Judges: "Armen, Robert N."
Attorneys: Charles Theodore Henry Dennis III (an officer), for petitioner. Don R. Spellman , for respondent.
Filed: Feb. 05, 2008
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2008-21 UNITED STATES TAX COURT SOLUTION PLUS, INC., Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 23774-06X. Filed February 5, 2008. Charles Theodore Henry Dennis III (an officer), for petitioner. Don R. Spellman, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: Respondent denied petitioner’s request for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3)1 on the 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2008-21 UNITED STATES TAX COURT SOLUTION PLUS, INC., Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 23774-06X. Filed February 5, 2008. Charles Theodore Henry Dennis III (an officer), for petitioner. Don R. Spellman, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: Respondent denied petitioner’s request for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3)1 on the 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, ..
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T.C. Memo. 2008-21
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
SOLUTION PLUS, INC., Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 23774-06X. Filed February 5, 2008.
Charles Theodore Henry Dennis III (an officer), for
petitioner.
Don R. Spellman, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: Respondent denied petitioner’s
request for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3)1 on the
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and all Rule
(continued...)
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grounds that: (1) Petitioner was not organized exclusively for
exempt purposes; (2) petitioner was not operated exclusively for
exempt purposes; and (3) petitioner failed to establish that it
did not operate for a substantial nonexempt purpose. Pursuant to
section 7428, petitioner seeks a declaratory judgment that
respondent’s denial of its request for tax-exempt status was
erroneous and that petitioner qualifies for tax-exempt status
under section 501(c)(3). The matter is now before us on
respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment.
Background
Petitioner’s only involvement in this case has been to file
the petition and a designation of place of submission. See Rules
211(a) and 212. Thereafter, petitioner did not, or would not,
participate in stipulating to the administrative record, as
defined in Rule 210(b)(12). See Rule 217(a). As a consequence,
respondent filed the entire administrative record, appropriately
certified as to its genuineness by an official authorized to act
for the Commissioner. See Rule 217(b)(1). The following is
drawn from that record.
1
(...continued)
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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A. Charles Theodore Henry Dennis III
Charles Theodore Henry Dennis III (Mr. Dennis) formed
petitioner as a Maryland corporation on February 15, 2005.
Petitioner has not yet begun to operate.
Mr. Dennis’s experience and expertise involve debt
management programs (DMPs). A DMP is a program, often run by a
credit counseling agency, in which a debtor enrolls to
consolidate or restructure and repay unsecured debt. Creditors
pay the entity that runs a DMP a percentage of the debt collected
through the DMP. The financial criteria for qualification of a
debtor in a DMP are established by the debtor’s creditors.
Before forming petitioner, Mr. Dennis sold DMPs, developed
plans to increase his company’s DMP portfolio, managed a “high
performance call center” for 7 years, and served as a senior loan
officer at a mortgage company. Mr. Dennis has also been a vice
president of operations and a call center manager for two
companies that provided financial counseling and DMPs.
B. Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws
Petitioner’s articles of incorporation state that its
purpose is to “promote financial literacy to highly leveraged
consumers who want to become debt free” and “Offer products and
services to assist the consumers in reaching their financial
goals.”
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Petitioner’s bylaws provide that its specific objectives and
purposes are:
1. Establish Solution-PLUS as a viable and beneficial
entity in the credit counseling industry through
expanded financial services and diversification of
revenue.
2. Provide a financial literacy model that focuses on
increasing consumer financial awareness and preventing
financial distress.
3. Provide a structured debt repayment plan (debt
management program) for the immediate and long-term
relief of financially overburdened consumers.
4. Establish Solution-PLUS as a reliable corporate
community support mechanism for those in need.
C. Board of Directors and Officers
Petitioner’s articles of incorporation and bylaws provide
that petitioner shall have two directors. Petitioner’s articles
of incorporation named Mr. Dennis and his wife as the only
directors.
Mr. Dennis is petitioner’s president, chief executive
officer (CEO), and only employee. Mr. Dennis’s compensation is
determined, in part, by the growth of petitioner’s portfolio of
DMPs.
