M. CHRISTINA ARMIJO, Chief District Judge.
District courts may refer dispositive motions to a magistrate judge for a recommended disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). "Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the [magistrate judge's] recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When resolving objections to a magistrate judge's proposal,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
"[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Further, "[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived." Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001) ("In this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's report are deemed waived.").
Defendant raises two objections to the PFRD. First, characterizing the firearm enhancement as a "separate state sentencing enhancement" or a "separate offense" distinct from the crime of armed robbery, Defendant contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that armed robbery with a firearm enhancement, in contrast to armed robbery, constitutes a violent felony under the elements clause of the Armed career Criminal Act
Defendant was convicted in New Mexico of armed robbery (firearm enhancement). [Doc. 19 p. 3] NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-2, which criminalizes robbery, provides that:
NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-16(A), a sentencing statute, provides in relevant part that:
N.M. U.J.I. 14-6013, is a special verdict instruction which "is required by Section 31-18-16[.]" In relevant part, it instructs the jury that:
Viewing Section 30-16-2, Section 30-16-2, and U.J.I. 14-6013 together, the Magistrate Judge concluded that "to determine whether armed robbery is a violent felony under the ACCA, the Court must analyze the elements of robbery, plus the additional element of commission of the offense `while armed with a deadly weapon'" namely, a firearm. [Doc. 19 p. 8-9, 12] In reaching this conclusion, the Magistrate Judge observed that, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476, 494-95 (2000), the Court is required to consider the "use of a firearm" to be an element of the crime of armed robbery with a firearm enhancement.
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the firearm enhancement is an element of armed robbery with a firearm enhancement. In support of his objection, Defendant variously characterizes Section 31-18-16(A) as a "state sentencing enhancement" independent of the crime of armed robbery and as a "separate offense with its own separate statute." [Doc. 20 p. 2, 5] Building on that premise, Defendant argues that using the firearm enhancement which, viewed independently, carries a penalty of only one year, "to transform his New Mexico armed robbery conviction into an ACCA violent felony runs afoul of the plain language and meaning of Section 924(e)(2)(B)." See § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (stating that a violent felony is a "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"). Defendant's argument, viewed against the backdrop of Apprendi, is unsustainable.
At issue in Apprendi were two New Jersey statutes—one classifying "the possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose as a `second-degree' offense" and another that provided "for an `extended term' of imprisonment if the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity" (the hate crime statute). Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69 (alterations omitted). Whereas "possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose" was classified as a criminal offense, the hate crime statute was found within the "sentencing provisions" of New Jersey's criminal code. Id. at 468, 495. The defendant (Apprendi) pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. Id. at 469-70. In the plea agreement, the state reserved the right to request that the court impose an "enhanced" sentence on one of the counts pursuant to the hate crime statute. Id. at 470. Apprendi reserved his right to challenge the hate crime sentence enhancement on the ground that it was unconstitutional—an issue that was ultimately resolved in Apprendi's favor by the Supreme Court. Id. at 469, 473-74 ("The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
Of significance in regard to Defendant's objection in the present case is the Apprendi court's holding that "the mere presence of [the] `enhancement' in a sentencing statute does not define its character." Id. at 496. In other words, the fact that a sentence "enhancer" is the subject of a distinct statute, found within the sentencing provisions of the criminal code, does not mean that that it is "not an essential element of the offense." Id. at 495. Because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt," the relevant inquiry is whether "the required finding expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict[.]" Id. at 476, 494. Where this inquiry commands a response in the affirmative, the at-issue provision, regardless of whether it is found in a "separate" sentencing statute, constitutes an "element" of the offense. Id. at 494.
Like the hate crime statute at issue in Apprendi, Section 31-18-16(A) is the subject of a distinct "sentencing" statute. However, as explained in Apprendi, this fact is not dispositive of the issue whether it constitutes an "essential element of the offense" to which it is tied. Applying Apprendi to the circumstances here, the relevant inquiry is: does the firearm enhancement in Section 31-18-16(A) "expose[] [a] defendant [charged with armed robbery] to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict" on the crime of armed robbery? See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. The answer is yes. Therefore, armed robbery with a firearm enhancement has as an element "the use of a firearm." U.J.I. 14-6013; see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. Defendant's argument to the contrary is not persuasive, and his objection to the PFRD on this ground is overruled.
