Smith, District Judge.
In the middle of the night on May 2, 2016, the plaintiff heard a knock at her door. Answering the door in her pajamas, she found several City of Allentown police officers seeking information about her son's whereabouts and requesting permission to search her home without a warrant. The plaintiff flatly refused and attempted to close her door and end the encounter. What happened next is disputed by the parties. The plaintiff argues that two officers proceeded to violently pull her from her doorway, throw her over a railing, handcuff her, and drag her to a police car. The defendants allege that the plaintiff violently slammed the door shut on an officer's hand, then punched him in the face, and was restrained using a reasonable amount of force. Regardless of what occurred, it is undisputed that the encounter ended with a warrantless entry into her home and in her arrest.
The plaintiff brought the instant civil action against the officers who entered her home and arrested her, the former chief of police, the former mayor of the City of Allentown, and the City of Allentown. Concerning the asserted causes of action, she brings several 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and state law claims (i.e., assault and battery, trespass, civil conspiracy) against the individual officers. Against the former police chief, she brings a claim for supervisory liability-policymaker liability under section 1983. Against the City of Allentown, she brings a section 1983 claim for municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Currently before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. The defendants request summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff has (1) failed to establish her claims as a matter of law and (2) the officers, for certain of her claims, qualify for immunity under federal and state law. As to all her claims but one, which the court dismisses without prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), and partial summary judgment for another, the court finds disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Therefore, for the reasons stated below, summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
The plaintiff, Charlene Klein, filed her complaint against the defendants, Officer Stephen Madison ("Officer Madison"), Officer Christopher Hendricks ("Officer Hendricks"), Officer Michael Good ("Officer Good"), Officer Jacoby Glenny ("Officer Glenny"), John/Jane Does 1-X ("Does"), (former) Mayor Edwin Pawlowski ("Mayor Pawlowski"), the (former) Chief of Police Keith Morris ("Chief Morris"), and the City of Allentown (the "City") on October 10, 2017. Doc. No. 1. The complaint asserted twelve causes of action:
The defendants filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint on December 27, 2017. Doc. No. 13. After discovery concluded, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims brought by the plaintiff on December 14, 2018. Doc. No. 55. On January 4, 2019, the plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Doc. No. 58. The court heard oral argument on the motion on January 9, 2019. See Doc. No. 60. The defendants then filed a reply brief and a separate response to plaintiff's additional facts on January 14, 2019. Doc. Nos. 62, 63. Lastly, the plaintiff filed a surreply brief as to certain issues raised during oral argument on January 24, 2019. Doc. No. 68. On March 27, 2019, the parties dismissed the claims against the Does and Mayor Pawlowski by stipulation. Doc. No. 95.
The motion for summary judgment is ripe for disposition.
A district court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Additionally, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden "of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving
"When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). The court must decide "not whether...the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial'" and the court should grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, when one party's claims are "blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it," the court should not take those claims as true for the "purposes of ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
On May 2, 2016, at approximately 2:30 a.m., the Officers were dispatched to the
According to the defendants, witnesses informed several of the officers that Brandon lived at 830 North 9th Street (the "Residence") and that he ran up the alley towards his home. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13. Also according to the defendants, the victim informed the officers that Brandon ran into the home. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 12-13. According to the plaintiff, the officers were never informed, at the time they approached the home, that Brandon was seen running into the house. Compare, Defs.' Facts at ¶ 13 ("The victim stated that Brandon assaulted her and fled into Plaintiff's home."), with Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 13 ("A genuine dispute exists. No witness told either Madison or Hendricks that the suspect `fled towards the home through the alley.'").
Armed with the information above, Officer Madison and, ultimately, the other officers, walked up to the Residence in search of Brandon.
Officer Madison then knocked on the front door of the Residence and the plaintiff answered by opening the solid door.
It is undisputed that at this time, Officer Madison's hand was holding the screen door open. See Defs.' Facts at ¶ 19; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 19; see also Klein Dep. at 91 ("So in the meantime, my door, the screen door, is jugged. You know he [Officer Madison] had it in his hand."); Madison Dep. at 75 ("I held the door to keep her from closing it."). When the plaintiff refused to allow the Officers into her home, she attempted to close the screen door and end the encounter.
The parties dispute what occurred next. According to the defendants, Officer Madison tried to free his hand from the door and then the plaintiff punched him in the face. See Madison Dep. at 75 ("She then took both of her hands and forcefully closed it shutting my hand in the door. From then, I ripped the door open to get my hand out. And I stepped forward and she punched me in the face."), 94 ("Well, after I removed — forced the door open and removed my hand, I stepped forward and she punched me in the face."). This prompted Officers Madison and Hendricks to approach the plaintiff and attempt to "detain her." Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23.
After being placed in handcuffs, Officers Glenny and Madison placed the plaintiff in the back of Officer Madison's police car. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 23; Klein Dep. at 146; see Madison Dep. at 128 (describing the plaintiff as being "placed in the rear side of my — my vehicle by Officer Glenny. I opened the door and he placed her inside[]"). The plaintiff was later transported to the Allentown Police Department. Defs.' Facts at ¶ 28; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 28.
The plaintiff was subsequently "charged with aggravated assault, simple assault and harassment in connection with the incidents on May 2, 2016." Defs.' Facts at ¶ 30; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 30. The plaintiff successfully completed Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition ("ARD"). Defs.' Facts at ¶ 35; Pl.'s Resp. at ¶ 35; see also Defs.' Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I ("Klein ARD") at 2, Doc. No. 56-9.
"Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for the `deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'" Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). "To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that `some person has deprived him of a federal right...[and] that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.'" Id. (quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) (alteration in original)). Here, the plaintiff brings several section 1983 claims against the Officers in their individual capacities: (1) excessive force; (2) unlawful search; (3) failure to intervene; (4) civil conspiracy; (5) denial of medical care; and (6) violation of due process. The defendants argue that
In addressing the parties' arguments, the court first addresses whether the Officers have qualified immunity regarding the plaintiff's excessive force and unlawful search claims. Then, the court discusses the merits of the plaintiff's failure to intervene, civil conspiracy, denial of medical care, and due process violation claims.
The defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of qualified immunity as to the plaintiff's section 1983 claims for excessive force and unlawful search. The Officers have qualified immunity if their conduct "does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). "The doctrine is designed to `give[ ] government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments by protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Bryan v. United States of Am., 913 F.3d 356, 362 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting City and Cty. of San Francisco, Cal. v. Sheehan, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1774, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015)); see also Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. 808 ("The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). To determine whether an officer's conduct is entitled to qualified immunity, courts ask two questions,
Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d 711, 716 (3d Cir. 2018).
During this analysis, the court views the facts as most favorable to the non-moving party and "courts must take care not to define a case's `context' in a manner that imports genuinely disputed factual propositions." Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004)). Similarly, when addressing
Id. at 656-57 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
To determine whether Officers Madison, Glenny, and Hendricks (collectively the "Arresting Officers") are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiff's excessive force claim, the court first determines whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff established a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
Reasonableness is determined objectively, "but should give appropriate scope to the circumstances of the police action, which are often `tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.'" Groman, 47 F.3d at 634 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865); see also Gonzalez v. Murin, C.A. No. 17-324 Erie, 2019 WL 858096, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2019) ("Courts have found these elements — significant injury and repeated complaints of pain — to be particularly relevant in determining whether an excessive force claim may be maintained in the context of handcuffing cases." (citations omitted)). "The reasonableness of the use of force is normally an issue for the jury." Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 290 (3d Cir. 1999)).
In the context of summary judgment, certain nuances arise. To the
Here, the parties do not dispute that the officers "seized" the plaintiff when they arrested her, thus, "the only question is whether it was unreasonable." Rivas, 365 F.3d at 198. Compare Defs.' Facts at ¶ 25 ("No additional force was used on the Plaintiff."), with Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶ 25 ("A genuine dispute exists."). The defendants argue that the Arresting Officers used appropriate force because the plaintiff shut the door on Officer Madison's hand and physically resisted arrest. Defs.' Br. at 6. The defendants also dispute the plaintiff's assertion that Officers Madison and Hendricks threw her into the porch railing. Id.; Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 23, 25. In response, the plaintiff argues that disputed issues of fact preclude the court from granting summary judgment on the merits or because of qualified immunity. See generally Pl.'s Mem. at 7, 23.
As to the force applied, the parties dispute what force was applied during the plaintiff's arrest. Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 23, 25; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts at ¶¶ 23, 25. Officers Madison and Hendricks both dispute that they "threw" the plaintiff over the barrier. Compare Hendricks Dep. at 90 ("Q. By somebody throwing her on a railing. A. She was not thrown.") and Madison Dep. at 122 ("Q. Was [the plaintiff's body] not placed against the banister? A. Absolutely not."), with Klein Dep. at 92 ("[Officers Madison and Hendricks] had me jerked over my concrete wall and I kept telling him they're hurting me, they're hurting me, and I'm screaming and telling these people to stop hurting me."). Officer Glenny admits only to helping Officer Hendricks handcuff the plaintiff. See Glenny Dep. at 63-64 ("Q. Why did you help him handcuff him [sic]? A. She was resisting and she was yelling at — at all of us. And she was not — she didn't cooperate and place her hands behind her back. She had her — needed assistance with — with getting her hands behind her back and handcuffed."). Whereas the plaintiff argues that the officers who transported her to the car caused her pain by lifting her off the ground while cuffed. Klein Dep. at 143-44.
The parties also dispute the nature of the plaintiff's behavior and demeanor during the entire incident. Evidence in the record supports two theories depending on whether the court believed the defendants or the plaintiff. Based on the record evidence cited by the defendants, the plaintiff was uncooperative to the point of violence, namely first slamming Officer Madison's hand in the door and then punching him in the face. See, e.g., Madison Dep. at 117 ("She was very, very wild. She was swinging her arms around — and just very uncooperative."). According to the plaintiff's testimony, four uniformed police officers tried to unlawfully enter her home, and she attempted prevent the unlawful search
As to the defendants' argument that the Arresting Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, even if there was a violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, the court cannot determine whether the Arresting Officers are entitled to the defense at this time. Both avenues to qualified immunity, i.e., no violation or, if a violation, it is excused because the Arresting Officers made a reasonable mistake of law or fact, hinge on disputed facts (e.g., whether the plaintiff punched Officer Madison, the degree to which the plaintiff resisted arrest, and the force applied during her arrest).
