Judges: "Vasquez, Juan F."
Attorneys: Tim A. Tarter and Kirk A. McCarville , for petitioner. Anne W. Durning , for respondent.
Filed: Feb. 23, 2010
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: SARI F. DEIHL, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT Docket No. 22897–08. Filed February 23, 2010. In 2004 P and her husband litigated three consolidated cases before the Court concerning their 1996, 1997, and 1998 tax years. P’s attorney raised the issue of relief from joint and several liability under sec. 6015, I.R.C., in the petition for 1996 but not 1997 or 1998. The request did not invoke any specific subsection of sec. 6015, I.R.C. P then withdrew her claim for relief
Summary: SARI F. DEIHL, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT Docket No. 22897–08. Filed February 23, 2010. In 2004 P and her husband litigated three consolidated cases before the Court concerning their 1996, 1997, and 1998 tax years. P’s attorney raised the issue of relief from joint and several liability under sec. 6015, I.R.C., in the petition for 1996 but not 1997 or 1998. The request did not invoke any specific subsection of sec. 6015, I.R.C. P then withdrew her claim for relief ..
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SARI F. DEIHL, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, RESPONDENT
Docket No. 22897–08. Filed February 23, 2010.
In 2004 P and her husband litigated three consolidated
cases before the Court concerning their 1996, 1997, and 1998
tax years. P’s attorney raised the issue of relief from joint and
several liability under sec. 6015, I.R.C., in the petition for
1996 but not 1997 or 1998. The request did not invoke any
specific subsection of sec. 6015, I.R.C. P then withdrew her
claim for relief from joint and several liability in the stipula-
tion of facts for the consolidated cases. P’s husband died after
the opinion in the consolidated cases was filed but before
decisions were entered. After decisions were entered, P filed
an administrative claim for relief from joint and several
liability with R for 1996, 1997, and 1998. R determined P did
not qualify for relief under sec. 6015(b), (c), or (f), I.R.C., and
that P’s claim was barred by sec. 6015(g)(2), I.R.C., regard-
less. Held: Sec. 6015(g)(2), I.R.C., applies because the Court
entered final decisions for 1996, 1997, and 1998. Held, further,
P did not participate meaningfully in the prior proceeding.
Held, further, relief from joint and several liability was raised
only in the pleadings for 1996. Therefore, for 1997 and 1998
sec. 6015, I.R.C., relief from joint and several liability was not
an issue in the prior proceeding. Held, further, relief from
joint and several liability under sec. 6015(b) and (f), I.R.C., for
1996 was an issue in the prior proceeding. Held, further, for
purposes of sec. 6015(g)(2), I.R.C., an election under sec.
6015(c), I.R.C., shall not be deemed to have been an issue in
a prior proceeding where the requesting spouse’s original
request for relief under sec. 6015, I.R.C., did not specifically
invoke sec. 6015(c), I.R.C., and the requesting spouse was
ineligible to make an election under sec. 6015(c), I.R.C., at the
time because the requesting spouse’s husband was alive.
Accordingly, an election under sec. 6015(c), I.R.C., for 1996
was not an issue in the prior proceeding. Held, further, sec.
6015(g)(2), I.R.C., bars P from claiming relief from joint and
several liability for 1996 under sec. 6015(b) and (f), I.R.C.
Held, further, the exception in sec. 6015(g)(2), I.R.C., applies
to, and P is not barred from electing, relief from joint and sev-
eral liability under sec. 6015(c), I.R.C., for 1996 and relief
156
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(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 157
from joint and several liability under sec. 6015(b), (c), and (f),
I.R.C., for 1997 and 1998.
Tim A. Tarter and Kirk A. McCarville, for petitioner.
Anne W. Durning, for respondent.
OPINION
VASQUEZ, Judge: Petitioner seeks review of respondent’s
determination that she is not entitled to relief from joint and
several liability under section 6015(b), (c), and (f) 1 with
respect to her joint Federal income tax liabilities for 1996,
1997, and 1998. Our jurisdiction to review petitioner’s
request for relief is conferred by section 6015(e). The only
issue for decision is whether petitioner is precluded by the
doctrine of res judicata as set forth in section 6015(g)(2) from
raising the issue of relief from joint and several liability for
the years in issue. 2
Background
Petitioner and her husband (Mr. Deihl) were the taxpayers
in three cases previously litigated in the Tax Court in 2004:
Docket Nos. 11136–02 (1996), 16293–02 (1998), and 1024–03
(1997). The cases were consolidated for trial, briefing, and
opinion (the consolidated cases). The consolidated cases con-
cerned the substantiation of business expense deductions
claimed by Mr. Deihl and petitioner in 1996, 1997, and 1998
related to their S corporation.
