1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*84
Petitioner, a dentist, conducted his private practice through a wholly owned professional corporation. The professional corporation established an employees pension trust, with petitioner as trustee. In December 1980, petitioner sold stock to the trust for cash and a non-interest-bearing demand note. In February 1981, the trust sold the stock to a third party and paid off the note. In December 1981, petitioner determined that the price at which he sold the stock to the trust exceeded the price that the trust would have had to pay for the stock on the open market, and paid such difference to the trust.
88 T.C. 1474">*1475 The Commissioner determined that petitioner was liable for the excise tax imposed by
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are incorporated by this reference.
88 T.C. 1474">*1476 Petitioner Alden M. Leib resided in Farmington Hills, Michigan, at the time he filed his petition in this case. Petitioner is a dentist specializing in the practice of periodontics. Petitioner has been engaged in the private practice of periodontics since 1966. Since 1969, petitioner has conducted his private practice through a professional corporation known as Alden M. Leib, D.D.S., M.S., P.C. Petitioner owns 100 percent of the stock of the professional corporation. In 1980, the professional corporation had approximately 20 employees. The professional corporation established the Alden M. Leib, 1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*87 D.D.S., M.S., P.C. Employees Pension Trust (the trust) in 1969. Petitioner has been the trustee since its inception. As of the time of trial, approximately 15 individuals had vested amounts in the trust.
By the fall of 1980, petitioner had accumulated a block of stock in Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc. (Cunningham), a retail drug store chain whose stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange. On November 18, 1980, the Detroit Free Press published an article stating that a group of New York investors had purchased approximately 32 percent of the outstanding stock of Cunningham on November 14, 1980, for $ 18 per share. The article stated that the owners of the remaining shares would be offered the same price in proxy materials to be sent out by mid-December.
On December 12, 1980, petitioner sold 8,900 shares of Cunningham stock to the trust for $ 17.50 per share for a total price of $ 155,750. Petitioner determined that $ 17.50 per share was the amount the trust would have to pay to purchase the stock on the open market. In payment for the stock, petitioner received a check in the amount of $ 25,750 and a promissory note in the amount of $ 130,000 from the trust. The note was 1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*88 payable on demand and was non-interest-bearing.
On January 30, 1981, an article published in the Detroit Free Press stated that the shareholders of Cunningham had approved the sale to the New York investors on January 29, 1981, and that the shareholders would receive $ 18 per share by February 20, 1981. On February 20, 1981, the trust sold the 8,900 shares of Cunningham stock to the New York investors for $ 18 per share for a total selling price of 88 T.C. 1474">*1477 $ 160,200. On February 27, 1981, the $ 130,000 promissory note issued to petitioner by the trust was paid in full.
In December 1981, petitioner determined that the price at which he sold the stock to the trust exceeded by $ 0.50 per share the price that the trust would have had to pay had it purchased the stock on the open market and paid commissions on the purchase. On December 15, 1981, petitioner paid the trust $ 4,450, or $ 0.50 on 8,900 shares.
On March 8, 1985, the Commissioner mailed a statutory notice of deficiency to petitioner in which he determined that petitioner entered into a prohibited transaction under
OPINION
Petitioner concedes that he is a disqualified person and that the sale of the Cunningham stock to the trust constituted a prohibited transaction. However, petitioner contends that the
To evaluate the contention of petitioner, we look initially to the express language and framework of the statute. 88 T.C. 1474">*1478
In
The language and statutory framework of
In addition, the committee reports accompanying ERISA indicate that Congress intended to unconditionally prohibit certain transactions irrespective of the prudence of the transaction or whether the plan benefited therefrom. The Senate Finance Committee report provides as follows:
88 T.C. 1474">*1480 Currently, transactions generally are prohibited1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*95 when the dealings involved are on other than an arm's-length basis. However, arm's-length standards require substantial enforcement efforts, resulting in sporadic and uncertain effectiveness of these provisions. This is the same problem which was faced by the Congress in 1969 when it acted with respect to prohibited transactions and private foundations. At that time the Congress concluded that in most cases arm's-length standards did not preserve the integrity of private foundations, and amended these definitions of prohibited transactions for the most part to prohibit outright questionable transactions between the trust and interested parties. The committee's bill generally follows the approach that was developed in 1969, * * * [S. Rept. 93-383 (1973), 1974-3 C.B. (Supp.) 80, 174.]
