In 1939, independent parties sold vacation property and executed a deed granting decedent and his wife life interests, with remainder interests to their two sons. The deed states that "one dollar and other valuable considerations" were paid by decedent, his wife, and his two sons. The wife predeceased decedent. In connection with respondent's audit of her estate, the sons, executors of her estate, swore in affidavits that decedent bought the property and was a sole purchaser. The sons also became executors of decedent's estate. In a letter from one of the sons in connection with respondent's audit of decedent's estate, the son states that "I do not deny that [decedent] made a gift [to the sons] at the time of [the] purchase of [the property]." Held:
1. The affidavits and the letter are admissible into evidence as admissions under
2. Decedent furnished the consideration 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*67 for the purchase of the property.
3. Decedent's gross estate includes the value of the property, as having been transferred with a retained life interest.
80 T.C. 1145">*1146 Respondent determined a deficiency in Federal estate tax against petitioner in the amount of $ 56,738.33. The issue presented is whether under
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated; the stipulations and the stipulated exhibits are incorporated 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*68 herein by this reference.
Petitioner's coexecutors are Arthur Chase Shafer and Robert Resor Shafer (hereinafter sometimes referred to individually as Chase and Resor, respectively), the two sons of Arthur C. Shafer (hereinafter sometimes referred to as decedent). For his entire lifetime, decedent was a resident of the State of Ohio, living in Cincinnati. Letters testamentary as petitioner's coexecutors were granted to Chase and Resor by the Probate Court of Hamilton County, Ohio.
Decedent was born on April 2, 1901, and died on April 23, 1974. He was married to Eunice C. R. (Chase Resor) Shafer 80 T.C. 1145">*1147 (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Eunice) on January 29, 1929. Eunice died on July 30, 1973.
During their marriage, decedent and Eunice had two children: Chase, 3 born on October 31, 1929, and Resor, born on April 20, 1933. From 1937 until their respective deaths, decedent and Eunice resided in Cincinnati.
At some point, the maternal grandmother of Chase and Resor began giving annual birthday presents of $ 3,000 to each of her nine grandchildren. These presents to Chase and Resor were 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*69 deposited in savings accounts; decedent or Eunice purchased shares of stock on behalf of Chase and Resor with some of these funds.
On October 11, 1938, for $ 600, decedent was granted a deed in fee simple to lot No. 437 at Gay Head, Dukes County, Mass. On February 14, 1974, decedent transferred lot No. 437 to Chase and Resor.
By deed executed on June 8, 1939, Charles D. Whidden and Leslie M. Flanders (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Whidden and Flanders, respectively), acting as trustees, 4 conveyed certain interests in lot No. 436 (which is adjacent to lot No. 437) to decedent, Eunice, Chase, and Resor. The consideration for lot No. 436 was $ 1,200. Lot No. 436 contains 6 acres, more or less, with frontage on Menemsha Pond, a saltwater arm of the sea. From the time of its acquisition, lot No. 436 has been improved with a four-bedroom, two-bath house and a pumphouse put on the property by decedent. 51983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*70 The house was used as a vacation summer house by decedent, Eunice, Chase, and Resor.
The deed to lot No. 436 states as follows:
in consideration of one dollar and other valuable considerations, paid by Eunice C. R. Shafer, Arthur C. Shafer, and Arthur Chase Shafer and Robert Resor Shafer, * * * the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged [the trustees] do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said Eunice C. R. Shafer, Arthur C. Shafer, and Arthur Chase Shafer and Robert Resor 80 T.C. 1145">*1148 Shafer, in accordance with the estates and interests set forth in the habendum, * * * Lot No. 436 * * *
The habendum provides as follows:
To Have and To Hold the granted premises with all the privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging to the said Eunice C. R. Shafer and Arthur C. Shafer for the term of their natural lives with remainder to Arthur Chase Shafer and Robert Resor Shafer as tenants in common, their heirs and assigns to their own use and behoof forever.
Neither decedent nor Eunice conveyed his or her respective interest in lot No. 436 to their sons.
Chase and Resor were the coexecutors of Eunice's estate; they did not include lot No. 436 in 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*71 the gross estate reported in the Federal estate tax return for Eunice's estate. This tax return was examined for respondent by an estate and gift tax examiner attorney, Donald Grigsby (hereinafter referred to as Grigsby). During the examination of this tax return, an issue was raised as to whether her gross estate should include the value of lot No. 436 under
On December 19, 1974, Resor signed 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*72 an affidavit stating in part as follows:
fall 1938 or early 1939, Arthur C. Shafer received letter from Leslie Flanders, executor of the estate of Walter L. Mayhew et al. stating that surveyor had wrongly surveyed, and Arthur C. Shafer had built house on property not belonging to him. Executor would sell Arthur C. Shafer south Lot No. 436 for $ 1200.00. Arthur C. Shafer bought lot spring of 1939.
