Per Curiam.
Plaintiffs are three retired Supreme Court Justices certified
Justice Gerald Loehr served first as a Judge of the Westchester County Court, and in 2012 was elected to a 14-year term as a Supreme Court Justice, to commence on January 1, 2013. On December 31, 2012, Justice Loehr retired, began receiving retirement benefits, and simultaneously drew the salary to which he was entitled as a Supreme Court Justice. In anticipation of turning 70 on May 19, 2013, Justice Loehr applied to the Administrative Board for certification pursuant to Judiciary Law § 115. Without that certification, he would have been prohibited from serving as a Supreme Court Justice after December 31, 2013.
Justice J. Emmett Murphy served as a full-time judge from 1980 to 2011. He became a Judge of the Westchester County Court in 1991, and was elected to Supreme Court in 1996. In 2010, Justice Murphy was reelected as a Supreme Court Justice with a term commencing on January 1, 2011. On December 31, 2010, Justice Murphy retired, and began receiving retirement benefits thereafter. Justice Murphy turned 70 on March 12, 2011, and in that same month applied to the Administrative Board for his first certificate pursuant to Judiciary Law § 115. Without that certification, he would have been
Justice William Miller joined the Unified Court System in 1983 when he was appointed, after service in the Kings County District Attorney's office, to the Criminal Court of the City of New York. In 2012, he was elected to Supreme Court for a 14-year term commencing January 1, 2013. Prior to taking that office, and on the advice of the pension director for the Office of Court Administration, Justice Miller applied for and was granted retirement benefits. Because he would reach age 70 in 2013, Justice Miller also applied to the Administrative Board to be certified to perform the duties and draw the salary of a Supreme Court Justice for the two years commencing January 1, 2014. Without that certification, he would have been prohibited from service as a Supreme Court Justice after December 31, 2013.
While plaintiffs' applications were pending, the Board released the administrative order at issue, giving notice that it would no longer certify applicants who would, on reappointment, choose to receive both a retirement allowance for prior judicial service and their salary as a certified justice. The Board's order was grounded in its belief that judges who simultaneously drew both a full judicial salary and a full pension (colloquially called "double-dipping") adversely affected both the public's impression of the court system and the court system's negotiations with the other branches over crucial budgetary and personnel matters. A subsequent memorandum from the Office of the Chief Administrative Judge clarified that retired Justices otherwise approved for certification would be certified only if they deferred receipt of their New York State pensions until their judicial service ended.
Plaintiffs commenced this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking an order declaring the Board's policy illegal and unconstitutional, directing the Board to certify them, and awarding money damages, plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses incidental to the relief.
We start with the basic proposition that New York's public policy strongly disfavors the receipt of state pensions by persons also receiving state salaries. Section 150 of the Civil Service Law establishes New York's general public policy against the simultaneous receipt of a state pension and a state salary:
Indeed, as we explained in Matter of Baker v Regan, the "Legislature has for [nearly] a ... century evinced a strong public policy in favor of the suspension of retirement benefits of a person who after retiring accepts an office in the civil service of the State" (68 N.Y.2d 335, 341 [1986]). Moreover, we emphasized that "[a]lthough exceptions have been made to this general proscription, it is clear that such exceptions were enacted for limited purposes and were not meant to abrogate or dilute the long-standing and overriding State policy to prohibit the receipt of retirement benefits and salary at the same time" (id.).
That "overriding State policy" is repeatedly restated in the Retirement and Social Security Law. Section 101 (a) provides:
Section 101 (b) (1) further provides, as to temporary state employees: "The payment of any retirement allowance ... on account of retirement for other than physical disability shall be suspended as provided herein, during the time that the beneficiary thereof is in receipt of other compensation paid from direct or indirect state or municipal taxes."
Section 101 (c) (1) expresses that same public policy specifically as regards certified Supreme Court Justices, stating:
Section 211 of the Retirement and Social Security Law expresses the same general prohibition, but provides exemptions allowing retirees to collect their full pensions and at least a partial salary in two basic situations: (a) when the retiree's total income, including her retirement allowance and salary, is not more than $500 above the greater of (1) her annual unadjusted retirement allowance or (2) the salary on which her retirement allowance is based or her final salary, whichever is greater; or (b) the position in which she is employed is not a
Keeping in mind New York's general public policy concerning the simultaneous receipt of a state pension and a state salary, we consider the action of the Board.
