ORTEGA, P.J.
After a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment convicting defendant of two counts of aggravated murder, ORS 163.095, and two counts of first-degree abuse of a corpse, ORS 166.087.
We recount the facts consistently with the trial court's factual findings. State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66, 75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993) (appellate courts are bound by a trial court's findings of historical fact relating to a defendant's motion to suppress, to the extent that those findings are supported by evidence in the record). On a Sunday morning in November 2006, Washington County law enforcement received reports of a potential homicide scene on Highway 26. Upon arriving at the scene officers found two male bodies in a driveway about 20 feet off the highway. One of the bodies had been dismembered and was missing its limbs and lower torso; much of the skin had also been removed from the upper torso. The other body had not been dismembered but appeared to law enforcement to have been dragged to the location where it was found. An identification card found on the latter victim identified him as David Copeland. A medical examiner at the scene determined that the victims had been shot, stabbed, and also subjected to blunt force trauma. Based on the lack of blood and the position of the bodies, law enforcement believed that the homicides had been committed elsewhere and the bodies dumped. Officers also located other evidence, mostly items of clothing, which appeared to have been thrown from a moving vehicle headed east toward Portland on Highway 26.
Two Washington County detectives stationed themselves in a police car directly across the street from the house. Although it was not a marked police car, it had indicia of being a law enforcement vehicle, including a spotlight and the fact that two officers were sitting in the car using a cell phone and a laptop. The detectives were able to learn through computer research that the owner of the house was Francis Weber. They obtained Weber's driver's license photo and thereby identified Weber as the dismembered homicide victim. Given all the information they had, officers believed that the residence would contain evidence relating to the murders and, in fact, might well be the location where the victims were killed.
While detectives were watching the house, it was dark, windy, and raining hard. After they had been stationed in front of the house for some time, a person walked by the police car and attracted the officers' attention. The individual, who had a slender build and wore a black hooded sweatshirt, did not look at the officers as he passed the police car. Although they could not see his face, based on his gait, demeanor, and build, the individual appeared to the officers to be in his thirties or forties, unlike the 62-year-old roommate identified by Littrell. The detectives momentarily lost sight of the person as he approached the house, but immediately thereafter lights were turned on upstairs and a television set appeared to have been turned on. It also appeared to the detectives that the person was moving about inside the house.
Officers from the Portland Police Bureau arrived and, while the person was inside the house, positioned themselves in locations around the house to ensure that no one else could enter or leave it without being seen. In addition, police set up a command post and officers gathered in a community center nearby. At that point, officers were aware that two of the three residents of the house had apparently been murdered, that the whereabouts of the third resident were unknown, and that a person who did not appear to be the third resident was inside the house.
Believing that there was evidence relating to the murders inside the house and concerned that that evidence was being destroyed and that the third resident might be dead or injured inside, officers determined that they needed to attempt to contact the person inside the house. However, given the brutal violence of the murders, they agreed that it would be unsafe to send officers to the door to attempt the contact. Police investigators had gathered information about telephone numbers that were associated with the house and, at about 11 p.m., a detective called the first of those numbers. Although the telephone rang for some time, the call went unanswered. The result was the same when a detective called the second number: Although the telephone rang for some time, no one answered the call. A call to the third number associated with the house was answered by a man who identified himself as Sproul. He informed the detective who called him that he used to live at the house but had moved away.
Concerned that calls to the house had gone unanswered, officers decided that an officer, Defrain, would attempt to contact the person inside the house by performing a "loud hail" over the public address system in a police car. At the same time a detective, Steed, was assigned to begin an application for a search warrant which police were concerned would take some time to obtain. Steed went downtown to begin work on the warrant affidavit. At approximately 11:45 p.m., Defrain gave the hail which was repeated over a period of several minutes: "The occupants of
Ultimately, the person, later identified as defendant, opened the front door. Ignoring Defrain's continued instruction to keep his hands up and walk towards police, he instead reached into his pockets and turned back and fumbled with the front door of the house. Eventually, defendant turned from the door and walked toward the officers with his hands up. As defendant walked toward him, Defrain observed and alerted officers around him to a bloodstain on defendant's pants.
