1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*5 Decision will be entered for respondent.
Petitioner is the common parent corporation of an affiliated group of corporations making a consolidated return of income (the affiliated group). The only issue in dispute is whether a member of the affiliated group's share of partnership income from a foreign partnership is subpt. F income, includable in the gross income of the member under
104 T.C. 105">*106 HALPERN,
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*6 The only issue in dispute is whether Brown Cayman, Ltd.'s (Brown Cayman's) share of partnership income from Brinco, a Cayman Islands partnership, is subpart F income, includable in the gross income of a member of the affiliated group under
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A trial was held on March 9, 1993. Petitioner called no witnesses. Respondent called one: Theodore Presti. The parties had stipulated certain facts, however, and the facts stipulated are so found. The stipulation of facts and attached exhibits is incorporated herein by this reference. The following summarizes the facts relied on by us in reaching our decision.
Petitioner Brown Group, Inc. (sometimes Brown Group), is a New York corporation. At the time the petition herein was filed, petitioner's principal place of business was in St. Louis, Missouri. The following diagram facilitates an understanding of the relationships of the parties involved:
104 T.C. 105">*107
Throughout 1985 and1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*7 1986, Brown Group had divisions that sold footwear at the retail and wholesale levels, manufactured footwear, and imported footwear. Brown Group manufactured footwear in the United States and imported footwear from, among other countries, Brazil.
Brown Group International (International), a Delaware corporation, was incorporated in 1985, as a wholly owned subsidiary of Brown Group. Throughout 1985 and 1986, International was a U.S. shareholder of Brown Cayman within the meaning of
Brown Cayman, a Cayman Islands corporation, was incorporated in 1985. Brown Cayman was a controlled foreign corporation within the meaning of section 957(a) at all times relevant to this case.
T.P. Cayman, Ltd. (T.P. Cayman), a Cayman Islands corporation, was incorporated in March 1985.
Pidge, Inc., is a Missouri corporation; the date of its incorporation is not contained in the record.
104 T.C. 105">*108 Brinco, a partnership within the meaning of section 7701, and the regulations thereunder, was formed in the Cayman Islands in March 1985. The partners of Brinco, and their percentage interests in the net profits and losses of Brinco, were Brown Cayman, 88 percent, T.P. Cayman, 10 percent, and an1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*8 individual, Delcio Birck (Birck), 2 percent.
Prior to the formation of Brinco, Brown Group utilized independent agents to purchase footwear manufactured in Brazil. At that time, Birck, a Brazilian citizen, and Presti, a U.S. citizen, were employed by a company, Michelle Manard, which purchased footwear manufactured in Brazil on behalf of Brown Group and others. Michelle Manard "officially" charged Brown Group a 7-percent commission, although occasionally that rate was greater. Brinco was formed, among other reasons, to attract Presti and Birck to source Brazilian footwear exclusively for the Brown Group companies and to consolidate Brown Group's Brazilian buying power. Brinco was structured as a partnership, among other reasons, because: (1) Presti's salary requirements could not be satisfied within Brown Group's existing payroll structure, (2) it allowed Presti and Birck to have some entrepreneurial interest in Brinco's operations, and (3) it permitted the partners to avoid Brazilian currency controls and currency fluctuations.
During 1985 and 1986, Brinco acted as purchasing agent for International with respect to footwear manufactured in Brazil. The footwear so imported was sold1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*9 primarily in the United States. Presti was the managing partner of Brinco. As such, he was responsible for the design, manufacture, and quality control of the footwear. He also supervised Brinco's operations within Brazil.
The Brown Group companies paid Brinco a 10-percent commission for acting as their purchasing agent for footwear manufactured in Brazil. The commission was based on the purchase price of the footwear. Brinco's 1985 commission income for acting as purchasing agent for the Brown Group companies was $ 1,119,970. The Brown Group companies included the commissions paid to Brinco in their costs of goods sold.
Pursuant to negotiations among the Brinco partners, because of the uncertainty of first-year profits, for the 7-month period ending November 2, 1985, T.P. Cayman 104 T.C. 105">*109 received guaranteed payments totaling $ 151,662 ($ 21,666 a month for 7 months), instead of its share of partnership profits called for in the Brinco partnership agreement. After making guaranteed payments to T.P. Cayman, Brinco's partnership net earnings for 1985 totaled $ 917,465, which were distributed as follows:
Brown Cayman | 98% | $ 897,281 |
Birck | 2% | 20,184 |
In 1986, T.P. Cayman1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*10 received its share of partnership profits as called for in the Brinco partnership agreement (and no guaranteed payments).