D. Petitioner’s Application for Exemption and Followup
Correspondence
1. Application for Recognition of Exemption
Mr. Dennis signed petitioner’s Form 1023, Application for
Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, and dated it February 25, 2005, a date 10 days
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after petitioner’s incorporation. An exempt organization
specialist for respondent reviewed the Form 1023 and wrote to
petitioner seeking additional information under penalties of
perjury about (a) entities (such as banks and lending
institutions) to which petitioner planned to refer individuals,
(b) whether petitioner would advertise or promote its products or
services in any way, (c) whether petitioner would receive any
benefit for referring individuals to companies, and (d) whether
petitioner had agreements with any such companies.
2. Petitioner’s Response to the Request for Additional
Information
a. General Response
In response to respondent’s request for additional
information, Mr. Dennis wrote that before petitioner began to
actually operate, petitioner wished to obtain exemption under
section 501(c)(3) so that it “can launch [its] DMP operating
platform and begin the process of originating and servicing DMP
Candidates” and begin offering “DMP services on a National
scale.” Mr. Dennis stated that petitioner’s “goal is to focus
initially on offering the best DMP platform in the marketplace”
and “strictly put full emphasis on DMP Origination and Servicing”
and that petitioner “want[s] to fully concentrate on offering the
DMP” and “keep the DMP Service in the forefront.” Mr. Dennis
explained that petitioner would be the “sole Service Provider of
DMP Origination and Customer Servicing for potential Customers”
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and would provide all necessary DMP services, including
origination, customer servicing, document processing, research,
payment distribution, account reconciliation, and marketing
materials. Mr. Dennis stated that petitioner’s “goal is to build
relationships with participating Creditors of the DMP by ensuring
Customer payments are made in a timely fashion and also reaching
out to the Creditors for continuous feedback as to how [it] can
maintain operational efficiency.”
Mr. Dennis explained that petitioner’s DMP services would be
available to anyone who inquired, as long as they qualified for
the DMP, and that petitioner planned to track on a monthly basis
how many customers are originated on DMPs. Once petitioner has
launched its DMP platform, it will use “traditional advertising
that has led to maximum lead generation for the Credit Counseling
Industry” and use advertising to “enable further brand
recognition”. Petitioner could purchase leads for customers as
might be necessary to meet its revenue goals. Additionally,
petitioner’s “goal is to network with organizations that offer
Homebuyer Certification Programs” as a “great platform to offer
DMP services.”
Further, petitioner contemplated having a call center to
primarily handle inquiries for DMPs. Petitioner’s goal is to
have each of its employees answer one new DMP inquiry per hour
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and to take approximately eight new DMP inquiries on an average
business day.
Petitioner’s training materials inform its anticipated
future employees that its goal is to provide them with the
necessary resources to ensure the success of its clients on DMPs.
Petitioner may adopt a bonus structure for its call center
employees “in accordance with industry norms.” Mr. Dennis made
clear that petitioner would identify and service DMP candidates,
screen third-party vendors that offer appropriate products and
services, and expand the DMP portfolio before referring its
customers to such vendors. Mr. Dennis also acknowledged that
petitioner might receive referral and marketing fees for
generating leads for outside vendors.
Mr. Dennis stated that as petitioner’s DMP operation
“evolves and becomes more viable,” petitioner will begin
screening vendors that offer services that complement
petitioner’s “growing Portfolio of DMP Customers”. Petitioner
will expose its customers to “various Products and Services -
that will complement their short- and long-term financial goals”
such as mortgage and insurance products. Petitioner might
receive referral fees for marketing these products and services
to its potential customers.
Mr. Dennis stated that petitioner also plans to provide
information to callers on credit report analysis, properly
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utilizing credit, homebuyer certification programs, and financial
planning. Petitioner plans to develop a program of services
after identifying the caller’s “short-term and long-term
financial goals.” Petitioner will tell callers that it provides
DMPs and these other programs to improve their overall “Credit
Profile”.
b. Telephone Call Center Script and Training Materials
Mr. Dennis attached to his response: (1) An “origination
script” to be used by petitioner’s employees who would operate a
telephone call center to screen potential DMP applicants; and (2)
a training manual.