To determine whether the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff's illegal search claim, the court first asks whether a reasonable jury could find that the Officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home without a warrant. Here, the parties do not
The Fourth Amendment provides:
U.S. Const. amend. IV. When a search occurs without a warrant, it is "presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." See Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). While a lawful search always requires probable cause, "certain circumstances can excuse the warrant requirement." Id. "One well-recognized exception applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts commonly refer to the exception as "exigent circumstances." Id. at 455, 131 S.Ct. 1849.
"Examples of exigent circumstances include, but are not limited to, hot pursuit of a suspected felon, the possibility that evidence may be removed or destroyed, and danger to the lives of officers or others." United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). "The common thread is imminence—`the existence of a true emergency.'" United States v. Mallory, 765 F.3d 373, 384 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Simmons, 661 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir. 2011)). The burden to establish exigent circumstances is on the government and it is not an easy burden to overcome. See Coles, 437 F.3d at 366 n.8 ("The Supreme Court has emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are few in number and carefully delineated, ... and that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches...." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Lastly, law enforcement cannot create the exigent circumstance themselves through their own investigatory behavior or "justif[y] [a warrantless search] by its fruits." Parkhurst, 77 F.3d at 711 n.4.
"In determining whether exigent circumstances existed, [the court] must review `the facts and reasonably discoverable information available to the officers at the time they took their actions and in making this determination consider the totality of the circumstances facing them.'" United States v. Jones, 155 F. App'x 62, 65 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Estate
United States v. Anderson, 644 F. App'x 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 130, 196 L.Ed.2d 102 (2016).
Application of the Dorman factors is fact intensive and difficult to generalize.
In the present case, a reasonable jury could find that the defendants violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered the Residence without a warrant. The court addresses each Dorman factor in turn.
The first factor, the gravity of the crime, weighs in favor of finding that exigent circumstances privileged the search. The parties do not dispute that the Officers arrived at the scene in response to a violent crime, and the Officers acknowledge that they were investigating a violent crime and not a minor offense such as a traffic violation.
As to the second factor, the Officers did not have a reasonable belief that the suspect was armed. The victim did not report that the crime occurred with a weapon. Madison Dep. at 145. The Officers' only rationale that he may have been armed is the general assumption that someone who commits a crime may have access to weapons inside their home. Specifically, Officer Madison testified that "it was a concern" that Brandon may have "access to weapons in the home." Id. at 146. While this general assumption has some significance, law enforcement officers likely have (or could have) this same assumption in almost all circumstances involving individuals accused of assault. Cf. United States v. Butler, 405 F. App'x 652, 661-62 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[P]olice officers will almost always have some reason to suspect that the targets of their drug investigations are armed." (emphasis in original)). However, unlike instances where the victim reports that the suspect used a weapon in the commission of the crime, there was no such report here. See Madison Dep. at 48 (stating victim indicated that Brandon struck her with his fist); see also Anderson, 644 F. App'x at 194-95 (finding exigent circumstances when officer witnessed armed robbery of convenience store, suspect "retained the weapon" upon leaving scene, and officer knocked on door and suspect answered). If a general suspicion that a suspect may be armed was enough, it would be rare to find a case where the police did not have exigent circumstances. Therefore, the court finds that this factor does not weigh in favor of finding exigent circumstances.
Concerning the third factor, the police had probable cause to obtain a search warrant of the Residence and an arrest warrant for Brandon. Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citations omitted). "In other words, the constitutional validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed any crime." Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Here, the Officers were responding to a 9-1-1 call wherein a witness reported that a male recently assaulted a female. See Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 3, Notes from 9-1-1 Calls at ECF p. 25 ("Um, I heard screaming outside. A woman was being attacked by a man. She said she was taking him home. When I came out, um, I seen him punch her right in her face."), Doc. No. 58-3.
As to the fourth factor, the Officers also had a reasonable belief that Brandon was at the Residence because of the information reported by the victim and witnesses. Even if the witnesses did not tell the Officers that Brandon ran into the home, it is reasonable to assume that it was his likely destination given the proximity of the Residence to the incident. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of finding exigent circumstances.
The fifth factor does not weigh in favor of justifying the Officers' entry into the Residence.
The sixth factor also does not weigh in favor of finding exigent circumstances. The Officers' entry into the home was not peaceable. While the Officers did attempt to gain the plaintiff's consent to enter, when she refused to let them inside, Officer Madison admits that he refused to allow her to close the door. Specifically, Officer Madison stated in his deposition that he "held the door to keep her from closing — it was a screen door — a storm door or screen door. I held the door to keep her from closing it so I could continue to speak with her." Madison Dep. at 74-75. Notably, in Officer Madison's "arrest narrative" he states that he "grabbed the screen door before it could be fully closed" which in turn caused his hand to get stuck and a struggle to ensue with the plaintiff. Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 4 ("Allentown Police Dep't Offense Reps.") at ECF p. 36, Doc. No. 58-3.
The defendants seek to rely on Grayer v. Township of Edison, 198 F. App'x 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2006), for support of their argument that the Officers' entry was peaceable. See Defs.' Br. at 26-28. Defendants' arguments based on Grayer fail because, unlike the plaintiff in Grayer who gave "some manner of consent" to the police officers, there was no modicum of consent provided by the plaintiff. Grayer, 198 F. App'x at 208. A physical struggle between an elderly woman and two police officers at 3:00 a.m. is not peaceable entry. Cf. Mallory, 765 F.3d at 387 (rejecting argument that family was hostile to search of home when they "briefly protest[ed] the warrantless entry of their home in the middle of the night" (citing United States
Lastly, this case does not fit within the "hot pursuit" exception. While the "hot pursuit" exception does not require a continuous chase or "an extended hue and cry in and about (the) public streets[]" typically "some type of chase" is required. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike situations where the suspect runs away upon seeing uniformed officers, even if the police lose sight of the suspect, or the chase is short, here, the Officers merely knew he ran in the direction of the Residence.