At 11:54 p.m., after he walked to Defrain as directed, officers placed handcuffs on defendant. In a casual conversational style, Defrain asked defendant his name and defendant identified himself as "Frank" and asked what was going on. Defrain informed defendant that he was not under arrest, but detectives needed to speak with him. Defendant informed Defrain that he had two roommates, but that there was no one else in the house at that time. Defendant also explained, in response to an inquiry by Defrain regarding what he had done at the front door of the house, that he had gone back to lock the door because "Francis would kill him if he did not lock up the house." Defendant was then asked if he would sit in the patrol car to get out of the rain while waiting for detectives to speak with him and defendant responded that he would not mind doing so. He was then placed inside a patrol car while still wearing handcuffs. Officers then performed a safety check of the house. No observations of any evidence were made at that time, but they were able to confirm that there was no one else inside.
At the same time, another group of police officers had been unsuccessfully searching the area for the maroon van. While heading toward a fast food restaurant for a late dinner at about 12:05 a.m., they happened to drive by a maroon van parked about one mile from the 62nd Street house. They stopped and looked through the windows of the van, observed what appeared to be human remains inside, and immediately notified the lead investigators regarding their discovery.
Just before 12:30 a.m., after the discovery of the maroon van and while it was still raining heavily, the detectives assigned to speak with defendant arrived in front of the 62nd Street house in a police van. The officers, who were in plain clothes and not showing any weapons, instructed defendant to step out of the police car, took him to the police van, and removed the handcuffs. Inside the police van (which, instead of having regular passenger seats, was configured with a table and chairs in the back), officers told defendant that they would like to speak with him. Defendant agreed to speak with the officers, and they told him that they were investigating the disappearance of his housemates and were concerned about possible foul play. They then asked for his consent to search the house. He agreed, indicated that he had no questions about the consent form officers presented to him, and signed it. After doing so, defendant asked if he needed an attorney. One of the detectives responded, "That is up to you." The officer then immediately proceeded to read defendant his Miranda rights. After providing defendant with those warnings, the detective asked defendant if he understood his rights, and defendant stated that he did and also signed an advice of rights form. Defendant then agreed to speak with the detectives.
During his conversation with detectives, defendant appeared to be concerned about his roommates. He gave detectives information about them and their living situation, informing them that he had last seen Weber the previous Friday and that Weber had a "purple-ish red" van that defendant had driven three or four months before. Detectives asked if Weber had any enemies who might want to injure him, and asked defendant for his pants size and about his activities on Sunday. Defendant, in response, told them a couple of stories about Weber's possible
After conversing for about an hour in the van, the detectives asked defendant if he would be willing to go over to the community center and make a recorded statement because the pounding rain made it hard to hear and impossible to record defendant's statements. Defendant agreed. Officers indicated that they would have allowed defendant to leave at that time if he had asked to do so. Inside the community center the light was much brighter than it had been outside or in the police van, enabling officers to see bloodstains the size of baseballs on both of defendant's knees. In addition, defendant removed his jacket once inside the community center and detectives observed a bandage on his arm, which defendant initially tried to cover. Shortly after officers began recording, defendant again asked if he should have an attorney. One of the detectives again told him that it was up to him. Defendant responded that he did want an attorney, so officers ended the conversation and took defendant into custody.
Pursuant to the consent to search that defendant had signed, another detective began a walk-through of the 62nd Street house at about 3:15 a.m. and observed blood in various areas, including the living room door jamb, the living room carpet, and on the transition strip from the living room into the kitchen. As a result, detectives froze the scene and left the house until obtaining a search warrant about 9:14 that morning.
Defendant filed several pretrial motions to suppress evidence. He contended that he was seized in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution
Following a lengthy suppression hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motions, concluding that police had acted reasonably at each turn. Specifically, the court concluded that the loud hail was not a seizure of defendant and was justified by exigent circumstances in any event. The court explained:
The court also concluded that officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant "was involved in a homicide at the time that he was removed from the home," that police acted reasonably in handcuffing defendant and having him wait in the police car, and that defendant's question regarding whether he needed an attorney did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel and, in any event, "it was immediately responded to by an advisal of rights." Furthermore, the court determined defendant's statements to law enforcement were voluntary. In addition, according to the trial court,
On appeal, defendant renews the arguments he made before the trial court. Specifically, he contends (1) that he was unlawfully seized when police hailed him from the house, (2) that he was arrested without probable cause when officers handcuffed him and placed him in the patrol car, (3) that officers violated his rights when they spoke with him before providing him with Miranda warnings, and (4) that his question about whether he needed an attorney was an equivocal invocation of his right to counsel and the police did not properly respond to that equivocal invocation.