The New York Constitution requires various judges, including Supreme Court Justices and Court of Appeals Judges, to "retire on the last day of December in the year in which he or she reaches the age of seventy" (NY Const, art VI, § 25 [b]). The sole exception to that mandate is that a retired Court of Appeals Judge or Supreme Court Justice may, for no more than six years thereafter, perform the duties of a Supreme Court Justice if certified "in the manner provided by law that the services of such ... justice are necessary to expedite the business of the court and that he or she is mentally and physically able and competent to perform the full duties of such office" (id.). The legislature has vested the Board — composed of the Chief Judge and the four Presiding Justices of the Appellate Division — with the power to determine whether those two criteria are met and, if so, whether to certify former Justices for service (Judiciary Law § 115). Under the Judiciary Law, "[a] retired justice so certified shall for all purposes, ... including powers, duties, salary, status and rights, be a justice of the supreme court" (Judiciary Law § 115 [3]).
The Board enjoys "the very broadest authority for the exercise of responsible judgment" and "very nearly unfettered
In the case before us, we are asked to determine whether the Board exercised its discretion within the framework provided by the Constitution. As in Marro (id. at 680), the mental and physical abilities of the Justices are not at issue. Rather, the issue presented is whether the Board's policy is rationally related to whether certification is "necessary to expedite the business of the court."
Whether the services of a particular Justice are "necessary to expedite the business of the court" encompasses much more than a mechanical inquiry into the size of the courts' docket divided by the number of Justices. Viewed in isolation, the services of an additional mentally and physically able Justice will always expedite the business of the courts. Were the inquiry merely mechanical, the Board would need no broad, largely unreviewable discretion. But the impact of any certification, as the Constitution's use of the word "necessary" implies, must be determined with the costs — including non-monetary costs — of that certification in mind. The Constitution and the Judiciary Law entrusted this determination to "the integrity and collective wisdom of a carefully selected, high level certifying authority endowed with peculiar experience and expertise" (Marro, 46 NY2d at 682), rather than to functionaries responsible for the court's docket or budget, for precisely that reason.
Here, the Board concluded that the net effect of certifying pensioners — taking into account their potential future contributions as certified Justices — would be detrimental to the creation of new judgeships and thereby hamper rather than expedite the business of the courts. The Board also calculated that the cost of certifying pensioners included not only the narrow matter of annual pay, but also the impact of "double-dipping" on the courts' public prestige and other private negotiations.
The facts here differ from those in Marro insofar as the Board chose to announce a prospective rule rather than issue, as plaintiffs concede it could have, inscrutable applicant-by-applicant determinations. However, we see no reason to curtail the Board's power because it opted to reveal and explain its rationale in the interest of providing those aspiring to certification with the opportunity to make an informed choice. Marro excused the Board from promulgating its certification criteria (id. at 681), but did not bar or discourage it from doing so.
The Board's determination that certifying retired Supreme Court Justices would not expedite the business of the courts did not violate any statutes or promote an unconstitutional purpose. Plaintiffs' reliance on section 212 in support of their claim that the Board has exceeded its authority is misplaced.
Section 212 provides:
Plaintiffs interpret section 212 to allow all pensioners over the age of 65 — including certified Justices — the option of receiving an undiminished pension alongside a full salary. Even under that interpretation, the Board did not act in contravention of that section.
Section 212 is one of the limited exceptions discussed in Baker. That exception, which the legislature enacted to benefit "low income pensioners" (Bill Jacket, L 1964, ch 803), provides retired persons the option of drawing, and their prospective public employers the option of providing, a limited amount of earnings in excess of the already-provided pension. "May," however, is a "term of enablement but not of entitlement" (Marro, 46 NY2d at 680). The choice of verb and the elective nature of the section 212 scheme defeat plaintiffs' suggestion that Retirement and Social Security Law § 212 reduces the Board's broad discretion to act in the best interest of the courts and instead requires it to certify otherwise-qualified former Justices who opt into that section's provisions.
Plaintiffs' remaining arguments, that the Board's policy violates Judiciary Law § 115 (3) by creating two classes of Justices and impairs plaintiffs' pension benefits in violation of article V, § 7 of the New York Constitution, fail. Because former Justices have no right to certification or to receive a pension alongside a full salary and are, under the Board's policy, able to choose to continue as a retired Justice with a full pension or, if they prefer, to suspend their pension and seek certification, the Board's order runs afoul of neither Judiciary Law
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, without costs, and the judgment of Supreme Court reinstated.
Chief Judge DIFIORE taking no part.
Order reversed, without costs, and judgment of Supreme Court, Albany County, reinstated.