102 T.C. 721">*722 Whitaker,
FINDINGS OF FACT
During the taxable year 1979, Exxon Co., U.S.A. (Exxon USA), a division of petitioner Exxon Corp. (Exxon), produced natural gas in Texas and transported the gas through the Exxon Industrial Gas System (EGSI). 4 On their return for the taxable year 1979, petitioners claimed a depletion deduction 102 T.C. 721">*723 relative to natural gas transported by EGSI. In calculating this percentage depletion, petitioners used a figure for the "gross income from the property", a percentage of which constitutes the depletion allowance, in the amount of more than $ 495 million. This amount was based upon purportedly appropriate RMFP's for the subject natural gas, after transportation, manufacture, or conversion. Petitioners applied a 22-percent depletion rate to petitioners' "gross income from the property", for a deduction in the amount of $ 109,017,036. Because of their fixed price contracts, petitioners' actual 1979 contract sales revenue of gas produced by Exxon USA and transported by EGSI for delivery under fixed contracts to certain industrial customers was considerably1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*39 less than they could have sold it for in the absence of such contracts. That actual revenue was approximately $ 95,502,000, or about one-fifth of the "gross income from the property" for depletion purposes claimed by petitioners on their 1979 return for this gas. The difference between petitioners' claimed "gross income from the property" for purposes of depletion and petitioners' actual gross receipts from the sales of the natural gas at issue was not included in Exxon's 1979 gross income or taxable income for purposes of section 61 or 63.
Respondent conceded solely for purposes of respondent's motion several facts which involve other issues related to percentage depletion that respondent apparently believes might have required us to deny respondent's motion because of the1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*40 existence of an issue of material fact. Solely for purposes of respondent's motion, 5 we find as follows:
(1) Exxon possessed the requisite economic interest in the wells for which percentage depletion is claimed;
(2) the gas at issue was sold under fixed price contracts within the meaning of section 613A(b)(1)(B) and (3)(A);
(3) the volumes of gas claimed by petitioners to be qualified for percentage depletion are so qualified;
102 T.C. 721">*724 (4) petitioners properly computed the royalty exclusion;
(5) the gas at issue was not "sold on the premises but [was] manufactured or converted into a refined product prior to sale, or [was] transported from the premises prior to sale" within the meaning of
(6) there are one or more RMFP's for the gas at issue;
(7) the RMFP's determined by petitioners are "market or field prices" as defined by
(8) an RMFP may exceed the maximum lawful selling price of the gas, and/or the maximum lawful selling prices for1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*41 the gas at issue were equal to or exceeded the alleged RMFP's used by petitioners;
(9) cost depletion with respect to the gas at issue does not exceed percentage depletion;
(10) the taxable income limitation provided by section 613(a) does not otherwise limit petitioners' percentage depletion deduction;
(11) the actual sales proceeds for the gas at issue do not require further reduction for any income attributable to post-production activities; and
(12)
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*42 In respondent's determination of "gross income from the property", respondent used a type of net-back methodology, whereby the actual revenues received by petitioners for the gas after transportation were reduced by royalties in connection with the wells at issue, which resulted in a complete disallowance. 6 Petitioners ask us to hold that Exxon must use the applicable RMFP's as the figure for "gross income from the property" for purposes of percentage depletion where the gas is transported away from the well. Respondent asks the Court to hold that petitioners' "gross income from the property" for purposes of percentage depletion cannot exceed the actual gross income from the sale of the gas minus the royalty exclusion required by section 613(a); thus respondent effectively contends that under these circumstances respondent 102 T.C. 721">*725 may employ a net-back methodology to determine "gross income from the property".
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*43 OPINION
Rule 121(b) provides that this Court may grant a summary adjudication in favor of the moving party where it has been shown that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law." Respondent has conceded, solely for purposes of respondent's motion, the propriety of petitioners' depletion deduction other than with respect to the legal issue at hand. We have held that it is appropriate to do so. E.g.,
Section 611 allows a "reasonable allowance for depletion" in the case of, inter alia, oil and gas wells, "according to the peculiar conditions in each case". Section 613(a) provides for a percentage depletion deduction based upon a percentage of a taxpayer's "gross income from the property". 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*44 7 While the statute is silent as to the definition of "gross income from the property" as it relates to the issue before us, respondent's regulations provide that it means
the amount for which the taxpayer sells the oil or gas in the immediate vicinity of the well. If the oil or gas is not sold on the premises but is manufactured or converted into a refined product prior to sale, or is transported from the premises prior to sale, the gross income from the property shall be assumed to be equivalent to the representative market or field price of the oil or gas before conversion or transportation.