Mr. Deihl hired Donald MacPherson (Mr. MacPherson) to
represent him and petitioner in the consolidated cases.
Robert Hartmann (Mr. Hartmann) assisted Mr. MacPherson
with the representation. 3 Petitioner was not involved in the
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as
amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2 Respondent in the notice of determination denied petitioner relief from joint and several li-
ability for each of the years in issue because: (1) ‘‘The information we have available does not
show you meet the requirements for relief ’’; (2) ‘‘The United States Tax Court or other court
issued a final decision regarding the liabilities from which you seek relief and you meaningfully
participated in that proceeding’’ (i.e., res judicata); (3) ‘‘You knew, or had reason to know, of
the income or deductions that caused the additional tax’’; and (4) ‘‘You did not show it would
be unfair to hold you responsible’’. On Mar. 27, 2009, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion
to sever the issues. This Opinion deals only with the issue of res judicata. We do not here decide
whether petitioner qualifies for relief from joint and several liability under sec. 6015.
3 Mr. Hartmann was originally hired by Mr. Deihl over 20 years ago to serve as counsel for
Mr. Deihl and petitioner’s businesses as well as for personal matters. He withdrew as attorney
of record in the consolidated cases to be able to serve as a witness at trial but continued to
Continued
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158 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156)
hiring of Mr. MacPherson and did not sign the engagement
letter for the consolidated cases.
Mr. MacPherson signed and filed the three petitions in the
consolidated cases; petitioner did not sign them. The petition
in docket No. 11136–02 (the 1996 petition) raised the issue
of relief from joint and several liability. It states:
Under Sec. 6013(e) and 6015, PETITIONER SARI F. DEIHL was/is an
innocent spouse for the year at issue in the statutory NOD. Considering
all of the facts and circumstances, it would be unfair to hold SARI respon-
sible for the understatement of tax, if any, and related penalties and
interest, if any.
The petitions in docket Nos. 16293–02 (1998) and 1024–03
(1997) did not raise the issue of relief from joint and several
liability. 4
On October 21, 2004, the parties submitted their stipula-
tion of facts in the consolidated cases. Paragraph 20 thereof
(paragraph 20) states that ‘‘Petitioner Sari F. Deihl no longer
seeks innocent spouse relief for the taxable years 1996, 1997
or 1998’’. Relief from joint and several liability was not dis-
cussed at trial in the consolidated cases (the 2004 trial).
The Tax Court filed its opinion in the consolidated cases on
December 15, 2005. See Deihl v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2005–287 (Deihl I). The Court generally sustained the
Commissioner’s determinations of deficiencies in tax, addi-
tions to tax, and penalties against petitioner and Mr. Deihl
for 1996, 1997, and 1998 and instructed that decisions would
be entered under Rule 155. Mr. Deihl died on February 5,
2006, 52 days after Deihl I was filed but before the final
decisions in the consolidated cases were entered.
Petitioner served as personal representative for the estate
of Mr. Deihl from March 20, 2006, to July 30, 2007. She
sought new counsel after receiving advice from Mr. Mac-
Pherson and Mr. Hartmann with which she disagreed. On or
about March 16, 2006, petitioner retained Martha Patrick,
whose representation of petitioner ended on or around April
24, 2006. Soon thereafter, on April 27, 2006, petitioner
retained Terence D. Woolston (Mr. Woolston) and Tim A.
assist Mr. MacPherson throughout the litigation.
4 Similarly, the answers filed in 1997 and 1998 were silent as to relief from joint and several
liability and the Commissioner, in his pretrial memorandum for the consolidated cases, referred
only to 1996 in addressing petitioner’s claim for relief from joint and several liability.
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(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 159
Tarter of Woolston & Tarter P.C. to represent her and the
estate of Mr. Diehl.
Mr. Woolston and counsel for the Commissioner worked
together to finalize the Rule 155 computations in the consoli-
dated cases.
