challenge jury instructions and (2) object to the court's response to the jurors' question during deliberations."
Iromuanya II, 806 N.W.2d at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted). Iromuanya claimed "[t]he critical factual question to be decided [was] whether [he] acted intentionally but by the provocation of a sudden quarrel."
Iromuanya further alleged the instructions relieved the State of its burden to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death or the attempt to cause the death was not committed by provocation during the course of a sudden quarrel."
The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected all of Iromuanya's arguments. First, the Court addressed Iromuanya's argument that counsel failed to challenge the trial court's response to the jurors' inquiry. The Court noted that the trial court "instructed the jurors that they could not consider a sudden quarrel provocation in deciding Iromuanya's intent for attempted second degree murder. . . ." Iromuanya II, 806 N.W.2d at 434. The Court determined the "response was correct under the governing law at the time of Iromuanya's trial." Id. The Court explained that sudden quarrel provocation was derived from Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-305(1) (Reissue 2008), which "provides that `[a] person commits manslaughter if he kills another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or causes the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act.'" The Court explained the law governing at the time of Iromuanya's trial:
Iromuanya II, 806 N.W.2d at 434-35. Thus, the Court reasoned, "Iromuanya's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the court's response to the jury." Id. at 435.
Next, the Court addressed Iromuanya's argument that counsel failed to challenge various jury instructions. The Court observed, "Instruction No. 10 informed jurors that they should consider whether the conflict between Iromuanya and Jenkins was a sufficient provocation for the charge of manslaughter." Iromuanya II, 806 N.W.2d at 435. The Court noted, however, that sudden quarrel provocation was relevant only to the charge of manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to the charge of second-degree murder of Cooper. Id. The Court concluded that, "[i]f the jurors had believed that Iromuanya did not intend to kill Jenkins, the instructions required them to find him not guilty of attempted second degree murder."
Iromuanya timely filed his petition in this action pro se in 2012.
The court addresses Iromuanya's claims below.
When a state court has adjudicated a habeas petitioner's claim on the merits, there is a very limited and extremely deferential standard of review both as to the law and the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) states that a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), a state court acts contrary to clearly established federal law if it applies a legal rule that contradicts the Supreme Court's prior holdings or if it reaches a different result from one of that Court's cases despite confronting indistinguishable facts. 529 U.S. at 405-06. A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" when it identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407. "A state court's application of clearly established federal law must be objectively unreasonable, not merely incorrect, to warrant the granting of a writ of habeas corpus." Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
With regard to the deference owed to factual findings of a state court's decision, Section 2254(d)(2) states that a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if a state court proceeding "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Additionally, a federal court must presume that a factual determination made by the state court is correct, unless the petitioner "rebut[s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
As the Supreme Court noted, "[i]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). The deference due state court decisions "preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents." Id. In short, "[i]t bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. However, this high degree of deference only applies where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court. See Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[A]s the language of the statute makes clear, there is a condition precedent that must be satisfied before we can apply the deferential AEDPA standard to [the petitioner's] claim. The claim must have been `adjudicated on the merits' in state court.'").
The Eighth Circuit clarified what it means for a claim to be adjudicated on the merits, finding that:
Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 496-97 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Eighth Circuit also determined that a federal court reviewing a habeas claim under AEDPA must "look through" the state court opinions and "apply AEDPA review to the `last reasoned decision' of the state courts." Id. at 497 (internal citation omitted). A district court should do "so regardless of whether the affirmance was reasoned as to some issues or was a summary denial of all claims." Id. The Supreme Court agrees, stating:
Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784.
Condensed and summarized for clarity, Iromuanya's claims are as follows:
Iromuanya's first claim alleges he was denied due process of law and the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because his trial counsel: (1) rejected a plea agreement without first informing Petitioner of the plea offer; and (2) failed to recognize that the prosecutor had a duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt "the absence of a sudden quarrel provocation" regarding the second degree murder charge and therefore failed to object on that basis.
Respondent concedes that Iromuanya's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "does not appear to have been procedurally defaulted."
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the two-pronged standard outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires that the petitioner demonstrate both that his counsel's performance was deficient, and that such deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687; see also Bryson v. United States, 268 F.3d 560, 561 (8th Cir. 2001); Williamson v. Jones, 936 F.2d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 1991).
The first prong of the Strickland test requires the petitioner to demonstrate that his or her attorney failed to provide reasonably effective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In conducting such a review, the courts "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]" Id. at 689. When addressing a claim of ineffectiveness, a court must assess the "reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. at 691.
