In 74 T.C. 1097">Bregin v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayer filed a tax return for 1974 on which he claimed a credit for taxes withheld on his wages in excess of the amounts shown to have been withheld on his Forms W-2. The Commissioner overlooked the discrepancy and allowed a refund to the taxpayer based on the withholding credit reported on the taxpayer's return. Later, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer in which the Commissioner determined that the taxpayer had received unreported income in 1974. The notice did not include any allegation that the taxpayer had claimed any excessive credit. The taxpayer invoked this Court's jurisdiction by filing a petition for redetermination.

Shortly before trial, the Commissioner filed a motion for leave to amend answer to include an allegation that the taxpayer had claimed an excessive withholding credit under section 31. Although recognizing that the alleged excessive credit did not fall within the definition of a deficiency under section 6211(a), the Commissioner argued that the Court had jurisdiction over the issue 1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*66 on the ground that it constituted an "additional amount" within the meaning of section 6214(a).

Upon review of the matter, we rejected the Commissioner's argument for several reasons. First, we looked to chapter 68 entitled "Additions to the Tax, Additional Amounts, and Assessable Penalties", for guidance as to the meaning of the term "additional amount" as used in section 6214(a). In light of the similarity between the language used in section 6214(a) and the various provisions included under chapter 68, we concluded that the term "additional amount" as used in section 6214(a) was meant to refer to one of the assessable civil penalties described in chapter 68. 74 T.C. 1097">Bregin v. Commissioner, supra at 1102-1103.

107 T.C. 249">*257 Next, we examined the plain language of section 6214(a) and its predecessors and reviewed the legislative history of such section. We noted that section 6214(a) originated as section 274(e) of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 56, which authorized this Court's predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals, to determine "whether any penalty, additional amount or addition to the tax should be assessed." 74 T.C. 1097">Bregin v. Commissioner, supra at 1103.1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*67 Although the term "penalty" was later omitted when section 6214(a) was enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, we observed that the committee reports declared that no material change was intended. Id. We further observed that the language in former section 274(e) expanding the Board's authority to determine whether "any penalty, additional amount or addition to the tax should be assessed" was added by the Senate Finance Committee for the express purpose of allowing the Commissioner to determine that a deficiency is attributable to fraud or negligence, after the issuance of a deficiency notice, but without requiring the Commissioner to issue a second notice of deficiency to the taxpayer. 74 T.C. 1097">Id. at 1103-1104 (citing S. Rept. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 332, 353). We stated that "the legislative history of section 6214(a) indicates that the provision was not designed to have the broad meaning urged by the Commissioner." 74 T.C. 1097">Id. at 1104.

We also pointed out in Bregin that the Commissioner was given the authority under section 6201(a) (3) to recover amounts due from a taxpayer's overstatement1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*68 of withholding credits without issuing a notice of deficiency. Under the circumstances, we could find no indication that Congress intended section 6214(a) to provide the Commissioner with an alternative method for recovering on such a claim. 74 T.C. 1097">Id. at 1104-1105.

Petitioners, like the Commissioner in Bregin, propose a broad interpretation of the term "additional amount" in section 6214(a) in an effort to persuade the Court to exercise jurisdiction over an item that otherwise does not satisfy the statutory definition of a deficiency under section 6211(a). In furtherance of their position, petitioners assert that the Court's more restrictive interpretation of section 6214(a) in Bregin is erroneous on the grounds that (1) the Court's interpretation impermissibly renders the term "additional 107 T.C. 249">*258 amount" a mere redundancy; and (2) the Court violated section 7806(b) by relying on the use of the term "additional amounts" in chapter 68 in interpreting the term "additional amount" in section 6214(a). ⁷

1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*69 We disagree with petitioners' assertion that this Court's interpretation of section 6214(a) in Bregin v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1097">74 T.C. 1097 (1980), renders the term "additional amount" a mere redundancy. As our detailed analysis of section 6214(a) and its legislative history in Bregin amply demonstrates, Congress used the phrase "any additional amount, or any addition to the tax" in section 6214(a) to ensure an understanding that this Court's jurisdiction encompasses items that are to be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes, including the additions to tax and other additional amounts (not labeled "additions to tax") described in chapter 68. ⁸

We likewise find petitioners' reliance on section 7806(b) to be misplaced. Section 7806(b) provides that no inference, implication, or presumption of legislative1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*70 construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or provision or portion of title 26. In Bregin, we did not draw an inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or provision of the Internal Revenue Code in interpreting section 6214(a). As explained above, we merely looked to chapter 68, and the meaning given to the term "additional amounts" therein, to aid in interpreting the same term as it is found in section 6214(a). Simply stated, we see no tension between the Court's analysis in Bregin and the proscriptions of section 7806(b).