The Court entered its decision in docket No. 11136–02 on
September 12, 2006, and in docket Nos. 16293–02 and 1024–
03 on October 3, 2006. 5 Neither side appealed. 6
On or about March 6, 2007, petitioner filed Form 8857,
Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, requesting relief under
section 6015(b), (c), and (f) for 1996, 1997, and 1998. On
August 22, 2008, respondent sent petitioner a notice of deter-
mination denying petitioner’s request for relief from joint and
several liability for each of those years. On September 16,
2008, petitioner timely filed a petition for review of respond-
ent’s determination. Petitioner resided in Arizona at the time
she filed the petition in this case.
Discussion
Respondent argues that res judicata as delineated in sec-
tion 6015(g)(2) bars petitioner from claiming relief from joint
and several liability for 1996, 1997, and 1998 because the
Court entered final decisions for those years. Respondent fur-
ther argues that the exception to res judicata in section
6015(g)(2) does not apply because relief from joint and sev-
eral liability was an issue in the consolidated cases and peti-
tioner participated meaningfully therein.
Petitioner argues that the exception to res judicata in sec-
tion 6015(g)(2) applies because relief from joint and several
liability was not an issue in the consolidated cases and she
did not participate meaningfully therein. She also argues
that res judicata should not apply to her election under sec-
tion 6015(c) because she could not have raised it in the
consolidated cases. 7
5 The Court originally entered its decisions in docket Nos. 16293–02 and 1024–03 on Sept. 12,
2006, but vacated the original decisions after granting the Commissioner’s motion to vacate.
6 The decision in docket No. 11136–02 became final on Dec. 12, 2006. The decisions in docket
Nos. 16293–02 and 1024–03 became final on Jan. 2, 2007.
7 Respondent argues petitioner could have raised sec. 6015(c) by moving the Court to reopen
the record or to vacate the decisions before they became final. Given our conclusion, discussed
hereinafter, that petitioner did not participate meaningfully in the consolidated cases and that
relief under sec. 6015(c) in fact was not an issue in the consolidated cases, we need not decide
whether petitioner could have raised relief under sec. 6015(c) in the consolidated cases.
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160 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156)
I. Section 6015(g)(2)
Section 6015(g)(2) codifies the application of res judicata
with respect to claims for relief from joint and several
liability under section 6015.
A. Res Judicata in General
Under the judicial doctrine of res judicata, when a court of
competent jurisdiction enters a final judgment on the merits
of a cause of action, the parties to the action are bound by
every matter that was or could have been offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim. Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); see also Gustafson
v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 85, 91 (1991). The doctrine of res
judicata ‘‘serves to promote judicial economy and the repose
of disputes’’ by precluding repetitious lawsuits. Gustafson v.
Commissioner, supra at 91.
Because Federal income taxes are determined on an
annual basis, each year is a separate cause of action, and res
judicata is applied to bar subsequent proceedings involving
the same tax year. Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra at 597–
598; Calcutt v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 14, 21 (1988). As a
general rule, where the Tax Court has entered a decision for
a taxable year, both the taxpayer and the Commissioner
(with certain exceptions) are barred from reopening that
year. Burke v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 41, 47 (1995);
Hemmings v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 221, 233 (1995).
A stipulated judgment is a judgment on the merits for pur-
poses of res judicata. Baker v. IRS, 74 F.3d 906, 910 (9th Cir.
1996) (and cases cited thereat). It follows that, for res judi-
cata purposes, the decision incorporates those elements that
the parties have settled by stipulation as well as those that
have been redetermined by the Court. See Lincir v. Commis-
sioner, T.C. Memo. 2007–86.
Although the general outlines of res judicata are relatively
straightforward, the details applicable in certain cases may
be quite intricate. See, e.g., the discussion in Hemmings v.
Commissioner, supra at 230–235. In addition, Congress
sometimes enacts legislation that overrides or modifies res
judicata. See, e.g., Burke v. Commissioner, supra at 47.
