NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, District Judge.

Before this Court is: (1) a Motion by S.S., on behalf of N.S. ("Plaintiff") for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 113) and (2) a Motion by Brick Township School District ("Brick" or the "District") and Susan Russell, Individually and as Director of Special Services ("Defendant Russell") (collectively "Defendants") for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 114). Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 118) and Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 117). Having reviewed the submissions filed in connection with the motions and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause shown, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

S.S. is the parent of N.S., who is currently 21 years old and has been diagnosed with autism. (ECF No. 44 ¶ 6.)1 N.S. was enrolled at Brick Township Memorial High School ("BTMHS") for ninth grade, in the 2012-2013 academic year, and then at Brick Township High School ("BTHS") for tenth grade, in the 2013-2014 academic year. (ECF No. 44 ¶ 17.) Prior to high school, N.S. was enrolled in an LLD-M (Learning Language Disability-Mild) program at Veterans Memorial Middle School ("VMMS") in Brick. (Id.)

On May 31, 2012, the middle school child study team at VMMS completed an IEP of N.S. (the "May 2012 IEP") in which it was recommended that N.S. continue in the selfcontained LLD-M class. (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. B.) The May 2012 IEP recommended speech therapy three times per week, occupational therapy three times per week, and supplemental instruction for three hours per week. (Id.) Furthermore, the May 2012 IEP scheduled a meeting to be held sixty days after N.S. started the program. (Id.) On November 12, 2012, S.S. was sent a "Request for Parental Participation in a Meeting," requesting participation in the sixty-day follow-up meeting, planned for November 30, 2012. (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. C.)

Plaintiff claims that, on October 9, 2012, S.S. received a "revised IEP" (the "October 2012 IEP") which again confirmed N.S.'s placement in the LLD-M class. (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 5.) Plaintiff contends the October 2012 IEP "superseded the May 2012 IEP and the October 2012 IEP was to be implemented for the 2012-13 school year." (Id.) Plaintiff further notes Defendants do not discuss the October 2012 IEP, and that it was not considered by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") in the Due Process Hearing. (July 29, 2014 ALJ Decision (ECF No. 113-4).) The October 2012 IEP is identical to the May 2012 IEP. (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. B; ECF No. 101, Exs. 2 & 3.)2

On November 30, 2012, N.S.'s sixty-day review was held, which was attended by S.S. and several individuals from BTMHS, including social workers and teachers. (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. C; November 2012 IEP (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. D).) S.S. testified that she did not know that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss modifications to N.S.'s IEP. (ECF No. 113, Ex. C, 29:4-12; 155:21-156:8.) S.S. left the sixty-day review "abruptly" before it concluded. (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 12; ECF No. 114-1 ¶ 12.) At the conclusion of the sixty-day review, Brick drafted an IEP dated November 30, 2012 (the "November 2012 IEP") with an implementation start date of December 1, 2012. (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. D.) Pursuant to the November 2012 IEP, N.S. remained in the LLD-M class with the same teacher. (ECF No. 113, Ex. A at 41.) The November 2012 IEP was generated despite the lack of a written notification specifying that the sixty-day review was an "IEP meeting." (Id.) Furthermore, there was no sign-in sheet at the sixty-day meeting and S.S. did not receive a copy of the amended IEP with a notice of a right to object within fifteen days, as required by law. (Id.)

The November 2012 IEP stated, in pertinent part:

(ECF No. 114-4, Ex. D.)

The November 2012 IEP differed slightly from the May 2012 IEP. The November 2012 IEP "added program goals but did not actually change N.S.'s individual goals and objectives, though the wording was different." (Id.) Additionally, the November 2012 IEP had slightly different academic goals than the May 2012 IEP, especially with respect to content. (ECF No. 144-4, Exs. B & D.) For instance, the May 2012 IEP had the following goals, among others, for N.S. in ninth grade science class:

(ECF No. 114-4, Ex. B at 118.)

Meanwhile, the November 2012 IEP had differing objectives from the May 2012 IEP, listing, inter alia, N.S.'s science goals for the 2012-2013 school year as follows:

(ECF No. 114-4, Ex. D at 149-50.)

