REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARTIN C. CARLSON, Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

In evaluating Social Security appeals we are enjoined to apply a deferential standard of review, which calls upon us simply to determine whether substantial evidence, a quantum of proof that is less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla of evidence, supports the Administrative law Judge's (ALJ's) findings. Governed by this deferential standard of review we turn to the instant case, a Social Security appeal brought by Brad Koppenhaver. Koppenhaver contends on appeal that the ALJ erred: (1) in failing to find him per se disabled; (2) in evaluating the severity of his symptoms; and (3) in framing a residual functional capacity assessment for the plaintiff. However, recognizing the equivocal nature of this medical record, and given the very deferential standard of review which applies here, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is adequately explained in a written decision that conforms to the legal and regulatory guidelines governing Social Security claims. Accordingly we recommend that the decision be affirmed and the plaintiff's appeal be denied.

II. Statement of Facts

On January 15, 2015,1 Brad Koppenhaver filed an application for supplemental security benefits,2 alleging that he had become disabled due to the combined effects of spinal conditions, hepatitis C, diabetes, MRSA, depression, obesity, and coxa-vera, a hip deformity which caused a discrepancy in the length of his legs. (Tr. 17, 139, and 155.) At the time of this disability application, Koppenhaver was in his 30's and qualified as a younger worker under the Commissioner's regulations. (Tr. 28.) He had a high school education, (id.), and prior employment as a laborer, bricklayer and a cook. (Tr. 65.)

Koppenhaver also had a significant polysubstance drug abuse history, spanning more than 15 years, which included an episode in 2011 in which he was found by police playing chicken with an imaginary train after ingesting bath salts. (Tr. 334, 336.) At the time of his disability hearing, Koppenhaver was undergoing methadone treatment for his addiction, (Tr. 69), but reported receiving no other treatment for what he described as chronic pain. (Tr. 71.)

While Koppenhaver's disability application cited a series of emotional and physical impairments, before the ALJ and now on appeal the "crux" of Koppenhaver's disability claim related to his back and hip disorders. (Tr. 63.) With respect to these physical conditions, Koppenhaver's coxa-vera hip disorder had caused only a minor, ½ inch discrepancy between the length of his legs. (Tr. 67.) Further, it appeared that no medical source evidence provided by Koppenhaver relating to this condition opined that it was a disabling impairment. (Tr. 101.) Instead, the only medical opinion evidence relating to Koppenhaver's physical impairments was the opinion of a state agency medical expert, Dr. Mesaros, who stated in April of 2015 that Koppenhaver retained the residual functional capacity to perform a range of sedentary work. (Tr. 105-08.)

Koppenhaver himself acknowledged at various times that he retained the ability to engage in some physical activity. For example, at his disability hearing Koppenhaver reported taking walks with his daughter and being able to shovel snow for brief periods of time.(Tr. 68-9.) Medical records also disclosed that in June of 2014 Koppenhaver had reported to treating doctors that he had experienced discomfort while playing basketball with his daughter, (Tr. 230), and Koppenhaver acknowledged some involvement in this sport during his disability hearing. (Tr. 74.) Further, the record revealed that Koppenhaver was not fully compliant with recommended treatment regimes. Thus, because of his history of opiate addiction, Koppenhaver's care-givers had recommended other treatment for his chronic pain, including physical therapy, but Koppenhaver had declined to follow through on this physical therapy treatment plan. (Tr. 220, 476.) While no medical source opined that Koppenhaver's physical impairments were disabling, medical treatment records disclosed that he was observed in February of 2015 walking normally, (Tr.251), and displayed no joint stiffness or restricted range of motion in the Summer and Autumn of 2015. (Tr. 441, 459.) Koppenhaver did report to his physicians, however, that he had been seeking disability since 2009. (Tr. 225, 227, 476.)

It was against this equivocal medical and factual backdrop that the ALJ conducted a hearing into Koppenhaver's disability application on March 22, 2017. (Tr. 59-80.) At this hearing Koppenhaver and a vocational expert both appeared and testified. (Id.) Following this hearing, on May 30, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision denying Koppenhaver's claim for disability benefits. (Tr.14-29.) In this decision, the ALJ first found at Step 1 of the five-step sequential process that applies to disability claims that Koppenhaver had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 14, 2015, the application date. (Tr. 19.) At Step 2, the ALJ concluded that Koppenhaver had the following severe impairments: coxa vera deformity, joint and degenerative disc disease, neuralgia, bursitis, hepatitis C, obesity, social anxiety disorder, anxiety, depression and an opioid disorder. (Id.) At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that none of these impairments met a listing which would define Koppenhaver as per se disabled. (Tr. 20-22.) In particular, with respect to Koppenhaver's disc and hip disorders, the ALJ found that:

The ALJ then found that Koppenhaver retained the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of sedentary work. Specifically, the ALJ found:

In reaching this conclusion the ALJ arrived at a residual functional capacity assessment which was consistent with the only medical opinion on record, the opinion of Dr. Mesaros, the state agency expert, who stated that Koppenhaver could perform sedentary work. (Id.) The ALJ also concluded that this residual functional capacity assessment was congruent with Koppenhaver's reported activities of daily living, and the relatively conservative treatment history in this case. (Tr. 24-26.) Thus, the ALJ gave only partial credence to Koppenhaver's claims of totally disabling pain.

