NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Lawrence Miles appeals from the June 21, 2013 Law Division order denying his motion to amend the complaint to add a party and granting defendant1 Nhien "Peter" Nguyen's motion for summary judgment. Defendant cross-appeals from the April 27, 2012 Law Division order vacating a default judgment and reinstating plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the reinstatement of the complaint, albeit with a different effective date, and reverse the dismissal of the complaint based on the statute of limitations. We also affirm the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add CCS Group.

I.

Plaintiff entered into a contract to sell property he owned in Camden for $350,000. The contract listed CCS Group as the buyer; defendant signed the contract on behalf of the buyer.2 Plaintiff and defendant executed the contract in June 2004 and were scheduled to close on September 6, 2004. For reasons unexplained on the record, the closing never occurred. Almost six years later, on August 31, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of contract, breach of a personal guaranty, and fraud. In the complaint, plaintiff named as defendants "CCS Corporation, C.C.S. Corporation, CCS Corp., C.C.S. Corp., Peter Nguyen and several "John Does" as "fictitious" parties. Plaintiff did not name CCS Group, the buyer listed on the contract of sale, as a defendant.

After filing the complaint, plaintiff failed to serve any named defendant. Consequently, on March 18, 2011, the court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of prosecution. Almost a year later, in March 2012, plaintiff served defendant at his home in Pennsylvania and filed a motion to reinstate the complaint. In support of the motion, plaintiff's attorney submitted a certification explaining that several health and personal issues caused him to need to take a medical leave and that he was now back and sought to have the default vacated. Defendant contested the motion, claiming prejudice due to his serious health issues and the time delay. After hearing oral argument on April 27, 2012, the court reinstated the complaint, finding that sufficient exceptional circumstances existed to warrant granting the motion. However, the court refused to relate the reinstatement back to August 31, 2010, the date the complaint was filed.

Subsequently, in December 2012, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was barred by the six-year statute of limitations, that the complaint failed to set forth facts supporting plaintiff's guaranty and fraud claims, and that plaintiff failed to name CCS Group as a defendant. Plaintiff opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion3 seeking to amend the complaint to name CCS Group as a defendant. Plaintiff certified that he believed CCS Group "was part of or was affiliated with defendant" and that he named CCS Corporation as a defendant based on a business card purportedly given to him by defendant at an unknown date prior to the signing of the contract of sale, which identified defendant as the President of CCS Corp.

Mary Nguyen, wife of defendant, submitted an affidavit stating that she and defendant were the sole owners of CCS Group, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited liability company, and she first learned of the existence of the lawsuit in March 2012, when she was served with a complaint for her husband. She explained that she and her husband formerly operated a check cashing business in Camden, under the name of Check Cashing Service, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, until they sold the business in August 2011. She certified that Check Cashing Services, Inc. and CCS Group were two separate entities incorporated in different states. She also certified that her husband was gravely ill and unable to participate in the defense of the litigation.

At a hearing on April 5, 2013, the judge told the parties that he realized that he "was incorrect in selecting the date" of reinstatement and that it should have "relate[d] back to the original filing date." That said, the court informed the parties that he also realized that he had a conflict of interest with defense counsel and as such, he was recusing himself. Apparently, the judge had discovered that defendant's law firm had represented his wife, from whom he was separated, in an unrelated residential landlord-tenant action several years ago. The court explained that the matter would be transferred to another judge to hear the parties' motions.

As promised, a second judge heard oral argument on the pending motions on June 21, 2013. The judge denied plaintiff's motion to add CCS Group, LLC as a defendant. The judge held that the amendment did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 4:9-3 because that Rule requires that the party to be added must receive notice before the statute of limitation ran. R. 4:9-3. In this case, the first time the Nguyens, the principals of CCS Group, had any notice of the lawsuit was in March 2012, well after the statute had expired.

Further, the judge determined that the proposed amendment did not meet the requirements of Rule 4:26-4, the fictitious party rule. The judge found that the name of the buyer was easily ascertainable from the contract of sale, and the description of the fictitious party was too broad and provided inadequate notice. Further, the judge concluded that plaintiff failed to act diligently to ascertain the identity of the proper parties.

In addition, the judge granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the guaranty claim, noting that there was no written guaranty as required by the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-15. He found also that on the breach of contract count, defendant signed as a principal, not individually, and there were no allegations in the complaint alleging it was appropriate to "pierce the corporate veil[.]" The judge rejected defendant's argument that the fraud claim should be dismissed because specific facts had not been alleged. The judge reasoned that the complaint set forth "a specific allegation of fraud[,]" namely that defendant signed a contract with no intention of following through.

In addition to ruling on the individual claims against defendant, the judge concluded that the complaint should be dismissed in its entirety as it was reinstated after the six year statute of limitations had run and did not relate back. The judge determined that there was no evidence in the record that plaintiff intentionally allowed the complaint to be dismissed in order to manipulate the court or the case and observed that, generally, such a case should be restored to the date of the filing of the original complaint. However, the judge reasoned that because plaintiff failed to appeal or seek reconsideration of the reinstatement order, he could not challenge the order at this stage of the litigation. This appeal followed.