The November 2012 IEP, like the May 2012 IEP, provided N.S. with the same special education services for the several subjects. (ECF No. 114-4, Exs. B & D.)

On April 25, 2013, Crystal Badders ("Badders"), a social worker at BTMHS and N.S.'s case worker at BTMHS, sent an email to Marjorie Eckhoff indicating that "per the directive given by Donna Stump [("Stump")], Director of Social Services, supplemental instruction in the district will be terminated as of Tuesday April 30, 2013." (ECF No. 113, Ex. D.) Plaintiff contends this decision conflicted with the May 2012 IEP and the November 2012 IEP, both of which call for supplemental instruction for N.S. (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 28.)

Plaintiff argues that, "[i]n lieu of giving N.S. failing grades for the 2012-2013 school year, N.S.'s teachers drafted narratives instead." (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 30.) Plaintiff notes these narratives "were not considered by ALJ Bingham during the Due Process hearing." (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 31.) For example, Courtney Arre, one of N.S.'s special education teachers, provided the following statement in lieu of a letter grade:

(ECF No. 101, Ex. 8).

Similarly, Nicole Pannucci ("Pannucci"), a Brick special education teacher who taught N.S. in the LLD program, provided the following narrative in lieu of a letter grade:

(ECF No. 101, Ex. 8.)

Despite the explanations of unsatisfactory work provided by N.S.'s instructors, S.S. eventually received a transcript indicating passing marks for N.S. in the 2012-2013 school year. (ECF No. 113, Ex. A at 42.)

On May 28, 2013, Brick held an IEP meeting to discuss N.S.'s program and placement for the 2013-2014 school year. (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. E.) This meeting was mandated by the November 2012 IEP. (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. D.) On May 14, 2013, S.S. sent an email to Badders and Stump indicating that she was unable to attend an IEP meeting on May 28, 2013 and that she preferred not to have Defendant Andrew Morgan ("Defendant Morgan") present at the meeting. (ECF No. 113, Ex. F at 1.) S.S. claims she "did not want to meet with [Defendant] Morgan without her husband present because of all the threats he had made and his abuse of her," but provides no evidence of such threats nor any evidence that she informed Brick of such. (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 40.) On May 17, 2013, Badders replied to S.S.'s email confirming that the May 2013 IEP meeting would be held on May 28, 2013, stating, "Since the original meeting date of Thursday 5/30/13 at 12:15pm was rescheduled as per your request, the meeting scheduled for 5/28/13 at 1:00pm is second notice." (Id.) Defendants contend the "District appropriately provided S.S. with written notice of the May 28, 2013 IEP meeting" and that "[d]espite said notice, S.S. chose not to attend" the meeting. (ECF No. 114-1 ¶ 18.)

At the May 28, 2013 IEP meeting, the child study team discussed N.S.'s overall academic progress as well as his difficulties during the 2012-2013 academic year. (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. E.) Ultimately, the team drafted an IEP (the "May 2013 IEP") which concluded, among other things, that N.S. attend a Multiply Disabled class ("MD") at BTHS for the 2013-2014 school year, that N.S. be provided with a shared paraprofessional for guidance and support, that N.S. attend thirty minute speech and language services twice a week, that N.S. attend occupational therapy for thirty minutes twice a week, that N.S. attend group counseling once a week for thirty minutes per session, that N.S. be given access to "assistive technology," and that N.S. participate in the in-District Extended School Year Program and Social Skills Group ("ESY"). (ECF No. 114-4, Ex. E at 174-209.)

On June 3, 2013, Plaintiff received a Parental Notice of Completed IEP from Brick pertaining to the May 2013 IEP. (ECF No. 113, Ex. H.) A copy of the May 2013 IEP was attached to the notice, however, Plaintiff was not informed of the right to file for due process or provided with the "Parental Rights in Special Education" handbook. (Id.)

On June 17, 2013, Brick held a reevaluation planning meeting concerning the May 2013 IEP, which S.S. attended. (ECF No. 114-5, Ex. L.) At the June 17, 2013 meeting, the child study team proposed conducting educational, psychological, and assistive technology evaluations upon N.S. (Id.)

