Petitioners contend that these references to partnerships in sections 512(c) and 513(b) apply only in the case of general partnership interests held by exempt organizations and not to limited partnership interests. They argue that limited partnership income is analogous to such 1982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*104 passive-income items as dividends, interest, royalties, and some rents. Congress, petitioners argue, could not have meant to make taxable the income from a passive investment such as a limited partnership interest, where the exempt organization could not actively manage the business in a fashion to result in unfair competition. We disagree.

In examining the application of a particular statute, our first reference must be to the words of that statute. Here, the provisions in question (secs. 512(c) and 513 (b)) impose a tax on an exempt organization's distributive share of partnership gross income (less allocable deductions) attributable to a partnership's regularly carrying on a trade or business unrelated to the exempt organization's purpose. The only statutory requirement for the imposition of this tax is that the organization be a "member" of such a partnership. Petitioners would limit the meaning of the word "member" to "general partner." There is nothing in the language or structure of these sections 78 T.C. 812">*818 to demand or even justify reading into them petitioners' narrower requirement. See Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65">374 U.S. 65, 374 U.S. 65">70 (1963); George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245">278 U.S. 245, 278 U.S. 245">253 (1929); 1982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*105 Warrensburg Board & Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1107">77 T.C. 1107, 77 T.C. 1107">1111 (1981).

Additionally, the legislative history of these sections does not support petitioners' narrow reading. In discussing the application of the Supplement U tax in the case of partnership interests, both the House and Senate reports from 1950 contain the following example:

For example, if an exempt educational institution is a silent partner in a partnership which runs a barrel factory and such partnership also holds stock in a pottery manufacturing corporation, the exempt organization would include in its unrelated business income its share of the barrel factory income, but not its proportionate share of any dividends received by the partnership from the pottery corporation. [S. Rept. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950-2 C.B. 561; H. Rept. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), 1950-2 C.B. 460. Emphasis supplied.]

While, as petitioners point out, a "silent partner" is not necessarily the same thing as a "limited partner," we think the above example clearly demonstrates Congress' intent to include exempt organizations' distributive shares of partnership income within the Supplement U tax, regardless of whether, 1982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*106 as partners, they behaved in an active or passive manner with regard to the management of the partnership's unrelated trades or businesses.

Indeed, it would have been unlikely for Congress to have thought otherwise. One problem which Congress was addressing in the Supplement U tax was the availability of pools of tax-exempt income which gave previously nontaxable trades or businesses unfair competitive advantages over their taxable counterparts. In the case of a partnership, these pools of income can be created when a partner who otherwise would have to withdraw some of his partnership income each year to pay the tax on his distributive share of partnership income does not have to withdraw any cash from the partnership because he has no income tax to pay. Whether the tax-exempt partner actively manages the underlying unrelated partnership business or not is thus irrelevant to the issue of whether the partnership as a whole has an unfair competitive advantage 78 T.C. 812">*819 from the accumulation of an unwithdrawn pool of tax-exempt income. ^{51982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*107}

We agree with respondent that petitioner's reliance upon such cases as Freedman v. Tax Review Board of the City of Philadelphia, 212 Pa. Super. 442, 243 A.2d 130">243 A.2d 130 (1968), affd. 434 Pa. 282">434 Pa. 282, 258 A.2d 323">258 A.2d 323 (1969), is inappropriate in construing the Internal Revenue Code. That case construed State statutes and municipal ordinances applicable in an entirely different context than that presented here. Likewise, Hill Family Foundation v. United States, 347 F. Supp. 1225">347 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Minn. 1972), is not related to the business at hand. The court there interpreted the phrase "trade or business regularly carried on" in a particular factual context, after finding that there was no joint venture or partnership.

In short, we decline to strain the construction of the word "member" in sections 512(c) and 513(b) and defeat the intent of Congress. Therefore, we hold that an exempt trust which is a limited partner may receive unrelated business taxable income (within the meaning of section 512) through a limited partnership upon which the trust is taxable under section 511. 1982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*108 Since it is undisputed that the wholesale fastener partnerships in which petitioners were members engaged in the type of activity which falls within the section 513(a) definition of unrelated trade or business, respondent's determinations of petitioners' liabilities for the tax imposed by section 511 must be sustained. ⁶

The next issue for decision is the liability of petitioners for the additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for petitioners' failure to file returns for the years before the Court. The burden of proof is on petitioners to show that their failure to file was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. Heman v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 479">32 T.C. 479, 32 T.C. 479">490 (1959), affd. in part and modified in part 283 F.2d 227">283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960); Rule 142(a). The fact that this case was submitted fully stipulated does not alter this burden. See Rule 122(b).

