EDMONDSON, J.
¶ 1 This proceeding was commenced in the District Court as an administrative appeal from student disciplinary proceedings at the University of Oklahoma. We conclude that the District Court lacked administrative appellate jurisdiction and direct the District Court to dismiss the administrative appeal. We do not resolve the claims by the student that the University failed to use the constitutionally proper procedures for imposing discipline on him. These claims were not adjudicated by the District Court, and we conclude that students have available District Court remedies for constitutionally improper student discipline when the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act does not provide them with an administrative appeal. Because the controversy is improperly before us on a discretionary petition for certiorari, we recast that petition to an application to assume original jurisdiction and a discretionary petition for a writ of prohibition, and we direct the Clerk of this Court to correct the style of the proceeding on the docket of this Court.
¶ 2 Frank George, a student at the University of Oklahoma (University), was charged by the University with violating five provisions of the University's student code. The Campus Disciplinary Board (CDB) found that he was guilty of violating three provisions of the Code: 16.4 (Failing to Comply with Directions of Institutional Officials), 16.65 (Public Drunkenness), and 16.25 (Violating Applicable Local, State, or Federal Laws). He appealed to the University's Campus Disciplinary Council (CDC) and alleged that the evidence was insufficient for the administrative decisions that the student code had been violated. The CDC "invited Mr. George to provide a written submission regarding the insufficiency of the evidence, and invited the University to respond." Petition for Review, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, pp. 1, 10. The CDC reviewed the statements of the witnesses and the student, and in its written decision concluded that the student had failed to meet his burden to show that the evidence against him was insufficient. The decision of the CDB was sustained by the CDC.
¶ 3 George filed a petition for review in the District Court of Cleveland County seeking administrative appellate review of a final agency decision. The University filed a motion to dismiss with two attached exhibits and raised insufficiency of service of process and lack of jurisdiction pursuant 75 O.S.2011 § 250.4(B)(12), a provision of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act.
¶ 5 The University filed a reply with three additional attached exhibits and argued that the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court was not based upon whether George had alleged due process violations, but whether the Administrative Procedures Act provided for appellate jurisdiction. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss. The University sought review in this Court by a petition for certiorari and the request for review was granted.
¶ 6 The order in the District Court before us on review is titled "Final Judgment." However, it is an interlocutory order anterior to judgment and the order is neither final nor a judgment.
¶ 7 The claim made by the University was that the District Court was without subject matter appellate jurisdiction. This Court has examined jurisdictional claims within certiorari review of a certified interlocutory order without commenting on whether the jurisdictional claims involved the merits of the controversies.
¶ 8 Our opinions have indicated that it is possible for a jurisdictional issue to be intertwined with an issue on the merits of a controversy,
¶ 9 The method of review herein is by certiorari to review a certified interlocutory order. In federal courts, when a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits of the controversy the court is required to convert the motion to dismiss into either (1) a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted [Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion], or (2) a motion for summary judgment [Federal Rule 56 motion].
¶ 10 When the University's motion raising a jurisdictional issue is construed to be intertwined on the merits of George's claims, then the University's motion to dismiss (with reply) should be deemed to be a motion for summary judgment.
¶ 11 In summary, if the University's claim is jurisdictional then the order adjudicating that claim is not on the merits, and the order is thus not a certified interlocutory order that qualifies for a § 952(b)(3) review. On
¶ 12 The University makes a claim challenging the District Court's jurisdiction. The remedies provided by this Court's constitutional supervisory writs may be used to challenge the exercise of jurisdiction by a District Court. The constitutional supervisory writ of prohibition is often used for a jurisdictional challenge.
¶ 13 We treat the University's motion for summary judgment as raising both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims. We grant prohibition to prevent enforcement of the District Court's order that denied the University's motion for summary judgment on the jurisdictional issue that the trial court lacked Administrative Procedures Act appellate jurisdiction. We make no adjudication on other claims intertwined with this jurisdictional issue, including any claim on the merits or defense raised by the parties. Our opinion herein addresses the parties' issues necessary to adjudicate whether the District Court possesses appellate jurisdiction. Pursuant to issuance of the writ, we further direct the District Court to dismiss George's Administrative Procedures Act appeal in that court, but we make no adjudication on the jurisdiction of the District Court relating to George or the University which may arise from any source other than Oklahoma's Administrative Procedures Act.
