REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

WILLIAM I. ARBUCKLE, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 2019, Tevin Jordan ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint against the following Defendants: Scranton Police Officer Donald Hofsommer, Lackawanna County District Attorney Mark Powell, and Lackawanna County. (Doc. 1). Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting leave to file in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2).

Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Atamian v. Burns, 236 F. App'x 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007) ("the screening procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply to in forma pauperis complaints filed by prisoners and non-prisoners alike"). Under this statute, the Court is required to dismiss any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 828 (10th Cir. 1979) ("[T]here is no constitutional right to the expenditure of public funds and the valuable time of federal courts to prosecute an action which is totally without merit.").

After reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint, I conclude that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Granting Plaintiff leave to amend would be futile. Thus, I RECOMMEND that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED.

II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

According to his Complaint, Plaintiff is a prisoner at Lackawanna County Prison. (Doc. 1, p. 2). On July 5, 2019, Defendant Officer Hofsommer claims to have observed the following events near 629 Pittston Ave in Scranton:

Id. at pp. 3-4.

Defendant Officer Hofsommer arrested Plaintiff. Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Officer Hofsommer did not have probable cause to make the arrest. Id. Charges were filed against Plaintiff in Lackawanna County. Id. at pp. 2-4. Plaintiff's Lackawanna County Docket can be found at Docket No. CP-35-CR-0002538-2019.

On October 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Complaint (Doc. 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff names the following as defendants: Scranton Police Officer Donald Hofsommer, Lackawanna County District Attorney Mark Powell, and Lackawanna County.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officer Hofsommer arrested him without probable cause. (Doc. 1, p. 2). In the Police Criminal Complaint (PCC), Defendant Officer Hofsommer alleges four (4) counts against Plaintiff: (1) Receiving Stolen Property; (2) Theft by Unlawful Taking—Movable MV—Trucks and buses; (3) Burglary—Not Adapted for Overnight Accommodation, No Person Present—Forcible Entry; and (4) Criminal Trespass— Enter Structure. Id. at pp. 9-10.

Regarding Charge 1, Plaintiff argues: "No where in the affidavit do (sic) it state that I knew that the bike was stolen or that I was questioned about a bike or anything." Id. at p. 9. As for Charge 2, Plaintiff argues: "Nowhere in the affidavit do (sic) it contain (sic) information that I took possession of a stolen bike. Lack of sufficient evidence. Dismiss charge." Id. As for Charge 3, Plaintiff, argues: "Insufficient evidence. This charge does not have an accompanying affidavit establishing probable cause for this charge." Id. at p. 10. Finally, as to Charge Four, Plaintiff argues: "The affidavit do (sic) not contain information of a forced entry or the defendant broke into 629 Pittson (sic). Dismiss charges for insufficient." Id.

Plaintiff alleges that "these four offenses above is (sic) without an accompanying affidavit establishing probable cause for these 4 offenses and this violates due process rights of the [P]laintiff." Id. at p. 3. Plaintiff alleges "Hofsommer and Attorney Powell actions of depriving the plaintiff of his liberty knowing the arrest was without probable cause and the imprisonment is without due process, notice, and was not wihin (sic) the scope of their employment." Id. at p. 4.

Plaintiff alleges numerous Causes of Action, including:

Id. at pp. 2, 4-6.

Plaintiff has requested the following relief:

Id. at p. 6.

Plaintiff's criminal matter regarding this arrest is still ongoing. See Commonwealth v. Jordan, MJ-45102-CR-0000296-2019 (Magis. Ct. Lackawanna County). Indeed, the matter has only recently been transferred to the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas.

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR REVIEWING COMPLAINTS FILED BY PLAINTIFFS PROCEEDING IN FORMA PAUPERIS

This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Specifically, the Court is obliged to review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:

In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same standard that is used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed the evolving standards governing pleading practice in the federal courts, stating that "pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Id. at 211. It also "has to `show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id.

To test the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must conduct the following three-step inquiry:

Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and `"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are enough to raise the Plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. YOUNGER ABSTENTION PRECLUDES ANY OF THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are barred by Younger abstention. Generally, federal courts must adjudicate all cases and controversies that are properly before them. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989). Abstention, however, "is the judicially created doctrine under which a federal court will decline to exercise its jurisdiction so that a state court or state agency will have the opportunity to decide the matters at issue." Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Twp., 671 F.2d 743, 746 (3d Cir. 1982).

In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court "held that absent extraordinary circumstances federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 364. Younger abstention is based on "the notion of `comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Younger abstention is also based on the concept of "Our Federalism," which represents "a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id. In a companion case to Younger, the Supreme Court also held that because the "practical effect" of declaratory relief can be "virtually identical" to injunctive relief, "where the state criminal prosecution was begun prior to the federal suit, the same equitable principles relevant to the propriety of an injunction must be taken into consideration by federal district courts in determining whether to issue a declaratory judgment, and that where an injunction would be impermissible under these principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well." Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971).

Over time, Younger abstention was expanded to apply to certain civil proceedings, see e.g. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. 420 U.S. 592 (1975), and even to certain administrative proceedings, see e.g. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986). "As Younger was expanded to new categories of cases, lower courts struggled to pinpoint the doctrine's outer limits and, as a result, increasingly declined to exercise federal jurisdiction when the subject matter of the federal suit was also implicated in a parallel state proceeding." Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2014). Many courts, including the Third Circuit, resorted to applying the three requirements derived from Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982), as the test to determine whether Younger abstention was appropriate. ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 135, 136 n.7 (3d Cir. 2014). The Middlesex factors are: "(1) there must be pending or ongoing state proceedings which are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings must implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional issues." O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 789 (3d Cir. 1994). Mechanical application of these requirements "commonly resulted in abstention because `the three Middlesex factors have been expanded so broadly that most parallel state criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement or similar actions will satisfy them.'" ACRA Turf Club, 748 F.3d at 135-36 (quoting Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical Perspective, 12 Nev. L.J. 1, 9 (2011)).