* * * *
To the best of my memory, in all conversations with my father, he stated that he was the sole purchaser of this property and the house thereon.
80 T.C. 1145">*1149 Chase signed an affidavit dated December 19, 1974, stating that "My father bought Lot 436 from Charles D. Whidden and Leslie M. Flanders, Trustees * * * in late spring, 1939." Chase states in the affidavit the following with regard to lots Nos. 436 and 437:
5. The question has arisen: who paid for those two lots?
My brother Resor Shafer and I have searched at length for old checks written by our mother and father, and have not found a cancelled check from either of them dating back to 1938 and 1939. It was my father's practice to throw away old cancelled checks after seven years or more, and I suspect he threw away the checks which had purchased 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*73 both these lots.
Throughout my life both my mother and father referred to these lots as "belonging" to my father, Arthur C. Shafer. He dealt with them as if they were his. The shipping tags for the Hodgson House we erected had his name on them. And his initials were stamped on each piece of the Swedish log cabin we built after World War II on the other lot. My father always said that he had bought and paid for both these lots, and I never heard my mother contradict him when he said so.
Chase drafted both of these affidavits.
On the basis of all the material presented to Grigsby, primarily Chase's and Resor's affidavits, Grigsby determined that decedent had furnished the consideration for lot No. 436, and that Eunice had not furnished the consideration. From this, Grigsby concluded that the value of lot No. 436 should not be included in Eunice's gross estate.
Decedent's will, executed January 9, 1970, appointed his two daughters-in-law as the executors. By a codicil executed January 24, 1974, decedent revoked this appointment of his daughters-in-law and appointed his two sons, Chase and Resor, as the executors.
On July 21, 1975, Chase and Resor, as petitioner's executors, filed petitioner's 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*74 Federal estate tax return. This tax return lists lot No. 436 (and the improvements on it) as being includable in decedent's gross estate as a transfer made by decedent on February 14, 1974, in contemplation of death. The value of lot No. 436, as so included, was listed as $ 130,000. This tax return does not list lot No. 437.
Grigsby was respondent's examiner for petitioner's Federal estate tax return. In a letter dated September 15, 1976, to Grigsby "Re: Estate of Arthur C. Shafer," Chase stated as follows:
80 T.C. 1145">*1150 You have asked me to write you explaining why my brother and I, coexecutors of this estate, have not included in this taxable estate Lot No. 436 at Gay Head, Dukes County, Massachusetts.
Lot No. 437 was granted to Arthur C. Shafer (hereinafter: ACS) in fee by Harriet O. Robinson, on October 11, 1938. (Copy of this deed enclosed.) ACS transferred this lot No. 437 to my brother and myself on February 14, 1974 (copy of deed enclosed). My brother and I have, as co-executors of this estate, included the value of this Lot No. 437 in ACS's taxable estate 61983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*75
* * * *
(It will amuse you to know that ACS bought Lot 437 for $ 600, put up a small camp on it, only to find that he had put the camp on Lot 436, which he then bought for $ 1200.)
* * * *
I contend that
I do not deny that ACS made a gift to CS and RS at the time of his purchase of Lot No. 436. To my knowledge, ACS never filed a gift tax return or an information gift return dealing with this gift of the remainder to CS and RS. Nevertheless, the value of the gift to CS and RS on June 8, 1939, must have been less than two annual exclusions at that time, and less than the lifetime exemption at that time.
The relevant value of lot No. 436 is $ 130,000.
Decedent furnished the entire consideration for the purchase of lot No. 436 from Whidden and Flanders in 1939.
OPINION
Respondent 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*76 contends that decedent furnished the entire consideration for the purchase of lot No. 436, that decedent thereby indirectly transferred the interests to Eunice, Chase, and Resor that were recited in the 1939 deed, and that this is sufficient to make decedent the transferor of lot No. 436 for purposes of estate tax inclusion under
Petitioner contends that
We agree with respondent.
At the trial, respondent offered into evidence Chase's affidavit, Resor's affidavit, and Chase's letter (described in the findings of fact,
Each of these documents was received into evidence for all the purposes for which it was offered. On answering brief, petitioner renews his objections, which we deal with as a preliminary matter.
