JOHN T. CURTIN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Jamel E. Ben Abdallah brought this action on October 5, 2009, against Defendant Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), alleging discriminatory discharge from his employment as a Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") officer, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VII"). The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is granted, and the case is dismissed.
Mr. Abdallah was born and raised in Tunis, Tunisia. See Deft. Exh. 1 (p. 4).
Plaintiff began his employment with CBP in October 2007 as an intern under the Federal Career Intern Program ("FCIP"), which is a 2-year "excepted service" program established to "provide the career interns with formal training and developmental opportunities to acquire the appropriate agency-identified competencies needed for conversion" to a career-track "competitive service" position. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3202(o)(9) (effective May 11, 2006 to July 9, 2012). Plaintiff signed an FCIP Employment Agreement on October 8, 2007, acknowledging that:
Deft. Exh. 2 (p. 28).
Upon completing training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center ("FLETC"), plaintiff was assigned to the Port of Buffalo in the position of CBP Officer. On March 17, 2008, plaintiff signed an "Acknowledgment of Receipt of Conduct Information" form indicating that he received several documents outlining the CBP's policy on employee ethics, including the CBP Standards of Conduct. Deft. Exh. 4 (p. 43). Section 5.1 of the CBP Standards of Conduct explains that:
Deft. Exh. 3 (p. 31). In addition, section 6.4.2 of the CBP Standards of Conduct states, "[w]hen directed by competent authority, employees must truthfully and fully testify, provide information, or respond to questions (under oath when required) concerning matters of official interest that are being pursued administratively." Id. (p. 32).
In July 2008, the DHS Office of Inspector General ("DHS-OIG")
The investigation was assigned to Special Agent Richard Ford ("SA Ford"). On September 16, 2008, SA Ford and Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") Special Agent Mark Reimann ("SA Reimann") traveled to St. Petersburg, Florida, to interview Faycel Ben Hajmeftah, who was listed as a reference on plaintiff's CBP employment application. SA Ford's "Memorandum of Activity" regarding this interview indicates that Mr. Hajmeftah is also from Tunisia, and met plaintiff when they worked together at Salem's Gyro restaurant in St. Petersburg. SA Ford noted that a subsequent review of the Standard Form 86 employment questionnaire and Background Investigation Personal Interview Worksheet in plaintiff's personnel file revealed no reference to his employment at Salem's Gyro restaurant. See Deft. Exh. 10 (pp. 85-86).
On September 22, 2008, SA Ford and SA Reimann interviewed plaintiff at DHS offices in Buffalo. As reported in SA Ford's Memorandum of Activity regarding this interview, plaintiff was given a Beckwith/Garrity
On September 30, 2008, SA Ford and SA Reimann interviewed plaintiff's father-in-law, Malcolm Hulse, at Mr. Hulse's residence in Medina, New York. As reported in SA Ford's Memorandum of Activity regarding this interview, Mr. Hulse related the circumstances of his daughter's relationship with plaintiff, their wedding in Tunisia, and their relocation to the United States. Pltff. Exh. 2 (p. 20).
On October 2, 2008, plaintiff voluntarily submitted to a polygraph test, which was conducted at the United States Secret Service ("USSS") field office in Buffalo by USSS Special Agent Donald Witham ("SA Witham"). Plaintiff signed several forms, including a Beckwith/Garrity Advice of Rights (Deft. Exh. 14 (p. 5)); a notice of Miranda rights (Deft. Exh. 15 (p. 7)); and a "Polygraph Examination Statement of Consent" form indicating his voluntary "consent to be interviewed and submit to a Polygraph Examination in connection with an investigation concerning national security." Deft. Exh. 16 (p. 9). SA Witham reported that "Series I was administered and evaluated as Deception Indicated to relevant question pertaining to terrorist activity." Deft. Exh. 13 (p. 3). Upon being advised of the results of the initial series of questions, plaintiff "stated that he wished to terminate the examination to consult with an attorney." Id.
Later on October 2, 2008, plaintiff reported to work and told his immediate supervisors, Kevin Sekuterski and Patricia Janicki, that he was being harassed by DHS investigators. See Deft. Exh. 18 (p. 14). Plaintiff was "granted leave to return home and collect his thoughts." Id. Upon returning to work the next day, plaintiff was informed by his supervisors that they had discussed the matter with Chief CBP Officer John Madsen and were advised that CBP Internal Affairs was conducting an investigation into plaintiff's conduct. Officer Sekuterski instructed plaintiff to cooperate with the investigation, and placed plaintiff on restricted duty until further notice. Id.