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(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 161
B. The Exception
Under common law principles of res judicata, a taxpayer
who was a party to a prior proceeding for the same taxable
year is barred from seeking relief from joint and several
liability whether or not the claim had been raised as an issue
in the prior proceeding. Section 6015(g)(2) creates an excep-
tion to this rule where such relief was not an issue in the
prior proceeding. However, the exception does not apply if
the court determines that the taxpayer participated meaning-
fully in the prior proceeding. 8 Thus, res judicata does not bar
a taxpayer from requesting relief from joint and several
liability under section 6015(b), (c), or (f) if: (1) Relief from
joint and several liability under section 6015(b), (c), or (f) was
not an issue in the prior proceeding; and (2) the court deter-
mines that the taxpayer did not participate meaningfully in
the prior proceeding. Said differently, if a final decision was
entered in a prior proceeding for a tax year and relief from
joint and several liability was an issue therein, section
6015(g)(2) will bar the taxpayer from subsequently
requesting the same relief for that year. Or, if a final deci-
sion was entered in a prior proceeding for a tax year and the
taxpayer participated meaningfully therein, section
6015(g)(2) bars the taxpayer from subsequently requesting
relief from joint and several liability that was or could have
been an issue in the prior proceeding. See Vetrano v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 272, 278 (2001); sec. 1.6015–1(e),
Income Tax Regs.
II. The Consolidated Cases
This Court entered final decisions in the consolidated cases
for the tax years at issue here. Res judicata as delineated in
section 6015(g)(2) bars petitioner’s claims for relief from joint
and several liability unless those claims for relief were
not an issue in and petitioner did not participate meaning-
8 Sec. 6015(g)(2) provides:
RES JUDICATA.—In the case of any election under subsection (b) or (c) or of any request for equi-
table relief under subsection (f), if a decision of a court in any prior proceeding for the same
taxable year has become final, such decision shall be conclusive except with respect to the quali-
fication of the individual for relief which was not an issue in such proceeding. The exception
contained in the preceding sentence shall not apply if the court determines that the individual
participated meaningfully in such prior proceeding.
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162 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156)
fully in the consolidated cases. We first address whether peti-
tioner participated meaningfully in the consolidated cases.
A. Meaningful Participation
Under section 6015(g)(2), the requesting spouse bears the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
he or she did not participate meaningfully in the prior litiga-
tion. Monsour v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004–190.
Meaningful participation is not defined in section
6015(g)(2) or the accompanying regulations, and the legisla-
tive history does not provide guidance as to the proper defini-
tion. Moreover, the Court, despite deciding whether
requesting spouses have participated meaningfully in prior
proceedings, has not clearly defined meaningful participation,
although we have indicated that while ‘‘merely [complying]’’
with a spouse’s instructions to sign various pleadings and
other documents filed in prior litigation is not conclusive of
meaningful participation, Thurner v. Commissioner, 121 T.C.
43, 53 (2003), signing court documents and participating in
settlement negotiations are indicators of meaningful partici-
pation, id.; Monsour v. Commissioner, supra. This case war-
rants a brief description of our cases discussing meaningful
participation.
In Thurner v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayer husband
and the taxpayer wife filed separate petitions each seeking
relief from joint and several liability under section 6015. The
Commissioner moved for summary judgment on the issue of
meaningful participation. We found that the record clearly
established that the taxpayer husband had participated
meaningfully in a prior court proceeding. The taxpayer hus-
band had signed court documents and been fully engaged in
the proceeding. In addition, the taxpayer husband had main-
tained exclusive control over all tax matters including the
handling of the prior proceeding. To the contrary, we found
there to be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
taxpayer wife had participated meaningfully in the prior pro-
ceeding where she asserted that she had merely complied
with her husband’s instructions to sign the pleadings and
various other documents that were filed in the prior pro-
ceeding. 9
9 Because the case involved a motion for summary judgment, the Court did not decide whether
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(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 163
In Monsour v. Commissioner, supra, we found the taxpayer
had participated meaningfully in a prior Tax Court pro-
ceeding involving the taxpayer and her husband. We found
significant the fact that the taxpayer chose not to call a par-
ticular witness to testify about her level of participation in
the prior proceeding and inferred from her failure to call this
witness that his testimony, if given, would have been
unfavorable to the taxpayer. The taxpayer relied on her hus-
band’s testimony to support her position that she had not
participated meaningfully. However, we did not find this
testimony to be credible and we did not rely on this testi-
mony to support the taxpayer’s contentions. Moreover, the
taxpayer, an attorney, agreed to a stipulated decision that
she was jointly and severally liable for deficiencies in tax.
In Huynh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006–180, affd.
276 Fed. Appx. 634 (9th Cir. 2008), the record showed that
in a prior proceeding 10 the requesting spouse had read and
signed two petitions filed with the Tax Court; spoken and
participated at pretrial meetings with IRS counsel; signed
various documents including a stipulation of settled issues, a
power of attorney, and stipulations of facts; testified about
her husband’s potential income sources; and signed a trial
brief, a reply brief, and a motion for leave to file a reply
brief. The taxpayer had also prepared her and her husband’s
joint Federal income tax returns for the years in issue.