Petitioners assert that, under the literal terms of this regulation, where, as here, the gas was transported from the premises prior to sale, respondent may not use a net-back methodology1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*45 to determine gross income from the property, 102 T.C. 721">*726 but must apply the literal language of
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*46 Petitioners contend that we must follow the literal language of the regulation at issue and require use of the RMFP's without further analysis. Petitioners essentially rely upon the so-called ordinary meaning or plain meaning rule, whereby courts have held that, in the exercise of judicial restraint, the plain words of a regulation should be followed where those words are clear and unambiguous, without resort to legislative intent or legislative history. Petitioners refer to this Court's holding that "When the authority to prescribe legislative regulations exists, this Court is not inclined to interfere if the regulations as written support the taxpayer's position."
102 T.C. 721">*727 The regulation at issue is legislative in nature, 9 and the rules of interpretation applicable to statutes should be used in determining the meaning of legislative regulations. 1A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 31.06, at 532 (4th ed. 1985); see
courts are forbidden to tamper with the plain meaning of the words employed unless they are clearly ambiguous or nonsensical. The concomitant rule of interpretation is that courts may not re-write inartfully but unambiguously drafted legislation in order to accomplish results perceived by the court to be the goals of such flawed legislation.
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*50 In making this determination, our review of the cases has revealed that there has been considerable erosion of the rule foreclosing inquiry of legislative purpose even in the context of "clear" language. A long line of precedent establishes the principle that a provision may be interpreted in a manner contrary to its unambiguous language "when the intent of the legislative scheme clearly indicates a result contrary to that dictated by" the literal language.
As we said in
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would "compel an odd result,"
Originally depletion was intended to constitute a tax-free return of the taxpayer's investment or a recoupment to the taxpayer for exhaustion of the resource.
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*58 Valuations of properties, however, caused frequent disputes between taxpayers and taxing authorities, and these administrative and valuation difficulties resulted in the development of a completely new type of depletion. Burke,
In discussing the general effect of the 1926 Act, the Joint Committee report described the relevant terms as follows:
102 T.C. 721">*732 "From the property" is interpreted to mean from each individual tract or lease. In other words, the net or gross income must be computed not for all the properties of the taxpayer lumped together, but from each individual leasehold.
"Gross income from the property" may be defined, therefore, for oil and gas properties, as the
[Staff of Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, Preliminary Report on Effect of Section 204(c)(2), Revenue Act of1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*60 1926, Depletion of Oil and Gas Wells 12-13 (1927); emphasis added. 14]
As it indicates, the last sentence in the above quote was designed to provide guidance as to how to separate from the refining and transportation aspects of the resulting product that portion of the gross receipts which was attributable to the product as it came out of the ground before transportation or refinement. A few years later in 1929, the Commissioner incorporated the method employed by this concept into a regulation dealing with the definition of "gross income from the property", the predecessor to the regulation at issue (see Regs. 74, art. 221(i) (1931)), and, with a few minor amendments in 1933 and 1936, the amended regulations1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*61 under the 1939 Code provided:
In the case of oil and gas wells, "gross income from the property" as used in section 114(b)(3) means the amount for which the taxpayer sells the oil and gas in the immediate vicinity of the well. If the oil and gas are not sold on the property but are manufactured or converted into a refined product prior to sale, or are transported from the property prior to sale, the gross income from the property shall be assumed to be equivalent to the representative market or field price (as of the date of sale) of the oil and gas before conversion or transportation. [Sec. 39.23(m)-1(e)(1), Regs. 118 (1953).]