Brinco was dissolved on October 31, 1987. At that time, Presti became executive vice president of International, and Birck, as an independent agent, continued to source footwear for the Brown Group companies on a commission basis.
Respondent determined that Brown Cayman's distributive share of Brinco's earnings is foreign base company sales income, includable as subpart F income in the gross income of International.
OPINION
For all relevant periods, the parties have stipulated that (1) Brown Cayman was a "controlled foreign corporation" (CFC) within the meaning of section 957(a) and (2) International was a "United States shareholder" of Brown Cayman within the meaning of
Petitioner argues as follows: under
104 T.C. 105">*111 B.
Respondent agrees that, under
Substantially, we agree with respondent. We believe that a close reading of the regulations under subpart F, a consideration of the structure and language of subchapter K (the partnership provisions), Congress' purpose in enacting subpart F, and certain language of
For purposes of
104 T.C. 105">*112
the gross income of a foreign corporation for any taxable year shall, subject to the special rules of paragraph (c) of this section, be determined by treating such foreign corporation as a domestic corporation taxable under section 11 and by applying the principles of section 61 and the regulations thereunder.
Paragraph (c)(1) of
In summary, the cited provisions of the regulations lay out a scheme under which the U.S. shareholder of a CFC must determine the foreign base company sales income of the CFC (including the described commission income) under most of the rules applicable to a domestic corporation determining its tax liability under section 11, including the rules of subchapter K.
Subchapter K deals with the taxation of partners and partnerships.
104 T.C. 105">*113
The character in the hands of a partner of any item of income, gain, 1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*18 loss, deduction, or credit described in
Brown Cayman, a partner of Brinco, is a foreign corporation and, apparently, has no Federal income tax liability. Nevertheless, International, a U.S. shareholder with respect to Brown Cayman, must take into account its pro rata share of Brown Cayman's subpart F income. See
Subpart F contradicts the general rule that the shareholders of a corporation defer paying a tax on the income earned by the corporation until such income is distributed to them, usually in the form of a dividend. Subpart F was designed to remove the tax deferral benefits of certain offshore operations that Congress considered to be "tax haven" devices; i.e., foreign operations that were artificially structured to take advantage of a low (or zero) rate of foreign tax. S. Rept. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962),
It is important to keep in mind the method that Congress chose to meet its objectives: subpart F imposes a conduit1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*20 scheme with regard to subpart F income. Subpart F income is taxed currently to U.S. shareholders notwithstanding that no distribution of such income is made. See
The facts of this case show that the formation of Brinco did not significantly change the way Brown Group (through International) imported shoes manufactured in Brazil. Presti and Birck1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*21 still continued to do the actual commission agent work. They did it, however, as partners (directly or indirectly) in Brinco. Under the prior arrangement, Brown Group had paid a 7-percent commission to Michelle Manard, Presti and Birck's employer. Ostensibly, Brown Group raised its commission rate to 10 percent. However, as the owner, indirectly, of Brown Cayman, a partner in Brinco, Brown Group, was entitled to receive back the bulk of that 10 percent and, apparently, realized a net savings. Had Brown Cayman hired Presti and Birck as employees, or otherwise engaged them as agents, and collected directly from Brown Group or International a commission agent's fee, it would be clear that at least the net amount retained by Brown Cayman would be foreign base company sales income.
The law of partnerships in the Cayman Islands is derived from the law of partnerships in England. See Davies, The Legal System of the Cayman Islands 89, 188-194 (1989). Compare Partnership Law, 1983 (Cayman Islands) with Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vic., c. 39 (Eng.). English law lends itself to the view that Brown Cayman, as a partner of Brinco, acting on its own behalf, and through its partners (its agents), 1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*22 did function as a commission agent. 5 The facts seem 104 T.C. 105">*116 ripe for the application of subpart F. A contrary result would lead to just the type of siphoning of profits that Congress was concerned with when it subjected foreign base company sales income to the conduit treatment of subpart F. But cf.
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*23 E.
