GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1.] Keith Mendenhall appeals a jury verdict awarding $211,710 to Lisa Swanson, his former wife, in compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and alienation of affection. Keith argues the circuit court erred by admitting 14 exhibits consisting of court documents from prior proceedings. We reverse and remand.
[¶ 2.] Lisa married her first husband, Steve Swanson, in 1992. Lisa and Steve had four children together. In 2005, Steve died in a ranching accident. Keith and Steve were close friends, and following Steve's passing, Keith helped Lisa continue to operate the Swanson ranch. Keith and Lisa grew closer during this time and married approximately one year after Steve's death. They had one child together. Lisa and Keith separated in December 2010 and divorced in December 2011.
[¶ 3.] Before the divorce was finalized, the relationship between Lisa and Keith deteriorated significantly. Shortly after the separation, Lisa sought a protection order against Keith. On March 3, 2011, Keith stipulated to the entry of a restraining order to run for five years, which was entered by Judge Jon Flemmer. Six months later, on September 8, 2011, Lisa was granted a one-year protection order against Keith. On March 18, 2013, Judge Scott Myren extended the protection order until September 9, 2016.
[¶ 4.] Meanwhile, the parties also clashed over the custody of their child.
[¶ 5.] Keith initiated the present action on October 19, 2012. He brought a claim for slander against Lisa, alleging she had falsely reported to a law-enforcement officer that Keith had sexually abused her daughter. Lisa counterclaimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, slander, and alienation of her daughter's affection. Since that time, Keith has been held in contempt two additional times for failing to comply with an order for discovery and an order to pay costs.
[¶ 6.] Before trial, Lisa made a motion for judgment as a matter of law on Keith's slander claim, which was granted. The remaining claims proceeded to trial January 19-22, 2016. Leading up to the trial, Lisa persuaded the circuit court to admit 14 exhibits consisting of documents from the various, prior proceedings discussed above. These documents included Judge Gienapp's two letter decisions and Judge Myren's findings of fact and conclusions of law. At trial, the court received those documents into evidence and issued Jury Instruction 38, which stated:
The jury subsequently found in favor of Lisa on each of her counterclaims except slander and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $11,710 for intentional infliction of emotional distress and $25,000 for alienation of affection. The jury also awarded Lisa $175,000 in punitive damages.
[¶ 8.] Keith primarily argues that it is improper for the circuit court to admit the 14 exhibits listed in Instruction 38. According to Keith, the circuit court improperly took judicial notice of the facts in those exhibits. In contrast, Lisa argues that the instruction was justified under principles of issue preclusion. She further argues that even if those documents were improperly noticed, she presented other evidence and witness testimony sufficient to justify the jury's verdict.
[¶ 9.] "Judicial notice is merely a substitute for the conventional method of taking evidence to establish facts." Grand Opera Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 235 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir.1956). The doctrine "governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact." SDCL 19-19-201(a). "Adjudicative facts are those which relate to the immediate parties involved — the who, what, when, where[,] and why as between the parties." In re Dorsey & Whitney Tr. Co., 2001 S.D. 35, ¶ 19, 623 N.W.2d 468, 474 (citing Fed. R.Evid. 201 advisory comm.'s note to subdiv. (a)). Under South Dakota's rules of evidence, a "court may judicially notice [an adjudicative] fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) Is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) Can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." SDCL 19-19-201(b). Generally speaking, a court may not judicially notice a fact simply because it has been previously included in the findings of fact of a prior proceeding.
21B Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 5106.4 (2d ed.) (footnotes omitted), Westlaw (database updated April 2016); accord In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir.2014); Taylor v. Charter Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 829-30 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir.1994); Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir.1992); Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874, 878-79 (8th Cir.1987).
[¶ 10.] Even so, principles of issue preclusion might apply to prior factual findings. "Under the judicially-developed doctrine of [issue preclusion], once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation." United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158, 104 S.Ct. 568, 571, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984). This doctrine "relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial
[¶ 11.] It is unclear whether the circuit court admitted the 14 exhibits listed above, see supra ¶ 6, on the basis of judicial notice, issue preclusion, or some combination of the two. Throughout the various submissions and hearings, the court and the parties conflated these two concepts. Lisa initially asked the court to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion to Exhibits 9, 10, and 11. On the basis of those exhibits, she asked the court to grant summary judgment on her counterclaims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and alienation of affection. Yet, Lisa later submitted a motion titled "Request for Judicial Notice" in reference to all 14 exhibits. In a subsequent written order, the court granted the motion, stating: "Defendant has requested that the [c]ourt take judicial notice of various pleadings from the parties' divorce, restraining order, and protection order proceedings. These pleadings are matters of public record and it is appropriate for the [c]ourt to take judicial notice of the same." Similarly, at a pretrial hearing, the court noted: "I think the [c]ourt has previously ruled that judicial notice would be taken of those documents." However, the court went on to explain: "I believe that was the intent in asking for the judicial notice so that the documents would be entered into evidence and would be part of the evidence without the need to provide testimony as to what led up to those."
[¶ 12.] Regardless of whether the court relied on judicial notice or issue preclusion, it failed to conduct the appropriate analysis in either case. As explained above, the doctrines of judicial notice and issue preclusion each have specific prerequisites to application. See supra ¶¶ 9-10. An analysis of these elements is not apparent in the record in regard to any of the 14 exhibits, let alone to each of the facts contained in those exhibits.
[¶ 13.] Even so, Lisa contends that any error was harmless because she introduced sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict independent of the 14 exhibits. The circuit court's error is subject
[¶ 14.] We think the circuit court's error likely did have a substantial influence on the jury's verdict. The 14 exhibits were made available to the jury during its deliberations. The court informed the jury that it "should consider [the] judicially noticed facts [in the 14 exhibits] along with other testimony and exhibits introduced during the trial in deciding any of the issues before you." The court also instructed the jury that it was required to "accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed." Additionally, during closing argument, Lisa's counsel elaborated on the meaning of Instruction 38:
(Emphasis added.) The court's instructions, as well as Lisa's counsel's argument to the jury, were designed to ensure the 14 exhibits had a substantial influence on the jury's decision. We presume that the jury followed the court's instructions. See Karst v. Shur-Co., 2016 S.D. 35, ¶ 33, 878 N.W.2d 604, 618. Therefore, we conclude the circuit court's failure to properly admit the 14 exhibits by either judicial notice or issue preclusion was prejudicial.
[¶ 15.] Factual findings from previous proceedings are not per se noticeable under Rule 201. In order to justify Instruction 38, the court was required to analyze the facts contained in the 14 exhibits
[¶ 16.] We reverse and remand for a new trial.
[¶ 17.] ZINTER, SEVERSON, WILBUR, and KERN, Justices, concur.