On June 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Due Process and Request for Emergent Relief (the "Petition") with the State of New Jersey's Office of Special Education ("OES") against Brick. (ECF No. 114-5, Ex. M.) Specifically, the Petition challenged the May 2013 IEP, N.S.'s proposed placement for the 2013-2014 academic year, and the program provided to N.S. for the 2012-2013 academic year. (Id.)

On July 1, 2013, the parties appeared for an Emergent Relief Hearing before the Hon. Susan M. Scarola, A.L.J., at the Office of Administrative Law ("OAL") in Mercerville, New Jersey. (ECF No. 114-5, Ex. N.) On the same date, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which provided:

4) THE DISTRICT UNDERSTANDS THAT RUGBY SCHOOL REQUIRES THAT THE DISTRICT FACILITATE PARENTAL VISITS. AS THE PARENT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT RUGBY SCHOOL, THE DISTRICT AGREES TO FACILITATE THE VISIT. HOWEVER, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THE DISTRICT'S FACILITATION OF SUCH A VISIT BE CONSIDERED AGREEMENT WITH, ENDORSEMENT OF, OR A RECOMMENDATION OF SUCH PROGRAM.

(Id.)

Judge Scarola approved the settlement agreement on July 1, 2013. (Id.)

The educational and psychological evaluation of N.S., as referenced in the July 1, 2013 settlement agreement before Judge Scarola, were completed in July 2013. (ECF No. 114-5, Exs. O, P.) Defendants claim that, on August 12, 2013, pursuant to Judge Scarola's "Decision Approving Settlement," the parties held an IEP meeting. (ECF No. 114-1 ¶¶ 29-31.) Defendants provide no evidence of such meeting, but only a "Modified Stay Daily Schedule" which was apparently developed for N.S. (ECF No. 114-5, Ex. Q.)3

Plaintiff contends that in September 2013, "under threats and bullying by Defendant Morgan," they "reluctantly agreed to a temporary interim placement pending a Due Process Hearing" whereby N.S. would be in the MD class for part of the school day and in vocational and other skills trainings for the remainder of the day. (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 46.) As evidence of these alleged threats and this agreement, Plaintiff cites only to her own testimony that she was "threatened by [Defendant] Morgan" and that he "screamed at her many times," among other things. (ECF No. 113, Ex. C, 93:23-95:11.)

Between August and November 2013, Plaintiff filed various emergent motions, as well as a Motion for Summary Decision, in connection with their application for Due Process. (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 51; ECF No. 114-1 ¶ 33.) On December 5, 2013, the Hon. Patricia Kerins, A.L.J., issued an Order on Emergent Relief and Motion For Summary Decision holding, inter alia: the terms of the May 2013 IEP should be enforced; the stay-put program and placement in effect in the May 2013 IEP should be enforced; N.S. is to be put in the LLD class at BTHS; S.S. is to be provided N.S.'s grades from the 2012-2013 academic year; and S.S. is to be allowed access to N.S.'s teachers and District staff to the same extent as all other parents. (ECF No. 113, Ex. J.) Judge Kerins' decision also denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Decision without prejudice. (Id.)

On January 27, 2014, Judge Kerins recused herself from the matter and it was assigned to the Hon. Robert Bingham, II, A.L.J. (ECF No. 114-5, Ex. R at 2.) On February 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed an omnibus motion requesting an Order to: modify the stay-put; to enforce Judge Kerins' Order; and to compel Brick to allow S.S.'s expert to observe the proposed placement. (Id.) On March 19, 2014, Judge Bingham denied Plaintiff's motion in all respects except with regard to her request that her expert be permitted to observe the proposed placement. (Id.)