More recently, in Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013), the Supreme Court "provide[d] a forceful reminder that abstention is not the presumptive course, but rather an exception to the general rule that federal courts must hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction." Gonzalez, 755 F.3d at 180. The Court in Sprint reiterated that a federal court has a `"virtually unflagging'" obligation to hear and decide cases that fall within its jurisdiction, that Younger abstention is appropriate only in "exceptional" circumstances, and that "[a]bstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter." Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 588 & 591 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Sprint clarified that Younger abstention is appropriate in "only three `exceptional' classes of cases: (1) `state criminal prosecutions,' (2) `civil enforcement proceedings,' and (3) `civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions.'" Gonzalez 755 F.3d at 180 (quoting Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 591).

Absent extraordinary circumstances, Younger abstention requires that a district court abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings when: "(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims." Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005)). Younger abstention is "premised on the notion of comity, a principle of deference and `proper respect' for state governmental functions in our federal system." Evans v. C.C.P., Delaware Cty, Pa., 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992). Moreover, application of the Younger doctrine to Section 1983 civil rights actions in which the plaintiff is challenging the pending state court criminal charges filed against him and is alleging that the initiation and prosecution in the ongoing underlying state court action "violated and continues to violate his constitutional rights" is appropriate. See Miles v. Zech, Civ. No. 3:18-1061, 2018 WL 3207381, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2018) (citing Smithson v. Rizzo, 2015 WL 1636143, *4; Jaffery v. Atlantic Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 695 F. App'x. 38 (3d Cir. 2017)).

Here, all three Middlesex factors are met. Further, in this matter, the first class of cases is implicated; there is an ongoing state criminal proceeding in this matter. See Commonwealth v. Jordan, MJ-45102-CR-0000296-2019 (Magis. Ct. Lackawanna County). Indeed, it has just been bound over to the Court of Common Pleas as of November 7, 2019. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Jordan, CP-35-CR-0002538-2019 (C.P., Lackawanna County). Second, the state criminal proceedings necessarily implicate important state interests. Henry v. Potts, No. 1:18-cv-01950, 2018 WL 5841753, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2018) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46; see also Wallace v. Keen, No. 12-cv-1366, 2012 WL 5197948, at *4 (M.D. Oct. 19, 2012)). Finally, Plaintiff has the opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the context of his state criminal proceedings in state court at the trial stage and during any appellate proceedings. See Wallace, 2012 WL 5197948, at *4; see also Moore, 515 F.3d at 445 (providing that adequate state court review remains available to the plaintiff "at trial and thereafter, on appellate review"); Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 671 (3d Cir. 2010) (providing that Younger only requires "an opportunity to present federal claims in a state proceeding," and that the burden rests on the plaintiff "to show that state procedural law barred presentation of [his] claims") (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1997) and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1987)).

Additionally, Plaintiff has not made a showing that Younger abstention is inappropriate because: (1) the ongoing state proceedings are undertaken in bad faith; (2) such proceedings are meant to harass him; or (3) some extraordinary circumstance exists that would prevent a significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the asserted federal interest by deferring to the state courts. See Wallace, 2012 WL 5197948, at *4; Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003). Lastly, "[i]t does not appear from the record that [Plaintiff has] been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith." Younger, 401 U.S. at 47 (quoting Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943)).

Henry v. Potts, No. 1:18-cv-01950, 2018 WL 5841753, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2018).

Plaintiff's claims arise from a criminal prosecution that is still ongoing. Younger mandates abstention from providing injunctive relief in this case.

B. UNDER HECK V. HUMPHREY, MONETARY DAMAGES ARE NOT PROPER

While Younger applies to injunctive relief, Plaintiff's claims for damages are barred as well. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court ruled that a constitutional cause of action for damages does not accrue "for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," until the plaintiff proves that the "conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 486-87; see also Tayler v. Sanders, Civ. No. 11-1291, 2012 WL 4104871, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2012) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005)) ("`[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.'").

"The final termination rule announced in Heck bars Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims that have the effect of impugning the underlying [Lackawanna] County criminal charges against Plaintiff." Henry v. Potts, at *4 ("The final termination rule announced in Heck bars Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims that have the effect of impugning the underlying . . . County criminal charges against Plaintiff."); see also Marable v. Pottsgrove Twp., 176 F. App'x. 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2006). Heck applies to Section 1983 cases in which a plaintiff still has criminal charges pending against him and in which no conviction has yet occurred. See Clouser v. Johnson, 40 F.Supp.3d 425, 432 (M.D. Pa. 2014). For these reasons, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed.

III. GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND WOULD BE FUTILE

"[I]f a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). Allowing Plaintiff to amend his complaint would be futile and inequitable in this case. At this time, Plaintiff's claims under federal law are precluded by Younger abstention and barred by Heck. Therefore, granting Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint would be futile.

IV. DISMISSING THE FEDERAL CLAIMS, THIS COURT DECLINES TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER STATE-LAW CLAIMS

Having determined that Plaintiff's federal claims should be dismissed, the remaining claims are Plaintiff's state law claims over which this court has supplemental jurisdiction.

Whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, "a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cahill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The Third Circuit has held that "where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so." Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)(quoting Borough of West Miflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)).

There is nothing unique about this case such that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness provide an affirmative justification for exercising supplemental jurisdiction after the court disposes of the federal claims. Accordingly, I recommend that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

V. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3 which provides: