1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18">*18
Pursuant to a property settlement agreement, petitioner paid $ 18,000 to his ex-spouse and she transferred their former residence to him. Soon afterward, petitioner sold the house to a third party.
90 T.C. 200">*201 This case was assigned to and heard by Special Trial Judge Joan Seitz Pate pursuant to the provisions of section 7456 of the Code and Rules 180 and 181. 1 The Court agrees with and adopts the Special Trial Judge's opinion which is set forth below.
1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18">*19 OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
Pate,
FINDINGS OF FACT
Michael J. Godlewski (hereinafter petitioner) resided in Lilburn, Georgia, at the time the petition in this case was filed. Some of the facts have been stipulated1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18">*20 and are incorporated as a part of this opinion.
Petitioner was married to his former wife, Elizabeth Godlewski, on December 27, 1967. On July 13, 1973, they purchased a residence located at 1533 Sanden Ferry Drive in Decatur, Georgia, (hereinafter the house) for $ 32,200. The purchase was funded by a cash downpayment borrowed from petitioner's uncle and a first mortgage of $ 28,900. Mrs. Godlewski was named sole titleholder. 3 On June 24, 1984, the fair market value of the of the house was appraised at $ 66,500 by Mrs. Godlewski's professional appraiser.
Petitioner and Mrs. Godlewski lived in the house until May 16, 1981, when petitioner moved out because of 90 T.C. 200">*202 marital difficulties. By court order dated June 10, 1981, Mrs. Godlewski was granted exclusive use of the1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18">*21 house and petitioner never lived there again. Mr. and Mrs. Godlewski obtained a final divorce on October 31, 1983, but the divorce decree expressly reserved the division of marital property for later determination.
Consequently, Mr. and Mrs. Godlewski executed an agreement dated July 13, 1984 (hereinafter agreement), purporting to settle "all their property rights, and all other rights and duties growing out of or rising out of the marriage relationship between the parties." Mrs. Godlewski signed the agreement on July 13, and petitioner signed it on July 25, 1984. Under its terms, Mrs. Godlewski was required to transfer title to the house to petitioner contemporaneously with the execution of the agreement, and petitioner was obligated to pay Mrs. Godlewski $ 18,000 within 6 months of the conveyance. If the payment was not made, the house was to be sold and one-half of the "net equity" distributed to each spouse. On August 2, 1984, the Court entered a consent judgment adopting the agreement in its entirety.
Mrs. Godlewski executed a warranty deed transferring the house to petitioner on July 20, 1984, and the deed was recorded on September 5, 1984. There is no evidence in the record1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18">*22 as to the actual delivery date of the deed to petitioner. Petitioner paid a total of $ 18,000 to Mrs. Godlewski in August and October 1984, consistent with the terms of the agreement. Petitioner sold the house for $ 64,000 on October 26, 1984, and on December 3, 1984, he purchased a home in Lilburn, Georgia, for $ 75,000. Petitioner did not report the sale of the house or the acquisition of the Lilburn home on his 1984 income tax return.
Petitioner contends that respondent erred in computing the gain realized on the sale of the house by not increasing his basis to reflect the $ 18,000 he paid to Mrs. Godlewski. Respondent maintains that petitioner's basis in the house is its cost of $ 32,000 without adjustment for the $ 18,000 petitioner paid his ex-wife.
OPINION
The outcome of this case turns on whether
In general,
1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18">*26 The answer to the first question is fairly straightforward. The house was titled in Mrs. Godlewski's name and she executed a warranty deed in favor of petitioner on July 20, 1984. Since Mrs. Godlewski executed the deed on July 20, 1984, the transfer necessarily occurred after July 18, 1984.
The answer to whether such transfer was made under any instrument in effect on or before July 18, 1984, is not nearly so easily determined. Although, admittedly, the transfer was incident to the divorce, 7 the divorce decree specifically reserved the determination of property rights for later hearing. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the transfer of the house was not "under" that "instrument."
1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18">*27 Having eliminated the divorce decree, we next consider whether the agreement was the operative "instrument." The agreement was dated July 13, 1984, and was signed by Mrs. Godlewski on that date, clearly prior to the enactment date of July 18, 1984. However, the agreement was not executed by petitioner until July 25, 1984, obviously after the enactment of
To be effective, an agreement settling marital rights between residents of Georgia must meet the same requisites of formation and enforceability as other contracts. See
The record does not disclose any information surrounding the negotiation, preparation, or execution of the agreement except that the $ 18,000, at least initially, was Mrs. Godlewski's "asking" figure based on the fair market value as determined by the June 1984 appraisal. Therefore, there is no evidence indicating a meeting of minds prior to petitioner's execution of the agreement on July 25, 1984. Further, even if there were, the statute of frauds would establish, as the effective date, the day the agreement was reduced to writing. The earliest date this could have occurred was when the agreement was signed by petitioner on July 25, 1984. Thus, we conclude that
As previously stated,
Consequently, the basis to the transferee in the property is the adjusted basis of the transferor as contended by respondent.
90 T.C. 200">*206 In all cases, the basis of the transferred property in the hands of the transferee is the adjusted basis of such property in the hands of the transferor immediately before the transfer.
Since both the statute1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 18">*31 and regulations clearly provide that the $ 18,000 petitioner paid his former wife does not increase his basis in the house, we hold petitioner's basis in the house is $ 32,200.
Because of concessions,
1. Unless otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended and in effect during the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. Respondent conceded all of the issues raised in the notice of deficiency except for the one at issue here. In addition, he conceded that the gain at issue should be taxed as long-term capital gain rather than short-term capital gain as determined in the notice of deficiency and that the amount realized from the sale of the house should be reduced by sales expenses of $ 7,373.
At trial, petitioner abandoned his contention that the recognition of gain realized on the sale of the house could be deferred under sec. 1034.↩
3. Naming Mrs. Godlewski as titleholder was an attempt to shield the property from attachment or sale in the event petitioner was ever sued in his capacity as a physical education instructor. Petitioner is no longer employed in that capacity.↩
4. Exceptions to the general rule enunciated in
5. Although unclear, it appears from the record that the parties may have agreed that
6. The text of sec. 421(d), Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 795, reads as follows:
(1) In General. -- Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments made by this section, shall apply to transfers after the date of the enactment of this Act in taxable years ending after such date.
(2) Election to have amendments apply to transfers after 1983. -- If both spouses or former spouses make an election under this paragraph, the amendments made by this section shall apply to all transfers made by such spouses (or former spouses) after December 31, 1983.
(3) Exception for transfers pursuant to existing decrees. -- Except in the case of an election under paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section shall not apply to transfers under any instrument in effect on or before the date of the enactment of this Act unless both spouses (or former spouses) elect to have such amendments apply to transfers under such instrument.
(4) Election. -- Any election under paragraph (2) or (3) shall be made in such manner, at such time, and subject to such conditions, as the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate may by regulations prescribe.↩
7. For these purposes "transfer incident to divorce" means any transfer that occurs within one year after the date on which the marriage ceases or that is related to the cessation of the marriage.
8. These regulations were promulgated under the Treasury's general rule-making power as authorized by sec. 7805(a). They were in effect for the year in issue. While we recognize that the regulation involved is only temporary, we accord them the same weight as the final regulations.