NANCY J. KOPPE, Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee for the Holders of CSMC 2007-2's (hereafter, "Defendant") Motion to Join SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC ("SFR") as a Necessary Party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Docket No. 13. No opposition has been filed. The Court finds that this motion is appropriately resolved without oral argument. See Local Rule 78-2.
This interpleader action arises from the non-judicial foreclosure sale of the property located at 6342 Mighty Flotilla Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89139 (the "Property"), completed by Coronado Ranch Street Homeowner's Association ("HOA") on May 17, 2013. Docket No. 13, at 2. The transaction was conducted through the HOA's agent Nevada Association Services, Inc. ("NAS"), which sold the property to SFR. Id. The trustee's deed was recorded on May 22, 2013. Id.
NAS filed this interpleader action on March 7, 2014, in Clark County District Court, seeking declaratory relief regarding the priority of claims to excess proceeds of the HOA's foreclosure sale. See Docket No. 1-2. The action was removed to this Court on May 12, 2014. Docket No. 1. SFR is not presently a party to this case. Docket No. 13, at 2. Defendant requests that the Court join SFR as a necessary party on the ground that the Court cannot afford the parties complete relief absent SFR's participation. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). Defendant represents that the "Court cannot allocate the sale proceeds correctly without first determining whether US Bank's deed of trust survived the HOA's foreclosure sale." Id. Defendant accordingly seeks leave to file a cross claim against SFR in order to "enable this Court to resolve the interpleader and quiet title issues in one judicial action."
Determining whether a party is required to be joined to a lawsuit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 involves a three-step inquiry. EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). First, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a), the court determines whether a party is necessary.
To determine whether SFR is a necessary party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, the first step is to determine whether the Court can grant complete relief in SFR's absence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A).
Two Ninth Circuit decisions guide the Court's analysis. First, in Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement Dist., 276 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit found the Navajo Nation was a necessary party because the court could not grant complete relief in the Nation's absence. . The Navajo Nation had leased land to the defendant, who operated a business on the reservation. Id., at 1153. The lease included a provision whereby the defendant was required to extend employment preferences to qualified local Navajos. Id. The plaintiff, a member of the Hopi Tribe, sought to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the lease provision, but did not name the Nation as a party. Id., at 1153-54.
In finding that it could not grant complete relief in the Nation's absence, the court reasoned that the injunction sought would bind only the defendant and the plaintiff, not the Nation. Id., at 1155. As a result, even if the court enjoined the defendant from enforcing the lease provision, the Nation could continue to attempt to enforce the provision. Id. The court noted that if the defendant were to ignore the injunction, the plaintiff would not receive the relief he sought. Id. At the same time, if the defendant were to comply with the injunction, the Navajo Nation would likely take action against the defendant under the lease. Id. The court concluded that, if the court granted plaintiff an injunction, the defendant would be "between the proverbial rock and a hard place — comply with the injunction . . . or comply with the lease." Id., at 1156. If the defendant declined to abide by the injunction and instead complied with the lease, the plaintiff would not be afforded complete relief. As a result, the court found that the Nation was a necessary party. Id.
Similarly, in Peabody W. Coal Co., the Ninth Circuit found that the Navajo Nation was a necessary party because the court could not grant complete relief in its absence. 400 F.3d at 780. In that case, the Navajo Nation was a party to the challenged lease with defendant Peabody. Id. The EEOC sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, but did not join the Navajo Nation as a party. Id. The court found that while it could award the EEOC monetary damages without the Nation's participation, "declaratory and injunctive relief could be incomplete unless the nation is bound by res judicata." Id. The court stated, "[i]f the EEOC is victorious in this suit but the Nation has not been joined, the Nation could possibly initiate further action to enforce [the provision in the lease] against Peabody, even though that preference would have been held illegal in this litigation." Id. Accordingly, the court found that the Navajo Nation was a necessary party. Id.
The above-cited cases indicate that where a plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, and a third-party has an enforceable interest in the subject matter of the dispute, the court cannot grant complete relief in the third party's absence. Here, the Court finds that SFR is a necessary party to NAS' interpleader action, because it seeks to clarify rights to the proceeds of a contract in which SFR possesses a legally enforceable interest. Similar to the above-cited cases, a judgment declaring injunctive relief with respect to a contract in which SFR possesses a legally enforceable interest would not be binding against SFR. Thus, even if the interpleader action is resolved, the parties are not assured complete relief. As a result, SFR is a necessary party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A).
The Court also finds that SFR is a necessary party to this interpleader action under the second prong of Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i), a party is necessary if the party "claims
Nonetheless, even if a party has a legally protected interest in an action, if an existing party can adequately represent the absent party's interest, then the absent party is not a necessary party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B). See Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[I]mpairment may be minimized if the absent party is adequately represented in the suit"). A court considers the following factors in determining whether an existing party may adequately represent the interests of an absent party: (1) the present party will undoubtedly make all of the absent party's arguments; (2) the present party is capable and willing to make the absent party's arguments; and (3) the absent party would not offer any necessary elements that the present parties would neglect. Id.
Here, it is not clear that Defendant, NAS, or any other party will make SFR's arguments on its behalf. Due to its involvement in the HOA sale, NAS has interests which only partially align with the interests of SFR, as is true with respect to the interests of other parties who may or may not be entitled to proceeds from the HOA sale, including Defendant. Moreover, it is far from clear that all of the parties' interests align in this case, as some parties would presumably seek to uphold Defendants's senior lien holder's property interest with respect to HOA liens, while others would seek to strike it down. Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties cannot adequately represent SFR's individualized and legally protected interest in the sale of the Property.
Having determined that SFR is a necessary party to NAS' interpleader lawsuit, the Court next considers whether SFR can feasibly be joined as a party. Under Rule 19, joinder is feasible where the absent party is subject to service of process, and the absent party's joinder will not destroy subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). Defendant does not present the Court with any argument concerning whether SFR can feasibly be joined. Docket No. 13. As the Court's jurisdiction in this matter is based upon the presence of the United States of America as a defendant, however, SFR's joinder would not deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, SFR is subject to service of process in this district, given its ownership of real property in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Accordingly, as joinder of SFR is both necessary and feasible,
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In the instant case, SFR has not come forward and claimed a direct interest in this action. It is not clear, however, that SFR is even aware of the pending litigation. Because the court has found SFR to be a necessary party, it will soon have notice of the action and will be able to assert its rights accordingly. Withholding a discussion of SFR's rights under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B) at this time would require unnecessarily strict conformance to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a), which is intended to be flexible in its application. See Makah Indian Tribe, 910 F.2d at 558.