¶ 14 The Administrative Procedures Act is composed of two Articles. Article I of the Act relates to state agency filing and publication requirements for rules, and Article II relates to agency notice and hearing requirements for individual proceedings.
¶ 15 University argued that George's discipline was not subject to Article II, his hearing was not a § 310 hearing,
75 O.S.2011 § 250.4(B)(12).
We first examine the plain language of the statute. If wording in a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous then the plain meaning of the words used must be judicially accepted as expressing the intent of the Legislature, and there exists no reason or justification to use interpretive devices or rules of construction to determine meaning. Tulsa Indus. Auth. v. City of Tulsa, 2011 OK 57, n. 6, 270 P.3d 113, 119.
¶ 16 Paragraph 12 begins with stating that The Board of Regents or employees of any university, college, or other institution of higher learning need not comply with the provisions of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act. This language is then limited by the exception for an expulsion of any student for disciplinary reasons. The plain language of § 250.4(B)(12) states that Article II applies when the penalty of expulsion exists for charges brought against a student in a university disciplinary proceeding.
¶ 17 University argued that George was subject to censure (or reprimand), parental notification, a $150.00 administrative fee, community service, a period of probation, and a "second strike" on the University's "alcohol policy," and that these were "all off the record at graduation." University argued that the charges against George did not have an expulsion as a penalty.
¶ 18 George's brief challenged the University's statement that he was not subject to expulsion. He stated that a "third strike" on the University's Alcohol Policy results in a suspension which is an expulsion. He also
¶ 19 Historically, the terms "suspended" and "expelled" have referred to a person's status with respect to an organization where "suspended" and "expelled" have had different meanings. One difference between a suspension and an expulsion is that the former involves a temporary privation of rights and privileges where the one suspended maintains the status of a student (or continues as a member of an organization from which the person is suspended), and the latter involves a permanent privation of rights and privileges where the one expelled no longer has the status of a student (or no longer has membership in an organization from which the person is expelled).
¶ 20 The University's Student Code makes a distinction between (1) a suspension, which is student's exclusion from classes and activities "for a definite period of time not to exceed two years or until the conditions which may be set forth [in the order of suspension] are met," and (2) an expulsion, which is termination of student status for an indefinite time, and the order of expulsion may, or may not, include conditions for readmission. University's Mtn. To Dismiss, Ex. 2, O.R. at p. 29.
¶ 21 George received discipline. He received a censure for failure to comply with the directions of an institution official. For public intoxication his deferred First Strike was revoked.
University's Mtn. To Dismiss, Ex. 2, University of Oklahoma Student Code, 2010-2011, Title 17 Sanctions, 17.4, Individual Sanctions, 2nd Offense. O.R. at p. 30.
George was also found guilty under the Student Code because he had violated a local, state, or federal law, leading to his plea of "no contest" to a charge of public intoxication that was made in the City of Norman municipal court. For this violation the Campus Disciplinary Board stated that the minimum sanctions for a Second Strike against the Alcohol Policy that George received were an adequate discipline.
¶ 22 George's probation did not expressly include a suspension from academic activities.
¶ 23 The record supplied to us contains no information on circumstances that bar a student from enrollment or how such circumstances apply in this case. This Court does not base its decision upon either unsupported statements in a brief filed in this Court or unsupported statements made in argument of counsel to the trial court.
¶ 24 George also maintained that the express language of § 250.4 required the proceeding to be subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act because § 250.4 requires "due process." We again look to the language of the statute.
75 O.S.2011 § 250.4(B)(12), in part, emphasis added.
George argued that if his penalty was considered to be less than expulsion then the disciplinary proceeding was required to comply with due process, and that such compliance required both the application of Article II to the University proceedings and the availability of a judicial remedy by appeal to a District Court.
