MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Andrea Westmoreland commenced the above-captioned action on April 23, 2015 in New York State Supreme Court, Kings County. (Notice of Removal ¶ 1, Docket Entry No. 1.) The Complaint alleges that Defendants Wawona Packaging Company, LLC ("Wawona") and BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. ("BJWC") negligently packaged and distributed Sweet2Eat nectarines that, upon ingestion, caused Plaintiff to suffer severe injury. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 18, annexed to Notice of Removal as Ex. 5.) On October 27, 2016, BJWC removed the action to federal court in the Eastern District of New York. (See Notice of Removal.) After reviewing the Notice of Removal, Chief Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann filed a report and recommendation on November 7, 2016 (the "R&R"), recommending that the Court sua sponte remand the action to New York State Supreme Court, Kings County. (R&R 1, Docket Entry No. 8.) Defendants filed objections to the R&R on November 25, 2016, one day after the deadline for filing objections imposed by Judge Mann. (See Defs. Obj. to R&R ("Defs. Obj."), Docket Entry No. 9.) Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' objections. Despite Defendants' untimely filing, the Court considers the objections and, for the reasons set forth below, adopts the R&R in its entirety. This case is remanded to the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County.

I. Background

a. Procedural background

Neither the summons nor the Complaint, filed April 23, 2015, specified the amount of Plaintiff's damages. (See id. ¶¶ 42, 49, 58, 65, 71, 83.) On June 4, 2015, BJWC filed an answer and a demand for Plaintiff's claimed damages. (Answer, annexed to Notice of Removal as Ex. 4.) Despite three follow-up letters that BJWC sent on July 16, August 14 and October 30, 2015, Plaintiff failed to respond to BJWC's demand until September 30, 2016. (See Letters to Pl. for Demand of Damages, annexed to Notice of Removal as Ex. 6; Resp. to Def. Discovery Demands, annexed to Notice of Removal as Ex. 3.) At that point, Plaintiff claimed damages of five million dollars. (Resp. to Def. Discovery Demands at 4.)

On October 27, 2016, BJWC removed the action to federal court. (See Notice of Removal.) In its Notice of Removal, BJWC asserted that federal jurisdiction is proper because the parties are diverse and because Plaintiff seeks damages exceeding $75,000. (Id. ¶ 16.) BJWC also acknowledged that it sought removal more than one year after Plaintiff filed the Complaint, in contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) and § 1446(c)(3)(B), but argued that the Court should excuse BJWC's untimely removal because Plaintiff, in bad faith, caused the delay by failing to respond to the demands for claimed damages. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10-12.) BJWC also noted that "through conversations between [it] and co-defendant Wawona [], consent has been obtained to remove this manner [sic] to Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York. . . ." (Id. ¶ 15.)

b. Judge Mann's recommendations

Judge Mann recommended that the Court remand the action to state court because Defendants had not complied with the procedural rule of unanimity, which requires that each defendant independently consent to removal within the statutory thirty-day period after a Complaint is filed. (R&R 4-5.) Although BJWC contends that it timely removed the action within thirty days of receiving Plaintiff's September 30, 2016 response to a discovery demand for claimed damages, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3),1 Judge Mann found that Wawona "neither signed the Notice nor filed written consent to removal within thirty days of [P]laintiff's response, as the rule of unanimity demands." (R&R 4 (citing Bedminster Fin. Grp., Ltd. v. Umami Sustainable Seafood, Inc., No. 12-CV-5557, 2013 WL 1234958, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013).) Because the thirty-day statutory period has passed, Judge Mann reasoned that BJWC's failure is fatal to its petition for removal, and remand is warranted. (Id.)

II. Discussion

a. Standards of review

i. Report and recommendation

A district court reviewing a magistrate judge's recommended ruling "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When a party submits a timely objection to a report and recommendation, the district court reviews the parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objected under a de novo standard of review. Id.; see also United States v. Romano, 794 F.3d 317, 340 (2d Cir. 2015). The district court may adopt those portions of the recommended ruling to which no timely objections have been made, provided no clear error is apparent from the face of the record. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Neuman, No. 15-CV-1358, 2015 WL 7459920, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2015). The clear error standard also applies when a party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates its original arguments. Chime v. Peak Sec. Plus, Inc., 137 F.Supp.3d 183, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ("General or conclusory objections, or objections which merely recite the same arguments presented to the magistrate judge, are reviewed for clear error." (citation omitted)); see also DePrima v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 12-CV-3626, 2014 WL 1155282, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2014) (collecting cases).

ii. Removal

A defendant may remove a civil action brought in state court to a federal court of original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "[I]n light of the congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction, as well as the importance of preserving the independence of state governments, federal courts construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability." Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1994)). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction and procedural requirements are met. Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 100 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Where, as here, jurisdiction is asserted by a defendant in a removal petition, it follows that the defendant has the burden of establishing that removal is proper."); see Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 2000). A notice of removal must allege a proper basis for removal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1445. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir. 2007) ("In determining whether jurisdiction is proper, we look only to the jurisdictional facts alleged in the Notices of Removal."); Bankhead v. New York, No. 13-CV-3377, 2013 WL 6145776, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013) ("An effective petition for the removal of a state action to federal court must allege a proper basis for the removal under sections 1441 through 1445 of Title 28." (quoting Negron v. New York, No. 02-CV-1688, 2002 WL 1268001, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2002))).

