(b) Definitions. -- For purposes of this section --

(1) Alternative minimum taxable income. -- The term "alternative minimum taxable income" means gross income --

"Tax preference items" as used in section 55(b)(1)(C) and section 57(a)(9) specifically include as part of the alternative 84 T.C. 179">*182 minimum tax base income the 60-percent deduction for net capital gains under section 1202.

These provisions and their history were most recently analyzed in Huntsberry v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742">83 T.C. 742 (1984). In that case, we said that, 1985 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 125">*133 although we are no longer foreclosed from inquiring into legislative purposes where a statute is clear on its face,

we would require unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose before construing the statute so as to override the plain meaning of the words used therein. And this is particularly so in a case like the present, where we have a complex set of statutory provisions marked by a high degree of specificity. * * * [83 T.C. 742">83 T.C. 747-748.]

The legislative history of section 55 reveals no congressional intention or purpose whatsoever to exempt any form of capital gain, other than gain from the sale of a principal residence (section 57(a)(9)(D)), from the alternative minimum tax. See H. Rept. 95-1800 (Conf.) (1978), 1978-3 C.B. (Vol. 1) 521, 598-602.

We would certainly require specific evidence of legislative intent before we would conclude that a subsequently enacted nontax statute overrode specific provisions of a taxing statute. See Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753">365 U.S. 753, 365 U.S. 753">757-758 (1961); State Mutual Life Assur. Co. v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 319">246 F.2d 319, 246 F.2d 319">323-324 (1st Cir. 1957),1985 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 125">*134 affg. 27 T.C. 543">27 T.C. 543 (1956). We find no such evidence, as neither the Farmland Protection Policy Act, 7 U.S.C. secs. 4201-4209, nor its legislative history, addresses the tax treatment of gain from the sale of farmland development rights. See Agricultural and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-98, secs. 1539-1549, 95 Stat. 1213, 1341-1344; H. Rept. 97-377 (Conf.) (1981), 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2250, 2361-2362; S. Rept. 97-126 (1981), 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1965, 2178-2180. Title 7, section 4203(b), relied on by petitioners and quoted above, obviously does not and could not require the Internal Revenue Service to adopt, administratively, regulations that would counteract express congressional enactments contained in the Internal Revenue Code. (By its terms, it only directs the development of proposals.)

Furthermore, retroactive effect will not be given a statute unless legislative intent to achieve that result is clear. See, e.g., United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160">276 U.S. 160, 276 U.S. 160">16284 T.C. 179">*183 (1928). Congress' intention with respect to the Farmland Protection Policy1985 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 125">*135 Act is expressly to the contrary, however. The act provides that it does not become effective until 6 months from the date of enactment (December 22, 1981), or June 22, 1982, subsequent to the year in issue here. Pub. L. 97-98, sec. 1549, 95 Stat. 1213, 1344.

Petitioners present several other arguments that are equally unpersuasive. They claim that the alternative minimum tax provisions were not intended to apply to them because they paid a "substantial" regular tax. Their argument on this point, however, is based on legislative history and case law dealing with the "add on" minimum tax (formerly found in section 56), viz, Wardas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-137, and Dupont v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 588">483 F. Supp. 588 (D. Del. 1980). As we said in 83 T.C. 742">Huntsberry v. Commissioner, supra:

Although the term "alternative minimum tax" is confusingly similar to the term "minimum tax" already on the books for some 9 years, it nevertheless relates to a separate and distinct tax. Indeed, during 1979 and for several years thereafter a noncorporate taxpayer was subject to both the minimum tax and the1985 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 125">*136 alternative minimum tax. It is important that the difference between these two taxes be kept clearly in mind. To some extent, they have similar, but nevertheless at least partly different, objectives, and they are differently structured and have independent spheres of operation. [83 T.C. 742">83 T.C. 748-749; fn. ref. omitted.]

Section 55(a) is expressly structured so that the alternative tax is paid only if and to the extent that the alternative tax computation exceeds the taxpayer's regular liability. This provision was designed to overcome problems of equity and disincentive to capital formation perceived with reference to the "add on" minimum tax and reflected in the arguments relied on by petitioners. See, e.g., S. Rept. 95-1263 (1978), 1978-3 C.B. (Vol. 1) 315, 499-500. Congress has obviously taken the steps that it perceived to be necessary to correct the situation, and courts "are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement." Badaracco v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 925">461 U.S. 925 (1983); see also David Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 42">76 T.C. 42, 76 T.C. 42">80 (1981),1985 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 125">*137 affd. 693 F.2d 459">693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982); Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 783">80 T.C. 783, 80 T.C. 783">788 (1983), affd. 736 F.2d 1168">736 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1984).

84 T.C. 179">*184 Petitioners next argue that the fact that the transaction was a "one time deal" with the State of Maryland for the benefit of the general public should militate against categorization of their gain as a tax preference. There is no justification for creating such an exception to the express terms of the statute. See Frederick Smith Enter. Co. v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 356">167 F.2d 356, 167 F.2d 356">359 (6th Cir. 1948); Sullivan v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1156">76 T.C. 1156, 76 T.C. 1156">1158 (1981), affd. by unpublished order (10th Cir. 1983).

Similarly without merit is an assertion made by petitioners that their transaction was not really a "sale" and that they did not have a "true" capital gain. Petitioners reported the transaction correctly, as a capital gain under section 1201, and claimed a deduction under section 1202. There is no tenable argument that the incorporation of section 1202 into sections 55 and 57 does not apply to this transaction. 1985 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 125">*138 See also Parker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 29">74 T.C. 29, 74 T.C. 29">33 (1980); Sullivan v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1156">76 T.C. 1159. If the transaction were not a "true" capital gain, there would be no justification for reducing the taxable amount by 60 percent of the net income received.

We have considered petitioners' other arguments and found them to be without support in law or logic. Petitioners assert repeatedly the inequity of subjecting them to the alternative minimum tax under section 55 and argue that the tax is contrary to congressional policy with respect to farmland. Presumably, however, the farmland policy should encourage farmland preservation regardless of the tax situation of the particular owner of farmlands. If Congress had wanted to add additional incentives to farmland protection in the nature of tax benefits, some specific exclusion, deduction, method of calculation, or credit could have been provided. There is no reason to assume that a tax incentive would take the form of exemption from the alternative minimum tax, the impact of which is designed to and does substantially vary depending on the structure of the taxpayers' other1985 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 125">*139 income, deductions, and credits. We will not assume that Congress did indirectly what it could have, but has not, done directly.

Petitioners also argue that they might have planned the transaction differently (as an installment sale) if they had known that they would be subject to the alternative minimum tax computation. Petitioners did use income averaging in computing the tax due with their return. They have thus had 84 T.C. 179">*185 the benefit of a statutory provision expressly intended to cover some of the concerns that they have expressed in this case. If they had entered into an installment sales transaction, they might not have had the benefit of income averaging. We have no basis for determining which method would have resulted in less tax in the long run, and it is not material to our decision. In any event, petitioners are bound by the tax consequences of the transaction as it actually occurred.

Because of respondent's concession with respect to the additions to tax,

Decision will be entered for the respondent in the amount of the deficiency only.