¶ 25 University agreed that disciplinary proceedings less than expulsion must comply with due process. However, University argued that due process did not require application of Article II to the disciplinary hearings. University also argued that alleged due process violations in non-expulsion student disciplinary proceedings were subject to review by a civil action in a District Court but not by an Administrative Procedures Act appeal: "To the extent George believes he can articulate a cognizable claim for procedural and/or substantive due process violations, Oklahoma's civil procedure code, 12 Okla. Stat. §§ 1, et seq., would dictate that he `fil[e] a petition with the court' in order to commence a civil action." Petnr's Reply Brief at p. 3.
¶ 26 We first note that the statute does not state that upon any alleged infraction by a student of rules of an institution, with a lesser penalty than expulsion, such student shall be entitled to the procedures provided by Article II. The statute states that the student shall be given "due process, including notice and hearing, as may be otherwise
¶ 27 Section § 250.4 identifies two classes of students: first, students subject to discipline of expulsion where Article II applies; and second, students subject to discipline less than expulsion where Article II does not apply. The University argued that although Article II did not apply to students subject to discipline less than expulsion, § 250.4(B)(12) recognized that they were entitled to whatever due process was required in such cases. George argued that the language recognizing an entitlement to due process was the Legislature requiring Article II to be applied to all student disciplinary proceedings, both expulsion and non-expulsion proceedings. George's argument destroys the statutory distinction made between student discipline with expulsion and student discipline with non-expulsion. The plain words of a statute are deemed to express legislative authorial intent in the absence of any ambiguity in language. Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa, 2011 OK 57, ¶ 11, 270 P.3d 113, 118. Section 250.4(B)(12) is clear and a plain reading of § 250.4(B)(12) is contrary to George's argument.
¶ 28 George argued that judicial review in the form of an appeal is constitutionally required to preserve a person's rights protected by the Due Process Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.
¶ 29 Generally, the Due Process Clause does not by itself mandate any particular form of procedure. Powers v. District Court of Tulsa County, 2009 OK 91, n. 42, 227 P.3d 1060, 1074. We explained in Wood v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 141 of Pottawatomie County, 1983 OK 30, 661 P.2d 892, 896, and more recently in Daffin v. State ex rel. Dept. of Mines, 2011 OK 22, ¶ 21, 251 P.3d 741, 748, that the United States Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), established a balancing test to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the administrative procedures involved. The U.S. Supreme Court explained:
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903.
This balancing test requires consideration of the interests of George affected by the actions of the University, the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used, the probable value of additional or substitute procedures, and the University's interests. George argued that application of Article II is the essential element or condition to satisfy due process. This argument that Article II is the constitutional sine qua non of due process is simply incorrect. George does not present any argument based upon a Matthews balancing analysis that District Court appellate review is constitutionally required.
¶ 30 George claimed that the University hearing procedure was constitutionally flawed and Article II procedures must therefore apply to correct the flaws in the procedure of the disciplinary hearing at the University. When due process is invoked, it usually is invoked to require a particular procedure and not a collection of procedures unless each and every procedure in the collection is individually required to satisfy due process. One reason for this is that the necessity for one procedure to satisfy due process does not logically show that all procedures are necessary to satisfy due process.
¶ 31 George argued that Article II procedures must apply to correct the flaws in the
¶ 32 The language of 75 O.S.2011 § 250.4(B) lists several agencies that are not required to comply with Article II.
¶ 33 As a general rule and subject to some exceptions, decisions of administrative bodies, especially on questions of law, are subject to some form of judicial review.
¶ 34 A constitutional question would arise if the University made the argument that no judicial review of any nature was available to review the denial of due process rights possessed by a student in a student disciplinary hearing. But the University is not making the argument that judicial review of its actions is unavailable. The University's argument is that if a student is subject to discipline less than expulsion and that student's due process rights are violated, then that student may bring a civil action in a District Court alleging that the University violated the student's rights. George did not specify any property or liberty interest that he possesses that would be judicially unprotected if he is required to champion that interest in a District Court independent legal action instead of a District Court administrative appeal. He did not explain with legal authority how a statutory classification of those possessing due process rights in proceedings less than expulsion were constitutionally disadvantaged by bringing their due process claims in a District Court independent action as opposed to bringing them in a District Court administrative appeal.