Under
80 T.C. 1145">*1152 Under
Before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence by Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975), the weight of authority was that an out-of-court statement made by an executor was not admissible in evidence against the executor as an admission, unless the executor made the out-of-court statement in his capacity as executor. See 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 1076, at 154-155 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1972), to the effect that:
(2) Where the party sues in a
80 T.C. 1145">*1153 The footnote referred to in the Wigmore quotation cites a series of supporting authorities, and then makes the following observations:
The Uniform Rules of Evidence provision is in accord with the text. Thus subdiv. (7) of Rule 63 makes admissible as against himself a statement by a person who is a party to the action in his individual or a representative capacity and if the latter, who was acting in such representative capacity in making the statement; enacted as Canal Zone Code tit. 5, § 2962(7) (1963);
The California Evidence Code is
The official comment is as follows: "
The Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C. app. at 576 (1976 ed.), provide the following rationale for excluding admissions from the definition of hearsay under
(2)
The Advisory Committee's Notes continue by commenting more specifically:
80 T.C. 1145">*1154 The rule specifies five categories of statements for which the responsibility of a party is considered sufficient to justify reception in evidence against him:
(A) A party's own statement is the classic example of an admission.
The Advisory Committee's Notes to
Unlike Uniform Rule 63(7),
* * * *
The rule makes no attempt to categorize the myriad ways in which a party or his representative may make an admission. Admissions can be made expressly or may be inferred from conduct. They may be made orally or in writing. The statement may have been made in connection with the instant case or in connection with some other completely independent litigation. All that is required is that the statements have been made by the party or his representative and that 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*84 it be introduced by an adverse party as in some way relevant -- usually because it is contrary to a position that he is now taking. [Footnote references omitted.]
[4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, par. 801(d)(2)(A)[01], at 801-140 -- 801-142 (1981).]
From the foregoing, we conclude that the term "party" in
The statements in the affidavits and letter may be dealt with in two categories: (1) Direct statements by Chase and Resor, 12 and (2) statements by Chase and Resor as to statements by decedent. 131983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*85
80 T.C. 1145">*1155 A statement may constitute an admission under
We conclude that the direct statements by Chase and Resor (note 12
Chase's letter of September 15, 1976, appears to have been written in Chase's capacity as petitioner's executor, and so would have been admissible in evidence against Chase as an admission even under the more restrictive rules of prior law. In addition, Chase's letter is excluded from the definition of hearsay by virtue of
Chase's and Resor's statements, in their affidavits, as to statements by decedent 14 (note 13
We conclude that none of the documents constitutes hearsay when offered for the truth of the matters asserted by Chase or Resor, as the case may be, in the respective documents, nor when offered for the truth of the matters stated in the affidavits to have been asserted by decedent.
Petitioner contends that admitting the affidavits and letter violates
We conclude that neither the affidavits nor the letter is rendered inadmissible by
Petitioner contends that Chase's and Resor's affidavits are not admissible to impeach their testimony at trial because Grigsby's behavior was improper. 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*90 18
The testimony at trial did not indicate any impropriety in Grigsby's actions. Resor testified that he did not deal with Grigsby at all as to Eunice's estate, and that he signed an 80 T.C. 1145">*1158 affidavit prepared by Chase. Chase testified that he did deal with 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*91 Grigsby as to Eunice's estate; that Grigsby asked him for information as to the furnishing of consideration for lot No. 436; that when he could not provide any, Grigsby asked to interview decedent, which Chase was unwilling to allow because of decedent's failing health; and that Grigsby subsequently asked him to provide "affidavits which related to the purchase of the lot 436, and a little background as well, to set the scenes, make them comprehensible." Chase testified that Grigsby did not provide the wording of the affidavits. Grigsby testified that there was no arrangement or understanding that Grigsby would exclude the value of lot No. 436 from Eunice's gross estate if Chase provided him with affidavits that could form a basis for including this item in decedent's gross estate. Chase was not recalled in rebuttal to Grigsby's testimony.
We are at a loss to understand what petitioner believes to be Grigsby's improper actions, which petitioner states were "fully developed at the trial" and which are supposed to "cast grave doubts upon their [the affidavits'] legitimacy for any purpose."
We conclude that the documents are admissible to impeach Chase's and Resor's testimony.
Respondent contends that the value of lot No. 436 should be included in its entirety in decedent's gross estate under
Petitioner maintains that decedent never made a transfer (within the meaning of
We agree with respondent.
80 T.C. 1145">*1159
Under
2.
Petitioner bears the burden of proving error in respondent's determination in the notice of deficiency.
