Filed: Oct. 25, 2010
Latest Update: Oct. 25, 2010
Summary: PER CURIAM: In Petitioners' quiet title action, they allege the foreclosure of Kathleen and Bobbie Brown's property in 2000 should be set aside for lack of service of process. Since the foreclosure, the property has been transferred several times: in 2002, at a judicial sale to Robert L. Tuttle and Christl Gehring; Gehring later transferred her interest to Tuttle; and in 2003, Tuttle transferred his interest to Respondent Daniel Duggan. In 2005, Petitioners filed a complaint and lis pendens
Summary: PER CURIAM: In Petitioners' quiet title action, they allege the foreclosure of Kathleen and Bobbie Brown's property in 2000 should be set aside for lack of service of process. Since the foreclosure, the property has been transferred several times: in 2002, at a judicial sale to Robert L. Tuttle and Christl Gehring; Gehring later transferred her interest to Tuttle; and in 2003, Tuttle transferred his interest to Respondent Daniel Duggan. In 2005, Petitioners filed a complaint and lis pendens,..
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PER CURIAM:
In Petitioners' quiet title action, they allege the foreclosure of Kathleen and Bobbie Brown's property in 2000 should be set aside for lack of service of process. Since the foreclosure, the property has been transferred several times: in 2002, at a judicial sale to Robert L. Tuttle and Christl Gehring; Gehring later transferred her interest to Tuttle; and in 2003, Tuttle transferred his interest to Respondent Daniel Duggan. In 2005, Petitioners filed a complaint and lis pendens, seeking to quiet title to 28.6 acres of heirs' property, including the approximately .54 acre lot in question. Duggan moved for summary judgment, asserting as an affirmative defense under S.C.Code Ann. § 15-39-870 (2005 & Supp.2008)1 his status as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. In response, Petitioners claimed lack of service of process in the 2000 foreclosure action, arguing the foreclosure was void for lack of personal jurisdiction over the necessary parties because: (1) they were never personally served with process; (2) they were both incompetent at the time of the alleged service; and (3) the alleged substituted service upon a relative never occurred. The trial judge found such "irregularities in the proceedings" could not defeat Duggan's status as a bona fide purchaser under the statute and granted Duggan summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. Sara Mae Robinson v. Duggan, 378 S.C. 140, 662 S.E.2d 420 (Ct.App.2008). We affirm the court of appeals, pursuant to the following authority: Sara Mae Robinson v. The Converse Co., LLC, 389 S.C. 360, 698 S.E.2d 801 (2010) and Sara Mae Robinson v. Hutton, 388 S.C. 645, 698 S.E.2d 229 (2010) (holding that while a judgment to quiet title may be set aside for extrinsic fraud, notwithstanding the three-year statute of limitations in S.C.Code Ann. § 15-67-90, laches may bar such a claim).
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, JJ., and Acting Justices JAMES E. MOORE and JOHN H. WALLER, JR., concur.