As stated above, the court finds that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the Officers' violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home without a warrant; therefore, the court must determine whether the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the court has already determined that a reasonable jury could find the Officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights, the court moves onto the second question of whether the right at issue is clearly established.
The right to be free of warrantless searches of one's residence unless exigent circumstances apply is clearly established —"a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of `exigent circumstances.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (footnote and citations omitted). The defendants do not appear to dispute this contention. See Defs.' Br. at 28 ("It is well established that a warrantless entry may be justified by exigent circumstances, such as hot pursuit of a fleeing felon."). Therefore,
The defendants also argue the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity because "the situation, as perceived by the Defendants at the time was not so clear that a reasonable officer would conclude that exigent circumstances did not exist to enter the Plaintiff's home to search for her son." Id.
As to their first argument, Grayer does not stand for the proposition cited by the defendants. In Grayer, police officers spotted Thomas Raiford ("Raiford") out in public. 198 F. App'x at 205. The police had a warrant for Raiford's arrest. Id. Once Raiford saw the police, he ran and entered an apartment. Id. The police "lost sight of him" when he ran into the building but had "reason to believe Raiford thereafter entered the nearby apartment of Raiford's aunt[, the appellant, Grayer]." Id. at 205-06. The police approached Grayer's apartment and sought her consent to enter and search for Raiford. Id. at 206. Grayer gave one of the officers, Sergeant Anderko, her consent to enter. Id. Next, Grayer called out for Raiford. Id. When Raiford responded, the officers ordered him to surrender. Id. He surrendered and the police arrested him. Id. After Raiford's arrest, one of the officers, Detective Wheeler, tried to enter the kitchen of the apartment and Grayer put her body between him and the door and "told him not to open it." Id. The officer then testified that Grayer pushed him, so he detained and arrested her. Id.
The Third Circuit found that a "reasonable police officer could believe that the pursuit of Raiford into Grayer's home, even in the absence of the owner's consent, was constitutional[]" because "[p]olice officers had been chasing Raiford, for whom they had an arrest warrant, lost sight of him, had reason to believe he was in Grayer's apartment, and, apparently, saw him from the rear of the building at or around the time Anderko and Wheeler entered the building." Id. at 207. In determining that the Sergeant Anderko made a reasonable mistake of law in entering the apartment, the court also relied upon the fact that Grayer provided some element of consent to enter. Id. at 208. The court held that if Sergeant Anderko was mistaken about his ability to enter the apartment lawfully, "that mistake—in light of the exigency and at least a measure of consent—was reasonable." Id.
The defendants also offer no basis for why the Officers needed to immediately enter the Residence. The "common thread" between all exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement "is imminence—`the existence of a true emergency.'" Mallory, 765 F.3d at 384 (quoting United States v. Simmons, 661 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir. 2011)). Here, the Officers have failed to put forth any rationale why they could not wait to obtain a search warrant and, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the record does not support an argument that the Officers imminently needed entry into the home.
As to their second argument, that the Officers believed they were in "hot pursuit," this argument also fails. The defendants argue that because Brandon "assaulted a woman to the point of being unconscious and then fled the scene" and that "[w]itnesses identified who he was, where he lived, and where he had fled — Plaintiff's home[,]" the Officers were justified in believing they were in "hot pursuit" and could enter the home. Defs.' Br. at 28. This is not a reasonable mistake of law because every hot pursuit case involves "some sort of a chase." Santana, 427 U.S. at 42- 43, 96 S.Ct. 2406. Here, it is undisputed the Officers never chased Brandon. The Officers only knew of his likely location and that he was a suspect in a crime. Defs.' Br. at 28 ("Defendants responded to the home believing that the Plaintiff's son was hiding there."). Officers are not rewarded with the right to make warrantless searches simply because their investigations yield quick results. This is a rule that
The plaintiff brings four additional claims under section 1983 against the Officers in their individual capacities: failure to intervene, civil conspiracy, denial of medical care, and a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court addresses each in turn.
The plaintiff argues that the Officers failed to intervene to prevent the violation of her constitutional rights against excessive force and unlawful search. Compl. at ¶¶ 119-129. The defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) there was no predicate constitutional violation, and (2) even if there was a violation, the officers had no "reasonable opportunity to intervene." Defs.' Br. at 11-12. The plaintiff argues that there are disputed issues of material fact with respect to the underlying violations and whether the respective defendants had an opportunity to intervene. Pl.'s Mem. at 11-12.
To be directly liable under a failure to intervene theory, (1) the plaintiff must have "demonstrate[d] that her underlying constitutional rights were violated[,]" Adams v. Officer Eric Selhorst, 449 F. App'x 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005)); (2) the officer had a duty to intervene; and (3) the officer must have had a "realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene." Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650-51 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). In the context of excessive force cases, "a police officer has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a victim from another officer's use of excessive force, even if the excessive force is employed by a superior." Id. at 650. Courts should deny summary judgment if the parties dispute whether the officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene. See id. at 650 ("Moreover, it is undisputed that all of the named officers were in the vicinity at some point when Smith alleges he was beaten. The extent of each officer's participation is thus a classic factual dispute to be resolved by the fact finder."); Hayward v. Salem City Bd. of Educ., Civ. A. No. 14-5200 (JBS/AMD), 2016 WL 4744132, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2016) ("A reasonable view of the facts may demonstrate that Officer Sieber, who was one of four persons in a small office room, was aware of the physical search, despite his contrary assertions.").