As accurately reflected in the PFRD, "[t]o be convicted of voluntary manslaughter in New Mexico, a defendant must engage in intentional acts by which he kills a human being, knowing that his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, on a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion with sufficient provocation." [Doc. 19 p. 16-17] See N.M. U.J.I. 14-221 (stating the essential elements of voluntary manslaughter); N.M. U.J.I. 14-222 (defining sufficient "provocation"); N.M. U.J.I. 14-141 (defining "general criminal intent" which, according to a concomitant use note, must be included as an element in "all nonhomicide crimes requiring criminal intent"); State v. Reynolds, 650 P.2d 811, 812-13 (N.M. 1982) (discussing the elements of voluntary manslaughter in the context of determining whether the trial court erred in refusing such an instruction in a trial that concluded in a first degree murder and aggravated burglary conviction). The Magistrate Judge concluded that "to satisfy these elements, a defendant must necessarily use `physical force' within the meaning of the ACCA's elements clause." [Doc. 19 p. 17]
Defendant's objection to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion is founded on his contention that voluntary manslaughter may be committed without the intentional use of Curtis Johnson violent physical force. [Doc. 20 p. 6-7] Relying on the fact that "physical force" is not expressly mentioned in the voluntary manslaughter statute or the relevant uniform jury instructions, Defendant contends that the "focus" of New Mexico's voluntary manslaughter statute is "the death of the victim," rather than "the force" required to commit the offense. [Doc. 20 p. 6] This distinction is significant, Defendant argues, because our Tenth circuit has held that, in the context of a statute that focuses on the consequences of the force—for example one prohibiting the use of "deadly force," the act of poisoning or subjecting a person to a deadly disease could allow for a conviction; whereas, in the context of a statute that focuses on "how the force is generated," "physical force" "must refer to the mechanism by which the force is imparted to the person of another." [Doc. 20 p. 6-7] See United States v. Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d 1191, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2008) (examining whether the nonconsensual administration of a drug should be characterized as "the use of physical force" and recognizing that the "published appellate opinions stating that poisoning involves the use of physical force" are those that "focus on the consequences of poisoning" as opposed to "how the force is generated"). The Magistrate Judge rejected this argument based, in part, upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1415 (2014).
In Castleman, the Supreme Court considered the prohibition in 18 U.S.C., Section 922(g)(9), against the possession of firearms by anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, including one that has as an element "the use . . . of physical force[.]" Castleman, 134 S.Ct. at 1409. The petitioner, Castleman, had pleaded guilty in a Tennessee state court to having "intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to" the mother of his child. Id. Invoking the theory that bodily injury may be caused without the use of physical force as in the example of an intentional poisoning, Castleman argued that "although poison may have `forceful physical properties' as a matter of organic chemistry, no one would say that a poisoner `employs' force or `carries out a purpose by means of force' when he or she sprinkles poison in a victim's drink." Id. at 1415 (alterations omitted). The Supreme Court rejected Castleman's argument, reasoning that,
Id.
In his objection to the PFRD, Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in relying on Castleman because the Castleman court's analysis of "physical force" in the context of domestic violence does not apply in the context of the ACCA's definition of a "violent felony." [Doc. 20 p. 7] Defendant's objection to the PFRD on this ground is unfounded. While the Court agrees with Defendant that the analysis of the phrase "physical force" in Castleman does not illuminate the meaning of "physical force" as that phrase is used in the ACCA,
Defendant cites Rodriguez-Enriquez and United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that the Tenth Circuit distinguishes "statutes that require the application or threat of force and those that focus on the resulting injury." And, as noted earlier, he maintains that the prohibition on voluntary manslaughter is focused on "the death of the victim," as opposed to "the force" required to commit the offense and, therefore, a person can commit voluntary manslaughter without using violent physical force. [Doc. 20 p. 6-7] On this ground, he urges the Court to conclude that voluntary manslaughter is not a "violent felony" under the ACCA. [Doc. 20 p. 6-7]
In the case of Rodriguez-Enriquez our Tenth Circuit examined whether a Colorado conviction triggered a sentencing enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d at 1191. The at-issue Guideline defined "a crime of violence" as one which has "as an element . . . the use of physical force." Id. at 1192. The defendant had been convicted in Colorado of violating a statute that provided:
Id. Presented with the government's argument that the courts of Colorado had already determined that, in the context of state sentencing statutes, "assault two" was a "crime of force[,]" the Rodriguez-Enriquez court considered whether the meaning of "physical force" was distinct from the meaning of force. Id. at 1193 (emphasis added). The court reasoned:
Id. at 1193. Ultimately, the Rodriguez-Enriquez court "reject[ed] the view that the word physical relates to the effect of the force"; instead, the court concluded, that in applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines, "the adjective physical must refer to the mechanism by which the force is imparted to the person of another" where, for example, a person is "struck by a fist, a bat, or a projectile[.]" Id. at 1194.
