MICHAEL A. SHIPP, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Priscilla Smith ("Plaintiff") (ECF No. 22) and a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Clinton Police Department ("Clinton PD"). Police Officer Joseph Sangiovanni ("Officer Sangiovanni"), and the Township of Clinton ("Township") (collectively "Defendants") (ECF No. 23). Both Plaintiff and Defendants filed opposition to their adversaries' motion (ECF Nos. 26, 27) and replied (ECF Nos. 29. 30). The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs motion is DENIED, and Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
This case arises out of a traffic stop in Clinton, New Jersey that resulted in the arrests of Plaintiff and three other individuals: Leslie Fox ("Fox"), Gregory Carmichael ("Carmichael"), and Bianca Mitchell ("Mitchell"). (Pl.'s SUMF ¶ 16.) On December 4, 2015, Officer Sangiovanni was on duty in a marked police car driving on Route 78 at about 2:52 p.m. (Defs.' SUMF ¶ 2.) He saw a van with Pennsylvania license plates traveling in the left lane and conducted a random computer inquiry on the registration, which revealed that the van had been entered into the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") electronic database as stolen. (Id. ¶ 3; Pl.'s SUMF ¶ 10.)
The stop lasted about twenty-five minutes, during which Plaintiff was detained and not free to leave. (Id. ¶ 13.) The occupants were ordered to exit the vehicle with their hands above their heads, then each was forcefully apprehended and placed in handcuffs.
On February 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants bringing five counts: (I) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (II) violation of the New Jersey State Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA") and the New Jersey Constitution; (III) false arrest and illegal imprisonment against Officer Sangiovanni; (IV) a Manell claim against the Township and the Clinton PD; and (V) malicious prosecution against all Defendants. (See generally Compl.; Defs.' SUMF ¶ 57)
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment seeking: (i) a declaratory judgment and partial summary judgment on her claims against Officer Sangiovanni for unlawful arrest and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment and NJCRA; (ii) a declaratory judgment and partial summary judgment that Officer Sangiovanni is not entitled to qualified immunity; and (iii) a declaratory judgment and partial summary judgment against the Township on her Monell claim. (Pl.'s Moving Br. 20, ECF No. 22.) Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. (See generally Defs.' Moving Br., ECF No. 23-6.)
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A material fact—a fact "that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248—raises a "genuine" dispute if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 459 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must consider all facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-movant. Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court will not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" but will determine whether a genuine dispute necessitates a trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of proving an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catreft, 477 U.S. 317. 330 (1986). Thereafter, the nonmoving party creates a "genuine [dispute] of material fact if sufficient evidence is provided to allow a jury to find for him at trial." Gleason v. Nonvest Mori., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on three grounds. First, she argues that her arrest by Officer Sangiovanni was without probable cause and objectively unreasonable, based on "imaginative hunches" and "empty speculation." (Pl.'s Moving Br. at 6-7.) According to Plaintiff, the unlawful arrest occurred when the police stopped the van and detained Plaintiff, which constituted an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the New Jersey State Civil Rights Act. (Id. at 7. 20.) Second, Plaintiff claims that Officer Sangiovanni is not entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged Fourth Amendment violation. (Id. at 20.) Finally, she contends that the Township, through certain customs and policies, created the constitutional violation at the center of the action. (Id. at 18.) Specifically, according to Plaintiff, the Township "failed to train its officers relating to the legalities of arrest of a passenger in a stolen vehicle." (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff asserts that such training is constitutionally mandated, and a failure to train police officers properly subjects the Township to liability. (Id.)
Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Officer Sangiovanni's actions do not rise to a constitutional violation. (Defs.' Opp'n Br. 4, ECF No. 27-1.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff's presence in a stolen car and Officer Sangiovanni's supervisor's call to the Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office, were enough to establish probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and her fellow occupants. (Id. at 18-20.) Defendants also state that "Plaintiff supplies no opinion from a police practices expert to opine, let alone suggest, that no reasonable officer in [Officer] Sangiovanni's position would have concluded there was no probable cause for the arrests." (Id. at 22.) Defendants argue that they are, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity and cannot be subjected to suit in the present action. (Id.) Finally, Defendants state that Plaintiff has no basis to assert that Township unconstitutional customs and policies violated Plaintiff's rights. (Id. at 25)
Defendants move for summary judgment and raise arguments similar to those included in their opposition to Plaintiff's motion. First, Defendants argue that because there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. (Defs.' Moving Br. 4-15.) Second, Defendants assert that the Clinton PD is not a proper defendant because it is a department of a municipality and not a separate legal entity. (Id. 16.) Third, Defendants contend that because Plaintiff has not demonstrated an unconstitutional act, she cannot as a matter of law prevail on her Monell claim. (Id. at 16-19.) Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment on the New Jersey Constitution and NJCRA claims because the Court's analysis of those claims is analogous to its analysis of the federal claims that must be dismissed. (Id. at 20.)