The script spells out the DMP origination process to
prospective customers. Petitioner first tells callers that it
needs to ask them several questions before it can determine their
qualification for the DMP. It then asks if the caller is
employed, the type and amount of debts, and whether the debts are
current.
Next, petitioner explains that it is a “nonprofit
organization providing a free debt management program.”
Petitioner applies the qualifications for a DMP that the industry
and participating creditors establish. To qualify for a DMP,
petitioner tells callers that they must have at least $2,000 in
unsecured debts and at least two accounts with creditors
participating in petitioner’s DMP program. If a caller meets
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these requirements, petitioner tells the caller “we can
definitely assist you right away”. Petitioner advises that it
will consolidate the caller’s unsecured debts, give the caller
one place to make payments, and can typically reduce monthly
payments. Petitioner also advises callers that they will receive
benefits from their creditors that the callers cannot receive
individually.
Next, petitioner requests personal and debt information in
order to calculate the caller’s monthly payment on the DMP.
Then, petitioner advises the caller that there are no fees to
join the program, but asks for a contribution of $5 per creditor
per month. Petitioner tells the caller that the contribution is
tax deductible and that petitioner has already included the
contribution in the caller’s monthly payment amount.
Petitioner then completes a budget worksheet that the
“creditors require”. If petitioner determines from the worksheet
that the caller has positive disposable income, and the caller
says that he or she needs the program because of delinquency,
reduction in income, or increase in expenses, petitioner enrolls
the caller in a DMP. If a caller has positive disposable income,
but does not cite one of these reasons for needing the program,
petitioner tells the caller that creditors may not offer
benefits, says that it cannot assist the caller, suggests that
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the caller contact his or her creditors directly, and then ends
the call.
If petitioner determines that the caller has negative
disposable income, but the caller says that he or she thinks the
DMP payment is affordable, petitioner enrolls the caller. If the
caller has positive disposable income, but does not think the DMP
payment is affordable for some reason, petitioner tells the
caller that the program is not right for him or her, to call back
if something changes that would enable the caller to afford the
program, to call the creditors directly, and then ends the call.
For qualifying callers, the origination script then
completes the enrollment process, which includes setting the
payment date, account activation, automatic checking account
debiting, client agreement, and “keys to success on the DMP”.
Petitioner ends each call by asking the caller if he or she knows
anyone else who might be interested in a DMP and, if so, to have
that person call petitioner and seek its assistance.
c. Educational Materials and Goals
Mr. Dennis stated that petitioner plans to “educate high
school and college students on developing and maintaining sound
financial management skills” through free seminars and workshops.
The planned curriculum will include principles of financial
management, debt-to-income ratios, managing credit ratings, and
investing. Petitioner also contemplated a seminar topic and
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presentation entitled “On the Right Track”, which includes
material on understanding credit reports and credit scores,
establishing credit, and borrowing techniques. Petitioner
received two invitations in 2006 to make presentations on
financial management to students.
3. Petitioner’s Protest
After considering Mr. Dennis’s response, respondent advised
petitioner that it had been identified as an organization
engaging in at least one of the following activities: Credit
counseling, credit repair, debt consolidation, financial
education, money management, budgeting, or a related financial
activity. Respondent provided petitioner with a copy of a
comprehensive analysis as to whether entities engaged in these
activities can qualify as organizations described in section
501(c)(3). Respondent also provided petitioner with a detailed
statement of facts and law as to why it appeared that petitioner
did not qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) and
gave petitioner 30 days to file a protest.
Petitioner then submitted to respondent a protest stating
that its activities would mirror those in Consumer Credit
Counseling Serv. of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 44 AFTR 2d
79-5122, 78-2 USTC par. 9660 (D.D.C. 1978), because petitioner’s
activities contemplated education of the public and its DMP
activity was merely incidental. Petitioner attached to its
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protest a copy of a one-page handout entitled “Educational
Solutions” stating that petitioner has developed an educational
curriculum. Petitioner also attached a copy of “Articles of
Amendment” purporting to amend its bylaws by removing Mr.