On October 28, 2008, SA Ford and SA Reimann conducted a further interview of plaintiff at the CBP's Peace Bridge offices. See Deft. Exh. 20 (p. 28). Prior to the start of the interview, plaintiff was presented with an Advice of Rights (Kalkines
SA Ford immediately notified Chief CBP Officer John Madsen ("Chief Madsen"), plaintiff's second line supervisor, about plaintiff's unwillingness to participate in the interview. See Deft. Exh. 22 (pp. 32-36). Chief Madsen entered the interview room and questioned plaintiff about whether he was aware of the consequences of his actions. Id. (p. 33). Plaintiff replied that he understood he could be disciplined, including removal from service. Id. Chief Madsen then informed CBP Port of Buffalo Director Joseph Wilson ("Port Director Wilson") that plaintiff had decided not to participate in the interview. Id.
By letter dated November 3, 2008, Port Director Wilson advised plaintiff that his employment with CBP was being terminated because he "refused to cooperate in a [DHS] investigation conducted by the [OIG]" despite full notice and explanation of his rights and obligations. Deft. Exh. 23 (p. 38). The letter advised further that:
Id.
Plaintiff contacted CBP's Equal Employment Office on December 1, 2008.
Following an extended discovery period, defendant moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. Upon review of the record presented by way of the parties' written submissions, and for the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is granted.
Rule 56 provides that, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Although the language of this Rule has been amended in recent years, the well-settled standards for considering a motion for summary judgment remain unchanged. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Arista Records LLC, 797 F.Supp.2d 299, 311 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y.2011); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, Committee's notes to 2010 amendments. Under those standards, the moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Rockland Exposition, Inc. v. Great American Assur. Co., 746 F.Supp.2d 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y.2010), aff'd, 445 Fed. Appx. 387 (2d Cir.2011). A "genuine issue" exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law...." Id.
Once the court determines that the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials, but must set forth "concrete particulars showing that a trial is needed...." R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir.1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), quoted in Kaminski v. Anderson, 792 F.Supp.2d 657, 662 (W.D.N.Y.2011). In considering whether these respective burdens have been met, the court "is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Second Circuit has also held that, when deciding whether summary judgment should be granted in an employment discrimination case, the court "must take additional considerations into account." Desir v. City of New York, 453 Fed.Appx. 30, 32-33 (2d Cir.2011) (citing Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994)). As stated in Gallo:
Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. Nonetheless, summary judgment remains appropriate in discrimination cases, as "the salutary purposes
In support of her motion for summary judgment, defendant contends that several of plaintiff's Title VII claims — including claims based on allegations of hostile work environment and retaliation — are subject to dismissal for failure to comply with Title VII's time limitations and administrative exhaustion requirements. Defendant further contends that plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence sufficient to establish the elements of a Title VII disparate treatment claim. These contentions are discussed in turn.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer, including the federal government, "to fail to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). "Title VII is the exclusive remedy for discrimination by the federal government on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin." Boyd v. United States Postal Service, 752 F.2d 410, 413-14 (9th Cir.1985) (quoted in Briones v. Runyon, 101 F.3d 287, 289 (2d Cir.1996)).
As a prerequisite to bringing a Title VII action, a federal employee must timely exhaust administrative remedies by complying with the requirements set forth in the EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.101 et seq. See Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 74-75 (2d Cir.2008). Specifically, the EEOC regulations require that the aggrieved employee consult with an EEO counselor at the relevant agency within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1); see Mathirampuzha, 548 F.3d at 75. This initial 45-day period "serves as a statute of limitations; thus, as a general rule, claims alleging conduct that occurred more than 45 days prior to the employee's initiation of administrative review are time-barred." Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359 (2d Cir.2001); see also Forde v. Donahoe, 2012 WL 1020038, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. March 26, 2012).