Having made these findings the ALJ concluded at Step 4 of this analytical process that Koppenhaver could not return to his past work, but concluded at Step 5 that there were significant jobs in the regional and national economy which Koppenhaver could perform. (Tr. 27-29.) The ALJ therefore found that Koppenhaver was not disabled and denied this application for disability benefits. (Id.)

This appeal followed. (Doc. 1.) Koppenhaver contends on appeal that the ALJ erred: (1) in failing to find him per se disabled; (2) in evaluating the severity of his symptoms; and (3) in framing the plaintiff's residual functional capacity assessment. This case is now fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution.

For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.

III. Discussion

A. Evaluation of Social Security Disability Claims

Resolution of the instant social security appeal involves an informed consideration of the respective roles of two adjudicators—the ALJ and this court. At the outset, it is the responsibility of the ALJ in the first instance to determine whether a claimant has met the statutory prerequisites for entitlement to benefits. To receive disability benefits, a claimant must present evidence which demonstrates that the claimant has an inability to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). Furthermore,

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). Finally, to qualify for benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must also show that he or she contributed to the insurance program and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(a).

In making this determination the ALJ employs a five-step evaluation process to determine if a person is eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999). If the ALJ finds that a claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the sequence, review does not proceed any further. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). As part of this analysis the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant's impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant's impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. Id.

Steps 2 and 3 of this sequential analysis are governed by familiar legal standards:

Dotzel v. Astrue, No. 1:12-CV-1281, 2014 WL 1612508, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014).

Before considering step four in this process, the ALJ must also determine the claimant's residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). RFC is defined as "that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s)." Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of the claimant's impairments, including any medically determinable nonsevere impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).

There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC determination and have suggested that "[r]arely can a decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant." Biller v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 962 F.Supp.2d 761, 778-79 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11-2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that: "There is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC." Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any credible medical opinion supporting a claimant's allegations of disability that "the proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is misguided." Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F.Supp.3d 209, 214-15 (W.D. Pa. 2015).

These seemingly discordant legal propositions can be reconciled by evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in a factual setting where a factually-supported and well-reasoned medical source opinion regarding limitations that would support a disability claim is rejected by an ALJ based upon a lay assessment of other evidence by the ALJ. In contrast, when an ALJ fashions a residual functional capacity determination on a sparse factual record or in the absence of any competent medical opinion evidence, courts have adopted a more pragmatic view and have sustained the ALJ's exercise of independent judgment based upon all of the facts and evidence. See Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006); Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F.Supp.3d 209, 214-15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). In either event, once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment of the plaintiff's residual functional capacity is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir.2002).

At steps one through four, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her from engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i)(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) by reference); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912; Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). Once the claimant has met this burden, it shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could perform that are consistent with the claimant's age, education, work experience and RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.

The ALJ's disability determination must also meet certain basic procedural and substantive requirements. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination. Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by "a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, "[t]he ALJ must indicate in his decision which evidence he [or she] has rejected and which he [or she] is relying on as the basis for his [or her] finding." Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).

B. Judicial Review of ALJ Determinations — Standard of Review

Once the ALJ has made a disability determination, it is then the responsibility of this Court to independently review that finding. In undertaking this task, this Court applies a specific, well-settled and carefully articulated standard of review. In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) or 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) to review the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying a claim for disability benefits, the "findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The "substantial evidence" standard of review prescribed by statute is a deferential standard of review. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). When reviewing the denial of disability benefits, we must simply determine whether the denial is supported by substantial evidence. Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1988). It is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla of proof. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971). Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427 (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)).

A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. However, in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the decision] from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966). In determining if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court may not parse the record but rather must scrutinize the record as a whole. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981); Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D.Pa. 2003). The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether Pinca is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that she was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31292, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 11, 2014)("[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.")(alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D.Pa. 1981)("The Secretary's determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts."); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990)(noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F.Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D.Pa. 2012)("[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .").