Dennis’s wife as a director and adding two other individuals as
directors.
E. Denial of Petitioner’s Application for Exemption
Ultimately, on September 15, 2006, respondent issued a final
adverse determination letter, upon which the instant declaratory
judgment action is based. In the letter, respondent determined
that petitioner did not qualify for exemption under section
501(a) as an organization described under section 501(c)(3)
because petitioner: (1) Was not organized exclusively for exempt
purposes; (2) was not operated exclusively for exempt purposes;
and (3) failed to establish that it did not operate for a
substantial nonexempt purpose.
Respondent stated that petitioner’s origination script was
entirely devoted to selling DMPs and obtaining information about
the caller’s unsecured debt and that the script did not provide
for determining the caller’s broader financial situation,
assisting the caller in making a budget, or proposing any
alternatives to the DMP. Respondent noted petitioner did not
provide any of the meaningful educational materials that
petitioner claimed to be developing. Respondent further noted
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the information provided by petitioner shows that it expected
revenue from payments by creditors and from customers who would
be attracted to petitioner by traditional advertisements through
networks of organizations having members with credit issues. In
addition, respondent stated that petitioner had researched
companies that would purchase credit counseling leads supplied by
petitioner.
F. Proceedings in the Tax Court
Petitioner timely filed the petition seeking a declaratory
judgment under section 7428 with respect to its initial
qualification for exemption as an organization described under
section 501(c)(3). In the petition, petitioner states:
Solution Plus Inc. is requesting tax exemption status
under 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Solution
Plus filed form 1023 on February 25, 2005 and did not
receive a response until November 11, 2005. In the IRS
letter dated November 11, 2005 there was a request for
additional information inwhich detailed questions were
raised and answered in reference to Solution Plus
operations. Solution Plus primary goal is to educate
individuals about the pit-falls of improper debt
management. Solution Plus was formed to give the
general public a fair opportunity to educated [sic] and
counsel individuals who are going through hard
financial distress. On September 19, 2006, the IRS
sent Solution Plus a final denial of tax-exempt status
without providing adequate reasons for their denial.
Its appears that the IRS is focusing on our use of Debt
Management Plans, but the DMP is only a minimal part of
Solution Plus revenue. [Reproduced literally.]
As stated above, the petition and designation of place of
submission were the last documents that petitioner submitted to
the Court in the instant proceeding.
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Respondent filed an answer in which he denied the
allegations in the petition and to which he attached a complete
index to the administrative record. Respondent did not allege in
the answer any new or additional grounds for denying petitioner’s
exemption application beyond those grounds identified in the
final adverse determination letter.
Petitioner did not file a reply or move with respect to the
answer. The Court ordered the parties to submit the case on the
administrative record or to file a written report as to the then
present status of the case. As stated above, because petitioner
did not respond to respondent’s written request to stipulate to
the administrative record, respondent filed with the Court the
entire administrative record, together with the certificate
attesting to its genuineness.
Subsequently, respondent filed his Motion For Summary
Judgment. Petitioner was ordered to file a response to
respondent’s motion, but no response was received by the Court.
Thereafter, the Court issued an Order, placing respondent’s
Motion For Summary Judgment on a motions calendar assigned to
Special Trial Judge Armen, who was authorized to hear the matter
and make the decision of the Court. See sec. 7443A(b)(1), (c);
Rule 218(a); Deleg. Order No. 45,
126 T.C. VI (June 1, 2006).
At the hearing, counsel for respondent appeared and argued
in support of respondent’s motion. In contrast, there was no
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appearance on behalf of petitioner, nor did petitioner file a
written statement pursuant to Rule 50(c) in lieu of appearance.
Discussion
A. Declaratory Judgment
In a declaratory judgment action brought under section 7428,
the Court decides whether the Commissioner’s determination was
erroneous. See Church in Boston v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. 102,
105 (1978); Houston Lawyer Referral Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 570, 573, (1978); see also Note to Rule 217(a),
68 T.C.
1048.