b. Defendants have violated the rule of unanimity

Defendants object to Judge Mann's R&R in its entirety, arguing that although BJWC filed the Notice of Removal without attaching Wawona's written consent to approval, BJWC may attach that consent to removal now and fulfill the procedural requirement of unanimity.2 (Defs. Obj. 2.) In particular, Defendants argue that the case on which Judge Mann relied — Bedminster Financial Group, Ltd. v. Umami Sustainable Seafood, Inc. — "states that all defendants must provide written evidence of consent `in a timely fashion,'" but "did not write that all defendants must provide written evidence of consent within the thirty-day removal window." (Id.) According to Defendants, the court in Bedminster "provided no definition of `timely fashion' except to say that filing an affidavit several months after the Notice was not timely." (Id.) Defendants annex to their objections a letter from Wawona consenting to removal, (see Wawona Consent Letter, annexed to Defs. Obj. as Ex. 3), and contend that because the letter was filed "within the timeframe for objections set out by Judge Mann,"3 they have met their obligation to obtain timely unanimous consent of removal, (Defs. Obj. 3).

The Second Circuit has noted with approval that district courts "have consistently interpreted the [removal] statute as requiring that all defendants consent to removal within the statutory thirty-day period, a requirement known as the rule of unanimity." Pietrangelo v. Alvas Corp., 686 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Within this Circuit, the law is clear that, with rare exceptions not relevant here, "each defendant [must] submit some form of unambiguous written evidence of consent to the [c]ourt within the thirtyday period." Bedminster, 2013 WL 1234958, at *6 (quoting In re Vill. of Kiryas Joel, N.Y., No. 11-CV-8494, 2012 WL 1059395, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012)); see also Snakepit Auto., Inc. v. Superperformance Int'l, LLC, 489 F.Supp.2d 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (remanding where codefendants did not join the removal notice within the 30-day limit on removal); Burr ex rel Burr v. Toyota Motor Credit Co., 478 F.Supp.2d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (remanding for untimely notice of removal where removal notice attached affidavit from one defendant stating that the other defendant consented to removal, and the court did not receive written consent from codefendant until after the 30-day limit for removal had expired); Novick v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 410 F.Supp.2d 98 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (remanding where one defendant failed to file a written consent to removal within 30-day period, holding that neither a statement in the notice of removal that tardy defendant had orally consented to removal nor affidavits expressing consent filed after 30-day period satisfied the rule of unanimity).

Not only do Defendants provide no legal support for their contention that parties seeking removal need only provide consent in a "timely fashion," (R&R 2), but they affirmatively misstate the holding of Bedminster, (see id. ("The [c]ourt in Bedminster, however, did not write that all defendants must provide evidence of consent within the thirty-day removal window.")). Defendants assert, without citation, that Bedminster "states that all defendants must provide written evidence of consent `in a timely fashion'" but "provide[s] no definition of `timely fashion'. . . ." (Defs. Obj. 2-3.) The Court has not found any such language in Bedminster, which expressly rejects the proposition Defendants ascribe to it. Rather, the Bedminster court discussed a case cited by the defendants in support of their view that "an affidavit in which defendants indicate their consent to removal, even if filed after the time to petition for removal has passed, will cure a defect of non joinder to the notice of removal." Bedminster, 2013 WL 1234958, at *7 (citing Sicinski v. Reliance Funding Corp., 461 F.Supp. 649, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). The court noted that Sicinski "has repeatedly been called into doubt[,]" id. (collecting cases), and instead held that, "in line with a body of clear and settled precedent, . . . even where the removing defendant represents to the [c]ourt that the other defendants have consented to removal, the rule of unanimity is not satisfied unless the other defendants either sign the notice of removal or subsequently provide the [c]ourt with their unambiguous written consent to removal within the thirty-day period." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Assuming that Defendants could have timely filed for removal until October 30, 2016, see supra n.1, the failure to file Wawona's express consent to removal until November 25, 2016 is incurable.4 See Bedminster, 2013 WL 1234958, at *6 ("The failure of any defendant to provide its written consent within the thirty-day period constitutes a fatal procedural defect in the removal procedure and warrants a remand of the case." (quoting Kiryas Joel, 2012 WL 1059395, at *3)). As Judge Mann correctly noted, "[c]ourts have very little discretion — if any — to forgive a failure to comply with the rule of unanimity." (R&R 3 (quoting Bedminster, 2013 WL 1234958, at *5).)

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts Judge Mann's R&R in its entirety. This case is remanded to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County.

SO ORDERED.