Despite the requesting spouse’s arguments to the contrary
and although she may have signed some documents under
the direction of her husband, we held on the entire record
that the taxpayer had nevertheless participated meaningfully
in the prior proceeding.
In Moore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007–156, we found
the taxpayer’s participation in a prior proceeding to be mean-
ingful where the taxpayer had been informed about section
6015, had participated in meetings with IRS counsel and the
Court, and had voluntarily entered into a settlement.
Petitioner’s participation in the consolidated cases differs
significantly from that of the requesting spouses in Monsour,
Huynh, and Moore. Petitioner, who is not an attorney and
did not complete her high school education, did not sign any
the taxpayer wife had participated meaningfully in the prior proceeding.
10 Huynh v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2001–131.
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164 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156)
court documents in the consolidated cases. She did not
review the petitions or the stipulations of facts, nor did she
agree to any of the stipulations. Mr. MacPherson and Mr.
Hartmann did not discuss these documents with petitioner.
In fact, she saw them for the first time at trial in the present
matter. Petitioner did not meet with any IRS personnel,
participate in any settlement negotiations with the IRS, or sit
in on any such meetings between her attorneys and the IRS
during the litigation in the consolidated cases. However, peti-
tioner was called as a witness in the 2004 trial and testified
briefly 11 about certain expenses for entertainment and com-
puters deducted by her and Mr. Deihl’s S corporation.
Respondent called Robert Cuatto (Mr. Cuatto), associate
area counsel with the IRS, to testify about petitioner’s partici-
pation in the consolidated cases. Mr. Cuatto observed peti-
tioner in discussions with Mr. Deihl and their counsel during
several breaks in the 2-day trial and in the hallway in the
morning before trial both days. In his opinion, petitioner
seemed to be engaged and actively involved in the trial. How-
ever, Mr. Cuatto was not involved in any of the aforemen-
tioned discussions and admittedly had no knowledge of what
was being discussed. We cannot speculate as to what peti-
tioner, Mr. Deihl, and their counsel may have been dis-
cussing during breaks and in the hallway before trial.
Petitioner and respondent initially expressed a desire to
call Mr. MacPherson to testify as to petitioner’s participation
in the consolidated cases. However, Mr. MacPherson was in
Germany recovering from an illness at the time of trial in the
present matter and did not testify. The parties agreed that
the record was sufficiently complete without his testimony.
Therefore, we shall not infer anything from the fact that Mr.
MacPherson did not testify.
Mr. Hartmann did not meet with petitioner immediately
after Deihl I was filed. He was instructed by Mr. Deihl to
keep the findings in Deihl I ‘‘under our hat for a while’’. It
was only after Mr. Deihl’s death that Mr. Hartmann and Mr.
MacPherson met with petitioner. At that time they gave peti-
tioner advice with which she disagreed. Petitioner then
informed Mr. Hartmann that she was speaking with different
11 Only 11 out of 335 pages of the transcript from the 2004 trial consisted of petitioner’s testi-
mony.
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(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 165
attorneys. Mr. Woolston handled the consolidated cases from
that point on.
We believe Mr. Deihl, like the husband in Thurner v.
Commissioner, 121 T.C. 43 (2003), controlled the litigation in
the consolidated cases until his death. Although petitioner
testified at the 2004 trial, she was more like a third-party
fact witness than a participating litigant. The totality of the
evidence demonstrates that petitioner was never fully
informed or engaged in the litigation. We find that petitioner
has shown that she did not participate meaningfully in the
consolidated cases.
B. Relief at Issue in the Consolidated Cases
Mr. MacPherson raised the issue of relief from joint and
several liability in the 1996 petition. Although paragraph 20
seemingly withdraws the issue for all years in the consoli-
dated cases, the petitions and corresponding answers filed for
1997 and 1998 did not raise relief from joint and several
liability. Further, respondent’s pretrial memorandum for the
consolidated cases specifically addressed petitioner’s claim
with respect to 1996 only. Because relief from joint and sev-
eral liability was raised in the pleadings for 1996 only, that
is the only year in which said relief was an issue. See Rules
38, 324. Relief from joint and several liability was not an
issue in 1997 or 1998. The mere reference to 1997 and 1998
in paragraph 20 without more did not put relief from joint
and several liability in issue for those years. Accordingly,
petitioner is not barred from making an election under sec-
tion 6015(b) and (c) and requesting equitable relief under
section 6015(f) for 1997 and 1998.