C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ's Assessment of Medical Treatment and Opinion Evidence

The Commissioner's regulations also set standards for the evaluation of medical evidence, and define medical opinions as "statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s), including [a claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [a claimant] can still do despite impairments(s), and [a claimant's] physical or mental restrictions." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). Regardless of its source, the ALJ is required to evaluate every medical opinion received. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

In deciding what weight to accord to medical opinions and evidence, the ALJ is guided by factors outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). "The regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion and the individual become weaker." SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 at *2. Treating sources have the closest ties to the claimant, and therefore their opinions generally entitled to more weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)("Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources..."); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining treating source). Under some circumstances, the medical opinion of a treating source may even be entitled to controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2); see also SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (explaining that controlling weight may be given to a treating source's medical opinion only where it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and it is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record).

Where no medical source opinion is entitled to controlling weight, the Commissioner's regulations direct the ALJ to consider the following factors, where applicable, in deciding the weight given to any non-controlling medical opinions: length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination; nature and extent of the treatment relationship; the extent to which the source presented relevant evidence to support his or her medical opinion, and the extent to which the basis for the source's conclusions were explained; the extent to which the source's opinion is consistent with the record as a whole; whether the source is a specialist; and, any other factors brought to the ALJ's attention. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Furthermore, as discussed above, it is beyond dispute that, in a social security disability case, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by "a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests." Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704. This principle applies with particular force to the opinions and treating records of various medical sources. As to these medical opinions and records: "Where a conflict in the evidence exists, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but `cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason.'" Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066)); see also Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000).

Judicial review of this aspect of ALJ decision-making is guided by several settled legal tenets. When presented with a disputed factual record, it is well-established that "[t]he ALJ — not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants — must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations." Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). Further, in a case such as this where the sole medical opinion is rendered by a state agency expert, as part of this process it is clear that state agency doctor opinions should be given careful consideration by the ALJ. As the court of appeals has observed:

Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). See e.g., Deiter v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-2146, 2018 WL 1322067, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-2146, 2018 WL 1315655 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2018); Spallone v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-1152, 2018 WL 2771581, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-1152, 2018 WL 2770646 (M.D. Pa. June 8, 2018).

D. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ's Assessment of a Claimant's Alleged Symptoms

The interplay between the deferential substantive standard of review that governs Social Security appeals, and the requirement that courts carefully assess whether an ALJ has met the standards of articulation required by law, is also illustrated by those cases which consider analysis of a claimant's reported pain. When evaluating lay testimony regarding a claimant's reported degree of pain and disability, we are reminded that:

Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612-13 (3d Cir. 2014).

Yet, it is also clear that:

McKean v. Colvin, 150 F.Supp.3d 406, 415-16 (M.D. Pa. 2015)(footnotes omitted). Thus, we are instructed to review an ALJ's evaluation of a claimant's subjective reports of pain under a standard of review which is deferential with respect to the ALJ's well-articulated findings, but imposes a duty of clear articulation upon the ALJ so that we may conduct meaningful review of the ALJ's conclusions.

In the same fashion that medical opinion evidence is evaluated, the Social Security Rulings and Regulations provide a framework under which the severity of a claimant's reported symptoms are to be considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 16-3p. It is important to note that though the "statements of the individual concerning his or her symptoms must be carefully considered, the ALJ is not required to credit them." Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 (3d. Cir. 2011) (referencing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) ("statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled."). It is well-settled in the Third Circuit that "[a]llegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be supported by objective medical evidence." Hantraft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999) (referring to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). When evaluating a claimant's symptoms, the ALJ must follow a two-step process in which the ALJ resolves whether a medically determinable impairment could be the cause of the symptoms alleged by the claimant, and subsequently must evaluate the alleged symptoms in consideration of the record as a whole. SSR 16-3p.

First, symptoms, such as pain or fatigue, will only be considered to affect a claimant's ability to perform work activities if such symptoms result from an underlying physical or mental impairment that has been demonstrated to exist by medical signs or laboratory findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 16-3p. During the second step of this credibility assessment, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence or functionally limiting effects of his or her symptoms are substantiated based on the ALJ's evaluation of the entire case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16-3p. This includes, but is not limited to: medical signs and laboratory findings, diagnosis and other medical opinions provided by treating or examining sources, and other medical sources, as well as information concerning the claimant's symptoms and how they affect his or her ability to work. Id. The Social Security Administration has recognized that individuals may experience their symptoms differently and may be limited by their symptoms to a greater or lesser extent than other individuals with the same medical impairments, signs, and laboratory findings. SSR 16-3p.

Thus, to assist in the evaluation of a claimant's subjective symptoms, the Social Security Regulations identify seven factors which may be relevant to the assessment of the severity or limiting effects of a claimant's impairment based on a claimant's symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). These factors include: activities of daily living; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant's symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate his or her symptoms; treatment, other than medication that a claimant has received for relief; any measures the claimant has used to relieve his or her symptoms; and, any other factors concerning the claimant's functional limitations and restrictions. Id.; see George v. Colvin, No. 4:13-CV-2803, 2014 WL 5449706, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 24, 2014); Martinez v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-1090, 2015 WL 5781202, at *8-9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015).