According to the testimony of Mr. B.H. Bartholow, then a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, at hearings before the Joint Committee in 1930, the purpose for the 102 T.C. 721">*733 use of the market or field price of oil at the well was to eliminate postextraction income from the depletion computation. See Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 104, 111 (1930). The RMFP approach also was found to be designed to prevent discrimination in favor of integrated producers by eliminating profits attributable1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*62 to postproduction processes. See
In 1932, percentage depletion was extended to metal, coal, and sulphur mines. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, sec. 114(b)(4), 47 Stat. 203. Over the next several years, percentage depletion was applied to various other metals and nonmetals. Staff Summary at 20-31. In 1969, the percentage depletion rates were changed, including reduction in the rate on oil and gas production from 27.5 percent to 22 percent. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, sec. 501(a), 83 Stat. 629. But the basic substance of percentage depletion as it applied to oil and gas did not change until 1974, when percentage depletion was repealed for tax years after 1974, with certain exceptions. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-12, sec. 501, 89 Stat. 47. Most taxpayers1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*63 who took a depletion deduction after February 1, 1975, were not permitted to use percentage depletion under section 613. Sec. 613A(a). It is under the fixed contract exception contained in section 613A(b)(1)(B) 15 that petitioners claim that they continue to enjoy the benefit of a 22-percent depletion rate. The conference report on the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 indicates that percentage depletion was continued for natural gas sold under fixed price contracts because those contracts did "not permit price adjustment after * * * [February 1, 1975] to 102 T.C. 721">*734 reflect repeal of depletion." H. Conf. Rept. 94-120 (1975),
In a nutshell, 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*64 the legislative and administrative history of percentage depletion consistently shows two related concerns on the part of the legislators and administrators: First, there was concern about the possible abuse of the depletion deduction and its use to reduce profits from other lines of business unrelated to the purposes for depletion, those purposes being the return of capital to encourage further investment in oil and gas and recoupment for exhaustion of the resource. Second, there was concern that integrated producers might be able to obtain a competitive advantage over nonintegrated producers by taking a depletion deduction on that portion of a finished product -- transportation, refining, or conversion -- which already was otherwise qualified for depreciation. This concern about the competitive position of nonintegrated producers is amply described in the case law, e.g.,
Petitioners assert that one of the primary reasons for the creation of percentage depletion was to simplify the system by eliminating the need for a difficult and complicated valuation process, and that this mandates the use of the RMFP's1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*66 in all cases. The literal terms of the regulation, however, must be viewed in context: The RMFP technique referred to by the Joint Committee Staff and later embraced by the Commissioner in the regulation at issue was designed to prescribe a simplified method by which to ascertain that portion of the taxpayer's receipts which was attributable to the gas 102 T.C. 721">*735 at the wellhead without improvement or transportation; it thus was designed to separate those portions of gross receipts which were appropriate for depletion from those which were not. We see no indication that it was designed to create income that never existed in order to inflate a depletion deduction. Compare
Our review1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*67 of the case law confirms this conclusion. While few of the cases deal directly with the last sentence of the regulation at issue, a number of cases provide a great deal of insight into what the concept "gross income from the property" means in a more general context.171994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*70 In
In
To allow a deduction on the basis 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*71 of income never received and therefore no part of the gross income, on the net part of which a tax is exacted would be manifestly unfair. While oil extracted and sold to the Refining Company depleted the land, the depletion allowance is not granted to create a depletion reserve but to allow a deduction from gross income for tax purposes and there should not be included in such gross income proceeds 102 T.C. 721">*737 of oil never received by the taxpayer and no part of which became subject to income taxation. [
Similarly, the "phantom" income at issue here was never received by petitioners, nor was it treated as income on their consolidated return. We find it at least as unfair to allow it to be treated as gross income from the property as the court did in
Although it dealt with the somewhat different legislative history of depletion of minerals, the Supreme Court in another case,
In 1961, this Court decided the case of
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*75 A series of cases in the U.S. Court of Claims provides us with further guidance as to how the last sentence of the regulation at issue is being interpreted in the courts. In
From the outset, the producer has been held entitled to include in gross income for purposes of the percentage depletion allowance1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*76 only so much of the
The court went on to note that there were considerable complexities involved in the use of the RMFP, and that perhaps the proportionate profits method might have been more appropriate or feasible than the RMFP method, since the former method "has the advantages of being related directly to the taxpayer's own income."