The 1996 petition did not specify the basis for relief
requested under section 6015; i.e., whether petitioner was
electing or requesting relief under section 6015(b), (c), or (f).
However, petitioner was not eligible to make an election
under section 6015(c) when the 1996 petition was filed
because she was not divorced or separated from Mr. Deihl. 12
12 An individual shall only be eligible to make an election under sec. 6015(c) if at the time
of the election such individual is no longer married to, or is legally separated from, the indi-
vidual with whom such individual filed the joint return to which the election relates, or such
individual was not a member of the same household as the individual with whom such joint
return was filed at any time during the 12-month period ending on the date such election is
filed. Sec. 6015(c)(3)(A)(i). For purposes of these eligibility requirements, a widow is treated as
Continued
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166 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (156)
Determining what subsections of section 6015 were an issue
in a prior proceeding under these facts is an issue of first
impression. We hold that for purposes of section 6015(g)(2),
an election under section 6015(c) shall not be deemed to have
been an issue in a prior proceeding where the requesting
spouse’s original request for relief under section 6015 did not
specifically invoke section 6015(c) and the requesting spouse
was ineligible to make an election under section 6015(c) at
the time because the requesting spouse’s husband was
alive. 13 Therefore, we conclude that petitioner’s claim for
innocent spouse relief in the 1996 petition was an election
under section 6015(b) and a request for equitable relief under
section 6015(f). Relief under section 6015(c) for 1996 was not
an issue in the consolidated cases. 14
Petitioner argues she should not be bound by the 1996
petition or paragraph 20 because she was not adequately rep-
resented during the consolidated cases and she was not
aware of the contents of the 1996 petition or paragraph 20
until after Deihl I was released. However, we have held that
‘‘the quality of advocacy and the actual knowledge of the liti-
gants are not special circumstances in determining whether
a prior judgment is a bar in a subsequent litigation.’’ Moore
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007–156; see also Rule 33(b).
Accordingly, relief from joint and several liability under sec-
tion 6015(b) and (f) was an issue in the consolidated cases as
to 1996; relief under section 6015(c) was not.
We find that section 6015(g)(2) bars petitioner from
making an election under section 6015(b) and requesting
equitable relief under section 6015(f) for 1996. We find fur-
ther that the exception in section 6015(g)(2) applies to peti-
tioner’s claim for relief under section 6015(c) for 1996 and
petitioner’s claim for relief under section 6015(b), (c), and (f)
for 1997 and 1998.
no longer married. Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 123–124 (2002), affd.
353 F.3d 1181
(10th Cir. 2003).
13 Our holding does not impair the Court’s ability to interpret an ambiguous request for relief
under sec. 6015 as including an election under sec. 6015(c).
14 We do not attempt in this Opinion to decide how sec. 6015(g)(2) applies under a different
set of facts where a requesting spouse does not become eligible to elect relief under sec. 6015(c)
until after a decision in a prior proceeding has become final pursuant to sec. 7481.
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(156) DEIHL v. COMMISSIONER 167
III. Conclusion
A summary of our holdings follows. The Court entered
final decisions for petitioner’s 1996, 1997, and 1998 tax
years, which were litigated in 2004. Petitioner did not
participate meaningfully in that litigation. Relief from joint
and several liability was an issue in the consolidated cases
as to 1996 only under section 6015(b) and (f). Therefore, peti-
tioner is barred from making an election under section
6015(b) and requesting equitable relief under section 6015(f)
for 1996. Relief from joint and several liability under section
6015(c) for 1996 and section 6015(b), (c), and (f) for 1997 and
1998 was not an issue in the consolidated cases. Therefore,
the exception to res judicata in section 6015(g)(2) applies to
these claims. Accordingly, petitioner is not barred from
making an election under section 6015(c) for 1996 or
from making an election under section 6015(b) and (c) and
requesting equitable relief under section 6015(f) for 1997
and 1998.
In reaching all of our holdings herein, we have considered
all arguments made by the parties, and to the extent not
mentioned above, we find them to be irrelevant or without
merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be issued.
f
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