NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Mandy Topham1 appeals from a May 25, 2012 order granting summary judgment dismissing her complaint against defendant Sally Outwin, and a June 22, 2012 order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff also appeals from a September 12, 2013 order granting summary judgment dismissing her complaint against defendant Devereux Foundation (Devereux). Having reviewed the record de novo, in light of the applicable legal standards, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge E. David Millard in his comprehensive written opinions issued on May 25, 2012, and September 12, 2103.

The facts are set forth in Judge Millard's opinions and need not be repeated here in detail. To summarize, plaintiff was the manager of a group home for adults with developmental disabilities. The group home was owned and operated by Devereux. Plaintiff and her fellow employees were aware that some of the patients could exhibit violent behavior. As part of their employment, plaintiff and her co-workers were trained in self-defense techniques and were taught how to defuse potentially violent situations.

Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits after she was assaulted by one of the residents of the group home.2 She then sued her employer, Devereux, for placing a violent resident in the group home and failing to remove him after she warned that staff members were afraid of him. Plaintiff also claimed that the resident sexually harassed some of the female staff members, by making inappropriate personal comments, staring at them, sitting uncomfortably close to staff members, and in one case, putting his hand on a staff member's shoulder. She contended that Devereux was liable for his allegedly sexually harassing conduct, under the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). Plaintiff also sued the resident's mother, who was his legally appointed guardian, claiming that the mother negligently placed her son in the group home without warning Devereux of his violent tendencies.

Judge Millard first granted summary judgment to the mother. Relying on Berberian v. Lynn, 355 N.J.Super. 210, 218-19 (App. Div. 2002), aff'd on other grounds, 179 N.J. 290 (2004), he reasoned that the State Division of Developmental Disabilities, rather than the mother, was responsible for choosing the son's residential placement. He further found that the mother had no duty to warn Devereux of her son's aggressive tendencies, because Devereux was already well aware of his condition. He also found no proof that any action by the mother proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.

In a separate opinion, Judge Millard held that plaintiff's personal injury claim against Devereux was barred by the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statute. N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. He reasoned that dealing with potentially violent residents was part of plaintiff's job at the group home, for which she had received training. The judge further concluded that, in maintaining the resident at the group home, Devereux had not created a "virtual certainty that bodily injury or death [would] result" to plaintiff. See Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449, 470 (2012). Therefore, the intentional wrong exception, set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, did not apply to plaintiff's tort claim against her employer.

Judge Millard likewise rejected plaintiff's LAD claim, reasoning that the resident was not plaintiff's supervisor or co-worker, and his conduct did not occur because of any action or inaction of Devereux. The judge also concluded that dealing with inappropriate behavior by developmentally disabled residents "is simply a hazard of working in the [p]laintiff's chosen profession."

Our review of a trial judge's summary judgment decision is de novo, employing the Brill standard. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 477-78 (2013); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). After reviewing the record we conclude that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, for the reasons stated by Judge Millard. Plaintiff's appellate arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(e).

Affirmed.