In this case, although the record contains no specific supporting documentation in this regard, the parties agree that plaintiff sought initial counseling with the EEO office on December 1, 2008. Accordingly, under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1), any claims based upon conduct related to events that occurred before October 16, 2008 (45 days prior to initiation of administrative review) — including plaintiff's claims that defendant violated Title VII by subjecting him to an investigative interview on September 22, 2008 and a polygraph examination on October 2, 2008, and by placing him on restricted duty on October 3, 2008 — are time barred. See e.g., Pollock v. Chertoff, 361 F.Supp.2d 126, 135 (W.D.N.Y.2005) (dismissing Title VII claim where plaintiff sought EEO counseling more than 45 days after termination; court "cannot dispense freely with the 45-day
In addition, in cases where the employee failed to pursue a particular claim at the administrative level, "the federal court generally lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim." Fitzgerald, 251 F.3d at 359. Even as to claims not expressly pursued before the administrative agency, however, the court may consider them if they contain allegations that are "reasonably related" to the claims the plaintiff did assert before the agency. Id.; see also Mathirampuzha, 548 F.3d at 75. "A claim is considered reasonably related if the conduct complained of would fall within the `scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge' that was made." Fitzgerald, 251 F.3d at 359-60 (quoting Butts v. City of New York Department of Housing Preservation & Development, 990 F.2d 1397, 1402 (2d Cir.1993)).
At Paragraph 16 of the form administrative complaint in this matter, plaintiff checked the "religion" and "national origin" boxes as "the bases [he] believe[s] were relied on to take the actions described" in the factual allegations set forth in Paragraph 15. Deft. Exh. 26, ¶ 16. The box provided on the form for "retaliation/reprisal" was not checked. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, plaintiff was represented by experienced counsel well-versed in the nuances of federal employment discrimination law, yet nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff even mention the terms "hostile work environment" or "retaliation." Moreover, this court's reading of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 15 of the administrative complaint reveals no facts to support a plausible Title VII claim based on hostile work environment or retaliation, or to support a finding that such claims might reasonably have fallen within the scope of the EEOC investigation. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (hostile work environment exists "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.") (citations and quotations omitted); see also Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc., 419 F.Supp.2d 455, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (EEOC charge containing no reference to hostile work environment found "inadequate to define the scope of the EEOC investigation and serve as the predicate for claims in a federal lawsuit."); Gambrell v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 282182, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) ("Where the EEOC charge alleges discrimination but not retaliation, the reasonable scope of the agency's investigation cannot be expected to encompass allegations of retaliatory motive.").
Accordingly, plaintiff's hostile work environment and retaliation claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As a result, the only claim remaining viable in this action is plaintiff's claim of disparate treatment, i.e., that he was discharged from his employment with CBP on November 3, 2008 because of his national origin and/or religion.
Claims under Title VII seeking redress for disparate treatment in employment are analyzed under the burden-shifting analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir.2004); Phillips v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 2010 WL 1269772, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) he was in a protected group; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137-38 (2d Cir.2003); Collins v. N.Y. City Trans. Auth., 305 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2002). "The burden of establishing a prima facie case is not onerous, and has been frequently described as minimal." Scaria v. Rubin, 117 F.3d 652, 654 (2d Cir.1997) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)); see also Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir.2000) (plaintiff's burden of proof at prima facie stage is "de minimis").
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. In other words, "[t]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Upon the defendant's proffer of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its employment action, "the presumption of discrimination arising with the prima facie case drops from the picture ... [and] the plaintiff must then come forward with evidence that the defendant's proffered, non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for actual discrimination." Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742); see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1336 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 S.Ct. 851, 139 L.Ed.2d 752 (1998). To demonstrate pretext:
Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).
It is not disputed that Mr. Abdallah was a member of a protected group, or that he was qualified for the position he held when he was terminated. However, defendant contends plaintiff has failed to establish that being subjected to two investigative interviews, a polygraph examination, and reassignment to restricted duty caused him to suffer an adverse employment action,
An employee sustains an adverse employment action if he or she "endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment" that is "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Ed., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (overruled on other grounds). Examples of materially adverse employment actions include "termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a particular situation." Feingold, 366 F.3d at 152 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "A material adverse change is one that has an attendant negative result, a deprivation of a position or an opportunity. While adverse employment actions extend beyond readily quantifiable losses, not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action." Pimentel v. City of New York, 2002 WL 977535 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted), aff'd, 74 Fed.Appx. 146 (2d Cir.2003).