The Due Process hearing began before Judge Bingham on May 22, 2014. (Id.) The hearing lasted fourteen days with testimony taken on the following dates: May 22, 2014; May 29, 2014; May 30, 2014; June 2, 2014; June 5, 2014; June 13, 2014; June 17, 2014; and June 25, 2014. (Id. at 3.) The following individuals testified at the Due Process hearing: S.S.; Nicholas Krupinski, the school psychologist; Susan Winward, a special education teacher; Defendant Morgan, Brick's Auditor for Special Education; Dr. Danielle Chase, N.S.'s neuropsychologist; Peter Panuska, Assistant Principal at BTHS; Pannucci; Darla Novick, BTHS's SLE coordinator; Karen Morrison, a special education teacher; Susan Soltys, a special education teacher; and Stump, BTHS's Supervisor of Special Education. (Id. at 52-58.)4

On July 29, 2014, Judge Bingham issued a written decision concerning Plaintiff's Due Process Petition, determining: (1) Brick proved, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the IEPs and proposed IEPs for the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 academic years provided a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") in the least restrictive environment ("LRE"); and (2) although Brick committed minor procedural violations, those violations did not rise to the level of denying N.S. a FAPE in the LRE. (Id. at 58-81.) Specifically, Judge Bingham held that Brick failed to provide Plaintiff with adequate notice of the sixty-day review, stating:

(ECF No. 114-5, Ex. R at 74.)

Nevertheless, Judge Bingham held that the procedural defects in the implementation of the November 2012 IEP did not prejudice Plaintiff, and accordingly concluded that N.S. was not denied a FAPE in the LRE, explaining:

(Id. at 74-75.)

Plaintiffs contend Judge Bingham failed to consider many pieces of evidence they attempted to introduce, whereas this Court has allowed the introduction of such evidence. (ECF No. 113-1 ¶¶ 54-56.) Specifically, Plaintiff highlights that Judge Bingham declined to consider the narratives drafted by N.S.'s teachers, in lieu of failing grades, and letters from one of N.S.'s neurologists and psychiatrists, Dr. Matthew Pitera, regarding his condition and placement. (Id.) Dr. Pitera's letter, dated October 4, 2013, stated in pertinent part:

(ECF No. 101, Ex. 26 at 3-4.)

On November 20, 2013, Dr. Pitera issued a second report again concluding that N.S.'s placement was inappropriate, stating:

(ECF No. 101, Ex. 26 at 5.)

Finally, Plaintiff has presented evidence of alleged misconduct on the part of Defendants Morgan and Uszenski which Judge Bingham also declined to consider in rendering his opinion. On September 29, 2015, Defendant Morgan was indicted by the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office ("OCPO") for false swearing, theft by deception, conspiracy, and official misconduct. (ECF No. 101, Ex. 37.) Defendant Uszenski was also charged with official misconduct, with the charges stemming from the alleged orchestration between Defendants Morgan and Uszenski to effectuate a fraudulent IEP for Defendant Uszenski's grandson. (Id.) Defendants Morgan and Uszenski were also charged with "engag[ing] in official misconduct to remove programs from IEP's contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6," however, this charge was later dismissed. (Id.)5 Additionally, the OCPO's Application in Support of an Affidavit for Defendant Morgan's arrest warrant indicates that Defendant Morgan provided false information concerning his past criminal conviction — a Class B felony in New York for sale of a controlled dangerous substance — in order to obtain his position as "Interim Director of Special Services" with Brick. (ECF No. 101, Ex. 39 at 1252-53.)6

Plaintiff contends "search warrants alleged that [Defendant] Morgan manipulated students' IEP's, including N.S.'s IEP" (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 112), however, Plaintiff provides no evidence of such manipulation. Plaintiff further contends that several school staff members — including school psychologist Vincent Balestrieri, bus driver Barbara Burke, school psychologist Dana Gonzalez, and Stump — provided statements describing how they were "fearful of [Defendant] Morgan" and that Defendant Morgan "ordered them to change services for students and to manipulate IEP's." (ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 129.) While the aforementioned staffers did provide statements about their fear of Defendant Morgan, they indicated only that they were ordered to tamper with the IEP of one student, Defendant Uszenski's grandson. (ECF No. 101, Ex. 43 at 1296-1415.)7

On November 12, 2013, Defendant Morgan tendered a letter resigning his position with Brick, effective on December 31, 2013. (ECF No. 101, Ex. 42 at 1125-26.) Defendant Morgan lists health reasons as the grounds for his resignation and notes one of his accomplishments to be the "[e]limination of arbitrary and on-going tutoring," which he maintains saved Brick over $100,000. (ECF No. 101, Ex. 42 at 1125.)