To effectuate the purpose of Congress in enacting subpart F, we will require Brinco to state separately its commission income under
Authorities on partnership taxation have stated that subchapter K does not espouse either the aggregate or the entity theory of partnerships, but rather blends the two theories. 1 McKee Nelson & Whitmire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners (hereafter McKee et al.), par. 1.02 (2d ed. 1990). We agree. Compare sec. 751 with sec. 741. Moreover, for purposes of interpreting provisions of the Code not contained in subchapter K, a partnership also may be treated either as an aggregate of its partners or as an entity distinct from1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*24 its partners. Compare
For the reasons set forth above in our discussion of subpart F, we believe that, to accomplish the purposes of Congress in enacting subpart F, the aggregate nature of Brinco as a partnership must be emphasized. We are not here dealing with the computation of Brinco's income but with the consequence to Brinco's partners stemming from their rights under the partnership agreement to share in that income. The relationship between1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*25 the entity approach to the computation of partnership income found in
For * * * [the purpose of calculating partnership income], the partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable entity apart from the aggregate of its partners. Once its income is ascertained and reported, its existence may be disregarded since each partner must pay a tax on a portion of the total income as if the partnership were merely an agent or conduit through which the income passed. [
McKee et al. have characterized the Supreme Court's analysis as follows:
This analysis of the statute embodies a very clear and sharply defined separation between (1) the treatment of a partnership as a separate entity for purposes of determining its income, and (2) the taxation of partnership income, as so determined, to the partners under the conduit approach. * * * [1 McKee et al.,
4.
Indeed, an examination of cases requiring an entity (partnership) level determination of income shows that, once such determination is made, the partnership is ignored and the individual partners take account of such income as if they 104 T.C. 105">*118 had earned it directly. E.g.,
Notwithstanding such shift in emphasis from an entity view at the partnership level to an aggregate view at the partner level, any characterization of the partnership's activity with regard to an item generally persists. For instance, in
Pertinent to the question at hand, we, and other courts, have attributed to a partner the activities and even the property of a partnership to determine whether, by virtue of such activity or property, the partner had a particular status important for determining some aspect of the partner's Federal income tax status. In
F. "[
Our analysis has relied heavily on the provisions of subchapter K. Indeed, that is the path that the parties have taken, and it is supported by the weight of commentary that the issue has generated. 6 Before addressing one final argument of petitioner, we wish to point out that certain words of
income (whether in the form of profits, commissions, fees, or1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*30 otherwise) derived in connection with * * * the purchase of personal property from any person on behalf of a related person * * * [Emphasis added.]
Recently, we had the opportunity to construe the phrase "in connection with" as used in
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*32 G.
Finally, we wish to dispose of one argument made by petitioner: viz, that, for the year in question, Brinco was not a related person with regard to Brown Cayman or International. That is true; nonetheless, it is irrelevant. Nothing here turns on whether Brinco is a related person with regard to either Brown Cayman or International. We are dealing here with that part of the definition of foreign base company sales income that involves "the purchase of personal property from any person on behalf of a related person".
It is true that the definition of related person in
For the reasons stated, we find that Brown Cayman had commission income derived in connection with the purchase of personal property from any person on behalf of International. We hold that such income is foreign base company sales income under
HAMBLEN, PARKER, COHEN, SWIFT, PARR, and BEGHE,
WELLS,
RUWE,
The regulation upon which the majority relies is
In order for
2.
While there may be areas in the law of partnership taxation where the aggregate versus entity issue still exists, I do not believe there is any remaining issue with respect to the type of specific partnership income items that must be characterized by individual partners as if they had realized1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*38 the income directly from the source from which realized by the partnership. Congress has specifically provided statutory rules in
Brown Group International (a U.S. corporation whose stock is wholly owned by Brown Group), Brown Cayman (a Cayman Islands corporation whose stock is wholly owned by Brown Group International), and Brinco (a Cayman Islands partnership in which Brown Cayman held an 88-percent interest) were formed in 1985 to facilitate the purchase of Brazilian footwear on behalf of Brown Group. Brinco earned commission income by acting as purchasing agent for Brown Group International.
The issue is whether Brown Cayman's distributive share of Brinco's income is "subpart F income". This question can be answered by determining whether Brown Cayman's distributive share of partnership income from Brinco is foreign base company sales income within the meaning of
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*40
(1) IN GENERAL. --For purposes of subsection (a)(2), the term "foreign base company sales income" means (A) the property which is purchased * * * is manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted outside the country under the laws of which the controlled foreign corporation is created or organized, and (B) * * * in the case of property purchased on behalf of a related person, is purchased for use, consumption, or disposition outside such foreign country. [Emphasis added.]
104 T.C. 105">*125 There is no question that Brown Cayman is a controlled foreign corporation or that Brown Group International is a related person within the meaning of
Brown Cayman's distributive share of Brinco's profits is clearly within the broad term "income (whether in the form of profits, commissions, fees, or otherwise)".