The second prong requires the petitioner to demonstrate "a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694; see also Hubbeling v. United States, 288 F.3d 363, 365 (8th Cir. 2002). "When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Id. at 695. A court need not address the reasonableness of the attorney's skills and diligence if the movant cannot prove prejudice under the second prong of this test. See United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).
In the context of section 2254 habeas corpus petitions, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are afforded "a substantially higher threshold" of deference that does not focus on "whether a federal court believes the state court's determination [under Strickland] was incorrect" but whether the "determination was unreasonable[.]" Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). Additionally, "because the Strickland standard is a general standard[,]" state court decisions are given "doubly deferential judicial review[.]" Id.
In order for this court to grant Iromuanya's petition, it must find that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decisions (1) were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (1996).
Since Iromuanya argues the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision regarding counsel's assistance in plea negotiations resulted from an unreasonable factual determination, See
First, Iromuanya challenges the Nebraska Supreme Court's factual determination that he did not allege in his postconviction brief that the prosecutor offered a plea agreement.
Next, Iromuanya argues that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision—that defense counsel was not deficient during plea negotiations—was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
The court also denies Iromuanya's request for an evidentiary hearing. Iromuanya alleges in his petition that, subsequent to his trial and conviction, defense counsel informed his mother of a prosecution offer.
Given the foregoing, Iromuanya has failed to rebut the Nebraska Supreme Court's factual determination and establish that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision was based on a unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence adduced during the state court proceedings.
Iromuanya's second ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerns 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Iromuanya argues that defense counsel was ineffective because counsel "failed to recognize that the prosecutor had a duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of a sudden quarrel provocation regarding the second degree murder charge and therefore failed to object on that basis." See
Iromuanya's focuses his argument primarily on the "wildly fluctuating" changes to Nebraska's second-degree murder and manslaughter laws.
On postconviction review, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that defense counsel's performance was not deficient. See Iromuanya II, 806 N.W.2d at 434-35. The Nebraska Supreme Court observed that "[t]he absence of a provocation [was] not an element of second degree murder [at the time of the trial], and no element of the charge [was] presumed." Id. at 435. Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded, defense counsel's "failure to anticipate a change in existing law d[id] not constitute deficient performance." Id. at 435. This court agrees with the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision, and thus concludes it was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court stated, "[i]in any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." 466 U.S. at 688. Under Nebraska law, "absence of a provocation is not an element of second degree murder[.]" Iromuanya II, 806 N.W.2d at 435. Thus, it would have been erroneous, as a matter of Nebraska law, to include Iromuanya's requested negative element to the instruction for second-degree murder.
Given the foregoing, Iromuanya has failed to establish that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Iromuanya's second claim is that he was denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the trial court: (1) omitted a "lesser included offense instruction for attempted manslaughter"; (2) failed to instruct the jury that the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "the absence of a sudden quarrel provocation" regarding the charges of attempted second degree murder and second degree murder; and (3) did not properly instruct the jury on the distinction between "intent to kill" and "intent to kill resulting from a sudden quarrel." Iromuanya's third claim alleges that he was denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the trial court's errors, as set forth directly above in Claim two, parts two and three. Based on these alleged errors, Iromuanya seeks habeas relief.
The State argues that Claims two and three both have been procedurally defaulted.
"Ordinarily, a federal court reviewing a state conviction in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding may consider only those claims which the petitioner has presented to the state court in accordance with state procedural rules." Arnold v. Dormire, 675 F.3d 1082, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). "In order to fairly present a federal claim to the state courts, the petitioner must have referred to `a specific federal constitutional right, a particular constitutional provision, a federal constitutional case, or a state case raising a pertinent federal constitutional issue in a claim before the state courts.'" McCall v. Benson, 114 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Myre v. State of Iowa, 53 F.3d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1995)). "If a petitioner has not presented his habeas corpus claim to the state court, the claim is generally defaulted." Carney v. Fabian, 487 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1161 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). "Resolving whether a petitioner has fairly presented his claim to the state courts, thus permitting federal review of the matter, is an intrinsically federal issue that must be determined by the federal courts." Wyldes v. Hundley, 69 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1995). "Because exhaustion functions as a federal court gatekeeper, the federal, not the state, courts decide when the state process has been exhausted or should be deemed ineffective because of delay." Id. (internal citation and quotations marks omitted).
The United States Supreme Court "ha[s] stated many times that `federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'" Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)). "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. . . . [A] federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; see Arnold, 675 F.3d at 1086 ("We do not second-guess the decision of a Missouri state court on Missouri law.").
As noted above, the court finds that Iromuanya's Claims two and three are either procedurally defaulted or not proper for this court's review. Furthermore, the court finds that even if the claims had been properly raised and addressed, they are nevertheless without merit. As such, the court also will address the claims on the merits.
Claim two, part one, concerns the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted manslaughter. However, Iromuanya did not raise this claim either in his direct appeal brief or in his motion for postconviction relief. In fact, in his direct appeal brief, Iromuanya conceded "[a]ttempted manslaughter does not currently exist in Nebraska."
Claim two, parts two and three, and Claim three, entirely, concern the trial court's failure to instruct the jury and the Nebraska Supreme Court's subsequent affirmance. Iromuanya argues the trial court failed to instruct the jury (1) about the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of sudden quarrel provocation and (2) about the distinction between "intent to kill" and "intent to kill resulting from a sudden quarrel provocation." Iromuanya raised neither claim in his brief on direct appeal. The court finds that Claim two, part three, and Claim three, part two, were neither presented to, nor addressed by, the Nebraska Supreme Court. Accordingly, those claims are procedurally defaulted. Iromuanya argues the remaining claims— Claim two, part two, and Claim three, part one—were fairly presented to, and addressed by, the Nebraska Supreme Court on postconviction review.
Iromuanya argues the due process claim was fairly presented to the Nebraska Supreme Court by his referencing a denial of due process within the broader context of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
It is true the Nebraska Supreme Court mentions due process in its Iromuanya II opinion; however, the Nebraska Supreme Court addresses due process only as it relates to Iromuanya's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. It is clear, from both Iromuanya's postconviction brief and the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion in Iromuanya II, that all claims funneled through a Sixth Amendment filter. Iromuanya argued the absence of a sudden quarrel provocation ought to have been included in the instructions as a negative element of the second-degree murder charges. The gravamen of his argument, however, was not that the trial court erred by refusing its inclusion, which was correct under Nebraska law, but rather that defense counsel erred by not recognizing the supposed necessity of its inclusion and thus failed to object on those grounds. Even assuming Iromuanya had claimed trial court error, the error would be one of state law and not a violation of the federal Constitution. Had his conviction or direct appeal occurred after the decisions in State v. Smith, 282 Neb. 720, 806 N.W.2d 383 (2011) or State v. [William] Smith, 284 Neb.636, 822 N.W.2d 401(2012) the trial court's jury instructions would have required the procedure he asserts herein. Manslaughter on a sudden quarrel is not a lesser included of second degree murder and does not require a sequential decision. The Nebraska Supreme Court did not hold this change in the law either constitutional or retroactive. See [William] Smith supra. Unfortunately for Mr. Iromuanya, the inclusion of elements to a second-degree murder instruction is an issue of state, not federal, law. Accordingly, "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (1991); see Arnold, 675 F.3d at 1086 ("We do not second-guess the decision of a Missouri state court on Missouri law.").The Writ of Habeas Corpus was designed to liberate the unlawfully imprisoned. The court finds no such unlawful imprisonment in Iromuanya's case.
IT IS ORDERED that Iromuanya's petition for writ of habeas corpus and request for an evidentiary hearing are denied. A judgment in conformity with this Memorandum and Order will issue this date.
Intent is an element of the crimes charged against the defendant. In deciding whether the defendant acted with intent, you should consider his words and acts and all of the surrounding circumstances.
You may infer, but are not required to infer, that a person intended a reasonably probable result of his or her act.
"Sudden quarrel" is a legally recognized and sufficient provocation which causes a reasonable person to lose normal self control. The phrase "sudden quarrel" does not necessarily mean an exchange of angry words or an altercation contemporaneous with an unlawful killing and does not require a physical struggle or other combative corporal contact between the defendant and Nolan Jenkins. In considering the offense of manslaughter, you should determine whether the defendant acted under the impulse of sudden passion suddenly aroused which clouded reason and prevented rational action, whether there existed reasonable and adequate provocation to excite the passion of the defendant and obscure and disturb his power of reasoning to the extent that he acted rashly and from passion, without due deliberation and reflection, rather than from judgment, and whether, under all the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the evidence, a reasonable time had elapsed from the time of provocation to the instant of the killing for the passion to subside and reason resume control of the mind. You should determine whether the suspension of reason, if shown to exist, arising from sudden passion, continued from the time of provocation until the very instant of the act producing death took place.