Disposition of a declaratory judgment action concerning the
initial qualification of an exempt organization is ordinarily
made on the basis of the administrative record. Church in Boston
v.
Commissioner, supra at 105; Houston Lawyer Referral Serv.,
Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra at 573.
An action for declaratory judgment may be decided by summary
judgment. Rule 217(b)(2); see, e.g., Church in Boston v.
Commissioner, supra.
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v.
Commissioner,
90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be
granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues in
controversy “if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,
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depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be
rendered as a matter of law.” Rule 121(a) and (b); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Commissioner,
98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd.
17 F.3d 965
(7th Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the burden of proving
that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and factual
inferences will be made in a manner most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. See Dahlstrom v. Commissioner,
85
T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner,
79 T.C. 340, 344
(1982). The party opposing summary judgment must set forth
specific facts showing that a genuine question of material fact
exists and may not rely merely on allegations or denials in the
pleadings. Rule 121(d); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986); Grant Creek Water Works, Ltd. v. Commissioner,
91
T.C. 322, 325 (1988); King v. Commissioner,
87 T.C. 1213, 1217
(1986).
The Court’s decision in an action involving the initial
qualification of an exempt organization is ordinarily based on
the administrative record. Rule 217(b)(1). In the instant case,
neither party has asked the Court to admit evidence outside the
administrative record as filed and certified by respondent.
After careful review, we are satisfied that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and a decision may be
- 17 -
rendered as a matter of law. Accordingly, we shall grant
respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment.
C. Whether Petitioner Is Entitled to Exempt Status
A corporation that is organized and operated exclusively for
charitable purposes, as described in section 501(c)(3), is exempt
from Federal income tax unless exemption is denied under section
502 or 503. Sec. 501(a).
To qualify as an exempt organization under section
501(c)(3), a corporation must satisfy all of the requirements
stated therein, specifically including the requirements that the
corporation must be both organized and operated exclusively for
one or more exempt purposes specified therein and must not
operate for a substantial nonexempt purpose. Exempt purposes
include both charitable and educational purposes. A failure to
satisfy any one of the requirements is fatal to qualification.
Columbia Park & Recreation Association v. Commissioner,
88 T.C.
1, 13 (1987), affd. without published opinion
838 F.2d 465 (4th
Cir. 1988); see sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.
In a declaratory judgment action commenced under section
7428 to review the Commissioner’s denial of an organization’s
application for initial qualification for tax-exempt status under
section 501(c)(3), we ordinarily review only the administrative
record. Rule 217(a); Natl. Association of Am. Churches v.
Commissioner,
82 T.C. 18, 19-20 (1984).
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1. Whether Petitioner Is Organized Exclusively for Exempt
Purposes
Whether an organization is organized exclusively for exempt
purposes is sometimes known as the organizational test. To
satisfy the organizational test, the articles of organization (1)
must limit the organization’s purposes to one or more exempt
purposes; (2) may not expressly authorize the organization to
engage in activities that do not further one or more exempt
purposes except to an insubstantial degree; and (3) must contain
an express or implied provision dedicating its assets to an
exempt purpose upon dissolution. Sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)
through (4), Income Tax Regs.
a. Educational Purposes
Petitioner contends that it satisfies the organizational
test because it was organized for educational purposes and that
use of DMPs was only a minimal part of its revenue. However, the
administrative record clearly demonstrates otherwise.
Petitioner’s articles of incorporation do not limit its
activities to those related to education because the articles
empower petitioner to engage in activities that are not purely
charitable or educational. For example, petitioner could operate
an investment business and offer products and services with
respect to a customer’s individual needs. Those activities stand
in stark contrast to educational purposes acceptable under
section 501(c)(3), which include activities that instruct or
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train individuals to improve or develop their capabilities or
instruct the public on subjects useful to individuals and that
are beneficial to the community. See Am. Campaign Acad. v.