Plaintiff, in opposition, incorporates the arguments made in her summary judgment moving brief and asserts that Officer Sangiovanni had no probable cause to arrest her and Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. (Pl.'s Opp'n Br. 1-4, ECF No. 26.) She asserts that absence of a court ruling on an issue does not indicate that a right was not clearly established. (Id. at 3-4.) All that is required to defeat a qualified immunity defense, according to Plaintiff, was that a defendant had "fair warning" his conduct was unconstitutional. (Id. at 3.) As to the Monell claim, Plaintiff asserts that she has evidence of two policies or customs, and cites to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts to support her claim: (i) "per police practice for a reported stolen vehicle, Officer Sangiovanni had all occupants exit the stolen van one at a time having had the operator turn the engine off and drop the keys on the ground outside the driver's door"; and (ii) "[Assistant Prosecutor] Sweeney believed there was a well-grounded suspicion to conclude that the occupants were in direct or constructive possession of a confirmed stolen vehicle . . . ." (Id. at 13-14 (quoting Defs.' SUMF ¶¶ 8, 29).) As to the first alleged policy, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have a policy to remove and arrest occupants from a stolen car without probable cause, and the policy promulgates the execution of false arrest. (Id. at 15.) As to the second alleged policy, Plaintiff asserts that by Assistant Prosecutor Sweeney approving the arrest, the policy provides for an "automatic arrest and automatic finding of probable cause where none may exist." (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants' arguments regarding her claims under state law.
To prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove: (i) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and (ii) that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). "The New Jersey Civil Rights Act creates a private cause of action for violations of civil rights secured under the New Jersey Constitution." Payano v. City of Camden, No. 13-2528, 2016 WL 386040, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2016) (citing Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F.Supp.2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. 2011)). The District of New Jersey interprets the NJCRA in the same manner as § 1983. Hottenstein v. City of Sea Isle City, 977 F.Supp.2d 353. 365 (D.N.J. 2013); see also Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J.Super. 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). The Court, therefore, combines its analyses of Plaintiff's claims under the New Jersey and United States Constitutions.
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures prevents police officers from arresting individuals without probable cause. Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972)); see also Rodriguez v. City of Passaic, 730 F.Supp. 1314, 1319-23 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd. 914 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Art. 1, ¶ 7 of the New Jersey Constitution virtually replicates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and decision under the latter will be dispositive of the former."). Further, the Third Circuit has stated that:
Id. at 482-83 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The existence of probable cause at the time of arrest is typically a question for the jury; however, absent a dispute of material fact, the Court may resolve the issue as a matter of law. Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788-89 (3d Cir. 2000). "Courts must instead objectively assess whether, at the time of the arrest and based upon the facts known to the officer, probable case existed `as to any offense that could be charged under the circumstances.'" Rankines v. Meyrick, No. 14-1842, 2016 WL 545134, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2016) (citing Wright v. Philadelphia. 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005)); Barna v. Perth Amboy. 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The central issue, therefore, is whether or not the undisputed facts of the case warrant a reasonable person in Officer Sangiovanni's situation to believe that Plaintiff had committed or was committing a criminal offense. Here, the Court finds that they do. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled on a case substantially similar to the present action. The district court, in finding probable cause for the arrest of a passenger in a stolen vehicle, stated:
Sanders v. Philadelphia, 209 F.Supp.2d 439, 442 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
The Court notes that both parties discuss the facts and information that law enforcement learned after the arrest; however, post hoc justifications for probable cause are not relevant, as the Court must make its assessment "based upon the facts known to the officer" and at the time of the arrest." See Wright, 409 F.3d at 602. Officer Sangiovanni encountered a vehicle on a highway in New Jersey, registered in Pennsylvania, reported as stolen in New York. and occupied by four individuals with New York identification. "While it is true [P]laintiff was not operating the automobile, a prudent person is perfectly justified in believing that a passenger is somehow involved in the theft whether it be as an accomplice, conspirator or primary suspect." Sanders, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 442. Plaintiffs apparent voluntary presence[, therefore,] in a stolen automobile gives sufficient probable cause to warrant arrest and further investigation by the police." Id.; see also Apostol v. City of New York, No. 11-3851, 2014 WL 1271201, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014) ("[D]efendants had probable cause to arrest [the passenger in this] car. It is undisputed that, after observing the illegally parked vehicle, defendants searched for the car's plates in the [New York State Police Information Network ("NYSPIN")] database, which indicated that the car's license plates were stolen. NYSPIN provides reasonably trustworthy information, and therefore, the officers reasonably believed that plaintiff's were sitting in a stolen vehicle.").