As discussed above, the court has dismissed as time-barred any discrimination claims based on conduct which occurred prior to October 16, 2008 (including the investigative interview conducted on September 22, 2008; the polygraph examination conducted on October 2, 2008; and placing plaintiff on restricted duty on October 3, 2008). Furthermore, there is ample case law to support the finding that requiring an employee to participate in investigative interviews, excessive scrutiny of work performance, or reassignment to less desirable working conditions that cause no material disadvantage, "will not establish the adverse conduct required to make a prima facie case" of disparate treatment under Title VII. Bright v. Le Moyne College, 306 F.Supp.2d 244, 253 (N.D.N.Y.2004).
Plaintiff's November 3, 2008 termination from CBP, however, clearly constitutes a materially adverse change in the conditions of employment sufficient to establish the third element of his prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII.
A closer question is presented with regard to whether plaintiff has come forward with proof sufficient to establish the fourth element of his prima facie case, i.e., that the circumstances of his discharge give rise to an inference of discrimination. Defendant contends that no such inference can possibly be drawn in this case because plaintiff has not identified any similarly situated individuals outside of plaintiff's protected class who were employed by CBP at the Port of Buffalo and engaged in the same or similar conduct (i.e., failed to cooperate in an official investigation) but received a lesser sanction. See Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir.2003) (showing that employer treated plaintiff "less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside his protected group" is a recognized method of raising an inference of discrimination for purposes of making out prima facie case); Rosinski v. American Axle & Mfg., Inc., 663 F.Supp.2d 197, 204 (W.D.N.Y.2009) (to raise inference of discrimination, plaintiff must show she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself), aff'd, 402 Fed.Appx. 535 (2d Cir.2010).
However, while identification of a similarly situated comparator who was accorded
Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37-38 (2d Cir.1994).
Here, plaintiff contends that an inference of discrimination regarding his discharge from employment can be drawn from the following circumstances:
See Item 52-1, pp. 27-30.
Considered in their totality in the light most favorable to plaintiff, these circumstances are sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer discriminatory intent, at least for the limited purpose of finding that plaintiff has discharged his minimal evidentiary burden to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. The court therefore turns to the next step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to determine whether defendant has sufficiently articulated a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for terminating plaintiff's employment.
The undisputed facts presented by way of the parties' summary judgment submissions establish that plaintiff was terminated from his employment as a direct consequence of his refusal to participate in the October 28, 2008 Kalkines interview, which was conducted by DHS in connection with an ongoing administrative investigation to assess his fitness for duty as a Customs and Border Protection Officer.
The undisputed facts further establish that Port Director Wilson made the decision to terminate plaintiff following consultation with a CBP labor relations specialist, who recommended removal as an appropriate sanction for violation of section 6.4.2 of the CBP Standards of Conduct, considering plaintiff's intern status. See Deft. Exh. 24 (pp. 41-42). This recommendation was clearly within the range of sanctions outlined in the Standards of Conduct's Table of Offenses, authorizing punishment for the offense of "[r]efusing or failing to cooperate in an official investigation or inquiry" in a range from suspension of 14 days up to and including removal. See Deft. Exh. 3 (p. 41).
Given this proof, the court finds that defendant has clearly and specifically articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff's employment — namely, plaintiff's failure to fully participate in an official investigation into his conduct during the first few months of his probationary internship period, as he was required to do under the FCIP Employment Agreement and the CBP's Standards of Conduct. Cf. Butler v. Potter, 2011 WL 4479068, at *2, *3, *7 (N.D.Fla. Sept. 11, 2011) (postal employee's failure to cooperate in Kalkines interview during official investigation despite duty to do so found to be legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination). Accordingly, the presumption of discrimination arising with the prima facie showing "drops from picture," Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42, and the court turns to the question whether plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to support a rational finding of pretext — i.e., "that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the employer were false, and that more likely than not discrimination was the real reason for the discharge." Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal alteration omitted).
"Pretext may be demonstrated either by the presentation of additional evidence showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence, or by reliance on the evidence comprising the prima facie case, without more." Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As explained at further length by the Supreme Court:
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-48, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). In so holding, the Court expressly rejected the "pretext plus" rule followed by some circuit courts, under which a prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's explanation, was routinely deemed insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a jury's finding of intentional discrimination. Id. at 146, 120 S.Ct. 2097.