Commissioner,
92 T.C. 1053, 1064 (1989); sec. 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioner stated that it was in the process of developing
free educational pamphlets for its DMP clients that would focus
on financial literacy and financial soundness. However, other
than a one-page handout, petitioner did not provide respondent
with copies of the actual materials that it professed would be
provided to consumers, nor did petitioner describe in any detail
the content of any such materials. Petitioner’s origination
script does not mention, describe, or offer to send any
educational materials to a caller. The only information that
petitioner’s script discusses is the sending of literature about
petitioner’s DMP and associated programs, such as its credit
report analysis service. In short, the administrative record
does not contain copies of any meaningful educational program or
educational materials that petitioner might send to a caller.
Petitioner also stated that it plans to provide seminars and
workshops to high school and college students on developing and
maintaining sound financial management skills, and it provided
outlines of the planned curricula. The invitations indicate that
the student audience needs education on financial management and
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will benefit from petitioner’s program. However, these student
programs are an insignificant part of petitioner’s overall
activities.
Rather, petitioner’s activities are primarily structured to
market, determine eligibility for, and enroll individuals in
DMPs. Petitioner plans to inform consumers about the range of
financial services it provides, not about understanding the cause
of, and devising personal solutions to, consumers’ financial
problems. Further, petitioner does not plan to consider the
particular knowledge of individual callers about managing their
personal finances. Instead, petitioner simply plans to collect
data on the callers’ debts as necessary to qualify them for a DMP
or to determine whether they need other services that petitioner
provides.
In short, the record shows that petitioner would not operate
primarily for educational purposes and that educational purposes
were to be a minimal part of petitioner’s proposed activities.
b. Charitable Purposes
Respondent contends that petitioner was not organized
exclusively for charitable purposes. We agree.
The term “charitable” is used in section 501(c)(3) in its
generally accepted sense and includes relief of the poor
and distressed or of the underprivileged. However, primarily
providing services for a fee ordinarily does not further
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charitable purposes. See I.H.C. Health Plans, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 325 F.3d l188, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Offering
products and services to a broad segment of the population is as
consistent with self promotion and profit maximization as it is
with any ‘charitable’ purpose”), affg. T.C. Memos. 2001-246,
2001-247, and 2001-248; Am. Campaign Acad. v.
Commissioner, supra
at 1076-1077 (beneficiaries must possess “charitable
characteristics”); Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner,
71 T.C.
202, 215-216 (1978) (disadvantaged artisans constitute a
charitable class). A charitable organization’s programs must
also benefit the members of a recognized charitable class in a
“nonselect manner”. See Am. Campaign Acad. v.
Commissioner,
supra at 1077; Aid to Artisans, Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra at
215-216; sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs. (must
serve public rather than private interests). In short,
petitioner’s potential customers are not members of a class that
is benefited in a “nonselect manner”; indeed, petitioner’s
potential customers are likely to be treated in a “select”
manner, because they will be turned away unless they meet the
criteria of the participating creditors.2
2
We note that in Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115, the
Commissioner indicated that individuals with financial problems
are not on that account necessarily in need of assistance as
“proper recipients of charity”. We note further that the
Commissioner has ruled that an organization formed to help reduce
the incidence of personal bankruptcy by informing the public on
(continued...)
- 22 -
2. Whether Petitioner Is Operated Exclusively for
Charitable Purposes
We focus now on petitioner’s operations to decide whether
petitioner satisfies the operational test. Petitioner has not
begun to actually operate. However, its plans make clear: (a)
Petitioner’s primary activity would be to provide DMPs to the
general public for a fee that it hopes to collect from its
customers and from its customers’ creditors; (b) petitioner would
conduct this activity in a self-promotional and profit-maximizing
manner; (c) petitioner would not limit its DMP services to low-
income individuals; and (d) petitioner has not established that
its proposed DMP fee structure is reasonable. Thus, the
administrative record establishes that petitioner does not, or,
more accurately, would not, operate exclusively for charitable
purposes.
2
(...continued)
personal money management and aiding low-income persons with
financial problems by providing free counseling and, if
necessary, establishing a budget plan for the orderly discharge
of indebtedness, was considered to have furthered charitable
purposes.