Plaintiff argues that, essentially, police were "in a position to discover" that the circumstances of the stolen car report were unusual because Hayes, the vehicles' owner, is a Philadelphia resident that reported his car stolen in New York. (Pl.'s Reply Br. 2. ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff asserts that a "clear-thinking law enforcement group" would have, based on the facts, made a series of "reasonable inferences" that: (1) Hayes knew where his vehicle was located because he called the New York City authorities; (2) Hayes knew with whom the vehicle was located, again, because he reported the vehicle stolen to New York City authorities; (3) Hayes knew why his vehicle was in New York. i.e., he initially allowed his van to be used by someone he knew resided there; and (4) the police and Hayes were aware or should have been aware that the owner's previous authorization "should have struck the opposite chord of an actual car theft." (Id. at 2-3.) The Court finds that this attenuated argument lacks merit.
In connection with the false arrest analysis, Plaintiff also appears to argue that Officer Sangiovanni violated her constitutional rights by ordering her to exit the vehicle at the traffic stop. (See Pl.'s Moving Br. 13.) The Court disagrees. "Once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped, an officer may ask the driver to step out of the vehicle." United States v. Richardson, 504 F. App'x 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1997)). "An officer may also order `passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the [traffic] stop.'" Id. (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997)). Here, the NCIC database listed the van Plaintiff was riding in as stolen, and the Court finds that Officer Sangiovanni had probable cause to stop the vehicle. Ordering Plaintiff to exit the car, therefore, did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. To the extent that Plaintiff raises this argument, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on this ground is denied.
Plaintiff's briefing relies heavily on an opinion from a case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Brennan v. Springfield Township, that has since been withdrawn from publication and vacated. Brennan v. Springfield Twp., No. 97-5217, 1998 WL 381707 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 1998), vacated and withdrawn from publication. Plaintiff asserts on reply that there is no indication that the opinion was overturned or reversed by an appellate court or by the Brennan court itself. (Pl.'s Reply Br. 7.) The Court, however, reviewed the Third Circuit's docket in the appellate matter, docket number 98-1696. and on February 25, 1999, the court granted the parties' joint motion for a partial remand to the district court for an entry of an order vacating the opinion, order, and judgment. On March 9, 1999, the district court ordered that its opinion be vacated and withdrawn from publication. (E.D. Pa. Docket No. 97-5271, ECF No. 52.) The Court, therefore, affords no weight to the Brennan decision. Plaintiff further relies on a case from the Ninth Circuit, Rohde v. City of Roseburg, 137 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1998); however, no court in the Third Circuit has adopted its reasoning, and the Court declines to do so here. Plaintiff also cites a Ninth Circuit case on reply to argue that the stop was actually an arrest, Green v. City and County of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2014). This case, however, does not change the outcome here. Plaintiff has not carried her burden to demonstrate that she is entitled to summary judgment, and accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on her false arrest claim is, therefore, denied. Because the Court finds probable cause to arrest, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs false arrest claim is granted.
"`The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)) (citation omitted). Courts conduct a two-step test to determine the applicability of qualified immunity:
Id. at 250 (citation omitted). "`Where a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant's conduct violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional right.'" Trafion, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 432 (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997)). "Only if the plaintiff carries this initial burden must the defendant then demonstrate that no genuine [dispute] of material fact remains as to the `objective reasonableness' of the defendant's belief in the lawfulness of his actions." Id. at 432. A court may address the prongs in the order it sees fit, based on the facts of the case. Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated "a violation of a constitutional right." Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on this ground is, therefore, denied and Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to qualified immunity is granted.
"Under § 1983, a municipality may be held liable when it causes a constitutional violation through the implementation of a policy, custom, or practice." Wolf v. Escala, No. 14-5985, 2015 WL 2403106, at *17 (D.N.J. May 20, 2015) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). "A municipality[, therefore,] cannot be held liable on a Monell claim absent an underlying constitutional violation." Johnson v. Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343, 354 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Grazier ex rel. White v. Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2003)). Because the Court finds that no constitutional violation took place, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied on this ground, and Defendants' motion is granted.
"To survive summary judgment for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment, a plaintiff is required to show that the underlying arrest was not supported by probable cause." Boyd v. City of Jersey City, No. 15-0026. 2018 WL 2958468, at *4 (D.N.J. June 13, 2018) (citing Anderson v. Perez, 677 F. App'x 49, 51-52 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming grant of summary judgment after finding that plaintiff's "claims that require an absence of probable cause—false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment—fail"); Lawson v. City of Coatesville, 42 F.Supp.3d 664. 673 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (stating that the "threshold question" for plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest, unlawful search, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution is whether there was probable cause to arrest him)); Wilcioner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 389 (N.J. 2000) ("Because probable cause is an absolute defense to Plaintiff's false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims, and his Section 1983 claims, the central issue in this appeal is whether there was probable cause, or, alternatively, whether it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that probable cause existed at the time of plaintiff's arrest."). Flaying found that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff, the malicious prosecution and false imprisonment claims under state and federal law fail, and summary judgment is granted to Defendants on the remainder of the claims.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied and Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.