ERISA section 406 (part 4 of title I) which generally parallels
The labor provisions deal with the structure of plan administration, 1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*96 provide general standards of conduct for fiduciaries, 10 and make certain specific transactions "prohibited transactions" which plan fiduciaries are not to engage in. The tax provisions include only the prohibited transaction rules and apply only to disqualified persons, not fiduciaries (unless the fiduciary is otherwise a disqualified person and the transaction involved him, or the fiduciary benefited from the transaction). To the maximum extent possible, the prohibited transaction rules are identical in the labor and tax provisions, so they will apply in the same manner to the same transaction. * * * [H. Rept. 93-1280 (Conf.)(1974),
Thus, the case law interpreting ERISA section 406 is instructive with regard to interpreting the prohibited transaction provisions of
1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*97 ERISA section 406 has been uniformly interpreted as a per se prohibition of the transactions defined therein.
The object of Section 406 was to make illegal per se the types of transaction that experience had shown to entail a high potential for abuse. In the complex setting of employee benefit plans, brightline rules are advantageous1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*98 to beneficiaries and fiduciaries alike, providing assured protection to the former and clear notice of responsibility to the latter. [
After a review of the statutory framework and legislative history of
Petitioner, next contends that the prohibited transaction did not extend beyond December 31, 1980, and, therefore, he is not liable for the tax imposed by
Section 141.4975-13, Temporary Excise Tax Regs.,
Petitioner challenges the validity of the portion of section 53.4941(e)-1(c)(3)(ii), Foundation Excise Tax Regs., quoted above for two reasons. Petitioner also implicitly challenges the validity of the portion of section 53.4941(e)-1(c)(3)(i), Foundation Excise Tax Regs., quoted above for the same reasons. Petitioner contends that if the property involved is publicly traded stock, it can be disposed of at any time, and the trust and its beneficiaries1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*102 are adequately protected; therefore, correction of the prohibited transaction is unnecessary. 88 T.C. 1474">*1483 Petitioner also contends that rescission would not have been in the best interest of the trust or the beneficiaries as it would have deprived them of the gain which was assured upon the sale of the stock. Therefore, in keeping with the highest fiduciary standards, and in order to avoid placing the trust in a position worse than that in which it would have been if rescission were required, it was proper for the trust to hold the Cunningham stock in the name of petitioner as trustee until it was sold.
With respect to the first argument of petitioner, he basically contends that if a disqualified person sells marketable securities to a plan, the transaction does not have to be corrected in order to prevent the imposition of the tax under
With respect to the second argument of petitioner, he would apply the highest fiduciary standards in determining whether to require correction of a prohibited transaction. Petitioner, in essence, argues that although the sale to the trust was a prohibited transaction, it does not have to be corrected in order to prevent the imposition of the tax under
We have rejected above the contention of petitioner that a prohibited transaction is acceptable if it would qualify as a prudent investment when judged under the highest fiduciary standards. Petitioner is merely delaying the application of the standard until after the prohibited transaction occurs. The net effect of his argument would be that a prohibited transaction is subsequently rendered acceptable if under the highest fiduciary standards it should not be corrected. As a result, although petitioner is liable for the tax for the year of the initial sale, he would1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*104 not be liable for the tax in subsequent years if it is determined that the 88 T.C. 1474">*1484 transaction should not be corrected. This is inconsistent with the structure of
In determining the propriety of the challenged portions of the regulation, we begin with the general proposition that the Commissioner has broad authority to promulgate all needful regulations. Sec. 7805(a). We ordinarily defer to the Commissioner's interpretive regulations because "Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the courts, the task of prescribing" such regulations.
To ascertain legislative concerns and policies in enacting ERISA, it is not necessary to delve deeply into committee hearings and reports. In section 2 of ERISA, Congress stated its findings and policy:
(a) The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; 1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*107 * * * that the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national public interest; * * * that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, * * * by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*108 Federal courts.
[ERISA sec. 2, 88 Stat. 832.]
We have stated above that in enacting
It is evident that petitioner did not take any steps necessary to correct the prohibited transaction before 1981. The transaction was not rescinded and the stock was not sold to the New York investors until February 1981. Furthermore, petitioner did not pay to the trust the excess of the price at which he sold the stock to the trust over the price that the trust would have had to pay for the stock on the open market until December 1981. Accordingly, the only transactions that could constitute correction occurred after 1981 began. Petitioner is, therefore, also liable for the tax imposed by
Petitioner next contends that the amount of the tax is incorrect because it was not computed based upon the fair market value of the consideration received by him from the trust and because the computation did not take into account the subsequent repayment by him of a portion of the sales price.
The tax imposed is equal to 5 percent of the amount involved with respect to a prohibited transaction.