Id. In contrast, the Commissioner has indicated that an
organization assisting persons with financial problems by
analyzing their specific problems, counseling them on the payment
of their debts, and setting up payment plans based on their
ability to pay was not exempt under sec. 501(c)(3), because the
organization was not engaged in educational activities and did
not limit its program to persons who were in need of such
assistance as proper recipients of charity. Id.; Rev. Rul. 65-
299, 1965-2 C.B. 165.
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3. Whether Petitioner Would Not Operate for a Substantial
Nonexempt Purpose
An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for
exempt purposes under section 501(c)(3) unless it serves a public
interest, rather than a private one. Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States,
461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983); sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii),
Income Tax Regs. To satisfy this requirement, the organization
must not be organized and operated for the benefit of private
interests, such as those of its creator or the creator’s family.
Am. Campaign Acad. v. Commissioner,
92 T.C. 1065-1067.
a. Private Interests of Mr. Dennis
Mr. Dennis controls petitioner. He and his wife were
petitioner’s only directors at formation and listed on its
application for exemption. Mr. Dennis is petitioner’s president
and CEO, and a full-time employee, indeed, petitioner’s only
employee. Mr. Dennis’s compensation will be based, at least in
part, on the growth of petitioner’s portfolio of DMPs. Thereby,
his pay incentive parallels petitioner’s immediate goal to launch
its DMP operations to focus initially on offering the best DMP
platform in the marketplace, to offer DMP services nationally, to
strictly emphasize DMP origination and servicing, to fully
concentrate on offering the DMP, to keep the DMP service in the
forefront, and to use advertising to enable further brand
recognition. The record thus indicates that Mr. Dennis formed
petitioner to be a family-controlled business that he personally
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would run for financial gain, using his past professional
experience marketing DMPs and managing a DMP call center.
Petitioner did not identify any changes to the board in its
early submissions to respondent. However, petitioner later
represented, as part of its protest, that the board had added two
new members to replace Mrs. Dennis. However, petitioner did not
provide a date for such change, nor did petitioner provide board
minutes or other documentation, such as certification of amended
articles, to establish the formal change in petitioner’s board.
Even if two additional members replaced Mrs. Dennis, Mr. Dennis
still would benefit from the organization and operation of
petitioner.
b. Private Interests of Creditors
Petitioner only provides its DMP services to callers who
satisfy the qualifications established by participating
creditors. Petitioner completes a budget worksheet that the
creditors require for each of petitioner’s clients. In sum, the
administrative record establishes that petitioner would operate
for the benefit of private interests.
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c. Conclusion as to Operation of Substantial Nonexempt
Purpose
Based on undisputed facts in the administrative record, we
conclude that petitioner would operate for a substantial
nonexempt purpose.
4. Petitioner’s Other Contentions
Petitioner contends that the facts of this case are
substantially similar to those in Consumer Credit Counseling
Serv. of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 44 AFTR 2d 79-5122, 78-2
USTC par. 9660 (D.D.C. 1978). We disagree.
In Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., Inc., the
District Court held that community education and counseling
assistance programs were the primary activities, that the
plaintiff-agencies were organized and operated exclusively for
charitable and educational purposes, and that the DMP activity
was minimal. In the instant case, the sale of DMPs is the
primary reason for petitioner’s existence, and its charitable and
educational purposes are, at best, minimal. The facts in
Consumer Credit Counseling Serv. of Ala., Inc. stand in stark
contrast to the facts in the instant case.
5. Conclusion As To Denial of Petitioner’s Exempt Status
Respondent’s denial of petitioner’s tax-exempt status must
be upheld and respondent’s motion granted if respondent prevails
on any one of the three grounds for disqualification identified
in respondent’s final adverse determination letter. See Columbia
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Park and Recreation Association v. Commissioner,
88 T.C. 13;
sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. Respondent has
prevailed on all three grounds for disqualification. Thus, we
hold that respondent’s determination that petitioner does not
qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) was not
erroneous and that respondent is entitled to summary judgment.
To reflect the foregoing,
An order granting respondent’s
Motion For Summary Judgment and
decision for respondent will be
entered.