¶ 36 Our construction of § 250.4 does not deprive a litigant of a judicial forum to hear a constitutional claim challenging an administrative action. We hold that 75 O.S. § 250.4(B)(12) does not expressly provide for application of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act when a student, like George, is subject to discipline less than expulsion for an institutional rule infraction; and that George's remedy of an independent civil action is adequate to redress any alleged violation by the University of his claimed rights to due process in the University's administrative proceedings.
¶ 37 George maintained that the automatic suspension as a penalty on a "Third Strike" was equivalent to an expulsion and Article II applied on a Third Strike. He also argued that the two proceedings culminating in the First and Second Strikes would be used as a partial basis for a Third Strike, and thus the first two administrative proceedings must be subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedure Act. The express language of § 250.4 does not make non-expulsion disciplinary proceedings subject to Article II when they are considered in a subsequent expulsion proceeding. Thus, George's argument was that constitutional necessity made the First and Second Strike proceedings subject to Article II.
¶ 38 In 1975 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that in the State of Ohio, on the basis of state law, primary and secondary students "had legitimate claims of entitlement to a public education ... [and because statutes] direct local authorities to provide a free education to all residents between five and 21 years of age," the students thus possessed a property interest in public education; and "[h]aving chosen to extend the right to an education to people of appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct absent, fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon Goss v. Lopez when it concluded that a student at Oklahoma's
¶ 39 Then, in Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419 (10th Cir.1986), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals used the analysis applied to primary and secondary students in Goss v. Lopez and applied it to students of the University of Northern Colorado.
798 F.2d at 422, note omitted.
In Goss, Gaspar, and Harris, the courts first determined whether a property right was present based upon either state statutes or the payment of fees or tuition. This burden and a party's failure to satisfy it was noted in Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 80, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978), where the Court said "Because property interests are creatures of state law, ... respondent would have been required to show at trial that her seat at the Medical School was a `property' interest recognized by Missouri state law," and that no showing was made by the litigant on this point. Id. 435 U.S. at 82, 98 S.Ct. 948.
¶ 40 George relied in his brief on Goss, Harris, and Gaspar for the proposition that he possessed a property right subject to Due Process protection when he was disciplined. George's District Court filings and brief in this Court do not refer to any state statute, such as those cited in both Goss and Harris, for showing that he has a property right created by Oklahoma law. There is no allegation in George's District Court verified petition that he paid fees. George does state in his brief in this Court that he paid fees. However, a litigant may not supplement an appellate record to show a fact that is a necessary element to that party's claim or cause of action in the trial court by merely asserting that fact in his or her brief in this Court.
¶ 42 George's characterization that a no-expulsion Second Strike proceeding is constitutionally deemed, or turned into, an expulsion proceeding due to the possibility of a subsequent Third Strike expulsion proceeding is simply an incorrect concept. For example, "Enhancement statutes, ... that are commonplace in state criminal laws, do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction." Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994). In Nichols the Court also explained that consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid due to absence of imposition of prison term, could be used for enhancement of punishment for a subsequent conviction where a prison term was imposed. Id. 511 U.S. at 746-749, 114 S.Ct. 1921. In Nichols the former proceeding was not required to possess all of the procedures constitutionally required for the subsequent proceeding although the punishment in the subsequent proceeding was enhanced by the conviction in the former. George's brief in this Court cites no authority in support of his argument that a prior non-expulsion offence must constitutionally be deemed to be an expulsion proceeding due to the possible threat of an enhanced-punishment subsequent offense. In the absence of any authority cited by George on this point other than the trial judge's opinion, we thus reject George's claim that the possibility of the Third Strike with an enhanced punishment constitutionally requires a Second Strike proceeding to be subject to Article II with appellate review in a District Court.
¶ 43 George argued that when the University employed one attorney to counsel the Campus Disciplinary Board and another lawyer to prosecute George for institution infractions, this conduct was an egregious violation of due process that "is inherently unfair and unconstitutional and smacks of impropriety." However, the fact that an agency participates in the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of matters before it has been held not to violate the due process clause. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. of Mines v. Jackson, 1997 OK 149, ¶ 11, 950 P.2d 306, 310. An administrative deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest must be accomplished by an impartial and disinterested tribunal in an adjudicative process where the procedures employed are appropriate for the constitutional interest at stake. Bowen v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Real Estate Appraiser Board, 2011 OK 86, ¶ 12, 270 P.3d 133, 136-137. George's argument addresses whether a due process violation occurred during the University proceedings and what process George was due. It does not address whether George was entitled to an administrative appeal to the District Court. His other due process arguments also address the nature of the proceedings before the University and not a right to an administrative appeal.