Petitioner attempts to satisfy this obligation, as to the question of who furnished consideration for lot No. 436 in 1939, by relying on the language of the deed ("in consideration of one dollar and other valuable considerations, paid by Eunice C. R. Shafer, Arthur C. Shafer, and Arthur Chase Shafer and Robert Resor Shafer") and the evidence that Chase and Resor had assets which could have been used to furnish the appropriate consideration. 211983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*95
80 T.C. 1145">*1160 This evidence is both scant and ambiguous. The deed does not recite that each of the grantees thereto furnished consideration in money or money's worth equal to the fair market value of the interest conveyed to that grantee (see
Against this evidence for petitioner, there is the evidence of the admissions in the affidavits and the letter. These admissions, also ambiguous, are couched in terms that lead us toward the conclusion that decedent was the individual who provided the entire consideration for lot No. 436.
Although the matter is not free from doubt, weighing 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*96 the evidence on both sides we conclude that it is more likely than not that decedent furnished the entire consideration for the 1939 acquisition of lot No. 436. As a result, we have found that decedent furnished the entire consideration for the purchase of lot No. 436 from Whidden and Flanders in 1939.
Neither of the parties has cited us to a case dealing with the precise issue in the instant case, nor have we found such a case. The issue is whether decedent's furnishing consideration for the purchase of the real property in issue, with a deed back conveying a life interest to him, constitutes a "transfer" of "
In these circumstances, we agree with petitioner that the appropriate course is to "return to first principles."
In
The importation of these distinctions and controversies from the law of property into the administration of the estate tax precludes a fair and workable tax system. Essentially the same interests, judged from the point of view of wealth, will be taxable or not, depending upon elusive and subtle casuistries which may have their historic justification but possess no relevance for tax purposes. These unwitty diversities of the law of property derive from medieval concepts as to the necessity of a continuous seisin. Distinctions which originated under a feudal economy when land dominated social relations are peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures now so largely directed toward intangible wealth. [Footnote references omitted.]
More recently, in
In
In
Dora's estate sought to distinguish a line of cases (
on the ground that in each of them the decedent once owned or was entitled to receive the
Looking through form to substance * * * decedent and his wife merely substituted one piece of property for another of equal value. The effect of the exchange of properties was a transfer of parcel VII * * *. The transaction, therefore, should be treated for federal tax purposes as if the transfer of parcel VII had emanated from decedent and his wife and as if they had retained joint life interests therein. * * *
[Emphasis in original.]
The substance of the transaction in the instant case is that decedent gave Whidden and Flanders $ 1,200. In exchange, Whidden and Flanders deeded lot No. 436. Whidden and Flanders unbundled the interests in lot No. 436 in essentially the same manner as did the daughter and her 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*101 husband in
We conclude that decedent made a "transfer" of lot No. 436 under which he "retained" a life interest in that parcel, within the meaning of
Petitioner makes a series of contentions as to the application of
Firstly, petitioner contends that "Before
But the plaintiffs say that the tax here must be deemed to be a tax on property because the beneficiaries' interests in the policies were not transferred to them from the decedent, but from the insurer, and hence there was nothing to which a transfer or privilege tax could apply. Obviously, the word "transfer" in the statute, or the privilege which may constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in such a restricted sense as to refer 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*105 only to the passing of particular items of property directly from the decedent to the transferee. It must, we think, at least include the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the decedent with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another. Sec. 402(c) [of the Revenue Act of 1921] taxes transfers made in contemplation of death. It would not, we assume, be seriously argued that its provisions could be evaded by the purchase by a decedent from a third person of property, a savings bank book for example, and its delivery by the seller directly to the intended beneficiary on the purchaser's death, or that the measure of the tax would be the cost and not the value or proceeds at the time of death.
Secondly, petitioner asserts that the courts have uniformly rejected respondent's attempts to categorize other transactions by a decedent as "transfers" within the meaning of
80 T.C. 1145">*1165 Thirdly, petitioner contends that it is a "manifest error" to attempt to relate the instant case to the reciprocal trust doctrine. 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 66">*106 We agree that there are no trusts in the instant case and so the reciprocal trust doctrine, as such, is not applicable to the instant case. What we have is decedent's purchase of property from an independent seller and the delivery of that property (subject to decedent's life interest) by the seller directly to the transferees. Petitioner's assertion of the limitations of this doctrine simply does not advance its case or impede respondent's case.
Fourthly, on answering brief, petitioner contends that
Is it "adequate and full" consideration to him? To some extent, the concept of consideration is a subjective one. Anything of value, which is bargained for will be deemed to be adequate and full consideration. So if Arthur C. Shafer paid $ 1,200.00 exclusively out of his own funds, and received therefore the right to spend summers on Martha's Vineyard for the rest of his life, he surely must be deemed to have received adequate and full consideration.