Defendant Susan Russell ("Defendant Russell") also provided a statement to the OCPO in connection with its investigation of Defendants Morgan and Uszenski. This statement was not considered by the ALJ. Defendant Russell lamented that making "across the board cuts" to special education programs in IEPs is illegal, "especially if it's [for] cost saving reasons." (ECF No. 101, Ex. 44 at 1608.) Defendant Russell was referring to Defendant Morgan's elimination of certain supplemental instruction programs. (Id. at 1605-08.) Defendant Russell further conceded that supplemental instruction is "absolutely" necessary in effectuating an appropriate IEP for a child. (Id. at 1608-09.)

Toward the end of her statement to the OCPO, Defendant Russell provided specifics as to how Defendant Morgan's elimination of supplemental instruction impacted N.S., his grades for the 2012-2013 academic year, and his IEPs. The transcript reads, in pertinent part:

(ECF No. 101, Ex. 44 at 1643-49).

On October 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants Brick, Christopher Cerf ("Defendant Cerf"), David Hespe ("Defendant Hespe"), Defendant Morgan, the New Jersey Department of Education ("NJDOE"), Defendant Russell, and Dr. Walter Uszenski ("Defendant Uszenski"). (ECF No. 1.) On February 2, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint (the "Amended Complaint") in this matter asserting, inter alia, violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1504, et seq. against Defendants. (ECF No. 44.)8 On March 29, 2018, this Court issued an Opinion and Order allowing Plaintiff to introduce additional evidence before this Court that was not considered by the ALJ. (ECF Nos. 109 & 110.)9

On May 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Counts One and Two. (ECF No. 113.)10 On May 24, 2018, Defendants filed a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Counts One and Two. (ECF No. 114.) On July 2, 2018, Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 117) and Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 118). On July 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief to Defendants' Opposition (ECF No. 119), and on July 27, 2018, Defendants filed a Reply Brief to Plaintiff's Opposition. (ECF No. 120).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine only if there is "a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party," and it is material only if it has the ability to "affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence `is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, (1986); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002). "Summary judgment may not be granted . . . if there is a disagreement over what inferences can be reasonably drawn from the facts even if the facts are undisputed." Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3rd Cir. 1991) (citing Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985)); Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1996).

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, summary judgment is appropriate only if the evidence is not susceptible to different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999). On the other hand, if the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule 56's burden of production by either (1) "submit[ting] affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim" or (2) demonstrating "that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Once the movant adequately supports its motion pursuant to Rule 56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; Ridgewood Bd. of Ed. v. Stokley, 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999). In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).

There can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," however, if a party fails "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323; Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992).

III. DECISION

Plaintiff argues Judge Bingham's decision must be reversed because the preponderance of the evidence confirms his findings were erroneous, and Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on Counts One and Two as no genuine issues of material fact exist. (ECF No. 113-2 at 4-18.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues summary judgment is warranted as the additional extrinsic evidence admitted by this Court makes it apparent that N.S. was denied a FAPE in the LRE, and the voluminous extrinsic evidence regarding the criminal activities of Defendants Morgan and Uszenski show that N.S. was prejudiced by their scheme to defraud the District. (ECF No. 113-2 at 18-41.) Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Counts One and Two as Judge Bingham properly determined that Defendants did not commit any procedural or substantive IDEA violations denying N.S. a FAPE in the LRE in developing the November 2012 and May 2013 IEPs. (ECF No. 114-2 at 8-24.)

Once an ALJ makes a determination, any party has the right to appeal such decision in an appropriate state or federal court. See D.B. v. Ocean Twp. Bd. of Educ., 985 F.Supp. 457, 472 (D.N.J. 1997). The reviewing court "shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; shall hear additional evidence at the request of the party; and basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i)-(iii). "When deciding an IDEA case, the District Court applies a modified de novo review and is required to give due weight to the factual findings of the ALJ." L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2006). Under this standard, the district court's review over questions of law is plenary. Carlisle Are Sch. v. Scott P. By and Through Bess P., 62 F.3d 520, 528, n.3 (3d Cir. 1995). However, "[f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct" and "[i]f a reviewing court fails to adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why." S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The party challenging the ALJ's ruling bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the ALJ's findings were correct. Andrew M. v. Delaware Cty. Office of Mental Health & Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 2007).

