MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHIECHI, Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment (respondent's motion). We shall grant respondent's motion.

             Background

The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the following.

Petitioner resided in Jacksonville, Florida, at the time he filed the petition in this case.

Petitioner filed a Federal income tax (tax) return (return) for his taxable year 1995, which showed $ 8,125.87 as the tax due for that year. When petitioner filed his 1995 return, he did not pay the amount of tax due shown in that return.

On April 28, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a final notice of intent to levy with respect to petitioner's taxable years 1995, 1996, and 1997 (final notice of intent to levy). Thereafter, petitioner requested a hearing with the Internal Revenue Service Appeals Office (Appeals Office) with respect to2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*118 that notice.

On October 18, 2000, the Appeals Office held a hearing with petitioner with respect to the final notice of intent to levy. ¹ Prior to having been assigned to conduct the Appeals Office hearing with respect to the final notice of intent to levy, the Appeals officer who conducted that hearing had had no relationship with petitioner and had not had any involvement with petitioner's taxable year 1995.

Prior to the Appeals Office hearing, the Appeals officer obtained coded and noncoded (so-called "plain English") versions of computer-generated transcripts (transcripts) of respondent's records with respect to petitioner. Those transcripts identified petitioner, the type of tax assessed, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*119 the taxable period, the date of the assessment, and the amount assessed. At the Appeals Office hearing, the Appeals officer relied on the transcripts for the purpose of verifying that respondent made a valid assessment with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1995. The Appeals officer provided to petitioner a copy of the plain English version of those transcripts at the Appeals Office hearing.

On October 30, 2000, the Appeals Office issued to petitioner a "NOTICE OF DETERMINATION CONCERNING COLLECTION ACTION(S) UNDER SECTION 6320 and/or 6330" (notice of determination). That notice stated in pertinent part:

   (1) The only legal requirements before taking general

   enforcement action are the notice & demand and the notice of

   intent to levy and the notice of right to a collection due

   process hearing. The assessments were made, and notice & demand

   for payment, under IRC6303(a), were sent to your last known

   address, along with Publication 1, your rights as a taxpayer.

   You neglected or refused to pay the taxes and penalties due.

   Subsequently, you were sent the LT11 dated 4/28/2000. The

   Automated2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*120 Collection System followed all legal & procedural

   requirements and the action proposed is appropriate under the

   circumstances, with regard to the income tax due for 1995 only.

   (2) The issues raised by you on your request are that, for the

   income tax due for 1995, you did not earn the alleged taxable

   income. For the Civil Penalties for 1996 & 1997, that the

   penalty is not based on agency records. With regard to the

   income tax due for 1995, the tax was assessed via a tax return

   filed by you on 4/15/1996, showing total tax due of $ 8,125.87.

   The information that you have provided regarding your position,

   including the information presented by you at your hearing on

   10/18/2000, did not change our position that we have a valid

   assessment for 1995. However, with regard to the civil penalties

   assessed for 1996 (4@$  500), and 1997(1@$  500, they cannot be

   considered under the collection due process procedure, because

   they have a separate appeal procedure under Penalty Appeals.

   Therefore, they will be considered under that procedure, and you

   will be2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*121 notified of the result. Any other issues raised by you

   were determined to be not applicable to our consideration of

   this case.

   (3) The proposed collection action for 1995 balances the need

   for the efficient collection of the tax with your legitimate

   concern that any collection action be no more intrusive than

   necessary. [Reproduced literally.]

             Discussion

The Court may grant summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); ²Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518">98 T.C. 518, 98 T.C. 518">520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965">17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). We conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the questions raised in respondent's motion.

2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*122 The validity of the underlying tax liability for 1995 is not at issue in this case. ³ Consequently, we shall consider the matters addressed in respondent's motion using an abuse-of- discretion standard. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604">114 T.C. 604, 114 T.C. 604">610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176">114 T.C. 176, 114 T.C. 176">182 (2000).

In the petition, petitioner alleged that (1) "the IRS failed to make an assessment in accordance with the requirements of the IR Code and underlying regulations" and that (2) "the procedural due process requirements were not met, since the IRS did not conduct a fair and impartial hearing before an impartial2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*123 decision maker." Petitioner did not allege in the petition (1) any facts to support petitioner's allegation that he did not receive "a fair and impartial hearing before an impartial decision maker" or (2) any irregularity in respondent's assessment procedure with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1995.

In his response to respondent's motion (petitioner's response) and in his affidavit in support of that response (petitioner's affidavit), petitioner abandons the allegations set forth in the petition. Instead, he advances the types of arguments and contentions that we find to be frivolous and groundless and that the courts have repeatedly rejected. ⁴

2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*124 In respondent's motion, respondent contends that the Appeals officer's reliance on the transcripts to verify that respondent made a valid assessment with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1995 satisfies the requirements of section 6330(c)(1) that the Appeals officer obtain verification that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure have been met. That is because, according to respondent, (1) those transcripts contained all of the information required under section 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs., ⁵ and (2) petitioner failed to show any irregularity in respondent's assessment procedure with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1995.

2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*125 Respondent further contends in respondent's motion that petitioner received a fair hearing before an impartial decision maker as required by section 6330(b). ⁶ That is because, according to respondent, the Appeals officer "had no involvement with petitioner's case prior to receiving the file because a request for a CDP hearing was filed. * * * [The Appeals officer] also had no prior relationship with petitioner."

We agree with respondent. Section 6330(c)(1) does not require the Commissioner2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*126 of Internal Revenue to rely on a particular document to satisfy the verification requirement imposed by that section. ⁷ We have held that, absent a showing by the taxpayer of an irregularity in respondent's assessment procedure, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Appeals officer to have relied on certain computer-generated transcripts for purposes of complying with section 6330(c)(1). ⁸ On the record before us, we find that the Appeals officer's reliance on the transcripts to verify that respondent made a valid assessment with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1995 did not constitute an abuse of discretion. On that record, we further find that the facts that are undisputed for purposes of respondent's motion establish that petitioner received a fair hearing before an impartial decision maker.

2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*127 Based on our examination of the entire record before us, we find that respondent did not abuse respondent's discretion in determining in the notice of determination to proceed with collection with respect to petitioner's taxable year 1995. On that record, we shall grant respondent's motion.

Although respondent has not requested a penalty under section 6673(a)(1), this Court is authorized to impose such a penalty in an amount not to exceed $ 25,000 in cases where it appears to the Court that, inter alia, a proceeding before it was instituted or maintained primarily for delay, sec. 6673(a)(1)(A), or the taxpayer's position in such a proceeding is frivolous or groundless, sec. 6673(a)(1)(B). In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576">115 T.C. 576, 115 T.C. 576">581 (2000), we issued an unequivocal warning to taxpayers concerning the imposition of a penalty under section 6673(a) on those taxpayers who abuse the protections afforded by sections 6320 and 6330 by instituting or maintaining actions under those sections primarily for delay or by taking frivolous or groundless positions in such actions.

In the instant case, petitioner advances, we believe primarily for delay, frivolous and groundless arguments2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 117">*128 and contentions, thereby causing the Court to waste its limited resources. We shall impose a penalty on petitioner pursuant to section 6673(a)(1) in the amount of $ 1,000.

We have considered all of petitioner's arguments and contentions which are not discussed herein, and we find them to be without merit and/or irrelevant.

To reflect the foregoing,

An order granting respondent's motion and decision sustaining respondent's determinations and imposing a penalty under section 6673(a)(1) will be entered.