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the Officers failed to intervene with respect to two constitutional violations: excessive force and the illegal search of her Residence. First, for the reasons stated above, a reasonable jury could find the Officers violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered her Residence and used excessive force in arresting her.
Officer Glenny observed Officers Madison and Hendricks restrain the plaintiff, helped Officer Madison handcuff the plaintiff, and assisted in taking her to Madison's squad car. Glenny Dep. at 62-63. A reasonable jury could find that because Officer Glenny was close enough to assist in her restraint, that he could have intervened to prevent the excessive force. Officer Glenny also went to the backyard of the Residence while certain other officers went inside. Glenny Dep. at 92. If Officer Glenny had time to stand guard in the plaintiff's backyard, a reasonable jury could find that he had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the allegedly illegal search.
Officer Good, who the parties unfortunately did not depose, submitted an affidavit which indicates that he near the event and attests to personal knowledge as to what occurred on the porch and during the plaintiff's arrest. See generally Good Aff. at ¶¶ 4-13. The supplement to the "incident narrative" prepared by Officer Good also states that he went into the home with Officer Hendricks. Allentown Police Dep't Offense Reps. at ECF p. 35. The reasonable inferences drawn from the record, i.e., that he was in the area near the arrest and search, are sufficient to deny summary judgment as to the plaintiff's failure to intervene claims against Officer Good.
Officer Hendricks actively participated in restraining the plaintiff and could have intervened in Officer Madison's use of force.
Officer Madison was the primary actor in the arrest. As a result, a reasonable jury could find he had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the any excessive force applied by Officers Glenny and Hendricks. While Officer Madison did not enter the home, it appears that he was on the scene for some time after the other officers restrained the plaintiff. As already stated, the plaintiff remained on the scene long enough for Brandon to be brought out of the house and placed under arrest, and Officer Madison had time to search for the keys to Brandon's car prior to transporting the plaintiff to the police station. Madison Dep. at 133-34. At bottom, the record supports the plaintiff's augment that each officer had the opportunity prevent the constitutional violations from occurring. Therefore, the court denies the request for summary judgment on this claim.
"To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state
Thus,
Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 295 (alterations and omissions in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the plaintiff argues two bases for her civil conspiracy claim: (1) an agreement to violate her Fourth Amendment rights based on a conversation between Officers Madison and Hendricks and (2) that the defendants fabricated evidence as part of a conspiracy to cover-up the constitutional violations committed during the arrest and search. Pl.'s Mem. at 13-14. As to her first argument, the plaintiff did not produce any record evidence of a conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights other than testifying that prior to entering her home, Officer Hendricks allegedly turned to Officer Madison and said, "it's your call, Bud." Klein Dep. at 92. While the court finds this argument very weak, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff with respect to the conversation's purpose, it is sufficient to survive summary judgment. Given the procedural posture, the court cannot hold, as a matter of law, that the conversation does not provide evidence of a civil conspiracy because to do so requires the court to credit disputed material facts, namely that the conversation never happened. According to the plaintiff, the two officers came to an agreement and then conducted a warrantless search of her home. It is plausible this conversation was an agreement to illegally enter the home in violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights and the court cannot make a contrary factual finding on summary judgment. See Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 295 (stating that "an allegation of conspiracy can only be overcome at summary judgment when the moving parties' submissions foreclose[] the possibility of
The plaintiff's second argument, while weakly supported by the record, also survives summary judgment. The plaintiff alleges that the Officers conspired to cover up the constitutional violations in this case by fabricating evidence, namely submitting false police reports. See Pl.'s Mem. at 14 ("In addition, there is evidence that the officers conspired to cover up their actions by submitting false police reports that significantly downplayed the amount of force they used against Klein."). The plaintiff also points to an allegedly false affidavit submitted by Officer Hendricks.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the incident reports support an argument that the Officers conspired to downplay the incident. For example, Officer Hendricks describes the Officers as asking "politely" to enter the home and the plaintiff as becoming "very short and increasingly angry." Allentown Police Dep't Offense Reps. at ECF p. 40. Officer Hendricks also states that "K[l]ein escalated without reason even more when she suddenly grabbed the metal storm door and closed it on [Officer Madison's] hand." Id. Additionally, all the Officers tell the same story, that the plaintiff punched Officer Madison. The plaintiff disputes that she punched Officer Madison and the punch formed the basis for her arrest. The court finds, viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, that a reasonable jury could find that the Officers conspired to make the plaintiff appear worse in the reports to justify her arrest and their search. Therefore, while bare allegations that police reports differ from the plaintiff's version of events are insufficient to establish a civil conspiracy under section 1983 to violate her rights by submitting "false" police reports, Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288-89, the court will deny summary judgment on this claim because "[i]nferring mental state from circumstantial evidence is among the chief tasks of factfinders," United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 2012).
The plaintiff argues that the Officers violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying her access to medical care during her pretrial detention, namely by hurting her shoulder while handcuffing her, handcuffing her too tightly, and failing to provide her medical treatment upon request at the police department holding cell.
