1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*226
Petitioner's five-year-old daughter, who had experienced various respiratory ailments throughout her infancy, early in November 1944 suffered an attack of bronchitis, bordering on pneumonia. Petitioner immediately sent his daughter, accompanied by her mother, to Arizona, where the child was enrolled in a private boarding school. One month later the mother returned home, leaving the child at the school, where she remained until the close of school the following May.
12 T.C. 580">*580 This proceeding involves a deficiency of $ 731.23 in petitioner's income tax for the calendar year 1944.
The sole question involved is whether the Commissioner was correct1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*228 in disallowing as a deduction for medical expenses under
Petitioner concedes the correctness of the respondent's disallowance of a claim for taxes in the amount of $ 86.36 and concedes that he erred in claiming surtax exemption for his wife, who filed a separate return for the year 1944.
FINDINGS OF FACT.
The petitioner, L. Keever Stringham, is an individual, residing in Shaker Heights, Ohio. His individual income tax return for the calendar year 1944 was filed with the collector of internal revenue for the eighteenth district of Ohio.
Petitioner is the father of three children, John, Genevieve, and Susan, who were 7, 5, and 2 years of age, respectively, in 1944.
Genevieve contracted her first cold at the age of 2 months. At the age of 1 year she was hospitalized for 10 days with lobar pneumonia. It was also necessary to remove her adenoids at an early age. Throughout the first few years of her life she was regularly afflicted with colds and her general physical condition became1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*229 steadily worse.
On January 19, 1944, she was again hospitalized for a period of 3 days for the purpose of making various tests to determine the cause of her poor health. As a result of this examination, her condition was diagnosed as chronic bronchitis and sinusitis, and the tests showed a positive tuberculin reaction. She also suffered from asthma and anemia.
Genevieve was immediately withdrawn from a nursery school in which she was enrolled, and for the rest of the winter efforts were made to build her up physically.
In the fall of 1944 her parents entered Genevieve in the kindergarten class of the Hathaway Brown School in Cleveland, Ohio. On or about November 2, 1944, her tuition for the entire first term was paid, which amounted to the sum of $ 137.50. A few days thereafter Genevieve again fell ill and her ailment was diagnosed as deep bronchitis bordering on pneumonia.
The possibility of putting the child in a better climate for the winter was discussed by the parents with the physician. Immediately thereafter the mother set out to determine a suitable climate to which the child could be sent. After considerable difficulty, in view of Genevieve's age and the fact that she1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*230 was not tubercular, and after careful investigation, the parents decided to send her to the Arizona Sunshine School at Tucson, Arizona. Although the school ordinarily enrolled no children under the age of six, it agreed to enter Genevieve, as one other child her age who suffered from asthma had been entered and they felt they could thus provide a companion for the other child.
12 T.C. 580">*582 Due to wartime traveling conditions, only one lower berth could be obtained for the accommodation of the child and her mother. Upon their arrival in Chicago en route to Arizona, railroad officials, in view of the child's illness, arranged to secure a compartment for the remainder of the trip to Tucson. From Chicago to Tucson neither the child nor the mother left the compartment, due to the child's condition.
Genevieve and her mother arrived in Tucson, Arizona, on November 17, 1944. Her mother remained in Tucson for a month to assure herself that the child would make a satisfactory adjustment and be happy at school. No member of the family thereafter visited Genevieve during the remainder of that school year.
Genevieve remained at the Arizona Sunshine School until the end of the school year, and1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*231 on May 30, 1945, she returned to Cleveland, where she spent the summer with her parents. In the fall of 1945 she returned to Arizona and attended the same school in the academic year 1945-1946.
Petitioner is an electrical engineer, and during 1944 he was employed by the Lincoln Electric Co., a Cleveland concern engaged in war work. Because of his position he was granted a deferment by his draft board. In 1944 he was 31 years of age and had been employed by the Lincoln Co. for approximately 15 years. Petitioner's wife is not and has never been employed outside of her own home.