The only remaining question is whether Brown Cayman's income from Brinco was "derived
The foregoing analysis relies on a broad reading of the term "in connection with". This1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*43 phrase has previously been given a broad interpretation.
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*44 Congress intentionally used the phrase "in connection with" in lieu of more narrow terms such as "from" or "for", 6 and a broad interpretation of the phrase is consistent with the legislative objective of subpart F. Subpart F was "designed to end tax deferral on 'tax haven' operations by U.S. controlled corporations." S. Rept. 87-1881 (1962),
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*45 During 1985, Brown Group paid commissions to Brinco of $ 1,119,970. These commissions were added to Brown Group's cost of goods sold. Brinco distributed $ 897,281 during 1985 to Brown Cayman, its 88-percent partner. As a result, Brown Group reduced its gross profit for U.S. tax purposes by $ 1,119,970, while at the same time recouping $ 897,281 of that amount through its controlled foreign corporation without being subject to U.S. tax on the $ 897,281. Surely, Congress intended subpart F and the broad language of
BEGHE,
I don't disassociate myself from the majority's expansive interpretation and application of
However, if a literalistic interpretative approach to
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*48 If the issue is to be posed in terms of entity vs. aggregate, however, as the parties chose to do, it is appropriate to look to the intention of the applicable statutory provisions outside subchapter K (here, subpart F) for guidance about which approach is appropriate. See American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project, Subchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of Partners 452, 523-532 (1984); Youngwood & Weiss, "Partners and Partnerships--Aggregate v. Entity Outside of Subchapter K",
The dissent uses inappropriate authorities 1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*49 to support its conclusion that the entity theory must be applied to reach what would properly be characterized as a "bizarre" result under subpart F. Youngwood & Weiss,
It also bears pointing out that
Finally, in further support of the third leg of the majority opinion: As this writer observed in
SWIFT,
CHIECHI,
I cannot join in the ratio decidendi stated by the majority under the heading "
Nor can I join in the third rationale of the majority (and the only rationale in Judge Ruwe's concurring opinion) that is based on the language "in connection with" that appears in
JACOBS,
The majority relies on three reasons to reach the holding that 1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*54 the income in question is subpart F income: (1) A technical analysis under subchapter K of the Code; (2) application of the aggregate theory of partnerships; and (3) support from the language of
The controversy involved in this case involves a controlled foreign corporation (Brown Cayman) that was a member of a partnership (Brinco) that earned income by acting as a commission purchasing agent on behalf of the parent (Brown Group International) of the controlled foreign corporation. In reaching its conclusion, the majority would disregard Brinco as an entity and treat Brown Cayman as if it had performed the activities of Brinco. I disagree. In my opinion, the existence of Brinco should be respected, and the commission income Brinco received should be characterized at the partnership level.
"Subpart F income", as defined under
(1) IN GENERAL. --For purposes of subsection (a)(2), the term "foreign base company sales income" means income (whether in the form of profits, commissions, fees, or otherwise) derived in connection with the purchase of personal property from a related person and its sale to any person, the sale of personal property to any person on behalf of a related person, the purchase of personal property from any person and its sale to a related person, or the purchase of personal property from any person on behalf of a related person where-- (A) the property which is purchased (or in the case of property sold on behalf of a related person, the property which is sold) is manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted outside the country under1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*56 the laws of which the controlled foreign corporation is created or organized, and (B) the property is sold for use, consumption, or disposition outside such foreign country or, in the case of property purchased on behalf of a related person, is purchased for use, consumption, or disposition outside such foreign country.
(3) RELATED PERSON DEFINED. --For purposes of this section, a person is a related person with respect to a controlled foreign corporation, if-- (A) such person is an individual, partnership, trust, or estate which (B) such person is a corporation which (C) such person is a corporation which is
[Emphasis added.]
Here, there is no question but that Brown Cayman is a controlled foreign corporation and that Brown Group International is a U.S. shareholder of a controlled foreign corporation. Thus, Brown Group International (and ultimately the 104 T.C. 105">*133 affiliated group of which it is a member) must include in income the foreign base company sales income earned by Brown Cayman. But, as hereafter explained, Brown Cayman did not have foreign base company sales income.
In the elaborate detailing of
As to the third element, the majority does not claim there was a purchase of personal property from or to related parties. Rather, the majority asserts that there was a purchase on behalf of a related person by treating Brown Cayman as if it did the purchasing of footwear, through Brinco, on behalf of Brown Group International. 1 The majority's assertion is erroneous because Brinco is not a sham. In fact, it is undeniable that Brinco was formed and structured as a partnership, at least in part, for substantial business purposes. Further, the form of all of the partnership's (Brinco's) transactions involved reflect their substance.