In the context of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must
Young v. Kazmerski, 266 F. App'x 191, 193 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
With respect to an arrestee, "a police officer [must] . . . provide medical care to an individual who was injured during the course of an arrest when the need `is so obvious that a reasonably trained officer would recognize the necessity for attention.'" Bornstad ex rel. Estate of Bornstad v. Honey Brook Twp., No. C.A. 03-CV-3822, 2005 WL 2212359, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2005), aff'd sub nom. 211 F. App'x 118 (3d Cir. 2007).
As to the first prong, whether the plaintiff suffers from a serious medical condition, courts have found certain obvious conditions, such as gunshot wounds, "serious medical conditions." See, e.g., Sullivan v. Warminster Twp., 2010 WL 2164520, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2010) (finding plaintiff who alleged police shot him and allowed him to die on floor stated claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical condition). Whereas other conditions such as "weight loss, eczema of the feet, seborrhea of the scalp, athlete's foot, constipation, and swollen knuckles" are not sufficiently obvious to a lay person to satisfy the first prong without a medical diagnosis. Tsakonas v. Cicchi, 308 F. App'x 628, 632 (3d Cir. 2009). Further, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered injuries from an officer's use of typical detention tools which may cause pain, e.g., pepper spray and handcuffs, does not automatically convert any injuries to "serious medical conditions." See, e.g., McCamey v. Craig, Civ. A. No. 15-1108, 2016 WL 5816821, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2016) (finding no deliberate indifference to medical needs post-pepper spray because "[i]t is expected that there would be pain and discomfort after being exposed to pepper-spray. Moreover, simply alleging `excruciating pain' is insufficient"), appeal dismissed, No. 16-4045, 2017 WL 5564562 (3d Cir. June 12, 2017); Fielder v. Fornelli, Civ. A. No. 09-881, 2011 WL 4527322, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2011) ("First, the use of restraints, inevitably causes some amount of discomfort or irritation and hence, their use, even if it causes a rash does not deprive the detainee of the `minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' as is required to establish the objective prong of a deliberate indifference claim." (citations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 4527374 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2011); Wade v. Colaner, Civ. A. No. 06-cv-3715(FLW), 2009 WL 776985, at *11-12 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2009) (holding delay in providing medical care not deliberate indifference when officers pepper-sprayed plaintiff causing him to be in pain, but plaintiff did not suffer from severe complications due to spraying); Dayton v. Sapp, 668 F.Supp. 385, 389 (D. Del. 1987) (explaining that officer's conduct in believing plaintiff did not require medical care after being sprayed with mace could constitute "negligent response from a trained police officer. . . [h]owever, the standard is not negligence but `deliberate indifference'").
Here, the court is unable to determine whether the plaintiff's protests during the handcuffing incident sufficiently notified the Officers to the severity of her medical conditions because the material facts surrounding the incident are disputed. While it is undisputed that the plaintiff complained of shoulder pain to Officers Madison and Hendricks, and that they did not provide her with medical care,
The defendants move for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for fabrication of evidence. The defendants argue that her "fabrication of evidence claim" is merely a "false arrest claim" hidden by "creative pleading." Defs. Br. at 19. As a result, the defendants argue Heck bars the claim, because success on her fabrication of evidence claim necessarily implicates her underlying criminal charges. Defs.' Br. at 21-22. In response, the plaintiff argues that the court should deny summary judgment because the Third Circuit in Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 (2014), recognized a standalone cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment for fabrication of evidence claims. Pl.'s Mem. at 16. The plaintiff also argues that the Third Circuit does not consider Heck a bar to independent fabrication of evidence claims because Halsey held that fabrication of evidence claims are distinct from malicious prosecution claims. Id. The plaintiff argues that Halsey's rule is dispositive because it "operates on the basis of a conviction." Id. at 17.
In Halsey, the Third Circuit held
Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294.
Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295 (citation and internal footnote omitted).
At the summary judgment stage, "a civil plaintiff's fabricated evidence claim should not survive summary judgment unless he can demonstrate that the fabricated evidence `was so significant that it could have affected the outcome of the criminal
As to the defendants' argument that Heck bars this claim because it is actually a malicious prosecution claim, the defendants' argument is partially correct. As described above, the plaintiff may bring a standalone cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Halsey; however, Heck can bar standalone fabrication of evidence claims. See, e.g., Ortiz v. N.J. State Police, 747 F. App'x 73, 77 (3d Cir. 2018) (non-precedential) ("Ortiz's claims that the defendants fabricated and suppressed evidence are barred by Heck because success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction."); Webster v. Wojtowicz, Civ. A. No. 13-1171 (ES), 2018 WL 4442220, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2018) ("Plaintiff's fabrication of evidence claim, for which the sole supporting factual allegation in the Complaint is that Defendants `plant[ed] drug narcotics on [him],' is barred by Heck." (alterations in original) (footnote omitted)).
Heck bars section 1983 actions which implicate the validity of an underlying criminal conviction unless said conviction has been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. When such causes of action are brought under section 1983, Heck requires courts to determine
Id. (footnotes omitted).
In practice, Heck requires a section 1983 plaintiff to have received a "favorable termination" before bringing claims which implicate their underlying criminal conviction (e.g., false arrest, malicious prosecution). Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cty., 804 F.3d 338, 344-46 (3d Cir. 2015). Pennsylvania's ARD program does not constitute a "favorable termination." Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding plaintiff's "participation in the ARD program bars his § 1983 claim[]").
