GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1.] Rapid City (City) Ordinances require a developer to complete certain public improvements before the City accepts a final plat. In lieu of completing the improvements before the City accepts a plat, the City may accept a surety from a developer. In this case, Doyle Estes; Big Sky, LLC; and Dakota Heartland, Inc. (collectively "Developers") provided sureties which the City accepted. The sureties expired. The City sued Developers, seeking relief to have the required public improvements completed or repaired to meet the City's standards. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Developers. We reverse and remand.
[¶ 2.] Developers were involved in developing the Big Sky subdivision in Rapid City, South Dakota. Under SDCL 11-6-26, a municipality has extraterritorial jurisdiction to regulate the subdivision of all land within three miles of the municipality's corporate limits.
[¶ 3.] RCMC 16.16.010 requires developers to install or construct certain public improvements:
RCMC 16.16.010. "Improvements" include streets, curbs, gutters, property markers, sidewalks, street lights, traffic signs, water mains, sanitary sewers, and storm sewers. RCMC 16.16.020-.090. The City adopted Standard Specifications for Public Works Construction (Specifications) that improvements were required to meet.
[¶ 4.] The RCMC provided an alternative to prior construction of required improvements before approval of final plats would be considered. RCMC 16.20.060 provides:
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 5.] After improvements are completed, the City's Specifications address project acceptance:
RCMC Specifications, § 7.65 (emphasis added). This section was revised in June 2006 to clarify that the "contractor/subdivider/developer" is responsible for improvement repairs.
[¶ 7] The City conducted final inspections of the required public improvements for some of the properties. After the inspections the City provided a "punch list" identifying deficiencies.
[¶ 8.] The sureties expired. Developers claim to have spent $5,160,000.00 in payments to independent contractors and engineers to install public improvements in the subdivisions and paid $77,400.00 to the City for inspections of these improvements. The City has never formally accepted ownership or maintenance responsibility for any of the public improvements on the properties. No "acceptance letter" was sent to Developers as indicated in Specifications § 7.65. Developers contend that they informed the sub-contractors of the deficiencies but repair efforts either failed or were not undertaken.
[¶ 9.] The City filed suit in 2008. The City claims there are major deficiencies in the properties. The City alleges that Developers failed to satisfy their obligations on numerous plats to build or correct public improvements. The City seeks injunctive relief to require Developers to complete certain improvement obligations and repair any deficiencies, subject to a final inspection by the City. Alternatively, the City requests the court order Developers "to specifically perform their obligations under the City's subdivision ordinances." Developers filed for summary judgment, asserting that when the sureties expired, they were no longer liable for the improvements under RCMC 16.20.060. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Developers. On appeal, we address whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Developers.
[¶ 10.] The standard of review for a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is settled.
Muhlbauer v. Estate of Olson, 2011 S.D. 42, ¶ 7, 801 N.W.2d 446, 448 (quoting Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2011 S.D. 13, ¶ 5, 796 N.W.2d 685, 692-93). "All reasonable inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party." Benson Living Trust v. Physicians Office Bldg. Inc., 2011 S.D. 30, ¶ 9, 800 N.W.2d 340, 342-43.
[¶ 11.] The circuit court granted Developers' motion for summary judgment after Developers argued that, under RCMC 16.20.060, the expiration of the sureties released them from their obligations to complete the public improvements. The City argues that the circuit court erred because when reading all the ordinances together, the expiration of the sureties did not relieve Developers of their obligation to construct the improvements according to the City's Specifications.
[¶ 12.] This is a case of statutory and ordinance construction.
State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Clark, 2011 S.D. 20, ¶ 5, 798 N.W.2d 160, 162. In this case we have several statutes and municipal ordinances governing the acceptance of public improvements. "To determine legislative intent, this Court will take other statutes on the same subject matter into consideration and read the statutes together, or in pari materia" Onnen v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 49-5, 2011 S.D. 45, ¶ 16, 801 N.W.2d 752, 756 (citing Loesch v. City of Huron, 2006 S.D. 93, ¶ 8, 723 N.W.2d 694, 697). "Statutes are construed to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of person or things, or have the same purpose or object." Goetz v.
[¶ 13.] RCMC 16.16.010(B) states that: "All improvements required under these regulations shall be constructed in accordance with City Specifications and under the inspection of the City Engineer or his or her duly authorized representative." (Emphasis added.) Specifications § 7.65 clearly states that "[f]inal acceptance of the project by the Owner [City] will be documented by the issuance of an acceptance letter...."
[¶ 14.] We must also take into consideration Specifications § 7.55, which provides that: "The Engineer, upon completion of the contract work, shall satisfy himself by examination and test that the work has been finally and fully completed in accordance with the Specifications and Contract, and report such completion to the Owner." The engineer cannot examine and test the work if the developer never completes the improvements. If we were to agree with Developers' argument, then any time a surety is posted a developer can do nothing and hope that the city will let the surety expire. This clearly goes against Specifications § 7.55, which requires that the Engineer must be satisfied that the work has been completed correctly before the City can formally accept the improvements by letter.