Former Section 6621(c)

Contrary to petitioners' contention, we also find former section 6621(c) and the case law interpreting that section to be 107 T.C. 249">*259 relevant in resolving the jurisdictional issue presented by respondent's motions. A brief review of the provisions of former section 6621(c), as well as the case law developed by this Court in regard to our jurisdiction thereover, will be helpful before we discuss this matter further.

Former section 6621(c), originally codified as section 6621(d) and applicable1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*71 with respect to interest accruing after December 31, 1984, provided that interest payable under section 6601 will be computed at a rate equal to 120 percent of the normal rate provided under section 6601 on any substantial underpayment of tax attributable to a tax-motivated transaction. ⁹ Former section 6621(c)(4) provided in pertinent part:

(4) Jurisdiction of Tax Court.--In the case of any proceeding in the Tax Court for a redetermination of a deficiency, the Tax Court shall also have jurisdiction to determine the portion (if any) of such deficiency which is a substantial underpayment attributable to tax motivated transactions.

1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*72 In short, former section 6621(c) (4) established a limited exception to the general rule that this Court lacks jurisdiction over statutory interest by providing that, in a proceeding for redetermination of a deficiency, this Court has jurisdiction to determine the portion (if any) of such a deficiency that is a substantial underpayment attributable to tax-motivated transactions.

The question of the scope of this Court's jurisdiction under former section 6621(c) arose in White v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 209">95 T.C. 212-214, involving a so-called affected items proceeding. In White, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayers solely for additions to tax after the underlying tax deficiency was assessed following the conclusion of partnership level proceedings. The taxpayers filed a petition contesting the additions to tax as well as their liability for additional interest under former section 6621(c). This prompted the Commissioner to file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to the additional interest.

107 T.C. 249">*260 In granting the Commissioner's motion to dismiss in White, we first held, based upon a combined reading of sections 6211(a), 1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*73 6230(a), and 6601(e) (1), that interest computed at the increased rate prescribed in former section 6621(c)(1) is not a deficiency within the meaning of section 6211(a). Consistent with this holding, we rejected the taxpayers' argument that section 6230(a) (2)(A)(i) provided statutory authority for this Court to redetermine such interest. Next, we analyzed former section 6621(c) (4) and concluded that our jurisdiction under that provision is limited to cases where the parties dispute a deficiency in tax imposed by subtitle A, and, specifically, to determining whether a portion of such a deficiency constitutes a substantial underpayment attributable to tax-motivated transactions. In other words, Congress granted this Court limited authority to determine only the portion of a deficiency in tax that is subject to interest computed at the increased rate prescribed in former section 6621(c) (1). Because the only items in dispute in White concerned additions to tax, the underlying deficiency in tax having been previously assessed as a computational adjustment pursuant to section 6230(a) (1), we held that former section 6621(c)(4) did not provide this Court with jurisdiction to redetermine1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*74 the taxpayers' liability for increased interest under former section 6621(c). ¹⁰ Accord Odend'Hal v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 617">95 T.C. 617 (1990) (where addition to tax was sole item in dispute, this Court lacks jurisdiction to redetermine interest computed at the increased rate prescribed in former section 6621(c) (1)); cf. Barton v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 548">97 T.C. 548 (1991) (this Court has jurisdiction to redetermine additional interest computed at the increased rate prescribed in former section 6621(c) (1) pursuant to this Court's jurisdiction to determine an overpayment under section 6512(b)(1).

Although the specific subject matter of present section 6621(c) regarding corporate underpayments is different from that of former section 6621(c)1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*75 regarding substantial understatements attributable to tax-motivated transactions, the operative principle common to both provisions is the imposition of statutory interest at an increased rate. Given the commonality of purpose of the two provisions, it is wholly 107 T.C. 249">*261 appropriate to draw a negative inference from the fact that Congress expressly granted this Court jurisdiction in former section 6621(c) (4) but failed to do the same in present section 6621(c). In this regard, a brief recapitulation of the various elements of our analysis will buttress the point and expose the inherent weakness in petitioners' position.