In the present case, Heck bars the plaintiff's fabrication of evidence claim because (1) it implicates the validity of her criminal charges, and (2) she did not receive a favorable termination in her criminal proceeding. Under the first prong of Heck, her claim implicates the validity of her criminal charges because it seeks to establish that she was incorrectly charged based on fabricated evidence. Ortiz, 747 F. App'x at 77. Under the second prong of Heck, the plaintiff's claim also fails because she participated in ARD and ARD does not constitute a "favorable termination." Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211
The plaintiff brings two Monell claims: (1) supervisory liability-policymaker liability against Chief Morris, in his individual capacity, and (2) municipal liability against the City. See Compl. at 43 (Count VII), 51 (VIII).
"Individual defendants who are policymakers may be liable under § 1983 if it is shown that such defendants, `with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.'" A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586 (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). Individual defendants may also be held liable under a supervisory liability theory if "he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations." Id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The defendants ask the court to dismiss the official capacity claim against Chief Morris because it is duplicative of the plaintiff's claim against the City, Defs.' Br. at 37, however, the plaintiff's claim is brought against Chief Morris in his individual capacity. Compl. at 43. Unlike official capacity claims brought against policy-makers and supervisors, individual capacity claims are not duplicative of Monell claims against a locality. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586. Here, the plaintiff's only allegations against Chief Morris relate to his role as a policy-maker and not his personal involvement or acquiescence in any alleged violations. See Pl.'s Mem. at 30 ("Clearly, Chief Morris played an integral personal role in the policies, practices and customs which Plaintiff alleges, and the record and Dr. Peters' expert report details, were the moving force behind the Constitutional harms alleged here."). The plaintiff may proceed on this claim because she has sufficiently produced record evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could determine that the police department's policies caused her constitutional violations and that Chief Morris was a policymaker. Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 6, Defendants,
The defendants seek summary judgment on the plaintiff's Monell claim against the City because she allegedly failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation and, in the alternative, because the City's policies and practices did not constitute deliberate indifference that caused her harms. Defs.' Br. at 29-36. The plaintiff argues that she has produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her Monell claim, namely that her expert report shows how the City has failed to train police officers to avoid the constitutional violations that she suffered and that she has identified a constitutionally deficient policy. Pl.'s Mem. at 26-28.
Local governments can be held liable under section 1983 "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible for under § 1983." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. "[A] plaintiff advancing a municipal liability claim must establish (a) `a violation of a federal right'—which may not necessarily arise from the liability of an individual employee —and (b) a municipal policy or custom that caused the violation." Butler v. Lamont, 672 F. App'x 139, 142 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268-77 (3d Cir. 2000)). "Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict." Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Whereas custom "can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the plaintiff produced an expert report in support of her claim that the City's policies are deficient. See Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 5, Expert Op. Report: John G. Peters, Jr. ("Peters Rep.") at ECF pp. 43-72, Doc. No. 58-3. As to the first prong of Monell liability, i.e., a violation of an underlying constitutional or statutory right, for the reasons stated above, a reasonable jury could find the Officers violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights (excessive force and illegal search). As to the second prong, whether municipal policies and/or practices caused these violations, the plaintiff has produced evidence of policies which she alleges are constitutionally deficient and presented arguments, via expert, why those policies caused the violations she
The plaintiff brings several state law claims: assault and battery against Officers Madison, Hendricks, and Glenny (Count IX); state constitutional violations against the Officers (Count X); trespass against the Officers (Count XI); state civil conspiracy against the Officers (Count XII). Compl. at 60-64. As to the plaintiff's state law tort claims against certain individual Officers, the defendants argue (1) the defendants did not commit such torts because their actions are privileged and (2) the respective Officers are entitled to immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("PSTCA"). The defendants also seek summary judgment as to the plaintiff's "claim" for punitive damages.
For each of the plaintiff's state law tort claims, the defendants assert Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("PTSCA") immunity.
Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 292 (1994).
Aside from the exceptions for criminal activity, fraud, "actual malice, or willful conduct[,]" there are eight enumerated exceptions to PTSCA immunity: (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody or control of personal property; (3) real property; (4) trees, traffic control and street lighting; (5) utility services facilities; (6) streets; (7) sidewalks; and (8) care, custody, or control of animals. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(b)(1)-(8).
The plaintiff argues that Officers Hendricks, Madison, and Glenny committed the state torts of assault and battery during her arrest. An assault constitutes "an intentional attempt by force to do injury to the person of another and a battery is committed whenever the violence menaced in an assault is actually done, though in ever so small a degree, upon the person." Renk, 641 A.2d at 293 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Police officers are privileged to use "reasonable force" to effectuate a lawful arrest. See Pelzer v. City of Phila., 656 F.Supp.2d 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ("Similar to a Fourth Amendment claim, the officer's liability will hinge on the reasonableness of the force used." (citation omitted)); Renk, 641 A.2d at 293 ("A police officer may use reasonable force to prevent interference with the exercise of his authority or the performance of his duty.").