E. The ALJ's Step 3 Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence

At the outset, in this appeal, Koppenhaver argues that the ALJ erred at Step 3 of this sequential disability analysis process. Specifically, Koppenhaver contends that he met all of the exacting requirements for a per se finding of disability under the Commissioner's listings relating to spinal and joint disease. However, this contention warrants only brief consideration on appeal.

At Step 3 the ALJ is required to determine whether, singly or in combination, a claimant's ailments and impairments are so severe that they are per se disabling and entitle the claimant to benefits. As part of this step three disability evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant's alleged impairment is equivalent to a number of listed impairments, commonly referred to as listings, which are acknowledged as so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1; Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.2000). In making this determination, the ALJ is guided by several basic principles set forth by the social security regulations, and case law. First, if a claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is considered disabled per se, and is awarded benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119. However, to qualify for benefits by showing that an impairment, or combination of impairments, is equivalent to a listed impairment, Plaintiff bears the burden of presenting "medical findings equivalent in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar impairment." Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 (1990); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). An impairment, no matter how severe, that meets or equals only some of the criteria for a listed impairment is not sufficient. Id.

In this case, Koppenhaver alleged that the ALJ erred in failing to recognize that he was disabled as a matter of law under Section 1.02 of the Social Security Listings, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which related to spinal and joint disorders. Yet, these listings required a showing that Koppenhaver could not ambulate effectively to meet the listing requirements. In this case the ALJ found that no such showing was made here by Koppenhaver, and substantial evidence supports this conclusion. Indeed, the treatment notes of Koppenhaver's own physicians contradicted any claim that he could not ambulate effectively. Further, Koppenhaver's self-reported activities of daily living included walking with his daughter, further rebutting the suggestion that he was unable to ambulate effectively. In light of this evidence indicating that Koppenhaver retained the ability to walk effectively, and given the requirement at Step 3 that a claimant satisfy all of the criteria for a listing, the court should affirm the ALJ's Step 3 determination in this case.

E. The ALJ's Evaluation of the Medical Evidence, Symptom Evaluation and RFC Assessment Are Supported by Substantial Evidence

Further, on appeal Koppenhaver also challenges the ALJ's symptom evaluation and credibility determinations, which found that Koppenhaver's testimony was only partially credible. However, once again guided by the deferential standard of review that applies here, we conclude that these symptom evaluation determinations are supported by substantial evidence. In this regard, we are cautioned that we should "defer[] to the ALJ's assessment of credibility" provided that the ALJ "specifically identif[ies] and explain[s] what evidence he found not credible and why he found it not credible." Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612-13 (3d Cir. 2014). In this case, the ALJ explained that Koppenhaver's testimony concerning the severity of his symptoms was not entirely credible because it conflicted with objective clinical results, the state agency doctor's expert opinion, and his own self-described activities of daily living. Given the deference owed to this credibility determination, that decision—which is supported by substantial evidence—also should not be disturbed on appeal.

Finally, Koppenhaver's objections to the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment in this case are also unavailing. The RFC formulated by the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence. It drew upon the only medical opinion in the record, the clinical records, and the plaintiff's own proven capabilities as reflected by his self-reported activities of daily living. Each aspect of this RFC drew evidentiary support from these various sources, and the basis for the ALJ's assessment was adequately explained in the decision denying this application for benefits. Mindful of the fact that our review of the ALJ's assessment of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial evidence, we conclude that there are no grounds to set aside the residual functional capacity assessment made here, which was consistent with Koppenhaver's own reported capabilities. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Metzgar v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017); Rathbun v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018 WL 1479366 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018).

In sum, the ALJ's assessment of the evidence in this case complied with the dictates of the law and was supported by substantial evidence. This is all that the law requires, and all that a claimant like Koppenhaver can demand in a disability proceeding. Thus, notwithstanding the argument that this evidence could have been further explained, or might have been viewed in a way which would have also supported a different finding, we are obliged to affirm this ruling once we find that it is "supported by substantial evidence, `even [where] this court acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.'" Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, under the deferential standard of review that applies to appeals of Social Security disability determinations we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's evaluation of this case. Therefore, we recommend that the district court affirm this decision, direct that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant, and instruct the clerk to close this case.

IV. Recommendation

In summary, we find that the ALJ's decision represents the careful assessment of the factual, medical and opinion evidence. The decision was thorough, was adequately explained, and was based upon substantial evidence that the ALJ evaluated in accordance with prevailing legal and regulatory guidelines. Therefore, that decision should be affirmed and the plaintiff's appeal denied.

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: