GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1.] Blair and Lynn Gades appeal the circuit court's determination that their cause of action was time barred, as well as the court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Meyer Modernizing Co., Inc. (Meyer). The Gadeses assert there are genuine disputes of material fact as to the date of accrual of their cause of action. They also assert Meyer concealed the existence of their cause of action. We affirm.
[¶ 2.] The facts of this case are largely undisputed.
[¶ 3.] On April 3, 2000, the Gadeses hired Meyer to install the siding, soffits, and gutters on the home. The estimate offered by Meyer and accepted by the Gadeses did not mention, or include charges for, the installation of flashing around the windows and doors.
[¶ 4.] As early as spring 2001, but no later than 2002, the Gadeses first noticed water infiltration around window and door openings during rain and wind events.
[¶ 5.] The Gadeses retained counsel in this matter by April 11, 2005. However, they did not bring suit regarding their water infiltration claim until April 2010. They amended their complaint in 2013 to include the assertion that Meyer concealed the absence of installed flashing. Meyer moved for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted.
[¶ 6.] The Gadeses raise one issue on appeal: Whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to the date of accrual of their cause of action.
[¶ 7.] "In reviewing a grant or a denial of summary judgment under SDCL 15-6-56(c), we must determine whether the moving party demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact
[¶ 8.] There does not appear to be a genuine dispute as to the applicable period of limitation in this case.
[¶ 9.] As indicated in the previous paragraph, the Gadeses were permitted to file their cause of action within six years of its accrual. SDCL 15-2-13(1). The Gadeses assert they were not "actually aware of the lack of flashing" until October 2013. "A claim accrues when a plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of a cause of action." E. Side Lutheran Church of Sioux Falls v. NEXT, Inc., 2014 S.D. 59, ¶ 10, 852 N.W.2d 434, 438 (emphasis added).
[¶ 10.] The Gadeses were aware of facts sufficient for their cause of action to accrue by at least spring 2002. By virtue of not controverting Meyer's statement of undisputed material facts, if nothing else, the Gadeses admitted the following: Blair Gades became aware of water infiltration in 2001, Lynn Gades was aware of water infiltration no later than 2002, and the water infiltration has recurred every year since they moved into their home. These admissions make this case nearly identical to the relevant facts of East Side Lutheran Church. There, the plaintiff became aware of water infiltration problems within months of the substantial completion of a new addition to its church, but failed to file suit within six years of its discovery of the water infiltration. E. Side Lutheran Church, 2014 S.D. 59, ¶¶ 2-6, 852 N.W.2d at 436-37. "It [was] undisputed [the plaintiff] knew water infiltration existed throughout the building almost immediately after construction was completed...." Id. ¶ 12, 852 N.W.2d at 439. Thus, like the present case, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs had actual notice of water infiltration prior to six years before the commencement of their action. Id. We held, as we hold in the present case, "Because [the plaintiff's] actual notice of the water infiltration gave rise to a situation where [the plaintiff] could have filed suit and sought relief, any claim with a sufficient relationship to the water infiltration ... accrued and statutorily lapsed prior to [the plaintiff's] ... lawsuit." Id.
[¶ 11.] Despite the foregoing, the Gadeses argue East Side Lutheran Church supports their assertion that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to when their cause of action accrued. Specifically, they quote the following language from East Side Lutheran Church: "Because what a reasonably prudent person should inquire into when learning of water infiltration can differ depending on the circumstances, we conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact as to when East Side's structural design error and construction error claims accrued." Id. ¶ 15, 852 N.W.2d at 440. According to the Gadeses, "this is precisely the issue in this instance." The Gadeses misapprehend this quoted portion of East Side Lutheran Church. We used the terms structural design error and construction error to designate claims potentially distinguishable from the plaintiff's water infiltration claim. Id. ¶ 13, 852 N.W.2d at 439. At that point in the opinion — three paragraphs after we had already plainly stated the plaintiff's water infiltration claim had accrued prior to six years before the plaintiff commenced its action — we discussed
[¶ 12.] Next, the Gadeses assert that Meyer did not disclose its knowledge that no flashing had been installed on their home and that, instead, Meyer insisted that the installed "J-Channel" was sufficient.
[¶ 13.] A detailed discussion of the Gadeses' fraudulent concealment argument is not necessary, however, as it fails on the very same facts that establish the accrual of their cause of action: their actual knowledge of the water infiltration dating from at least 2002. Even if Meyer had somehow fraudulently concealed the absence of flashing, "[f]raudulent concealment will not toll the statute of limitations, no matter the nature of the concealment, if a plaintiff is already on notice of a cause of action." Strassburg, 1998 S.D. 72, ¶ 15, 581 N.W.2d at 516. Similarly, establishing fraudulent concealment will not toll the period of limitation beyond the moment "the claim is discovered or might have been discovered with reasonable diligence." Id. ¶ 14, 581 N.W.2d at 515. As we have already discussed, the Gadeses were put on notice of their cause of action by repeated and obvious water infiltrations occurring year after year since they first occupied their home. It would have been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for Meyer to conceal the water infiltration from the Gadeses.
[¶ 14.] "The right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Id. ¶ 8, 581 N.W.2d at 514 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 357, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979)). By their own admissions, the Gadeses were well aware of the repeated water infiltrations into their home beginning in 2001 or 2002, and the entirety of their claim relates to those water infiltrations. Any alleged concealment on Meyer's part, even if proved at trial, would not change the fact that the Gadeses had notice of their cause of action by 2002. Thus, the Gadeses' cause of action accrued in 2002, if not before, and they have offered no reason why the period of limitation should be tolled. The law does not permit the Gadeses to sit on an accrued cause of action for eight years and still prosecute their claim. We affirm.
[¶ 15.] ZINTER, SEVERSON, WILBUR and KERN, Justices, concur.