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*59 For tax purposes, there are two different ways of viewing a partnership. A partnership may be viewed as an aggregation of its partners, each of whom directly owns an interest in partnership assets and operations, or as a separate entity, 104 T.C. 105">*134 in which separate interests are owned by each of its partners. By disregarding Brinco, the majority uses an aggregate partnership approach. Using the aggregate approach, the majority attributes the partnership's (Brinco's) activities, and not merely the character of the partnership income, to its partner (Brown Cayman).
It is noteworthy that in defining a related person,
As stated, I believe the majority's aggregate approach is erroneous. The process of characterizing partnership income, for tax purposes, is a two-part process: First, the partnership is treated as an entity in whose hands the partnership income is characterized, and then the partnership is treated as a conduit (an aggregate concept) through which the income received is passed on to the partners in accord with their distributive shares. Treating the partnership (Brinco) as an entity in whose hands the commission income is to be characterized produces a result that the income in question is not foreign base company sales income, and hence is not subpart F income.
No court has addressed the issue of whether, in the context of subpart F of the Code,
For the most part, the cases that have directly considered whether partnership items should be characterized at the partner or partnership level have generally concluded that the characterization question should be resolved at the partnership level. See 1 McKee et al., Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners, par. 9.01[4][a], at 9-19 (2d ed. 1990) (the authors also note that partnership-level characterization is virtually required by the overall sense of the partnership taxation statutory framework).
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, for purposes of calculating partnership income, "the partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable entity apart from the aggregate of the partners".
The legislative history indicates, and1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*62 the commentators agree, that partnerships are entities for purposes of calculating and filing informational returns but that they are conduits through which the taxpaying obligation passes to the individual partners in accord with their distributive shares. [
Recent cases cite
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*63 In
The clear inference to be drawn from the Code sections and the regulation is that, as a general rule, for the purpose of determining the nature of an item of income, deduction, gain, loss or credit * * * the partnership is to be viewed as an entity and such items are to be viewed from the standpoint of the partnership (or joint venture) rather than from the standpoint of each individual member. * * * [
The court added:
It follows that in section 1221(1) the words "his trade or business" mean the trade or business of the partnership, 1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*64 even though under
In
While it is true that a partnership is not liable for tax * * * [it] is required to file returns and the partners are required to conform their individual returns to the partnership returns. If each partner could determine his share of the partnership income separately, confusion would result, confusion which Congress meant to avoid * * * [
In
This Court and several Courts of Appeals have addressed the issue of profit motive, for purposes of
1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*67 In
In addition, in
In
The partnership return is more than just an information return. It has consequences that go beyond the mere disclosure to the Commissioner of profits of the enterprise * * * And1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*69 in computing its net income under the revenue laws, it is generally the partnership, not the individual partner, that exercises the various options open to taxpayers in computing net income under the Code. * * * [
In
The character of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit included in a partner's distributive share under paragraphs (1) through (8) of
Similarly, the Service has ruled that characterization of ordinary loss under section 1231 must take place at the partnership level.
In nearly every context in which the issue of characterization of partnership income is relevant to the facts of this case, this Court and other courts have concluded that the proper level for characterizing an item of income is at the partnership level. Applying the logic of these cases to the determination of foreign base company sales income, I would apply the entity theory of partnership taxation; that is, I would characterize the income involved herein at the partnership 104 T.C. 105">*139 (Brinco's) level. As a consequence, I would conclude that the income in question is not subpart F income.
I recognize that acceptance of my position will result in petitioner's receiving a tax windfall because 100 percent of the commissions paid to Brinco by Brown Group International would be included in its cost of goods sold, whereas 88 percent of the commissions (which ultimately went to Brown Cayman) would not be taxed. But as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated:
The Government asserts that1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*71 in enacting subpart F Congress was more concerned with the nature of the income than the form of the entity generating the income * * *
We find this argument unpersuasive. * * * Congress wrote the statute unambiguously to apply to subpart F income received from controlled "corporations" only. If the omission of income received from controlled partnerships has indeed created an unjustified loophole in the tax laws, the remedy lies in new legislation, not in judicial improvisation.
[
Petitioner may have found a hole in the dike, but the closing of the hole "calls for the application of the Congressional thumb, not the court's."