The state responds that any seizure that police might have effected by hailing defendant through the loudspeaker and ordering him out of the house "was reasonable to prevent the destruction of evidence under the emergency/exigent circumstances doctrine." Furthermore, according to the state, "observation of bloodstains on his pant legs justified formally seizing defendant." With respect to the Miranda warnings, the state argues that police did not subject defendant to custodial interrogation without advising him of his rights. In response to defendant's assertions regarding his invocation of the right to counsel, the state contends that defendant's initial question was not an "ambiguous invocation of counsel" and, even if it "constituted an equivocal invocation," detectives responded appropriately. Finally, it is the state's position that, even if police engaged in unlawful conduct, the trial court properly concluded that "police would have inevitably discovered the
With respect to the loud hail, as noted, defendant argues that, when they used the loudspeaker to order him out of the house, police, in effect, entered the house and seized him. The state responds that, based on the circumstances presented, officers would have been justified in physically entering the house to secure the premises. Specifically, the state contends that exigent circumstances required police to act quickly to prevent destruction of evidence relating to the murders. Additionally, the state asserts that the loud hail did not constitute a seizure of defendant or, in the alternative, that any seizure was reasonable.
We turn first to defendant's assertion that he was unlawfully seized when the officers ordered him to come out of the house with his hands up. A seizure of a person occurs when officers arrest the person or when a police officer temporarily restrains a person's liberty. State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 407, 813 P.2d 28 (1991). A person is seized for purposes of Article I, section 9, "(a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual's liberty or freedom of movement; or (b) if a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would believe that (a) above has occurred." State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or. 297, 316, 244 P.3d 360 (2010) (emphasis omitted). The question of whether a person has been seized for purposes of Article I, section 9, "is a fact-specific inquiry into the totality of the circumstances." State v. Dahl, 323 Or. 199, 207, 915 P.2d 979 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant relies on Dahl in support of his assertion that he was seized under the circumstances in this case.
In Dahl, the court analyzed whether the defendant was seized when he complied with a police officer's order via telephone to come out of his house with his hands up. 323 Or. at 206, 915 P.2d 979. There, officers responded to a report of a man waving a gun on the front porch of a house and, upon arriving at the house, saw the defendant come onto the porch. After an officer shouted for the defendant to "come down `with his hands up,'" the defendant went back inside. Id. at 202, 915 P.2d 979. A police dispatcher then called the defendant and ordered him to come outside of the house with his hands up. Defendant complied, was determined to be under the influence of intoxicants, admitted to having driven his car and, during a subsequent prosecution for DUII, asserted that police had unlawfully seized him when they ordered him out of the house. Id. at 202-03, 915 P.2d 979. The court explained that an encounter is a seizure only if an
Id. at 207, 915 P.2d 979 (brackets in Dahl) (quoting Holmes, 311 Or. at 410, 813 P.2d 28). The court concluded that the police order to the defendant was not a request and conveyed the message that compliance was required. Furthermore, the order resulted in a restriction of the defendant's freedom of movement. In that case, the court concluded that the seizure was unlawful because officers, in effect, seized the defendant inside his home but there was no exigency or other justification for a warrantless entry into the house. Indeed, the court observed that "the officers `had no reason to go in [defendant's] house." Id. at 208, 915 P.2d 979 (brackets in Dahl).
In this case, we conclude that officers seized defendant when, using a loudspeaker, they repeatedly ordered him to come out of the house with his hands up. As in Dahl, the officers did not make a request; rather, they directed defendant to come out and, when he failed to comply, continued to repeat the order and added that they had seen him inside. Although officers did not formally place defendant under arrest, see ORS 133.005(1), they clearly placed a temporary
That conclusion, in turn, raises two other issues: whether officers had legal justification to seize defendant and whether officers could lawfully enter the house without a warrant. With respect to those issues, we agree with the trial court that police lawfully seized defendant at the time when they ordered him to come out of the house and that exigent circumstances allowed officers to make a warrantless entry into the house. In light of those considerations, we conclude that, although defendant was seized, officers acted lawfully. "A law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion and, thus, is permitted to stop an individual for an investigation, if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that gave rise to the officer's suspicion that the individual committed a crime." State v. Nguyen, 176 Or.App. 258, 262, 31 P.3d 489 (2001).