88 T.C. 1474">*1487 Petitioner contends that the tax should be calculated based upon the sum of the cash received and the fair market value of the non-interest-bearing demand note. Petitioner contends that the fair market value of the note is to be determined by discounting it to its present value. Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that the note was payable on demand. The note did not have a maturity date and consequently, there is no time period to be used in discounting the note. Immediately after issuance of the note, petitioner could have presented it for payment and would have been entitled to receive the face value. Further, petitioner was trustee of the obligor and testified that the trust had assets of approximately $ 700,000. So the risk of nonpayment on the note was negligible. Accordingly, we conclude that the fair market value of the note was equal to its face value as the evidence does not establish to our satisfaction1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 84">*111 that the note had any lesser value.
Petitioner also contends that his subsequent repayment of a portion of the sales price should reduce the amount involved. However, the amount involved in determining the tax under
In sum, we conclude that petitioner is liable for the excise tax imposed by
To reflect the foregoing,
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended and in effect for the relevant years, and all Rule references are to the Rules of Practice and Procedure of this Court.↩
2. Title I of ERISA sets forth guidelines and standards governing the establishment and operation of pension plans and also establishes general standards of conduct for plan fiduciaries. See generally ERISA sec. 2 et seq., 88 Stat. 832 et seq. The Department of Labor is given principal authority to administer and enforce the provisions of title I. See generally ERISA sec. 501 et seq., 88 Stat. 891 et seq. Title II of ERISA specifically amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See generally ERISA sec. 1001 et seq., 88 Stat. 898 et seq.↩
3.
(1) General rule. -- For purposes of this section, the term "prohibited transaction" means any direct or indirect -- (A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between a plan and a disqualified person; (B) lending of money or other extension of credit between a plan and a disqualified person; (C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a plan and a disqualified person; (D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of the income or assets of a plan; (E) act by a disqualified person who is a fiduciary whereby he deals with the income or assets of a plan in his own interest or for his own account; or (F) receipt of any consideration for his own personal account by any disqualified person who is fiduciary from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction involving the income or assets of the plan.↩
4. Petitioner does not contend that the sale of Cunningham stock to the trust comes within an exemption set forth in
5.
(d) Exemptions. -- The prohibitions provided in subsection (c) shall not apply to -- (1) any loan made by the plan to a disqualified person who is a participant or beneficiary of the plan if such loan -- (A) is available to all such participants or beneficiaries on a reasonably equivalent basis, (B) is not made available to highly compensated employees, officers, or shareholders in an amount greater than the amount made available to other employees, (C) is made in accordance with specific provisions regarding such loans set forth in the plan, (D) bears a reasonable rate of interest, and (E) is adequately secured;↩
6.
7.
(2) Special exemption. -- The Secretary shall establish an exemption procedure for purposes of this subsection. Pursuant to such procedure, he may grant a conditional or unconditional exemption of any disqualified person or transaction or class of persons or transactions, from all or part of the restrictions imposed by paragraph (1) of this subsection. Action under this subparagraph may be taken only after consultation and coordination with the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary may not grant an exemption under this paragraph unless he finds that such exemption is -- (A) administratively feasible, (B) in the interests of the plan and of its participants and beneficiaries, and (C) protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of the plan.↩
8. Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3790, authority to issue exemptions under
9. Petitioner stated on brief that he had filed a request with the Department of Labor for a retroactive exemption. The exemption was denied and petitioner contends that the denial was arbitrary and capricious. The propriety of the denial is not before us.↩
10. It should be emphasized that fiduciaries should be distinguished from disqualified persons. ERISA sec. 404 (part 4 of title I) provides that fiduciaries are to discharge their duties in accordance with a prudent man standard of care. The Conference report provides that to the extent a fiduciary meets the prudent man rule of the labor provisions, he will be deemed to meet these aspects ("cost must not exceed fair market value at the time of purchase, there must be a fair return commensurate with the prevailing rate, sufficient liquidity must be maintained to permit distributions, and the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor would adhere to must be present") of the exclusive benefit requirement under the Code. H. Rept. 93-1280 (Conf.) (1974),
11. See sec. 4941(e)(3).↩
12. Sec. 53.4941(e)-1(c)(3)(i), Foundation Excise Tax Regs., also provides that in order to avoid placing the private foundation in a position worse than that in which it would be if rescission were not required, the amount received from the disqualified person pursuant to the rescission shall be the greatest of the cash paid to the disqualified person, the fair market value of the property at the time of the original sale, or the fair market value of the property at the time of rescission. In addition to rescission, the disqualified person is required to pay over to the private foundation any net profits he realized after the original sale with respect to the consideration he received from the sale.↩
13. Sec. 53.4941(e)-1(c)(3)(ii), Foundation Excise Tax Regs., also provides that the disqualified person must pay over to the private foundation the excess (if any) of the amount which would have been received from the disqualified person pursuant to sec. 53.4941(e)-1(c)(3)(i), Foundation Excise Tax Regs. (see note 12