In James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2000), the Second Circuit considered whether the holding in Reeves was consistent with the holding in Fisher, in which the circuit court rejected the proposition previously outlined in Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193 (2d Cir.1995) — "that evidence satisfying McDonnell Douglas's minimal requirements of a prima facie case plus evidence from which a factfinder could find that the employer's explanation was false necessarily requires submission to the jury." James, 233 F.3d at 156-57 (2d Cir.2000). The Second Circuit reasoned that application of the Binder rule "would illogically permit a plaintiff to prevail notwithstanding the absence of evidence capable of supporting a finding of discrimination." Id. at 154. This is because the prima facie requirements of McDonnell Douglas "are so minimal that they do not necessarily support any inference of discrimination; and there are so many reasons why employers give false reasons for an adverse employment action that evidence contradicting the employer's given reason — without more — does not necessarily give logical support to an inference of discrimination." Id. The circuit court further recognized that in some circumstances, a prima facie showing plus proof of falsity might provide "powerful evidence of discrimination ... but in others, the two together might fall far short of providing evidence from which a reasonable inference of discrimination could be drawn." Id. "The essential point ... [is] that employers should not be held liable for discrimination in the absence of evidence supporting a reasonable finding of discrimination." Id. at 154-55. The court distilled from these holdings the following propositions to aid in determining whether a plaintiff's proffer is sufficient to avoid summary judgment at the pretext stage of the disparate treatment analysis:
Id. at 156-57.
Applying these propositions to the record presented on summary judgment in
These impromptu challenges must be rejected, for several reasons. First and foremost, plaintiff brought this employment discrimination action pursuant to Title VII, and did not allege deprivation of due process or denial of equal protection as grounds for relief in either the original or amended pleadings. Courts within the Second Circuit have consistently ruled that it is inappropriate to raise new claims for the first time in submissions in opposition to summary judgment. See, e.g., Thomas v. Egan, 1 Fed.Appx. 52, 54 (2d Cir.2001); Levion v. Societe Generale, 822 F.Supp.2d 390, 399 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (citing cases). In any event, since probationary federal employees have no constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment, their claims for denial of their due process right to a pre-termination hearing have been routinely dismissed by the courts. See, e.g., Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 2010 WL 55061, at *8-9 (D.Conn. Jan. 4, 2010) (probationary postal service employee did not have entitlement to or expectation of continued employment and thus did not have protected property interest), aff'd, 423 Fed.Appx. 108 (2d Cir.2011); Booher v. United States Postal Service, 843 F.2d 943, 944 (6th Cir.1988) (probationary federal employee had no property interest in continued employment); Ingalsbe v. Chertoff, 2006 WL 908678, at *13 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 6, 2006) (no protected property interest in probationary position as TSA Security Screener).
Furthermore, the courts have limited "strict scrutiny" analysis to cases in which legislative enactment or application of government policy has drawn a classification which "impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
Thus, in the absence of any further evidence to support a reasonable inference that defendant's explanation for the action it took against plaintiff was false, the court is left with the task of determining whether the probative value of plaintiff's circumstantial prima facie showing is sufficient to require the case to be submitted to a jury. As the discussion above reveals, plaintiff's prima facie evidence consists of little more than his claim, supported only by the allegations in the pleadings and his deposition testimony, that the CBP targeted him for investigation (and eventual termination) solely because of his national origin, his religious upbringing, and his association with others of similar background. In the face of defendant's clearly articulated and well-documented reasons for the actions it took, plaintiff's exclusive reliance on his prima facie case falls far short of the level of proof necessary to permit a rational jury to find that the defendant's reasons were false, and that plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination is true.
Based upon its careful scrutiny of the record in this case, developed after ample time for discovery, the court finds no admissible evidence beyond the allegations in the pleadings and plaintiff's self-serving deposition testimony that could be considered sufficient to raise the reasonable inference that plaintiff's probationary internship with CBP was terminated not because he refused to fully participate in the Department of Homeland Security's investigation of his continued suitability for employment, but because of his Tunisian national origin and Muslim upbringing. Accordingly, no rational juror could find in plaintiff's favor on his Title VII claim, and defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment (Item 45) is granted, plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment (Item 52) is denied, and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter final judgment in favor of defendant.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
So ordered.
In a decision and order entered on November 9, 2012, this court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in this action in its entirety. Abdallah v. Napolitano, 909 F.Supp.2d 196, 2012 WL 5471986 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2012). Plaintiff moves for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e), which provides, simply, that "[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment."