On appeal, plaintiff raises three contentions. Plaintiff argues that the trial judge's dismissal of the entire complaint based on the statute of limitations was erroneous as the complaint should have been reinstated effective the date of the original filing of the complaint. He also alleges that the trial judge committed reversible error by denying the amendment of the complaint to include CCS Group as a defendant. He additionally maintains that the first trial judge's failure to recuse himself before making any rulings rendered his orders "voidable."4

II.

First, plaintiff contends that the court erred in failing to apply the relation back doctrine when reinstating his complaint. Specifically, plaintiff argues that it was error for the court to reinstate the complaint as of April 27, 2012, the date of the reinstatement hearing, rather than August 31, 2010, the date the complaint was originally filed. In his cross-appeal, defendant challenges the decision to reinstate the complaint but not the finding that the reinstatement would not relate back.5

Rule 1:13-7(a) permits trial courts to dismiss a compliant for failure to prosecute. It is "`an administrative rule designed to clear the docket of cases that cannot, for various reasons, be prosecuted to completion.'" J. Roberts & Son, Inc. v. Hillcrest Mem'l Co., 363 N.J.Super. 485, 490 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Mason v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 233 N.J.Super. 263, 267 (App. Div. 1989)), certif. denied, 179 N.J. 309 (2004). Following a dismissal, the Rule permits reinstatement "either by consent or by motion[.]" Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1.2 of R. 1:13-7(a) (2015). In a single defendant action, absent consent of the other party, plaintiff must move for vacation of the dismissal based on "good cause[.]" R. 1:13-7(a).

The decision whether to grant or deny a motion for reinstatement is a matter within the trial court's discretion. As such, appellate courts review such determinations under an abuse of discretion standard. Baskett v. Cheung, 422 N.J.Super. 377, 382 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Weber v. Mayan Palace Hotel & Resorts, 397 N.J.Super. 257, 262 (App. Div. 2007)). "The Rules are to be construed so as to do justice, and ordinarily an innocent plaintiff should not be penalized for his attorney's mistakes." Giannakopoulos v. Mid State Mall, 438 N.J.Super. 595, 608 (App. Div. 2014), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 492 (2015).

The term "exceptional circumstances" is not defined in the Rule and no cases have interpreted this term since the Rule was amended in 2008 to include it. However, the requirement that exceptional circumstances be shown in multi-defendant cases does not apply here because at the time of the dismissal and subsequent reinstatement, no defendant had been properly served with the complaint. "The higher standard in multi-defendant cases was intended to avoid delay where a case has been proceeding against one or more defendants, and the plaintiff then seeks to reinstate the complaint against a previously-dismissed additional defendant." Id. at 609 (citing Pressler & Verniro, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1.2 on R. 1:13-7). The other defendants had not been served when the judge reinstated the complaint against the single defendant, and thus did not cause the kind of delay the Rule intended to prevent by requiring a much higher standard. See ibid. Hence, the standard to be used against the single defendant here is good cause. Ibid.

Determining whether "good cause" for reinstatement exists must be based on "the facts and circumstances of [each] particular case[.]" Ghandi v. Cespedes, 390 N.J.Super. 193, 196 (App. Div. 2007). Courts should determine whether the reason for the dismissal was due to plaintiff's actions or "`attributable only to counsel's neglect[.]'" Id. at 197 (quoting Rivera v. Atl. Coast Rehab. & Health Care Ctr., 321 N.J.Super. 340, 346-47 (App. Div. 1999)). Courts must also make findings on whether the defendant will be prejudiced if the motion to reinstate the complaint is granted. See Baskett, supra, 422 N.J. Super. at 384. Generally, the defendant has the burden to establish prejudice and courts have routinely found that a delay in service, even a substantial one, is insufficient to satisfy this standard. Id. at 384-85.

In this case, the judge found that counsel's health and personal problems were sufficient reasons to reinstate the complaint, and did not find that defendant's general claims of prejudice were sufficient to overcome the liberal application. We concur that where, as here, there was no legally competent proof of prejudice to defendant from the reinstatement and no evidence that plaintiff, as opposed to his attorney, was at fault, the interest of justice would not be served by declining to reinstate the complaint here. See ibid.

"Where a matter is reinstated, the action reverts to the status of the complaint as it existed at the time the dismissal was entered." J. Roberts, supra, 363 N.J. Super. at 491 (citing Mason, supra, 233 N.J. Super. at 268). A reinstated complaint "does not trigger the statute of limitations even though the reinstatement occurs after the statute of limitations has run." Ibid.; see also Rivera, supra, 321 N.J. Super. at 346 ("[R]einstatement always relates back to the date of the filing of the complaint.").

However, the relation back doctrine will not be applied where there is evidence that plaintiff or his attorneys engaged in willful misconduct. See Czepas v. Schenk, 362 N.J.Super. 216, 225, 228 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 374 (2003). As the second judge found, there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff intentionally manipulated the dismissal and subsequent reinstatement to gain a tactical advantage in the litigation. Hence, the general rule that when a dismissed complaint is reinstated it reverts to the status it had before the dismissal applies here. J. Roberts, supra, 363 N.J. Super. at 491 (citing Mason, supra, 233 N.J. Super. at 268).

Based upon the above well-established principles, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in reinstating the complaint as plaintiff established "good cause" under Rule 1:13-7(a). It is clear that plaintiff's failure to prosecute was attributable solely to his attorney, and as such, we decline to hold plaintiff responsible for his counsel's inaction. See Baskett, supra, 422 N.J. Super. at 385 (refusing to close "the courthouse doors" even though the plaintiffs could have done more). Furthermore, we perceive no reason on the record before us for not reinstating the complaint as of the original filing date. We conclude that the judge mistakenly exercised his discretion in failing to reinstate the complaint as of the original filing date under the relation back doctrine.6 See Rivera, supra, 321 N.J. Super. at 346. Consequently, we determine that the order dismissing plaintiff's complaint on statute of limitations grounds must be reversed as plaintiff filed his complaint prior to the expiration of the six-year period. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 ("Every action at law ... for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability ... shall be commenced within 6 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.").

III.

Plaintiff also argues that the court erred in denying his application to amend the complaint to substitute CCS Group for John Doe as a defendant. Plaintiff contends that he met the requirements of Rule 4:26-4 by diligently searching for the true name of CCS Group prior to filing his complaint, but was unsuccessful because of defendant's misleading actions. We are not persuaded.

Motions to amend a complaint are generally "liberally granted and without consideration of the ultimate merits of the amendment." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2.1 on R. 4:9-1; see also Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 456 (1998). Nonetheless, the decision whether to grant or deny a motion to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 424 N.J.Super. 448, 484 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 212 N.J. 198 (2012). In making this determination, courts must take into account "the factual situation existing at the time [the] motion is made." Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 303 N.J.Super. 239, 256 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Fisher v. Yates, 270 N.J.Super. 458, 467 (App. Div. 1994)).

Rule 4:26-4, also known as the fictitious party rule, provides in pertinent part:

Where the Rule applies, it will "suspend[] the running of the statute of limitations[.]" Mears v. Sandoz Pharm., Inc., 300 N.J.Super. 622, 628 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 547 (1986)). The purpose of the Rule is to "`balance the defendant's interest in repose with the plaintiff's interest in a just determination of his or her claim. The need to submit claims promptly to judicial management must be tempered by the policy favoring the resolution of claims on their merits.'" Ibid.

"[T]he first prerequisite to a fictitious name designation in a pleading is that the true identity of the defendant be `unknown' to the plaintiff." Id. at 629 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, if the true name of the defendant was known to the plaintiff prior to filing the complaint, the fictitious party rule will not apply. See generally Matynska v. Fried, 175 N.J. 51, 53 (2002) (affirming the denial of the plaintiff's motion to replace a fictitious party name where the name of the defendant was identified in the plaintiff's medical records); Bonczek v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 304 N.J.Super. 593, 602 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 51 (1998).

Here, we conclude that the judge reasonably denied plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint since CCS Group was listed as the buyer in the contract of sale. The contract clearly identified CCS Group as the buyer of the property, and plaintiff's attorney admitted that he had a copy of the contract at the time the complaint was filed. Even if plaintiff was unaware of the formal name, CCS Group, LLC, he could have named CCS Group in the complaint and made a technical correction later.

Further, as the second judge found, plaintiff failed to satisfy other requirements for invoking Rule 4:26-4. In particular, plaintiff failed to describe the fictitious party in appropriate detail. The purpose of providing a sufficient description under Rule 4:26-4 is two-fold: it gives notice of the cause of action while also helping to identify the unknown defendant. Descriptions which are too vague or broad fail to achieve these goals. See Viviano, supra, 101 N.J. at 555; see also Rutkowski v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 209 N.J.Super. 140, 143 (App. Div. 1986). And, as the judge found, plaintiff failed to act diligently in identifying the entity that entered into the contract of sale at issue. See Matynska, supra, 175 N.J. at 54 (noting that the plaintiff has an "obligation to investigate... in a diligent and timely fashion[.]").

Here, the complaint identified the fictitious parties as those who "are or may be certain defendants whose proper name and identities are unknown to plaintiff at the time of the institution of this action." This description fails to identify any cause of action or to indicate that the subject of the complaint relates to this real estate contract. Accordingly, as plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 4:26, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to amend here.

In sum, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of statute of limitations and affirm the denial of the motion to amend. We remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.