The IDEA includes strict substantive and procedural requirements for school districts to follow in implementing special education plans for students with disabilities. The purpose of the IDEA is to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs" and to "prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The Supreme Court recently provided a thorough analysis of what is required of school districts in order to satisfy the substantive, FAPE requirement of the IDEA, stating:

Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S.Ct. 988, 999-1001 (2017).

While the IDEA does impose procedural requirements upon school districts as well, the Third Circuit has clarified that "[procedural] compliance is not a goal in itself; rather, compliance with such procedural requirements is important because of the `requirements' impact on students' and parents' substantive rights." Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 274 (3d Cir. 2012). A procedural violation "is actionable under the IDEA only if it results in a loss of educational opportunity for the student, seriously deprives parents of their participation rights, or causes a deprivation of educational benefits." Id. (citing Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007)).

While a district court is required to consider the factual findings from an administrative proceeding "prima facie correct," S.H., 336 F.3d at 270, Plaintiff presented voluminous extrinsic evidence which was not considered by the ALJ and which creates a genuine issue of material fact concerning the integrity of the effectuation and implementation of N.S.'s IEPs. As such factual disputes regarding Defendants' compliance with the IDEA in developing and implementing N.S.'s IEPs persist, this Court must deny both parties' summary judgment motions.

Most notably, Defendant Russell's statements to the OCPO, which was not considered by the ALJ, demonstrates that N.S.'s matter proceeded to Due Process for, inter alia, the elimination of supplemental instruction in his IEP. (ECF No. 101, Ex. 44 at 1643-49). Defendant Russell further indicated that Defendant Morgan was instrumental in altering N.S.'s grades for the 2012-2013 academic year — specifically to give him passing marks which he had not achieved — which certainly calls into question the subsequent development of N.S.'s IEPs, as the child study team presumably operated under the mistaken assumption that N.S. was successful in his classes for that year. (Id.) Moreover, Defendant Russell also noted there was no evaluation of N.S.'s "situation" and "needs" before amending his IEP to remove the supplemental instruction. (Id.) These revelations certainly call into question Judge Bingham's conclusion that the procedural defects in Brick's development of the IEPs — namely, the exclusion of S.S. — was non-prejudicial and did not deny N.S. a FAPE in the LRE. Indeed, S.S.'s participation in an IEP development meeting could have raised the concerns highlighted via the introduction of the extrinsic evidence. Additionally, the letter from Dr. Pitera, which the ALJ also failed to consider, provides further evidence that the education N.S. was receiving due to the placement from his IEP was merely de minimis at best, and thus afoul of the substantive standard established under the IDEA in Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.

Accordingly, the evidence in the record is significant enough to compel this Court to deviate from the findings of the ALJ. Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence, which was not considered by the ALJ, to create a material question of fact as to whether the development and implementation of N.S.'s IEPs denied N.S. a FAPE in the LRE. As such, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts One and Two of the Amended Complaint is DENIED.

While Plaintiff has proffered evidence sufficient to persuade this Court to deviate from the ALJ's factual findings, there still exist material questions of fact as to whether Brick's deficient process, and Defendant Morgan's tampering with N.S.'s transcript, denied N.S. the right to a FAPE in the LRE. Although Plaintiff introduced evidence tending to suggest a violation of N.S.'s rights, the full evidentiary record has never been considered by a trier of fact. While the extrinsic evidence is sufficient to overturn the ALJ's decision, it does not compel the inevitable conclusion that N.S.'s rights under the IDEA were in fact violated. For instance, while Defendant Russell highlighted the improper termination of supplemental instruction, she also indicated that such instruction did not necessarily benefit N.S. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts One and Two of the Amended Complaint is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts One and Two is DENIED and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts One and Two is DENIED.