On December 30, 1994, the Service issued final regulations,
The antiabuse rule is effective for all transactions involving a partnership that occur on or after May 12, 1994. The provisions permitting the Service to treat a partnership as an aggregation of its partners as appropriate to carry out the purpose1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 5">*73 of any provision of the Code are effective for all transactions involving a partnership that occur after December 29, 1994. The transactions involved herein occurred prior to November 2, 1986, and Brinco was dissolved on October 31, 1987.
CHABOT and LARO,
*. An opinion in this case was filed on Apr. 12, 1994,
1. The parties have stipulated that petitioner's "taxable period" was a 52-53 week year ending on the Saturday nearest to Oct. 31. They have stipulated the same with regard to Brown Group International, Inc., and Brinco, discussed
2. On brief, petitioner states: "The Brinco partnership earned commission income by arranging for the purchase of footwear by * * * Brown Group International, Inc., from third parties for consumption primarily within the United States. The property was manufactured, and sold for use or consumption, outside the Cayman Islands, which was Brinco's and * * * Brown Cayman, Ltd's, country of incorporation. [sic]."↩
3. For purposes of applying the rules of subpt. F, Brown Cayman is, with some modification, treated as if it were a domestic corporation taxable under sec. 11 and by applying the principles of sec. 61 and the regulations thereunder. See
4. See
5. As in the United States, partnerships under English law sometimes are best understood in terms of an entity model and sometimes in terms of an aggregate model. Rather than using the terms "entity" and "aggregate", however, English partnerships are viewed either in a commercial notion or a legal notion. The commercial notion, in which the partnership is seen as an entity, stems from the business efficiencies that can be achieved if a firm is viewed as separate from those persons who make up the firm. Lindley & Banks on Partnership 26 (16th ed. 1990). Under the legal notion of partnership, the "firm is not generally recognized as distinct from the partners composing it."
Every member of an ordinary partnership is at one and the same time both a principal and an agent. As a principal, he is bound by what he does himself and by what his co-partners do on behalf of the firm, provided what they do falls within the limits of their authority; as an agent, he binds them by what he does for the firm, provided he keeps within the limits of his authority. [
Despite, perhaps, a greater emphasis on the aggregate view (relative to the United States, particularly under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act), English courts will employ either view depending upon the circumstances of a particular case. Lindley & Banks on Partnership 26. There seems little doubt that English partnership law would be susceptible to the conclusion that Brown Cayman, as a partner of Brinco, acting on its own behalf, and through its partners (its agents), functioned as a commission agent.↩
6. Davis & Lainoff, "U.S. Taxation of Foreign Joint Ventures",
7. But cf. our decision in
1. The majority implicitly seems to recognize this problem. Their apparent solution is to conclude that "we must look to International's tax liability to determine whether Brinco must separately state items, such as commission income, that could constitute foreign base company sales income." (Majority op. pp. 113-114.) But International was not a "partner"; rather it was a shareholder. No authority is cited for the proposition that
2. The fact that we are dealing with a situation that Congress may have intended to tax under subpt. F is not a justification for disregarding the plain language of the partnership provisions. In a case bearing a striking factual similarity to the instant case, the Government attempted to recharacterize foreign partnerships as corporations so that they would be "related persons" for purposes of subpt. F. This would have caused the income of a controlled foreign corporation to be subpt. F income. See
3. As the majority correctly notes, for purposes of subpt. F, the income of a controlled foreign corporation is to be computed as if it were a domestic corporation. A domestic corporation holding an interest in a partnership would have to compute its income from a partnership in accordance with subch. K, which includes
4. Subpt. F income is a statutory term applicable only to income of a controlled foreign corporation.
5. At issue in
In
6. For example, sec. 61 provides that gross income means "income "Compensation "Gross income derived "Gains derived "Income "Income
1. The force of this observation is not blunted by
2. Reliance on the good sense of judges to do the right thing should make it unnecesary to provide a presumption, by Code, regulation, or ruling, that the aggregate approach should generally be favored. The new partnership antiabuse regulations,
1. See majority op. p. 120, wherein the majority states:
Finally, we wish to dispose of one argument made by petitioner: viz, that, for the year in question, Brinco was not a related person with regard to Brown Cayman or International. That is true; nonetheless, it is irrelevant. Nothing here turns on whether Brinco is a related person with regard to either Brown Cayman or International. We are dealing here with that part of the definition of foreign base company sales income that involves "the purchase of personal property from any person on behalf of a related person".
2. See also
3. See also
4. See also