To have reasonable suspicion, an officer "need only form a belief that is objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances that an individual has committed a crime and may draw reasonable inferences from the circumstances based on the officer's experience." Id. at 263, 31 P.3d 489. Here, officers did not know who defendant was, but knew that he had entered a house occupied by two murder victims whose bodies had been found that day. Furthermore, they knew that the van belonging to one of the victims was missing, and defendant had been on foot dressed in dark clothes when he walked by the police car that dark and very stormy night. Defendant did not appear to match the description of the third person who lived inside the house and failed to answer telephone calls placed inside the house, although officers could see him moving around inside. Those facts and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from them provided reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in a crime and, therefore, officers could lawfully seize him by ordering him from the house.
Furthermore, contrary to defendant's assertions and in contrast to the circumstances presented in Dahl, in this case, police could legally effect a warrantless entry into the house. In particular, exigent circumstances justified such an entry to secure the premises because there was probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that evidence relating to it was inside the house and that a need to prevent destruction of that evidence required officers to act quickly.
Warrantless entries are considered "per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few specifically established and carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Bridewell, 306 Or. 231, 235, 759 P.2d 1054 (1988). The Oregon Supreme Court "has recognized the existence of an `emergency doctrine' exception to the warrant requirement in the context of investigation of a crime." Id. That exception applies when police are faced with "both probable cause to believe that a crime has occurred and an exigent circumstance." State v. Stevens, 311 Or. 119, 126, 806 P.2d 92 (1991).
"[P]robable cause exists when an officer subjectively believes that a crime has been committed and that belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. In determining whether probable cause exists, we look to the totality of the circumstances, but no single factor is necessarily dispositive." State v. Torres, 201 Or.App. 275, 288, 118 P.3d 268 (2005), rev. den., 340 Or. 308, 132 P.3d 28 (2006) (citation omitted). In this case, we easily conclude that police had probable cause to enter and secure the house based on the totality of the circumstances, including crimes that had been committed.
Further, we conclude that exigent circumstances existed to support a warrantless entry into the house. "An exigent circumstance is a situation that requires police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage of property, or to forestall a suspect's escape or the destruction of evidence." Stevens, 311 Or. at 126, 806 P.2d 92. Here, a person who police believed was not the third roommate had walked past and entered the house and could be seen moving about inside. Although officers did not know what the person was doing inside, they reasonably believed that evidence relating to the murders would be found inside the house and that that evidence was possibly being destroyed. When officers attempted to reach the person inside the house by calling two numbers associated with the house, no one answered the telephone even though the calls rang through. Furthermore, Steed, the detective assigned to prepare the search warrant application and affidavit, testified that he worked on those items for approximately nine hours, a period of time that was "pretty close to standard" in a homicide investigation. In such cases,
Under those circumstances, given the need to preserve evidence relating to the murders and the time it would have taken to obtain a warrant, exigent circumstances justified police entry into the 62nd Street house. The exigent circumstances would have justified officers physically entering the house to secure the premises, where they would have encountered defendant. The fact that, as noted by the trial court, officers chose to use a less intrusive procedure in the form of a "loud hail" is not determinative of the issues presented here. Officers in this case properly acted to secure a likely crime scene. Whether they chose to physically enter the house to secure the premises or to accomplish the same goal by simply instructing defendant to come out of the house, officers would have come into contact with defendant. Under the circumstances presented here, their actions were legally permissible.
Defendant next contends that he was arrested when officers handcuffed him and, in any event, when they placed him, in handcuffs, in the back of the patrol car. According to defendant, that arrest violated the state and federal constitutions because it was not supported by probable cause. We disagree. Assuming for purposes of discussion that defendant was arrested when officers handcuffed him, see State v. Werowinski, 179 Or.App. 522, 528, 40 P.3d 545 (2002); State v. Johnson, 120 Or.App. 151, 158, 851 P.2d 1160 (1993); State v. Morgan, 106 Or.App. 138, 141-42, 806 P.2d 713 (1991), such an arrest was supported by probable cause.
Probable cause to make an arrest exists when there is a "substantial objective
Here, as discussed above, defendant, although he did not match the description of the third roommate of the house, entered the residence of two roommates who had been found brutally murdered hours before. The crimes were bloody — one of the victims had been dismembered and the skin removed from part of his torso. A van owned by one of the victims was not at the house. Defendant approached the house on foot and dressed in dark clothes on an evening that was dark, very rainy, and windy. Police believed it likely that the house was a crime scene, and attempted to contact defendant by calling numbers associated with the house. He failed to answer the calls, although they could see him moving around inside. In addition, when officers instructed defendant to come out of the house, he did not immediately comply and was seen putting his head out of the window and then, again, opening and closing the window. When he came out of the house, although officers instructed him to walk toward them and keep his hands up, defendant turned back to the house and fumbled with the door. Finally, and importantly, when defendant did walk to the officers, they could observe what appeared to be blood on his pants. Under the totality of circumstances presented here, the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant when they placed him in handcuffs. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention to the contrary.