Here, for the reasons stated above with respect to the plaintiff's excessive force claim, the material factual disputes preclude summary judgment as to whether the Officers applied reasonable force during her arrest. Because the court cannot determine whether such force was reasonable, without accepting disputed facts, the court is also precluded from determining whether the Officers are entitled to summary judgment because their actions were not "willful" pursuant to the PTSCA. Cf. Rodriguez v. Panarello, 119 F.Supp.3d 331, 345 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (finding officer immune from assault claim under PSTCA because the "conclusion that the use of force was objectively reasonable is also dispositive of the issue of willful misconduct[]"). Thus, the court denies the defendants' request for summary judgment as to these claims.
Under Pennsylvania law, "`[o]ne who intentionally enters land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so is liable'" for trespass. Kopka v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 371 Pa. 444, 91 A.2d 232, 235 (1952) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 163); see also Woodham v. Dubas, 256 F. App'x 571, 576 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding jury's determination that officer entered property with permission precluded trespass verdict). If a law enforcement officer lawfully enters private property because the entry is privileged (i.e., the officer has a warrant, exigent circumstances justify warrantless entry, the officer has the owner's consent), the officer is not liable for trespass. See Dorkoski v. Pensyl, Civ. A. No. 4:05-0705, 2007 WL 775602, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2007) ("To the extent that the court has found that exigent circumstances justified the defendants' entry into the plaintiff's property, the defendants' entry was not unprivileged and the plaintiff's state law claim fails."). Here, for the reasons stated above, a reasonable jury could find the Officers' entry into the Residence was not privileged. The court defers analysis of PTSCA
The plaintiff also brings a claim for state law civil conspiracy based on the same grounds as her section 1983 civil conspiracy claim. See Pl.'s Mem. at 35 ("For the reasons set forth in the civil conspiracy/federal claims discussed above, the motion for summary judgment must be denied."). Under Pennsylvania law,
Skipworth by Williams v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 547 Pa. 224, 690 A.2d 169, 174 (1997).
Here, as discussed above, while the plaintiff presents a weak claim for civil conspiracy, disputed issues of material fact prevent the court from granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants at this time. Therefore, the court denies the request for summary judgment on the plaintiff's state law civil conspiracy claim.
The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's state constitutional law claim because there is no private right of action under the state constitution for monetary damages. Defs.' Br. at 39. The plaintiff argues in response that, to the extent she seeks non-monetary relief, the court should deny summary judgment. Pl.'s Mem. at 33-34.
"No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution." Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F. App'x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. City of Phila., 890 A.2d 1188, 1208 (Pa. Commw. 2006)). While parties may not seek monetary damages for violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, "equitable remedies are available." Id.
Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated her rights under Article 1, Section 1,
For the reasons stated above, the court denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's (1) section 1983 claims for (a) excessive force, (b) illegal search, (c) failure to intervene, (d) civil conspiracy, and (e) denial of medical care against the Officers; (2) section 1983 derivative liability claims against Chief Morris and the City; (3) state law claims against the individual Officers (i.e., assault and battery, trespass, civil conspiracy) and her claim for injunctive relief under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court will (1) dismiss without prejudice the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on fabrication of evidence because Heck bars this claim and (2) grant summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The parties may re-raise the following arguments at trial: qualified immunity on excessive force, PTSCA immunity as to the plaintiff's state law tort claims, and the plaintiff's request for a punitive damages instruction.
A separate order follows.
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
As to Officer Madison, it is disputed whether he crossed the threshold of the plaintiff's home while he was standing at the doorway. See Klein Dep. at 91-92 (describing Officer Madison as coming "into my doorway, pulls me out of the doorway"). Therefore, the court declines to grant summary judgement as to Officer Madison for lack of personal involvement. As to Officer Glenny, he testified that he did not enter the home after assisting Officer Madison with placing the plaintiff in the police car. See Glenny Dep. at 92 ("Q. Did you enter the house without a search warrant? A. No. Q. You were at the back door? A. I was at the — back of the house and the yard."). However, Officer Glenny testified that he was aware that a search of the plaintiff's home was ongoing, and he participated in the investigation by going to the back door and standing in the backyard. Id. at 92-95. The backyard of one's home is generally considered to be "curtilage." Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 156 (3d Cir. 2005). "A person's curtilage is the area immediately adjacent to his home in which he has a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id. at 156 n.14 (citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987)). Because Officer Glenny admits to entering part of the plaintiff's property without a warrant, the court denies summary judgment based on lack of personal involvement.
Hendricks Dep. at 98-99 (emphasis added).
The court agrees with the reading of Black described in Castellani, namely that "[t]here is no requirement under Black that the defendant in the criminal case (plaintiff here) must have faced trial." 2017 WL 3112820, at *11. Specifically, in Black the Third Circuit recognized that a conviction should not be a prerequisite to a fabrication of evidence claim because "[f]abricated evidence is an affront to due process of law, and state actors seeking to frame citizens undermine fundamental fairness and are responsible for `corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.'" 835 F.3d at 370 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). If the plaintiff's claims are true, she suffered the same harm, i.e., the initiation of a criminal proceeding based on fabricated evidence. While she ultimately did not go to trial, she participated in ARD—a costly and time-consuming process—a process initiated because she was criminally charged. Because "[the Third Circuit's] reasoning in Halsey makes no distinction between fabricated evidence leading to a wrongful conviction and wrongful criminal charges . . . [and] repeatedly referred to the injury of falsified evidence leading to wrongful initiation of prosecution[,]" the court finds the plaintiff may bring this claim even though she participated in ARD and was not convicted or acquitted. Black, 835 F.3d at 370 (citation omitted).