¶ 44 Absent exigent and unusual circumstances not present here, in the context of original supervisory writ this Court does not make first-instance assessments of applying legal principles to facts, but allows the parties to develop issues of fact and law in the trial court.
¶ 45 We hold that: (1) 75 O.S. § 250.4(B)(12) does not expressly provide for application of Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act when a student is subject to discipline less than expulsion for an institutional rule infraction; (2) the remedy of an independent District Court civil action is an adequate remedy for an alleged violation by the University of a student's rights to due process in a University disciplinary proceeding; (3) the possibility of a subsequent institutional offense that is subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act having an enhanced punishment because of former offenses does not require the former offenses to be also subject to Article II of the Administrative Procedures Act; and (4) absent unusual circumstances not present here, we decline in a supervisory writ proceeding to adjudicate constitutional arguments that were not adjudicated in the District Court.
¶ 46 We assume original jurisdiction, issue prohibition to prevent enforcement of the order denying summary judgment on the sole ground that the District Court lacks appellate administrative jurisdiction, and direct the District Court to dismiss George's administrative appeal. We decline to address the merits of George's due process claims relating to the procedures of the University.
¶ 47 WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, COMBS, and GURICH, JJ., concur.
¶ 48 COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J., and KAUGER, J., dissent.
KAUGER, J., with whom COLBERT C.J., and REIF, J., join dissenting:
¶ 1 The district court seeks an answer to the following question:
The answer is:
¶ 2 Article II of the APA concerns individual proceedings.
¶ 3 Rather, the APA provides detailed procedures to ensure that the same rights which are provided in district court actions are also preserved in administrative proceedings.
¶ 4 At issue here is 75 O.S.2011 § 250.4(B)(12) which provides in pertinent part:
The plain language of this statute states that the University, when holding disciplinary proceedings in which expulsion is concerned, must comply with the individual proceeding requirements of the APA. However, if something less than expulsion is sought, the strict procedural strictures of individual proceedings do not apply, but due process rights such as notice and a hearing and any other rights required by law are preserved and expressly required.
¶ 5 Here, because expulsion was not sought, under the plain language of § 250.4(B)(12), the formalities of an individual proceeding were not required. Had they
¶ 6 Title 12 O.S.2011 § 951 fills in where the APA ends. It states:
Here, the University's Disciplinary Council was acting as the functional equivalent of a judge in a judicial proceeding.
¶ 7 Both the APA and § 951 apply to this cause. The district court clearly had jurisdiction to review this disciplinary proceeding. Rather than force this student to start all over, the matter should be remanded for a continuation of that review.
Second, the order fails to satisfy 12 O.S. § 953 finality in that the order does not determine an action and prevent a judgment, and it is not an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon summary application after judgment.
Title 12 O.S.2011 § 953 provides:
Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.50 provides:
No certified interlocutory order shall be considered if taken from an order overruling a motion for summary judgment. See Rule 1.40 for the application of other rules to review of a certified interlocutory order."
This view is also consistent with our opinions explaining that an adjudication on a jurisdictional claim is not usually considered as an adjudication on the merits of the controversy when the plea of res judicata (claim preclusion) is made. Dearing v. State ex rel. Comr's of the Land Office, 1991 OK 6, n. 5, 808 P.2d 661, 665 (A plea of res judicata is based upon a judgment that was rendered on the merits of the case and not upon purely technical grounds.) citing, Powell v. Chastain, 1961 OK 28, 359 P.2d 336, 340 ("A judgment upon a demurrer which is based upon formal or technical defects of pleadings, a lack of jurisdiction, a mis-joinder of parties, or the like, as it does not involve the merits of the controversy, cannot be made available as res judicata."). Cf. Read v. Read, 2001 OK 87, n. 18 57 P.3d 561, 567 (Court explained res judicata as claim preclusion based upon a final judgment on the merits.).