Defendant's remaining arguments relate to police actions after he was in custody. Initially, we address his argument that police "violated [his] right to counsel when they failed to clarify whether his equivocal invocation was intended to be a request for counsel." (Boldface omitted.) We conclude that officers properly responded to defendant's question regarding whether he needed an attorney and, therefore, we reject his contention on that issue.
"During a custodial interrogation, a suspect has a `right of assistance of counsel' that `arises out of his [or her] right against self-incrimination as provided in Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution." State v. Field, 231 Or.App. 115, 122-23, 218 P.3d 551 (2009) (footnote omitted; brackets in Field) (quoting State v. Meade, 327 Or. 335, 339, 963 P.2d 656 (1998)). Accordingly, police must cease questioning a suspect in custody who unequivocally invokes the right to counsel. 231 Or.App. at 123, 218 P.3d 551. "However, where the request is equivocal, the police are permitted to `follow up with questions intended to clarify whether the suspect intended to invoke his [or her] right to counsel.'" Id. (brackets in Field) (quoting Meade, 327 Or. at 339, 963 P.2d 656). "In either case, the suspect may thereafter waive the right to have counsel present during that or later interrogations." Meade, 327 Or. at 339, 963 P.2d 656.
Here, as noted, near the beginning of his interaction with detectives inside the police van, defendant asked whether he needed an attorney. He now contends that his question was an equivocal invocation of his right to counsel. Assuming that the question did indeed constitute an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel, see Field, 231 Or.App. at 124-25, 218 P.3d 551; cf. State v. Charboneau, 323 Or. 38, 54-55, 913 P.2d 308 (1996), officers responded appropriately and defendant subsequently agreed to speak with the detectives. In particular, when defendant asked whether he needed an attorney, the detective informed him that "that was up to him." In other words, he indicated that defendant could make the decision whether to have an attorney or not. Furthermore, the detective immediately followed that statement by informing defendant of his Miranda
Finally, we address defendant's arguments relating to Miranda warnings, which relate to two interactions. First, after defendant was handcuffed, Defrain asked his name, informed defendant that he was not under arrest but that detectives needed to speak with him, and asked if there was anyone else in the house and what defendant had done at the front door. Second, after defendant was moved to the police van and the handcuffs were removed, detectives asked defendant for consent to search the house. In both instances, he contends, he was in compelling circumstances and officers interrogated him without providing Miranda warnings. The state agrees that, at both times in question, defendant was in compelling circumstances that required Miranda warnings before officers could conduct any interrogation. However, it asserts that neither interaction was an interrogation.
Interrogation, for purposes of both state and federal constitutional analyses, consists of either express questioning or words or conduct "that the police `should know [is] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response'; `incriminating response,' in turn, means any inculpatory or exculpatory response that the prosecution later may seek to introduce at trial." State v. Scott, 343 Or. 195, 203, 166 P.3d 528 (2007) (brackets in Scott) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)).
We turn first to the request for consent to search. On that point, we agree with the state that the request for consent to search did not constitute interrogation and, instead, was merely a request for permission. The likely response, either yes or no, is not incriminating. Rather, as observed by the concurrence in State v. Vondehn, 348 Or. 462, 489, 236 P.3d 691 (2010), the likely and expected answer to a request for permission to search "either gives permission or it does not; the response is neither inculpatory nor exculpatory (although, to be sure, the results of the search can be)." See also U.S. v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir.1993), cert. den., 510 U.S. 1061, 114 S.Ct. 733, 126 L.Ed.2d 696 (1994) ("[C]onsent to search is not a self-incriminating statement and, therefore, a request to search does not amount to interrogation."). Therefore, officers did not violate defendant's state or federal constitutional rights when they requested his consent to search the house before providing him with Miranda warnings.
Similarly, with respect to Defrain's interaction with defendant before putting him in the police car, we conclude that the question regarding defendant's name was not interrogation. Officers did not know who defendant was, only that he had been inside the house but did not match the description of the third roommate who lived there. Asking defendant his name was not a question likely to elicit incriminating evidence and was therefore permissible. In any event, with respect that question as well as Defrain's other two inquiries — whether there was anyone
In view of the foregoing, the trial court properly denied defendant's motions to supress.
Affirmed.