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*78 During that remand, in
Hypothetical gross | ||
Actual gross income | income from the | |
from sale of brick | property -- ball clay | |
1951 | $ 468,694.11 | $ 562,172.10 |
1952 | 465,668.33 | 543,436.95 |
1953 | 482,294.78 | 563,842.65 |
1954 |
102 T.C. 721">*741
Tax law is law unto itself. There are no equities in tax law. And there is an area1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*80 of permissible illogic in tax law. But when a taxpayer claims depletion on a fictitious gross income greatly in excess of its actual gross income, we find the claim highly indigestible. [
Thus, the fact that the finished product (brick) actually sold for considerably less than the hypothetical "gross income from the property" based on the raw material (ball clay) was simply an unacceptable result, one clearly contravening the mandate in
Subsequent to the remand in Hugoton I, the parties' positions were reversed from their earlier positions 22 in
The court in Hugoton II held that "The 'representative market or field price' required by the Regulation demands the utilization of an accounting system which considers comparative sales."
102 T.C. 721">*743 The difficulty in determining the RMFP articulated by the court was that, while a market price of 32 1/2 cents per MCF 25 had been proven for the sales of gas at issue, this also was the same as the price that the taxpayer received for the gas after it was gathered, transported, and delivered 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*85 away from the wellhead.
using the market comparison method and making such a determination on the basis of the unusual facts existing with respect to the issue at hand would stretch to the breaking point the doctrine of the
The above-mentioned consequences of establishing 32 1/2 cents per MCF of gas for all of plaintiff's Howell Field production add up to an end result essentially parallel in effect to the one that, among other factors, led the court, on appeal, in
[
Certainly an even more compelling case is presented here, where the affidavits and exhibits attached to the instant motions indicate that petitioners' proceeds for the gas at issue after it was transported away from the wells were far exceeded by the RMFP's used by petitioners on their return, a fact which petitioners do not appear to dispute. 261994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*88 Moreover, the purpose for the RMFP method was to provide a means by which parties could ascertain what portion of the taxpayer's
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*89 We conclude that use of the RMFP's here, resulting in an income from the property for 1979 far in excess of petitioners' actual gross income after the gas was transported away from the wellhead, would be unreasonable in light of the legislative history of and purposes for depletion and the case law interpreting the relevant statute and regulation. 28 Accordingly, petitioners may not use RMFP's in computing their 1979 percentage depletion for the gas in question, and petitioners' cross-motion for summary judgment will be denied. On the other hand, it is reasonable to permit the use of the type of net-back method used by respondent herein to determine petitioners' gross income from the property for the 102 T.C. 721">*745 1979 tax year. Since the net-back method starts with petitioners' actual sales proceeds and reduces them by, inter alia, royalties and transportation expenses, petitioners will not be permitted to compute percentage depletion on the basis of gross income from the property that is greater than the actual sales proceeds of the gas in question. Respondent's motion will be granted.
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*90
1. Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as in effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. Respondent's motion was filed in both docket Nos. 18618-89 and 18432-90. However, the substance of the motion pertains only to docket No. 18618-89 and the tax year 1979. The same is true with regard to petitioners' cross-motion. Respondent indicated in the memorandum of law in support of respondent's motion for partial summary judgment that "the legal principle at issue with respect to the motion is directly applicable to a number of other percentage depletion issues in that case and the case at Docket No. 18432-90." Because we have no knowledge about the facts pertaining to years other than 1979, we express no opinion as to the applicability of the principles discussed in this opinion to other years. We do note, however, that respondent expressly stated that the motions at issue only relate "to depletion claimed for alleged fixed contracts", which also may limit the scope of the applicability of this opinion to other years.↩
3. See
4. Respondent's brief states that the gas at issue was transported through a pipeline system owned by Exxon Gas Systems, Inc. (EGSI). We use the EGSI initials in this opinion to refer to the system, which is consistent with the parties' usage.↩
5. We view the parties' motions here essentially as two sides of the same coin. However, concessions that one party makes in support of his motion do not carry over and support the cross-motion of his adversary. 6 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, par. 56.13, at 56-176 (2d ed. 1993). Accordingly, respondent's concessions apply only to respondent's motion. In opposition to petitioners' cross-motion respondent has submitted affidavits attempting to show that there are numerous issues of material fact in this case which pertain to the same issues as those contained in respondent's concessions made in connection with respondent's motion. Some of these issues would become moot if we ruled in favor of respondent's motion. These issues would have to be resolved if we ruled in favor of petitioners' cross-motion.↩
6. While typically a net-back methodology also would have required the reduction of the gross income by transportation expenses, in this case the royalty exclusion resulted in a complete disallowance, and further reduction was unnecessary.↩
7. As discussed
8. We note that the Court of Federal Claims, in an order in another case involving the same issue in Exxon's 1974 tax year, addressed this issue and held that the literal language of the regulation controlled. Docket No. 660-89T (June 29, 1993). For the reasons discussed below, we do not agree with the conclusion of this order on this issue. See
9. Sec. 611(a) provides: "such reasonable [depletion] allowance in all cases [is] to be made under regulations prescribed by Secretary." Where a regulation is promulgated pursuant to a specific statutory authority, it is a substantive rule, legislative in character.
