NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

This is a residential mortgage foreclosure case. Defendants Juan C. and Madharshini Delacruz appeal from the July 12, 2013 order of the Chancery Division that denied their motion to vacate default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Lynx Asset Services, LLC. Utilizing the services of a mortgage broker, on February 8, 2007, defendants borrowed $570,000 and executed a mortgage and note in favor of GE Money Bank (GE).1 The mortgage proceeds were used to pay off an existing mortgage, and defendants retained a balance of $30,062.90 from the closing proceeds.

Defendants' mortgage was assigned to plaintiff. After intervening events which we discuss below, and alleging defaults in payment, on March 8, 2011, plaintiff served defendants with a notice of intention to foreclose. A complaint for foreclosure was served on April 27, 2011. Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim in which they asserted various defenses. However, defendants never specifically claimed a right to rescission of the loan.

In January 2012, plaintiff moved to strike defendants' answer and permit the foreclosure to proceed as an uncontested matter. Defendants did not oppose the motion. On March 2, 2012, the court entered an order striking the answer, and instructing the clerk to enter default against defendants. The matter was then transferred to the New Jersey Administrative Office of Foreclosure (the AOF) to proceed as an uncontested matter.

On May 24, 2012, plaintiff served defendants with notice of its intention to apply for final judgment. Defendants filed an objection with the AOF, specifically alleging failure to comply with Rule 4:64-1(d)(2) and Rule 4:64-2 regarding the required proofs in uncontested cases. Defendants further claimed that they had rescinded the loan within forty-eight hours of executing the documents and asserted they were presently suing the "loan originator" for "fraud in the origination of the loan."2 The matter proceeded as an uncontested case, and final judgment in the amount of $701,530.50 was entered on October 24, 2012.

On January 14, 2013, defendants filed a verified complaint in lieu of prerogative writs naming the AOF as the sole defendant. The complaint was dismissed by Judge Robert A. Contillo, and defendants appealed. We affirmed Judge Contillo's order in an unpublished opinion. Delacruz v. Admin. Office of Foreclosure, No. A-4145-12 (App. Div. Aug. 4, 2014).

In the interim, in May 2013, defendants moved to vacate the October 2012 default judgment. Relying upon the factual assertions contained in Mrs. Delacruz's certification, defendants contended that relief was appropriate under Rule 4:50-1(c) (the judgment was obtained by "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct"); (d) the judgment was "void"; or (f) "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment....").

Defendants' certification set forth a convoluted history of dealing with various loan servicing companies and lenders. It suffices to say, however, that defendants alleged they rescinded the loan in a timely fashion but were told their efforts were unsuccessful. They therefore began making loan payments and subsequently entered into a loan modification agreement with one of the servicers. In March 2009, defendants entered into a temporary loan modification agreement with plaintiff, which by then had taken assignment of the mortgage. Defendants made payments to plaintiff during the next two years.

Defendants asserted that in March 2011, plaintiff refused to continue with the modification and commenced foreclosure proceedings after defendants defaulted. Defendants acknowledged service of the foreclosure complaint and filing their answer. They also admitted knowledge that their answer had been stricken and that plaintiff had moved for final judgment. They claimed that once their counsel served an objection on the AOF, however, they were "told that the next step would be a hearing to determine the value of the Note." Without providing a specific date, defendants further stated that they were unaware judgment by default had been entered and a sheriff's sale scheduled until they made inquiry of the court. Defendants also attached documents that allegedly demonstrated a timely rescission of the loan, that the mortgage had been discharged of record in March 2007, and that plaintiff was not legally formed as a company until October 2008, more than two months after the date in the assignment of the mortgage and note by MERS.

In opposition, plaintiff's portfolio manager, Arlene Lieberman, certified that plaintiff bought the note and mortgage in January 2009, and the assignment from MERS was recorded in March 2009, well after plaintiff was formed. She further claimed that plaintiff was in possession of the original note, mortgage and assignment when it filed the foreclosure complaint. Lieberman also certified that during the term of the restructured payment agreement, defendants were late with monthly payments twenty-one of twenty-two months, and "bounced" seven checks, leading plaintiff not to renew the agreement after 2011.

