1978 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 180">*180
In 1968 petitioners changed the overall method of accounting for their sole proprietorship from the cash method to the accrual method utilizing the procedure set forth in
69 T.C. 689">*690 OPINION
The Commissioner determined a deficiency of $ 53,903 in petitioners' joint Federal income tax for the calendar year 1970.
The issue posed is one of first impression. It is whether1978 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 180">*182 the incorporation of a sole proprietorship causes a cessation of the trade or business of the individual proprietors within the meaning of
All of the facts have been stipulated. The stipulation of facts along with attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
Petitioners Dean R. Shore and Wilma V. Shore, husband and wife, resided in Fresno, Calif., at the time of filing their petition herein. They filed a joint Federal income tax return for the calendar year 1970 with the District Director of Internal Revenue for the Northern District of California.
From 1961 to July 16, 1970, petitioners owned and operated1978 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 180">*183 Shore Acoustical & Insulation Co., a sole proprietorship engaged in the acoustical and insulation contracting business. In the taxable year ending December 31, 1968, petitioners changed their overall method of accounting from the cash receipts and disbursements method to the accrual method in accordance with
69 T.C. 689">*691 On July 16, 1970, petitioners incorporated their sole proprietorship in a tax-free transfer under section 351 to form Dean R. Shore, Inc. One hundred percent of the stock of Dean R. Shore, Inc., was issued to petitioners in exchange for their transfer of the net assets of Shore Acoustical & Insulation Co. From the time of incorporation to the present 1978 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 180">*184 the former business of the proprietorship has been operated by the corporation.
Mr. Shore has continued as president and chief operating officer of the corporation since its incorporation in 1970. Petitioners have continued to own 100 percent of the stock of the corporation since that time and the corporation is neither a partner nor a joint venturer in any other business. Petitioners have not engaged in the acoustical and insulation contracting business as individuals since the incorporation of Dean R. Shore, Inc. They have continued to report one-tenth of the adjustment on their individual returns during the period subsequent to incorporation.
The question presented is whether incorporation of a sole proprietorship causes a cessation of the business of the sole proprietors within the meaning of
1978 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 180">*185
provides an administrative procedure whereby taxpayers may expeditiously obtain consent to change their overall method of accounting from the cash receipts and disbursements method to an accrual method for Federal income tax purposes. Taxpayers complying with the provisions hereof will be deemed to have obtained the consent of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to change their method of accounting.
One of the conditions for utilizing this administrative procedure is --
A taxpayer who has changed his method of accounting under the provisions of
The Commissioner is granted the authority to prescribe such conditions under
Petitioner makes several arguments in support of his position that the adjustment amount should not be triggered as income in the year of incorporation. First, he argues that he did not cease to engage in a trade or business. He also argues that to require reporting the adjustment amount at the time of the incorporation transaction would subvert the policy of section 351 which is designed to facilitate the incorporation of an on-going business.
Respondent counters by contending that petitioner ignores the change inherent in the incorporation of an unincorporated entity and that petitioners, by incorporating, ceased to engage in the acoustical and insulation business.
Initially, we must deal with those cases on which the parties focused their attention. This1978 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 180">*187 group of cases,
However, it has long been held that --
A corporation and its stockholders are generally to be treated as separate entities. Only under exceptional circumstances * * * can the difference be disregarded. [
1978 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 180">*188
As a result, on incorporation in 1970, petitioners placed what had 69 T.C. 689">*693 been their trade or business into a separate entity whose trade or business could in no way be imputed to them. 31978 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 180">*189 Thus, on incorporation they ceased being engaged in the acoustical and insulation business as individuals 4 and as a result, under the terms of the revenue procedures, must bring into income the balance of the
1978 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 180">*190
1. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as in effect during the taxable year in issue.↩
2. Both parties erroneously argue that the provision in issue is
3. Petitioners insist "that the mere technicality of incorporation should [not] trigger an acceleration of the ten year spread." However, we cannot agree. At least one obvious tax consequence caused by incorporation is that petitioners have split income formerly reported in one return into income reported in two separate returns, one individual and one corporate. While in a given case this might not cause significant tax differences, the possibility for distortion is sufficient to call the act of incorporation more than a mere technicality. What petitioners have done here is to cause the income of the business which gave rise to the
4. As owners of corporate stock, petitioners became investors rather than actually being engaged in the trade or business as was the case when they were proprietors. Cf.
5. As for petitioners' argument, that to require them to report the entire adjustment amount as income in the year of incorporation runs contra to the policy of sec. 351, we have two answers. First, the issue here posed is whether petitioners ceased to do business under
Since both parties mentioned
Finally, we also note that respondent would apparently require immediate recognition of the