MEMORANDUM OPINION

CYNTHIA M. RUFE, District Judge.

Before the Court is the motion to dismiss of Defendant Craig W. Steadman. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural history concerning Plaintiff's Complaint is recounted in the Court's February 11, 2016 Memorandum Opinion.1 In short, Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 1997. In 2004, Plaintiff filed a habeas corpus action in this Court,2 and then filed a petition for review of his conviction in state court under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). Plaintiff's federal habeas petition was dismissed without prejudice to allow Plaintiff to exhaust his state PCRA remedies.3 The PCRA review is still ongoing.

On February 17, 2012, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this § 1983 action alleging that Lancaster County District Attorney Craig Steadman violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law by refusing to produce certain evidence relevant to Plaintiff's claim in the PCRA proceedings, and seeking a judgment that Plaintiff is entitled to such evidence as well as fees and costs.4 As relevant here, on February 11, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to include new allegations, including that Defendant failed to produce the victim's fingernail scrapings and test results concerning those scrapings.5 Defendant now moves to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that the Court should abstain from proceeding with this matter pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine; and (2) that Defendant's claims are time-barred by the statute of limitations.6

II. STANDARD

Defendant moves to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (Younger abstention) and 12(b)(6) (statute of limitations). "When a motion under Rule 12 is based on more than one ground, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot."7 "Because the Court concludes that the doctrine of Younger abstention compels dismissal, further discussion of the legal standard for Rule 12(b)(6) is unnecessary."8

"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the jurisdiction of the court to address the merits of the plaintiff's complaint."9 Faced with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff has "the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist."10 "A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction."11 "In reviewing a facial attack, the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."12 "In reviewing a factual attack, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings."13

III. ANALYSIS

In Younger v. Harris, "the Supreme Court held that, unless there were extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions," out of concern for "traditional principles of equity" and "considerations of comity."14 For the Younger doctrine to apply: "(1) there must be ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings must implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims."15 Even if these elements are met, "Younger abstention is not appropriate if the federal plaintiff can establish that (1) the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other extraordinary circumstances exist . . . such that deference to the state proceeding will present a significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests asserted."16

All three elements for Younger abstention are met here: Defendant's PCRA proceedings are ongoing, Pennsylvania's enforcement of its criminal laws and review of its criminal procedures are undoubtedly important state interests, and the PCRA proceedings provide Defendant a forum to raise issues concerning the wrongful withholding of evidence.17 Faced with similar circumstances, the Court of Appeals and district courts in the Third Circuit have held that Younger abstention is warranted.18 Plaintiff's case is no different. The Court thus sees no reason to intervene in Plaintiff's long-running state-level efforts to challenge his conviction while those proceedings are ongoing.

Although all of the elements for Younger abstention are met here, Plaintiff also argues that "extraordinary circumstances" and "bad faith" exist—namely, that Plaintiff faces the death penalty and raises claims of prosecutorial misconduct—such that abstention is inappropriate.19 As to extraordinary circumstances, the Supreme Court has explained that circumstances justifying an exception to the Younger doctrine "must be `extraordinary' in the sense of creating an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief."20 Here, there is no pressing need for immediate federal relief because Plaintiff may renew his claims in this civil suit, or by federal habeas petition, once his PCRA proceedings have concluded.

Plaintiff also argues that the District Attorney's failure to turn over relevant evidence constitutes bad faith and shows that Plaintiff will be deprived of an adequate remedy in state court.21 But Plaintiff offers no convincing argument as to why the District Attorney's alleged misconduct has tainted the entire state-level appeals process such that Plaintiff requires federal intervention before Plaintiff's PCRA petition is resolved.22 Abstention is thus appropriate, and the Court does not reach Defendant's statute of limitations argument.23 However, because Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees and costs, as well as injunctive relief, this case is stayed, rather than dismissed.24

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion is granted. An appropriate Order will be entered.