1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*53
Decedent possessed at the time of his death a power to invade, for his benefit, income and corpus of a trust. The power was limited to the standard that the invasion be for decedent's "proper support, maintenance, welfare, health and general happiness in the manner to which he is accustomed at the time of the death of [his wife]."
87 T.C. 599">*599 OPINION
Respondent determined a deficiency of $ 191,087 in the Federal estate tax of the Estate of John Russell Little. The only issue is whether the value of assets of a trust of which John Russell Little was a beneficiary and the sole trustee is includable in his estate under
1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*56 This case has been submitted under Rule 122. All of the facts have been stipulated and are found accordingly. 2
Petitioner Crocker National Bank is the executor of the Estate of John Russell Little. Petitioner's principal office was located in San Francisco, California, when the petition herein was filed. The Federal estate tax return here involved was filed with the District Director of Internal Revenue, San Francisco, California.
John Russell Little (hereinafter sometimes referred to as decedent) died on August 2, 1979. At the time of his death, 87 T.C. 599">*600 he was a beneficiary and the sole trustee of a testamentary trust (hereinafter sometimes referred to as trust) created by the will of his wife, Grace Schaffer Little (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Mrs. Little), who died on November 11, 1971. The pertinent provisions of the trust are as follows:
During the lifetime of John Russell Little, the trustee shall1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*57 pay to or apply for the benefit of John Russell Little, so much of income and principal of the trust estate as is necessary, in the discretion of the Trustee after taking into consideration to the extent the Trustee deems advisable, other resources of John Russell Little available to him outside of this trust, for his proper support, maintenance, welfare, health and general happiness in the manner to which he is accustomed at the time of the death of Grace Schaffer Little.
Decedent's gross estate, as computed on his estate's Federal estate tax return, did not include the value of the trust's assets, which the parties agree was $ 539,088.01 at the time of decedent's death. Respondent determined an estate tax deficiency of $ 191,087 after including the value of the trust's assets in decedent's estate under
1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*58 Under the three paragraphs of
1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*59 For the
Unless the
1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*60 We look to State law to determine whether the standard relates solely to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent. See
Petitioner argues that a California State court construing the standard would "limit it to refer to the the standard of
Having rejected petitioner's contention, we now consider whether a California State court would interpret the standard employed by the trust to relate solely to the health, education, support, or maintenance of decedent. Our research of California State law, as aided by the parties, has not revealed any case directly on point. Therefore, we will 87 T.C. 599">*603 consider the general rule of construing testamentary trusts under California State law. "A trust created by1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*64 will is properly controlled by the expressed intention of the testatrix [and] the particular language used is always important."
We are convinced that a California State court properly applying these general rules would recognize that the standard employed by the trust does not relate solely to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent. "Were [it] confronted with a dispute between the [widower] 1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*65 and the remaindermen over the propriety of an invasion, [it] would not adopt a grudging and narrow interpretation of [general happiness]." 10
1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*66 We are convinced that a California State court would recognize that there are items which fall within the ambit of "general happiness," but which do not fall within the ambit of "health, education, support, or maintenance." Consider, for example, "travel." The California State Supreme Court87 T.C. 599">*604 has intimated that "travel" does not relate to "support, maintenance, or education." 11
1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*67 "Travel" is not the only example of a proper use of the assets of the trust that would not be proper if the power to invade was limited solely to decedent's health, education, support, or maintenance. A listing of other examples is not here necessary. That one exists is sufficient to show that the standard employed by the trust does not relate solely to decedent's health, education, support, or maintenance. Accordingly, we hold that the
1986 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 53">*68 Since none of the exceptions to general power of appointment apply, 13 we hold that decedent possessed, at the time of his death, a general power of appointment. The power of appointment was exercisable over the income and corpus of the trust. Respondent was therefore correct in including the value of the trust's assets in decedent's gross estate.
1. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended and in effect at the time of decedent's death, unless otherwise indicated. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. The stipulations and the exhibits attached thereto are incorporated herein by this reference.↩
3. Because Mrs. Little died less than 10 years before decedent's death and the value of the trust's assets was included in her estate, upon including the value of the trust's assets in decedent's estate, respondent allowed it an increase in the sec. 2013 prior transfers credit. The $ 191,087 deficiency reflects this increase in the sec. 2013 prior transfers credit.↩
4.
5. Although
6.
"Discretionary powers. A discretionary power conferred upon a trustee is presumed not to be left to his arbitrary discretion, but may be controlled by the proper Court if not reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly conferred by the declaration of trust."↩
7. "A power to invade corpus to provide for a beneficiary's 'reasonable care, comfort, support and maintenance in accordance with the standard of living as of the date of decedent's death' creates a far more
8. We envision only one situation in which the language referred to would affect whether the standard related solely to decedent's health, education, support, or maintenance. It may have been that decedent enjoyed no "general happiness" or "welfare" at the time of Mrs. Little's death. In such a case, the terms "general happiness" and "welfare" can be read out of the will as they refer to nothing. Even if petitioner had made such an argument before this Court, it would lose, as it has not proven that decedent's "general happiness" and "welfare" were nonexistent at the time of Mrs. Little's death. See Rules 142(a), 122(b), and 149(b).↩
9. See also
10. We, are aware that this Court has stated that a "word, such as 'happiness'" should be construed in the context in which it appears.
We do not find it necessary for the disposition of this case to construe "welfare." However, we note that "welfare" has, in the past, been construed to be broader than health, education, support, or maintenance.
11. The court does not refer to "health," but we readily note that "travel" often does not relate to the health of the traveler, the two being, for the most part, independent of one another.
Further, we note, as we feel the California State Supreme Court would, that "travel" might, in some situations, relate to "support, maintenance, or education," though, for the most part, "travel" is independent of "support, maintenance, or education."↩
12. We need not consider whether the standard is ascertainable as our holding that the standard is not related solely to the health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent is dispositive of the applicability of
In
13. See note 4