10. We note that petitioners concede the ambiguity of the language at issue at one point in their brief. It is arguable that the pertinent language, that "the gross income from the property shall be
11. In the Revenue Act of 1916, the 5-percent limitation was abandoned and the depletion amount was not to exceed the invested capital (cost) or the Mar. 1, 1913, value. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, secs. 5(a)(8), 12(a)(2), 39 Stat. 759, 768.↩
12. The Joint Committee Staff reported that Ways and Means Committee Chairman Green had expressed the following concern:
At present [a depletion deduction] may be as great as the entire net income on the property depleted, and I have known instances where companies actually advertised that they could make a distribution of their dividends without paying any corporation tax * * *. I think in many instances they have succeeded in evading the corporation tax through depletion allowances.
Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Legislative History of the Depletion Allowances 5 (1950).↩
13. A Treasury ruling in 1926 also was directed toward these concerns about depletion deductions being used to offset other income. It ruled that, under discovery depletion, an amount in excess of the fair market value of the product from the property at the date of discovery could not be applied against income from other sources.
14. While Joint Committee on Taxation staff explanations are not technically legislative history, we find this one to be useful in understanding the background meaning of the terms at issue, as did the Supreme Court in
15. Sec. 613A(b) provides:
(1) In general. -- The allowance for depletion under section 611 shall be computed in accordance with section 613 with respect to -- * * * (B) natural gas sold under a fixed contract,↩
16. In 1986, Congress prohibited depletion deductions on advance royalties and bonuses, contrary to the holding in
17. Petitioners state that many of the cases discussed below, which do not deal with sales away from the wellhead under the last sentence of
18. After the year at issue, Congress amended the percentage depletion statute to authorize the procedure recommended by the Commissioner and used by the Court in
19. Petitioners quote
20. The Court of Claims noted that the typical nonintegrated producer had to enter into longterm contracts and obtained the benefit of rising prices only to the extent that there were escalator clauses in the contract; thus a method employing contracts entered into over several years would tend to equalize the depletion allowance as between integrated and nonintegrated producers, as required by the Supreme Court in
We look to see what price plaintiff would have obtained for its gas at the wellhead if unintegrated, and we must disregard any increases in
Thus the Court of Claims in choosing the weighted average method of determining the RMFP was not willing to use the
21. The court noted that the disparity between the price for the brick and the representative (market) price for ball clay, strange as it seemed, was explainable on the ground that there was a relatively small market for clay as contrasted with brick.
22. The taxpayer contended that the RMFP could not be determined on the basis of interstate sales because it was engaged only in intrastate business, where prices were higher.
23. In Hugoton II the court also noted that in
24. In a subsequent case in this Court involving the successor to the Hugoton Production Co., we acknowledged the statements by the Court of Claims in the two prior Hugoton cases that under the last sentence of the regulation the wellhead price to be used is the RMFP.
25. An MCF is 1,000 cubic feet and is a standard of measure for natural gas.↩
26. We note that petitioners, in opposing respondent's motion, do not dispute the fact that the RMFP's used on their return exceeded their proceeds, but contend that as a matter of law the regulation mandates the use of RMFP in all situations where gas is sold away from the wellhead, regardless of the actual proceeds received.↩
27. Petitioners also attempt to distinguish
28. In reaching this conclusion, we do not hold that the regulation is invalid; we hold only that the method provided by the last sentence is not applicable to the facts of this case. There may be particular situations in which it is reasonable based upon the "peculiar facts" to allow use of the RMFP even where it exceeds the taxpayer's actual gross income. We are not prepared even to attempt to define such situations or to delineate for other cases where the use of the RMFP may or may not be unreasonable. We hold only that its use would be unreasonable here where the result of using RMFP's is five times the actual sales proceeds from the sale of gas after it was transported away from the wellhead.↩