The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is "strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995), quoted in Space Hunters, Inc. v. U.S., 2012 WL 4903254, at *4 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2012). "A movant for reconsideration bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that there has been an intervening change of controlling law, that new evidence has become available, or that there is a need to correct a clear
In support of his motion in this case, plaintiff contends that the court committed "clear legal error" by relying on Second Circuit case law of "questionable precedential value" (Item 63-1, p. 1) when it found that plaintiff had failed to proffer any admissible evidence, beyond the allegations in the pleadings and his own self-serving deposition testimony, sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that his probationary employment as a Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") Officer with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") was terminated on the basis of illegal discrimination. See Abdallah, 2012 WL 5471986, at *11-13. Specifically, plaintiff challenges the court's reference to the holdings in Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir.1997), and James v. New York Racing Association, 233 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.2000), which plaintiff contends have been abrogated or superceded by the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Plaintiff further asserts that, in reaching its determination, the court ignored the more recent binding precedent of Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003), cited by plaintiff in his summary judgment brief, in which the Supreme Court held that under the 1991 amendments to Title VII, a plaintiff in a so-called "mixed-motive" case is not required to produce direct evidence that the employer's stated non-discriminatory reason for its employment action was a pretext for discrimination, but need only offer evidence of discriminatory intent as a motivating factor. See Id. at 101-02, 123 S.Ct. 2148.
These contentions must be rejected, for several reasons. First of all, as should be clear from a reading of the November 9, 2012 decision, Fisher was cited by this court as supporting authority (along with other frequently cited — and binding — Second Circuit and Supreme Court precedent) for the well-established proposition that, under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for considering Title VII claims, once the plaintiff has satisfied its minimal burden to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and the employer has articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its employment action, in order to avoid summary judgment the plaintiff must "come forward with evidence that the defendant's proffered, non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for actual discrimination." Abdallah, 909 F.Supp.2d at 205, 2012 WL 5471986, at *7 (citing Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir.2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); and Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1336).
Second, this court's discussion of the holding in James reflects the Second Circuit's careful examination of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Reeves, finding it to be "wholly compatible and harmonious with [the] reasoning in Fisher" and finding "no inconsistency between the two rulings." James, 233 F.3d at 155. By way of further explanation:
James, 233 F.3d at 156 n. 3; see also Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 89 n. 5 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that "[i]t is arguable that the Supreme Court's reading of Fisher was inaccurate. We read Fisher as consonant with Reeves...."). Accordingly, a reasoned and thorough examination of the holdings in James and Fisher reveals the continued viability of their binding precedent in this Circuit, and this court's reliance on the standards set forth in James for guidance in determining whether plaintiff's proffer of circumstantial evidence was sufficient to avoid summary judgment at the pretext stage of the Title VII disparate treatment analysis cannot be deemed to be clear legal error.
Likewise, the court's reliance on James is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Desert Palace. In that case, the precise question before the Court was whether a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case — i.e., where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the employer's decision — must present direct (as opposed to merely circumstantial) evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under Section 2000e-2(m) of Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Nor does the Second Circuit's decision in Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.2008), require reconsideration. In Holcomb, the plaintiff was fired from his position as an assistant coach of the Iona College men's basketball team following a decline in the team's performance. He claimed that the college's decision to terminate him was motivated in part by his marriage to an African-American woman (the plaintiff is white). The district court
Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 141-42 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In this case, however, plaintiff has not alleged — nor did he argue in his submissions on summary judgment — that the decision to terminate him was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons. Rather, plaintiff has steadfastly challenged the legitimacy of the reasons given for his termination, asserting grounds which were thoroughly considered and rejected by the court. In any event, even if plaintiff's claims could be viewed as sufficient to invoke the mixed-motive principles applied in Desert Palace and Holcomb, there is nothing in his Rule 59(e) submissions that might reasonably be expected to show that the decision to terminate him was partly motivated by illegitimate reasons, or to somehow otherwise alter the conclusion reached by the court that the plaintiff's circumstantial proof, while sufficient to meet his minimal prima facie burden of production, is insufficient to warrant sending this case to a jury.
For these reasons, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.
So ordered.
Deft. Exh. 14 (p. 5).
Deft. Exh. 21, p. 30.