Conversion of a motion to dismiss with a jurisdictional claim intertwined with a claim on the merits of the controversy would appear to require conversion of such a motion to one for summary judgment for two related reasons. First, an adjudication in the form of summary judgment is on the merits of a controversy. See City of Broken Arrow v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, L.L.C., 2011 OK 1, n. 2, 250 P.3d 305, 310, citing, Union Oil Company v. Board of Equalization, 1996 OK 40, 913 P.2d 1330, 1334, for the proposition that granting a summary judgment motion is an adjudication on the merits of a cause of action. Second, a moving party's burden changes when a motion to dismiss that addresses the merits of a claim (or cause of action) is converted to a motion for summary judgment, State ex rel. Wright, supra, at ¶ 48. Thus, if a motion raises both jurisdiction and a § 2012(B)(6) failure to state a claim, and motion relies upon extra-pleading facts, then the jurisdiction/merits motion is converted to one for summary judgment with the respective procedural and substantive burdens placed upon the parties for such a motion.
Although a constitutional writ of certiorari may be used to bring up a record of an inferior court to a superior court for review of jurisdictional error, Parmenter v. Ray, 1916 OK 600, 58 Okla. 27, 158 P. 1183, 1184-1185, and the Court has Constitutional authority for issuing this discretionary writ in various circumstances; the Court's rules require the parties to prepare a record to be used for a supervisory writ proceeding, Okla.Sup.Ct.R. 1.191, and a jurisdictional challenge is more frequently sought by a request for a writ of prohibition.
In individual proceedings:
This distinction appears to have been used by our Court of Civil Appeals in Mason v. State ex rel. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 2001 OK CIV APP 33, ¶ 16, 23 P.3d 964, 970 (released for publication by order of the Court of Civil Appeals). In Mason, the court assumed for the purpose of argument that a student code could create a contract between a student and the university while the person was student, but after the student was expelled he was no longer a party to the contract and no new contract-based obligations from the student code could be created because such obligations required a person's status as a student.
The following sanctions may be imposed on students by the appropriate Campus Disciplinary Council or the proper administrative officials:
Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 7 provides that: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The United States Const., Amend. 14, provides in pertinent part:
In State ex rel. Westbrook v. Oklahoma Public Welfare Commission, 1946 OK 95, 167 P.2d 71, 72-73, we relied upon a right-privilege dichotomy for the principle that an administrative agency may possess final authority to decide an issue without judicial review. But in Westbrook the Court examined the litigant's claim of arbitrary and capricious administrative conduct, and nothing in Westbrook precludes the idea that an opportunity for judicial review of administrative actions must be available for constitutional claims.
U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
The Okla. Const. art. 2, § 7 provides:
The corporation commission, the industrial commission, and board of adjustment have all been recognized as acting in an adjudicative capacity as the functional analogue of a court of record with dispute resolution authority. Van Horn Oil Co. v. Okla. Corp. Com'n, see note 8, supra at ¶ 12; Special Indem. Fund v. Quinalty, 1949 OK 17, ¶ 5, 201 Okla. 204, 203 P.2d 713; Torrance v. Bladel, 1945 OK 41, ¶ 0, 195 Okla. 68, 155 P.2d 546. See also, the following cases in which administrative proceedings are conducted in a quasi-judicial capacity. Baumgardner v. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services, 1990 OK 24, ¶¶ 6-10, 789 P.2d 235 [Ethics and Merit Commission]; Jackson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16 of Payne Co., 1982 OK 74, ¶¶ 10-11, 648 P.2d 26 [School Board]; Brown v. Banking Bd., 1978 OK 75, ¶ 32, 579 P.2d 1267 [Banking Board]; Board of Examiners of Veterinary Medicine v. Mohr, 1971 OK 64, ¶ 13, 485 P.2d 235 [Vet. Med. Bd.]; State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma State Board of Embalmers etc. v. Guardian Funeral Home, 1967 OK 141, ¶ 24, 429 P.2d 732 [Bd. of Embalmers]; Oklahoma Insp. Bureau v. State Bd. for Property & Cas. Rates, 1965 OK 147, ¶ 0, 406 P.2d 458 [Property & Casualty Rates Bd.].
