* * * *

(e) Definitions. -- For purposes of this section --

(1) the term "medical care" means amounts paid --

The regulations under section 213 provide that deductions for expenditures for medical care are allowable if incurred "primarily for" the prevention or alleviation of illness. Section 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs., states in part: "Deductions for expenditures for medical care allowable under section 213 will be confined strictly to expenses incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness." (Emphasis1979 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 187">*194 added.) In relation to capital expenditures made for medical care, section 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii) provides more specifically:

(iii) Capital expenditures are generally not deductible for Federal income tax purposes. * * * However, an expenditure which otherwise qualifies as a medical expense under section 213 shall not be disqualified merely because it is a capital expenditure. For purposes of section 213 and this paragraph, a capital expenditure made by the taxpayer may qualify as a medical expense, if it has as its primary purpose the medical care * * * of the taxpayer, his spouse, or his dependent. * * * a capital expenditure for permanent improvement or betterment of property which would not ordinarily be for the purpose of medical care * * * may, nevertheless, qualify as a medical expense to the extent that the expenditure exceeds the increase in the value of the related property, if the particular expenditure is related directly to medical care. * * * [Emphasis added.]

Therefore, under the regulations, the test is whether the petitioner's expenditures were incurred for the "primary purpose" of, and were "related directly to," his medical care. See Ferris v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 1112">582 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1978),1979 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 187">*195 revg. and remanding on another issue a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Havey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 409">12 T.C. 409, 12 T.C. 409">412 (1949).

In light of all the facts and circumstances of this case, we must hold that the expenses the petitioner incurred in building a swimming pool were not for the primary purpose of, and were not related directly to, his medical care. Undoubtedly, swimming was beneficial to his condition, but such evidence is insufficient to establish that the primary purpose of the building of his own pool was related directly to his medical care. Cf. 582 F.2d 1112">Ferris v. Commissioner, supra. The need for special therapy for his leg 71 T.C. 644">*648 continued for only a limited period of time. Although he remains limited as to the forms of exercise in which he can engage, his present practice of swimming as a means of exercise is not significantly different than the activities of many others who prefer that form of exercise for its undoubted advantages. During the period special therapy for his leg was required, it could have been secured through other far less costly means; for example, the petitioner could have secured the1979 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 187">*196 necessary therapy at the hospital or he could have arranged to swim at a health club which was not far from his residence. The pool cost the petitioner over $ 19,000, and we cannot accept his contention that such amount was spent primarily for therapy for his leg in view of the limited need for such therapy and the alternatives which were then available.

Moreover, even the testimony of the petitioner's physician does not support his contention that his own swimming pool was a medical necessity for him. When asked his reason for recommending swimming to the petitioner, the doctor stated: "Well, he was having to go over to the hospital daily for quite a while there to get the exercises, and then they'd put him in a whirlpool, and I felt, and had the personal reasons for -- to advise him to build a pool himself so he could swim when he had occasion to swim." (Emphasis added.) The doctor's statements do not indicate a medical exigency for the petitioner's installation of his own pool. In Seymour v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1111">14 T.C. 1111, 14 T.C. 1111">1117 (1950), we said: "The statute deals with 'expenses paid for medical care of the taxpayer.' Not every expenditure prescribed1979 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 187">*197 by a physician is to be catalogued under this term, nor is every expense that may be incurred for the physical comfort of a party a medical expense." Having a swimming pool at his home made it more convenient for the petitioner to exercise in a pool, but an expenditure that merely serves the convenience of the taxpayer cannot be treated as a medical expense. 14 T.C. 1111">Seymour v. Commissioner, supra at 1117.

Other circumstances in this case also indicate that the petitioner's swimming pool was not built for the "primary purpose" of his medical care. He testified that he had access to his pool only from April to October; thus, its use was not available to him for approximately one-half of each year. He also testified that he would like to have enclosed the pool, but the additional cost of doing so was too great. However, in 582 F.2d 1112">Ferris 71 T.C. 644">*649 , where the taxpayer, a resident of Madison, Wis., was required to swim twice a day for the rest of her life, the pool was enclosed, and it was agreed that the costs of the enclosure were deductible. If swimming in his own pool was required for the treatment of the petitioner's1979 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 187">*198 broken leg, it does seem that such treatment should have been available for more than one-half of the year, and the fact that the pool was not available for such a large portion of the time provides further evidence that its construction was not required for medical purposes.

The pool built by the petitioner contained no special equipment to aid him with his physical therapy and was suitable for general use. In Mason v. United States, an unreported case ( D. Hawaii 1957, 52 AFTR 1593, 57-2 USTC par. 10,012), where the taxpayer was allowed to deduct the cost of constructing a swimming pool, the pool was specially designed to provide hydrotherapy and included a ramp which allowed access to the pool from a wheelchair. The petitioner did testify that he held on to the diving board and kicked his leg as the doctor had prescribed; yet, and ordinary diving board cannot be considered special equipment "for medical care." The petitioner's pool was suitable for use by others, and in fact, he admitted that it was used by other members of his family and his staff. In contrast, the examples in the regulations of capital expenditures which are deductible1979 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 187">*199 as medical expenses involve equipment which is not used significantly for any purpose other than the medical care of the taxpayer; that is, eye glasses, seeing eye dog, artificial teeth and limbs, wheelchair, crutches, and inclinator or an air conditioner which is detachable from the property and purchased only for the use of the person in need of medical care. Sec. 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii); see also Estate of Hayne v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 113">22 T.C. 113 (1954). The evidence presented to this Court leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner desired and built his own pool for reasons of convenience, and not for the primary purpose of medical care as that term has been defined by the regulations and the courts. Accordingly, we hold that such expenses are not deductible. Sec. 262.

Decision will be entered for the respondent.