The Rodriguez-Enriquez court supported its holding by relying, in part, on dictum from Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005), an earlier Tenth Circuit case. See Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d at 1195 ("Apparently focusing on the means employed, we decided [in Perez-Vargas] that intentionally exposing someone to hazardous chemicals does not constitute the use of physical force."). In Perez-Vargas, the defendant's federal sentence had been enhanced under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based upon a Colorado conviction for third degree assault which the district court had deemed a "crime of violence." 414 F.3d at 1283, 1285 (recognizing that the relevant guideline, USSG, § 2L1.2, defined "a crime of violence" as "any offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another"). In Colorado, third degree assault consisted of "knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another person or with criminal negligence [causing] bodily injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon." Id. at 1285. Considering the language of the statute, the court noted that
Id. at 1286. The court reasoned that "there must be a distinction between crimes that potentially involve violent conduct and crimes that merely involve the possibility of resulting harm" that effectively precludes "every sufficiently dangerous activity [from qualifying] as a crime of violence." Id. The feature distinguishing these two classes of crimes, the court concluded, is the element of intent. Id. Insofar as Colorado's third degree assault statute did not necessarily include an element of intent, the court held that it was not a "crime of violence" as that term is used in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 1286-87.
Returning to Defendant's argument, the Court does not agree with the proposition that the "focus" of New Mexico's voluntary manslaughter statute is a prohibition against the resulting injury (killing a human being) as opposed to the force required to commit the offense. [Doc. 20 p. 6] As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant's attempt to minimize the significance of "general intent" as an element of voluntary manslaughter. [Doc. 20 p. 6] Defendant points to the fact that the general intent instruction, which requires proof that the defendant "acted intentionally when he committed the crime" and which is a mandatory element of all nonhomicide crimes requiring criminal intent, "is used for a broad swath of crimes that would arguably not constitute violent felonies." U.J.I. 14-141. This observation, while objectively true, does not conflict with the Magistrate Judge's well founded conclusion that voluntary manslaughter requires proof that the defendant engaged in "intentional acts by which he kills a human being[.]" [Doc. 19 p. 17] Accordingly, to apply the distinction exemplified by Perez-Vargas, and followed in Rodriguez-Enriquez, "between crimes that. . . involve violent conduct and crimes that merely involve the possibility of resulting harm" voluntary manslaughter, which necessarily includes an element of intent, falls into the former category. Id. at 1286.
To conclude otherwise would require the Court either to parse the voluntary manslaughter statute to eliminate the "sufficient provocation" element, or to acquiesce in the absurd notion that "sufficient provocation" allows for the possibility of committing voluntary manslaughter by means other than violent physical force; and neither approach would be appropriate. See United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2017) ("[I]n construing the minimum culpable conduct, such conduct only includes that in which there is a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility the state statute would apply."); State v. Davis, 74 P.3d 1064, 1069 (N.M. 2003) (stating that New Mexico's statutes must not be construed "in a manner contrary to the intent of the Legislature and in a manner that leads to absurd or unreasonable results"); State v. Dunsmore, 891 P.2d 572, 574 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) ("A statute should be construed so that no part of it is rendered surplusage or superfluous."). As illustrated by our Tenth Circuit in Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d at 1286-87, and Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d at 1193, there are numerous examples of ways in which one could cause harm without using "physical force" (including, among others, poisoning, intentionally placing a barrier in front of a car causing an accident, and intentionally exposing someone to hazardous chemicals, and failing to offer medical assistance). However, it is unreasonable to suggest that "an ordinary person of average disposition," even "upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion," would not have "cooled off before acting" to effect a killing of a human being by means of these (or comparable) acts or omissions. See Section 30-2-3(A) ("Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion."); U.J.I. 14-221 (stating that "sufficient provocation" is an element of voluntary manslaughter); U.J.I. 14-222 (defining sufficient provocation, which "must be such as would affect the ability to reason and to cause a temporary loss of self control in an ordinary person of average disposition"; but "`provocation' is not sufficient if an ordinary person would have cooled off before acting"). Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant's contention that voluntary manslaughter may be committed without the intentional use of Curtis Johnson violent physical force. His objection to the PFRD on this ground is overruled.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that New Mexico armed robbery with a firearm enhancement and New Mexico voluntary manslaughter each constitute a "violent felony" under the ACCA. Accordingly, Defendant's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition shall be overruled.