78 T.C. 812">*820 There is no evidence in the record going to the issue of reasonable cause for failure to file. We do not know, for example, if petitioners embarked on their elaborate scheme of establishing corporations, partnerships, and trusts on the advice of competent tax counsel, or even against such advice. 1982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*109 In the absence of any evidence, we hold that petitioners have failed to meet their burden of proof on this issue and are therefore liable for the additions to tax. See West Side Tennis Club v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 149">39 B.T.A. 149, 39 B.T.A. 149">160 (1939), affd. 111 F.2d 6">111 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1940).

The third issue for decision is whether the respondent is estopped by his conduct from asserting the deficiencies and additions to tax herein against petitioners Akron and Pennsylvania. The pertinent facts are as follows:

On September 6, 1977, petitioners in each of the three dockets received from the Office of the Internal Revenue Service in Cleveland, Ohio, a so-called 30-day letter proposing to tax each respective petitioner on income it had received from the partnership interests each petitioner owned.

On October 17, 1977, each petitioner was assessed income taxes and additions to the taxes for the years in issue on the basis of the 30-day letters.

On October 6, 1977, November 10, 1977, and December 1, 1977, extensions of time for filing a written protest were granted each petitioner, which extended the time for filing a written protest to December 16, 1977.

On December 16, 1977, a protest, request for National Office 1982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*110 Conference, and a request for technical advice in behalf of each petitioner were received by the District Director at Cleveland, Ohio. These requests were forwarded to the Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C., on January 20, 1978, by the District Director, and the petitioners were so advised in writing on the same date. In the transmittal to Washington by the District Director on January 20, 1978, it was noted that the "Tax [was] inadvertently assessed."

On August 9, 1978, John B. Eldred, Chief, Technical Staff, Cleveland, Ohio, wrote John P. Rice, Jr., as attorney for each of the petitioners, on behalf of the District Director and enclosed for Rice's information copies of the National Office response to the technical advice request with respect to each of these petitioners and further notified Rice that "This rationale 78 T.C. 812">*821 will be included as a part of the statutory notices to be issued at an early date with respect to the above trusts."

Subsequently, Eldred requested the Cincinnati Service Center to adjust the prior assessments, made October 17, 1977, as follows: "This request for abatement of taxes, penalties and interest is due to the assessment having been made in error. A 1982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*111 statutory notice is now being prepared and will be issued at an early date."

On January 8, 1979, the Cincinnati Service Center abated the prior assessments of tax and penalties and so notified each petitioner.

On November 1, 1979, statutory notices of deficiency were issued to each of petitioners.

On December 6, 1979, Rice wrote a letter to the Internal Revenue Service noting the adjustment by the Service and representing that on the basis of this advice the trustees of Pennsylvania had disbursed all of the funds in the trust to the beneficiaries and that a similar statement of adjustment had been received by the other petitioners herein.

Petitioners do not contest the timeliness of the statutory notices of deficiency, but rather they argue that respondent's assessments and abatements of assessments led them to believe that respondent would not issue deficiency notices relating to the taxes and additions to tax herein. Petitioners contend that in reliance on respondent's notices of abatement, Akron and Pennsylvania shortly thereafter ceased doing business and distributed all their assets to the trust beneficiaries. This, they claim, should estop respondent from the assertion of the instant 1982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*112 deficiencies and additions to tax as against Akron and Pennsylvania.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the stipulated facts include no statement that Akron distributed all its assets to its beneficiaries. The stipulation refers only to Pennsylvania. Accordingly, assuming the doctrine of equitable estoppel were to apply in this case, as to Akron, the petitioners have failed to prove any detrimental reliance -- a necessary element of equitable estoppel. Sangers Home for Chronic Patients, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 105">72 T.C. 105, 72 T.C. 105">115 (1979).

As to Pennsylvania, the Revenue Service's decision to abate the assessment of the taxes and additions to tax can in no way be construed as a bar to later court proceedings as to those 78 T.C. 812">*822 taxes and additions to tax. The decision by the IRS to abate the assessment previously made can in no way be viewed as an accord and satisfaction or other binding action sufficient to estop respondent from further proceedings regarding these taxable years. Parks v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 298">33 T.C. 298 (1959); Miller v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 565">23 T.C. 565 (1954), affd. 231 F.2d 8">231 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1956). If petitioners in fact relied on such notice of abatement as a discharge of their tax liability, 1982 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 95">*113 they did so because of a mistake as to the legal effect of such notice; but the respondent may not be estopped by such a taxpayer mistake. Miller v. Commissioner, supra, 23 T.C. 565">23 T.C. 569.

Accordingly, we hold that petitioners have failed to prove the elements necessary to estop respondent from asserting the instant deficiencies and additions to tax.

Petitioners' request for attorneys' fees is denied. McQuiston v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 807">78 T.C. 807 (1982).

Decisions will be entered for the respondent.