As previously discussed, this Court's jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency in tax generally does not extend to statutory interest imposed under section 6601. Significantly, section 6601(e) (1) provides that the deficiency procedures set forth in subchapter B of chapter 63 are not applicable to interest imposed under section 6601. In addition to these principles, we have discussed this Court's opinion in Bregin v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1097">74 T.C. 1097 (1980), where we held that the term "additional amount" in section 6214(a) is limited to the assessable1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*76 civil penalties described in chapter 68. These factors alone are adequate to overcome petitioners' assertion that section 6214(a) provides a jurisdictional basis for this Court to redetermine interest computed at the increased rate prescribed in present section 6621(c).

Moreover, when Congress' enactment of former section 6621(c) (4) is also taken into account, the result is overwhelming confirmation that (1) petitioners' reliance on section 6214(a) is misplaced; and (2) Congress simply did not intend for this Court to exercise jurisdiction, at least in the context of a deficiency proceeding, to redetermine a taxpayer's liability for interest computed at the increased rate prescribed in present section 6621(c).

With regard to the first point, we note that if petitioners' theory that section 6214(a) provides this Court with jurisdiction to redetermine interest under section 6621(c) were correct, there would have been no need for Congress to enact former section 6621(c)(4). ¹¹ Thus, in order to avoid an interpretation that would render former section 6621(c)(4) redundant and superfluous, it follows that petitioners' theory of jurisdiction is incorrect. 11

1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*77 In addition to the foregoing, we believe that former section 6621(c) (4) reflects Congress' understanding of the need to 107 T.C. 249">*262 specifically define this Court's jurisdiction with respect to matters involving statutory interest in recognition of section 6601(e)(1), which serves to deny this Court jurisdiction over such interest. Against this background, we conclude that Congress would have expressly granted this Court jurisdiction to redetermine interest computed at the increased rate prescribed by present section 6621(c) if such had been the intent of Congress.

Section 7481(c)

Petitioners' initial objections to respondent's motions to dismiss included an alternative argument that this Court has the authority, by virtue of section 7481(c), to consider petitioners' liability for interest computed at the increased rate prescribed in section 6621(c).

Section 7481(c), codified by section 6246(a) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3751, serves to confer jurisdiction on this Court to resolve disputes concerning respondent's post-decision computation of statutory interest; i.e., to determine interest on deficiencies that have been redetermined1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*78 by this Court and assessed under section 6215. See, e.g., Stauffacher v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 453">97 T.C. 453 (1991); Note to Rule 261, 93 T.C. 821, 1040-1041 (1989).

Section 7481(c) provides in pertinent part as follows:

SEC. 7481(c). Jurisdiction Over Interest Determinations. -- Notwithstanding subsection (a), if --

then the Tax Court may reopen the case solely to determine whether the taxpayer has made an overpayment of such interest and the amount of any such overpayment. * * *

Notably, petitioners abandoned their alternative position in the memoranda that they filed after the hearing in these cases. Petitioners now assert 1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*79 that the question regarding the "applicable date" for computing interest at the increased rate 107 T.C. 249">*263 prescribed in section 6621(c) is not an issue the resolution of which falls within this Court's jurisdiction under section 7481(c). Petitioners further assert that if this Court also lacks jurisdiction to redetermine their liability for such interest in these deficiency proceedings, then they would be left without a remedy in this Court. ¹²

Consistent with the plain language of section 7481(c), it is evident that the proceeding contemplated by such section may only be brought after this Court's decision regarding the underlying deficiency is final and the taxpayer has paid the interest in dispute. See Asciutto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-564, affd. 26 F.3d 108">26 F.3d 108 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the scope of this Court's jurisdiction under section 7481(c) is not a matter that is properly1996 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 45">*80 before us at this time, and we therefore leave consideration of that issue for another day. Suffice it to say that the mere possibility that our jurisdiction may be limited in a proceeding under section 7481(c) to determine petitioners' liability for interest pursuant to section 6621(c) does not provide the requisite statutory basis for us to exercise jurisdiction over that matter in these deficiency proceedings.

Conclusion

In order to reflect the foregoing,

Orders granting respondent's Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Strike will be issued.