The Arizona Sunshine School describes itself as "A Practical Outdoor School for Children of Particular Parents." Its catalog states that "Since, of course, no child with any communicable disease can be accepted, in each case a health certificate from a physician is requested." However, many of the boarding school children at this institution suffered from complaints similar to those of Genevieve.
Petitioner in his 1944 income tax return claimed a deduction for total medical expenses of $ 1,996.05. Of this amount, $ 1,381 was for tuition paid to the Arizona Sunshine School and $ 138.82 for the transportation1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*232 of his daughter from Cleveland, Ohio, to Tucson, Arizona. These expenses were paid by petitioner in 1944.
In the deficiency notice respondent held that $ 1,519.82 of the total medical expenses incurred by petitioner in connection with sending his daughter to school in Arizona did not meet the requirements of
OPINION.
The sole question raised by petitioner is whether he is entitled to deduct as expenses for medical care, under
The maximum amount which may1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*233 be deducted by a taxpayer is limited to $ 2,500 * in the case of the head of a family or a husband and wife filing a joint return, and in all other cases the maximum is fixed at $ 1,250.
"Medical care" is defined by
* * * The term "medical care," as used in this subsection, shall include amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (including amounts paid for accident or health insurance).
As the broad and comprehensive language of this section is susceptible to a variety of conflicting interpretations, we feel impelled, in order to determine the limits of its construction, to inquire into the Congressional intent which lay behind the enactment of this legislation.
The report of the Senate Finance Committee (S. Rept. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 6) expresses the fundamental purpose of
This allowance is recommended in consideration of the heavy tax burden that must be borne by individuals during the existing emergency and of the desirability of maintaining the present high level of public health and morale.
This statement, construed in conjunction with the broad definition of "medical care" included in
In its Report No. 1631,
* * * It is not intended, however, that a deduction should be allowed for any expense that is not incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.
12 T.C. 580">*584 To show the relationship of
(b) Items Not Deductible. -- Section 24 (a) (relating to items not deductible) is amended by striking paragraph 1 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"(1) Personal, living, or family expenses, except extraordinary medical expenses deductible under
Thus, Congress made it very clear that the benefit of the deduction it was creating for "medical expenses" was in no way to encompass items which were primarily personal living expenses. Regulations 111, section 29.23 (x)-1, promulgated pursuant to
Sec. 29.23 (x)-1. Medical, Dental, Etc., Expenses. --
* * * *
* * *
The Congressional intent is sufficiently evident to require the showing of the present existence or the imminent probability of a disease, physical or mental defect, or illness as the initial step in qualifying an expenditure as a medical expense. In other words, the language used in the statutory definition and the report of the Senate Finance Committee is sufficiently specific to exclude, except as to diagnosis, amounts expended for the preservation of general health or for the alleviation of physical or mental discomfort which is unrelated to some particular disease or defect.
Secondly, it is clear that a deduction may be claimed only for such expense as is
The real difficulty arises in connection with determining the deductibility of expenses which, depending upon the peculiar facts of each case, may be classified as either "medical" or "personal" in nature. There1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*237 would seem to be little doubt that the expense connected with items which are wholly medical in nature and which serve no other legitimate function in everyday life is incurred primarily for the prevention or mitigation of disease. On the other hand, it is obvious that many expenses are so personal in nature that they may only in rare situations lose their identity as ordinary personal expenses and acquire deductibility as amounts claimed primarily for the prevention or alleviation of disease. Therefore, it appears that in cases such as the 12 T.C. 580">*585 one now before us, where the expenses sought to be deducted may be either medical or personal in nature, the ultimate determination must be primarily one of fact.
Petitioner has shown to our satisfaction that there existed in his daughter a disease or illness immediately prior to his sending her to Arizona and while en route. Her poor physical condition and her susceptibility to respiratory ailments almost from the time of her birth reveal the urgency of his decision. The evidence also convinces us that petitioner's choice of action was proximately related to the particular attack of bronchitis bordering on pneumonia which was contracted1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*238 by her not more than a few days before her departure and was only indirectly related to the numerous difficulties she had experienced in the past with similar illnesses. There is also evidence that the change in climate was discussed by the parents with the child's physician.