[¶ 15.] Under the ordinances and specifications, Developers remain liable until the City accepts the improvements by a final acceptance letter. The sureties made it possible for Developers to obtain plat approval from the City Council without first constructing the improvements. But it does not relieve Developers from constructing the improvements as required by the Specifications. Neither do the sureties release Developers from this obligation until they receive a final acceptance letter. Obtaining plat approval and receiving a final acceptance of the required improvements are distinct, separate actions.
[¶ 16.] Because it does not appear that all legal questions were correctly decided, we reverse and remand.
[¶ 17.] WILBUR, Justice, and MYREN, Circuit Court Judge, concur.
[¶ 18.] HOFFMAN, Circuit Court Judge, concurs with a writing.
[¶ 19.] PORTRA, Circuit Court Judge, dissents.
[¶ 20.] MYREN, PORTRA and HOFFMAN, Circuit Court Judges, sitting for KONENKAMP, ZINTER, and SEVERSON, Justices, disqualified.
HOFFMAN, Circuit Court Judge (concurring).
[¶ 21.] I concur in the majority decision. I write separately to address the standing issue.
[¶ 23.] According to South Dakota law, once the plat is approved, it may be recorded with the register of deeds. SDCL 11-3-6, 11-6-26, 11-6-34. Once that occurs, ownership and maintenance responsibility for the public areas within the subdivision passes to the City. SDCL 11-3-12. See also Herrmann v. Bd. of Comm'rs of City of Aberdeen, 285 N.W.2d 855, 856 (S.D. 1979); Haley v. City of Rapid City, 269 N.W.2d 398, 400 (S.D. 1978). Only upon that contingency may the Developer actually sell the subdivided lots. SDCL 11-6-35. The various developments at issue in this case were approved between 1998 and 2005. Had development and subdivision not occurred, the plats could have been vacated and the public rights returned to Developers. See SDCL 11-3-16. That is not what occurred in this case. Rather, the infrastructure is substantially completed in the developments, but the City seeks remediation from the Developers for certain quality control issues that have not passed final inspection by the City Engineer.
[¶ 24.] As the majority points out, Developers are not relieved of their obligations to bring the improvements into compliance with the City's Construction Specifications merely because the sureties that facilitated acceptance and recording of the plats have now expired. Rather, the Developers continue to be legally bound, pursuant to RCMC 16.16.010(B), to finish the job and build the infrastructure according to the Specifications. If, as the City now asserts, the Developers have defaulted in their obligations, and, were it the case that the Developers could not be held to account for the same, then the City ultimately would be obligated to bring the infrastructure within the public areas into compliance with the plats because the City owns them. 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1790 (2011); Haley, 269 N.W.2d 398.
[¶ 25.] The City has not issued an acceptance letter pursuant to the Construction Specifications documenting the start of the Developers' warranty period for improvements, due to its perception that the infrastructure is incomplete. However, the City's failure to issue an acceptance letter is of no consequence to the determination of the standing issue. As a matter of law, the City accepted the plats when it accepted the sureties in lieu of actual project completion, and title to the public areas vested in the City when the plats were recorded. This is the only cogent reconciliation of the applicable statutes and ordinances, when given their plain meaning. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Clark, 2011 S.D. 20, ¶ 5, 798 N.W.2d 160, 162.
PORTRA, Circuit Court Judge (dissenting).
[¶ 27.] I respectfully dissent. I find that the City does not have standing. First, the issue of standing has not been waived. This Court has previously held that a plaintiff must establish standing as an aggrieved person such that a court has subject matter jurisdiction. Cable v. Union Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2009 S.D. 59, ¶ 21, 769 N.W.2d 817, 825 (citations omitted). Further, "[i]t is the rule in this state that jurisdiction must affirmatively appear from the record and this [C]ourt is required sua sponte to take note of jurisdictional deficiencies, whether presented by the parties or not." Elliott v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Lake Cnty., 2005 S.D. 92, ¶ 17, 703 N.W.2d 361, 368 (citations omitted). Therefore, the issue cannot have been waived.
[¶ 28.] Considering the merits of the issue, the majority asserts that the City has standing "because after improvements are accepted, the City assumes ownership, maintenance and operation of them." However, the City has not accepted the improvements and therefore standing is based on a contingency. In order for the City to have standing, it must have suffered an injury in fact that is a) concrete and particularized and b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The speculated injury in this case may not happen.
[¶ 29.] The City's simple remedy is to refuse to accept the improvements until they are in compliance with the ordinances. If that never happens, the City can refuse to issue building permits within the subdivisions and abate any nuisance caused by the failed subdivisions, if necessary. So at this time, the City has suffered no injury and they have more than adequate remedies at law to protect themselves in the future. This lawsuit by the City is premature. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court on other grounds because the City does not have standing.