After considering oral argument, Judge Contillo found that defendants had failed to raise rescission as a defense in their pleadings, nor had defendants ever attempted to set aside the March 2012 order that struck their pleadings and ordered the litigation to proceed as an uncontested case. Judge Contillo explained, "[t]he facts about the rescission were known to the family at the time of the ... issue being joined on the pleadings. It can't be that we litigate and then as years go by things occur to us that we now seek to revisit." Assuming arguendo defendants' claims that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action because of alleged deficiencies in the documentary proof, the judge noted that might make the judgment voidable, but not void. He denied the motion, entered a conforming order, and this appeal followed.

Before us, defendants argue Judge Contillo erred in denying their motion to vacate the October 2012 default judgment because he failed to appreciate the "various frauds, misrepresentations[] and misconduct" of plaintiff. R. 4:50-1(c). In a single sentence, defendants also claim the judgment was "void" because there "was no loan to foreclose on," assumedly because the loan had been rescinded and the mortgage had been discharged. Additionally, defendants argue plaintiff's proofs were insufficient because Lieberman's certification was hearsay and not based upon personal knowledge. We reject these arguments and affirm.

We begin by recognizing that a motion seeking relief under Rule 4:50-1 is addressed to the motion judge's sound discretion, and we will not disturb that decision unless it resulted from a clear abuse of discretion. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). "A court should view `the opening of default judgments ... with great liberality,' and should tolerate `every reasonable ground for indulgence ... to the end that a just result is reached.'" Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993) (quoting Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J.Super. 313, 319 (App. Div.), aff'd, 43 N.J. 508 (1964)).

In asserting that relief is appropriate based upon fraud, a party must "allege with specificity the representation, its falsity, materiality, the speaker's knowledge or ignorance, and reliance." Palko v. Palko, 73 N.J. 395, 401 (1977) (Schreiber, J., dissenting). In the context of a motion under subsection (c) of the Rule seeking to vacate a judgment that followed trial, we said that

We have held that "a foreclosure judgment obtained by a party that lacked standing is not `void' within the meaning of Rule 4:50-1(d)." Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Russo, 429 N.J.Super. 91, 101 (App. Div. 2012). In rejecting a late-asserted claim that a default judgment in favor of a foreclosing creditor was void because the plaintiff lacked standing, we have specifically said that "[i]n foreclosure matters, equity must be applied to plaintiffs as well as defendants." Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Angeles, 428 N.J.Super. 315, 320 (App. Div. 2012). We agree with Judge Contillo that defendants, with full knowledge of the facts that allegedly supported their claim for rescission, failed to request that equitable relief in their pleadings. Knowing that their answer had been stricken in March 2012, defendants never sought reconsideration of that order based upon their alleged efforts to rescind or the filed discharge of the mortgage.3 Instead, defendants awaited service of plaintiff's notice of its intention to proceed to final judgment and decided to challenge, ultimately unsuccessfully, the administrative actions of the AOF in not granting them a hearing, rather than attacking the underlying order. Finally, although it is undisputed that plaintiff did not serve the October 2012 final judgment upon defendants, defendants admit that they knew of the final judgment before bringing their prerogative writ action against the AOF in January 2013, and never named plaintiff as a party to that action.

Moreover, while we might agree that the filed discharge of mortgage, if authentic, raises some concerns, defendants have failed to adequately address how, if at all, its existence demonstrates plaintiff proceeded in fraudulent fashion. This is particularly true in light of defendants' course of conduct after attempting to rescind, i.e., executing a mortgage modification agreement with plaintiff and making payments thereunder for more than two years.

Lastly, the majority of defendants' brief is spent debunking the ability of plaintiff to foreclose based upon evidential inadequacies in the original documents supporting the motion to strike, and in Lieberman's certification in opposition to the motion to vacate. These arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

We do not quarrel with defendants' lengthy exposition of the legal principles involved. However, we fail to see what inadequacies exist. Lieberman certified: "I am the portfolio Manager for Lynx ... and I have personally reviewed the business records of Lynx ... and make this certification based upon my personal review of those records." She further stated that she had "personally reviewed the original Promissory Note, Mortgage and Assignment, in [plaintiff's] physical paper files before they were stored in a safety deposit box...." Judge Contillo appropriately rejected any claim that these statements were inadequate to establish plaintiff's ability to foreclose.

Affirmed.