Moreover, the record does not support the slightest inference that petitioner sent his five-year-old daughter to Arizona for any purpose other than making it possible for her to recover from her then present illness. He had at that time two other children, who remained at home with the family in Cleveland. His position was such that it would have been highly impractical for him to have moved the whole family to Arizona for the benefit of one child. Little more than a week before his decision he had paid the child's tuition for the entire first term at a private school in Cleveland.
Although we do not feel that the
We also believe that there existed a reasonable relation between the change in climate and the cure, mitigation, and treatment of1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*239 the disease from which the child was suffering. It appears that during the subsequent months in Arizona she improved appreciably and no further hospitalization or medical services were required. In short, the record supports the conclusion that the climate had a direct and beneficial effect upon the cure and mitigation of the disease from which she was suffering, apart from the benefit acquired from the same climate by a vacationer or one suffering from a disease unrelated to or unaffected by the climate of Arizona.
It is true that petitioner did not send his child to a sanitarium. However, the mother testified that, in response to her requests, such establishments had refused to accept the child, due to the fact that she was not then suffering from an active case of tuberculosis, having only shown a positive reaction to a tuberculin test. Moreover, it would not be unusual that one sending a young child to another climate 12 T.C. 580">*586 for any considerable time, either for climatic benefits or for receiving medical services, would attempt to provide for the child's education.
The conduct of the parents and the clear showing of the relation of their course of action to the illness 1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*240 from which the child was suffering, together with all the other evidence herein, leads us to the conclusion that the travel expense and the cost of maintaining the child while in Arizona were expenses which were clearly incurred primarily for and essential to the cure and mitigation of the daughter's illness.
However, we believe that such amounts as are attributable to the cost of educating petitioner's child while in attendance at the school at Tucson are not deductible as "medical expense." The child's attendance at school appears to us to have been merely an additional activity, unrelated in any way to the cure or alleviation of the disease from which she was suffering.
The tuition charged by the Arizona Sunshine School for boarding students was from three to five times greater than the fee charged for the children enrolled in its day school or pre-school groups who resided at their homes. Since it is impossible from the record to accurately determine what proportion of the tuition charged by the school represented the cost of medical facilities or the child's meals and lodging, we have selected the figure of $ 850 of the total amount paid by petitioner to the school.
From an examination of the record, it is clear that respondent questions only the right of the petitioner to deduct the expenses in issue as medical expense, and he does not make a point of the fact that some part of the outlay was to cover Genevieve's expenses during the first five months of 1945. It should also be borne in mind that our decision in this case is applicable only to the deduction sought by the petitioner in his return for the taxable year 1944 and is in no way determinative of his right to claim similar deductions in subsequent years.
Murdock,
I disagree with that interpretation of the facts. There is no finding that the parents took the child to Arizona merely to cure her of the early November attack of bronchitis, that the attack was still in progress when she left Cleveland or when she arrived in Tucson, that any doctor was consulted in Tucson, or that "the particular attack 1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*243 of bronchitis" still needed curing during the following six months of her stay there. It stands to reason that she must have recovered sufficiently before they left home to lead the parents to think she was well enough to undertake the trip. The school would not accept a child with any communicable disease. Most important, however, are the findings that the parents sought "a better winter climate," "a suitable climate," that is, a climate where Genevieve would be less likely to contract further ills than would have been the case in Cleveland. They obviously sought primarily long-range prevention, rather than merely the cure of or recovery from any recent attack of bronchitis. Every indication in the record is that the primary purpose of the parents in taking the child to and having her remain in Arizona for six months was to prevent the recurrence of those respiratory diseases to which she had been susceptible in Cleveland. They sought to prevent disease by placing her in "a better winter climate." The real question presented for decision on these facts is whether the contested expenditures were "paid for * * * prevention of disease" and were "extraordinary medical expenses deductible1949 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 226">*244 under
This is one of the first cases to be decided under
Disney,
*. Amended by section 304, Revenue Act of 1948.↩