A similar contention was made in
We hold for respondent.
1. Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as in effect as of decedent's death.↩
2. In the notice of deficiency, respondent made a series of adjustments. The petition assigned error only to the issue presented in the opinion,
Unless indicated otherwise, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
3. Chase is a self-employed lawyer, who also owns and operates residential real estate as rental property.↩
4. These trustees were not related to the Shafers. The execution and recordation of the deed as to lot No. 436 was an arm's-length transaction between these trustees and the Shafers.↩
5. Apparently, lot No. 436 was purchased because decedent had unknowingly put these improvements on lot No. 436, having intended to put them on lot No. 437.
6. The parties agree that (1) Chase and Resor, as petitioner's executors, intended to include lot No. 437 in the gross estate and intended not to include lot No. 436, (2) lot No. 437 is includable in the gross estate, and (3) the relevant value of lot No. 437 is $ 124,000.
7.
Except in the case of proceedings conducted under section 7463, the proceedings of the Tax Court and its divisions shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure (other than rules of evidence) as the Tax Court may prescribe and in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in trials without a jury in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia.
8.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress.↩
9.
The following definitions apply under this article:
* * * *
(c) Hearsay. -- "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.↩
10.
The following definitions apply under this article:
* * * *
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. -- A statement is not hearsay if --
* * * *
(2) Admission by party-opponent. -- The statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.↩
6. [MISSING FOOTNOTE]↩
11. The Congress adopted in haec verba the relevant parts of
12. Category (1) statements include: (a) Resor's statement in his Dec. 19, 1974, affidavit that lot No. 436 was bought by decedent; (b) Chase's statements in his Dec. 19, 1974, affidavit that decedent bought lot No. 436, and that decedent dealt with lot No. 436 as if it were decedent's; and (c) Chase's statements in the letter dated Sept. 15, 1976, that decedent bought lot No. 436 and that "I do not deny that ACS made a gift to CS and RS at the time of his purchase of lot No. 436."↩
13. Category (2) statements include: (a) Resor's statement in his Dec. 19, 1974, affidavit that in all conversations with decedent, decedent stated that he was the sole purchaser of lot No. 436; and (b) Chase's statements in his Dec. 19, 1974, affidavit that decedent referred to lot No. 436 as belonging to decedent, and that decedent always said that he had bought and paid for lot No. 436.
Respondent offered the affidavits and letter for the truth of Chase's and Resor's statements and for the truth of what Chase and Resor stated were decedent's statements. Respondent did not indicate that the affidavits were offered for the truth of what Chase and Resor stated were Eunice's statements.↩
14.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement -- A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.↩
15.
* * * *
(b) Ex Parte Statements: Ex parte affidavits, statements in briefs, and unadmitted allegations in pleadings do not constitute evidence. As to allegations in pleadings not denied, see Rules 36(c), 37(c) and (d).↩
16.
17. In
18. At trial, petitioner contended that the affidavits and letter could not be used for impeachment purposes because they went beyond the direct examination and because the statements in the affidavits and letter are not inconsistent with testimony of Chase and Resor on direct examination. The tenor of the direct examination was to the effect that funds given to Chase and Resor by their maternal grandmother might have been used to purchase lot No. 436. The tenor of the affidavits and letter was to the effect that decedent provided all the consideration for the purchase of lot No. 436. Thus, use of the affidavits and letter does not exceed the breadth of direct examination, and appears to us to be sufficiently inconsistent therewith, to overcome these objections to the admission of these documents for impeachment purposes. See 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, par. 607[06], at 607-74 -- 607-75, 607-83, 607-85 (1982).↩
19.
(a) General Rule. -- The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death -- (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
20.
(a) In General. -- If any one of the transfers, trusts, interests, rights, or powers enumerated and described in
21. Chase and Resor testified that they paid portions of the total consideration for lot No. 436. However, they acknowledged that their testimony essentially was based on their conclusion that (in Resor's words) they "had no reason to question the deed," and on their understanding that they had sufficient assets in 1939 (Chase was 10 years old and Resor was 6 years old at the time) to pay for their remainder interests. This testimony has no greater weight than its acknowledged underpinnings.
22. The following appears in C. Lowndes, R. Kramer & J. McCord, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 186 (3d ed. 1974):
"A decedent may be taxed under
Tax Management Portfolio,
"A more difficult case would exist if A paid B $ 50,000 and B conveyed a life estate in a $ 50,000 house to A and the remainder to A's children.