PAUL A. CROTTY, District Judge:
Plaintiff Paulette Cameron claims that Defendants violated her rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and related state laws by filing a time-barred lawsuit to collect a debt from her. Defendants contend that the New York City Civil Court has already resolved this matter pursuant to a stipulated settlement agreement. Defendants move (1) to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (2) for judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ P. 12(b)(1), 12(c). For the reasons below, the motions are DENIED.
Defendants are debt collectors who sought to recover a debt that Cameron allegedly owed to non-party Chase Bank USA, NA ("Chase").
Defendants filed their debt collection action against Cameron in Civil Court on April 4, 2012 for a cause of action that allegedly arose on December 17, 2008. (See Compl. ¶¶ 16, 24.) Cameron alleges that Chase "resides" in Delaware, which subjects the debt to Delaware's three-year statute of limitations pursuant to New York's borrowing statute. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-31 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202; Del.Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106).) Cameron does not seek to recover the funds she was induced to pay, but rather seeks damages for her pain and suffering, lost time, and costs that she allegedly incurred from the lawsuit against her, in addition to applicable statutory damages.
Defendants respond that the Complaint omits an important and judicially noticeable fact: the parties agreed to a Stipulation of Settlement in the Civil Court that resolved this dispute. The Settlement provided that Cameron would pay $550 in monthly installments of $25 (substantially less than the amount claimed, $1,302), but that in the event of Cameron's default, the Civil Court would enter judgment for the full amount claimed. The Settlement further provided that:
(Wortman Decl. Ex. D.) Judge Elizabeth Taylor of the Civil Court "so ordered" this
"The standard for granting a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001). That is, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Upon a motion to dismiss, "[c]ourts may also properly consider `matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.'" Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 131 n. 7 (2d Cir. 2011).
Defendants contend that there are two distinct, but related, threshold grounds for dismissal: (1) under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action because it invites review of a state court judgment; and (2) Cameron's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they are inconsistent with the state-court judgment. Neither argument is persuasive.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable to this case. "[F]ederal plaintiffs are not subject to the Rooker-Feldman bar unless they complain of an injury caused by a state judgment." Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir.2005). Here, Cameron complains about the allegedly deceptive means that Defendants used to induce her to agree to the Settlement, not about the Settlement itself or the judgment enforcing it. Therefore, Defendants'"argument fails, as plaintiff[] assert[s] claims independent of the state-court judgment[] and do[es] not seek to overturn [it]." Sykes v. Mel Harris & Associates, LLC, 757 F.Supp.2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (Chin, J.).
Nor does res judicata bar Cameron's claims. Under New York law,
Here, the Civil Court's judgment determined Cameron's liability pursuant to the Settlement, which she does not challenge in this action. Again, Cameron's claims relate to Defendants' alleged misconduct that preceded the Settlement and subsequent judgment. Although she might have raised these allegations as defenses or counterclaims, New York law did not require her to do so. Thus, her claims in this action were not "necessarily decided" in the prior action, nor are they inconsistent with the Civil Court's judgment. Furthermore, since the judgment was entered pursuant to the Settlement, it required no determination of the timeliness of the underlying complaint. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 82(1) (1981) (a promise to pay a time-barred debt is enforceable). Accordingly, as a matter of res judicata, the Civil Court's judgment does not preclude the claims Cameron asserts here.
Cameron did not unambiguously release her present claims in the Stipulation of Settlement, in what was arguably a time-barred action. Defendants contend that Cameron's "waive[r]" of "any other claims [she] may have" released them from her present claims for deceptive debt-collection techniques. Given that she did not know of her claims or the alleged deception when she signed the waiver, Defendants' argument does not withstand scrutiny.
Under New York law, "[a] release will not be given effect unless it contains an `explicit, unequivocal statement of a present promise to release [a party] from liability.'" Golden Pac. Bancorp v. F.D.I.C., 273 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir.2001). Thus, "a release may not be read to cover matters which the parties did not desire or intend to dispose of." Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348, 157 N.E.2d 505, 510 (1959); see Maddaloni Jewelers, Inc. v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 354 F.Supp.2d 293, 299 (S.D.N.Y.2004) ("A release that employs general terms will not bar claims outside the parties' contemplation at the time the release was executed."). "Moreover, because the Taw looks with disfavor upon agreements intended to absolve [a party] from the consequences of his [wrongdoing],' a release which purports to excuse a party from responsibility for misconduct is subject to the `closest of judicial scrutiny.'" Golden Pac. Bancorp,
Given the allegations of Defendants' misconduct in inducing Cameron to agree to the Settlement that Defendants drafted, it is appropriate to subject the Settlement's terms to the "closest of judicial scrutiny." Such scrutiny is particularly important where, as here, a settlement purports to waive the very statutory remedies intended to protect unsophisticated, unrepresented, individual creditors like Cameron. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (FDCPA intended to prevent "abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices"). Here, the Settlement contains no "explicit, unequivocal" statement that Cameron intended to waive claims for deceptive debt collection practices. Thus, it would be error for the Court to construe the Settlement's general waiver of "any other claims" to include claims that were unknown to Cameron and about which Defendants had deceived her. See Nikkei v. Wakefield & Assocs., No. 10-CV-02411, 2011 WL 4479109, at *4 (D.Colo. Sept. 26, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss FDCPA claims even though settlement purported to waive them, where plaintiff alleged that "the Settlement Agreement itself was obtained in a manner that violated the FDCPA").
Defendants argue that an additional, independent, basis for dismissal is that the Complaint fails to adequately allege a claim under the FDCPA. That statute prohibits debt collectors from using "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. For example, a debt collector may not make a "false representation of ... the character, amount, or legal status of any debt .... [or] threaten] to take any action that cannot legally be taken...." Id. § 1692e(2), (5).
Cameron alleges Defendants violated the FDCPA by filing a time-barred lawsuit against her in Civil Court, which misrepresented the legal status of the debt. Under New York's six-year statute of limitations for contract disputes, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2), the lawsuit would have been timely. Cameron contends, however, that Delaware's three-year statute, Del. Code
Under New York's "borrowing statute," N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202, a nonresident who asserts a "cause of action accruing without the state" must do so within the "limitation periods of both New York and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued." Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. King, 14 N.Y.3d 410, 901 N.Y.S.2d 575, 927 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (2010). "If the claimed injury is an economic one, the cause of action typically accrues `where the plaintiff resides and sustains the economic impact of the loss.'" Id. For a business organization, "one looks to its State of incorporation or its principal place of business." Global Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 525, 693 N.Y.S.2d 479, 715 N.E.2d 482, 485 (1999). Where a plaintiff sues to collect a debt assigned to it from a bank, the debt collector "is not entitled to stand in a better position" than the bank. Portfolio, 901 N.Y.S.2d 575, 927 N.E.2d at 1060-61 (applying Delaware's three-year statute of limitations to debt collector where assignor bank was "incorporated in Delaware and [was] not a New York resident").
The Complaint plausibly alleges that Chase resides in Delaware, on the grounds that its articles of association state that its "main office" is there. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Chase has filed numerous public documents stating that its "main office," "headquarters," "residence," and "principal place of business" are in Delaware. (Pl.'s Br. 7-10 (citing Keshavarz Decl. Exs. 1-7).) If that is true,
Therefore, the only remaining question is whether the filing of such a time-barred complaint is a violation of the FDCPA.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.