Opinion by Justice FILLMORE.
In a single issue, appellants Kevin Quilens (Quilens), Angela Haynes (Haynes),
Appellees Linda Ann Miller and her son, Eric Lynord Wiley, sued Methodist Hospitals of Dallas, d/b/a Charlton Methodist Hospital, d/b/a Methodist Health System Police Department (Methodist Hospitals of Dallas), and appellants Quilens, Haynes, Rozzell, and Foster, among others,
The parties' accounts of the events underlying the lawsuit differ. Eddie Nelson, a member of appellees' family, was a patient in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of Methodist Charlton Medical Center. Appellees' pleadings indicate that while appellees were in Nelson's ICU room, three uniformed Methodist Health System Police Department officers — Haynes, Rozzell, and Foster — approached family members in the hallway outside the ICU room and demanded that the family leave the premises of Methodist Charlton Medical Center. Appellees and the other family members left the hospital building and congregated at a bus stop located across the street from the hospital. Thereafter, according to appellees, Haynes, Rozzell, and Foster, accompanied by hospital police officer Quilens,
Appellants' pleadings indicate that Methodist Health System Police Department officers were dispatched to the ICU unit because of a disturbance involving appellees' family members. According to appellants, officers asked certain family members, including one that was belligerent and intoxicated, to leave the hospital premises. When the intoxicated family member attempted to return to the hospital, appellees allegedly interfered with the officers' efforts to detain him on property controlled by the hospital. According to appellants, appellees were detained and given trespass warnings.
Appellees sued appellants for assault and battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment. Appellants moved for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of official immunity.
Pursuant to section 51.014(a)(5) of the civil practice and remedies code, appellants filed this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5) (West Supp.2011). According to appellants, this interlocutory appeal concerns the scope of immunity, privileges, and powers afforded licensed police officers commissioned by a private, nonprofit medical corporation under education code section 51.214. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.214 (West Supp.2011).
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the interlocutory appeal, asserting this Court lacks jurisdiction. In contesting the jurisdiction of this Court over the interlocutory appeal, appellees make two arguments. First, appellees argue that appellants failed to prove as a matter of law that section 51.214 of the education code applies to them. The point of this first argument appears to be that if appellants are not entitled to assert official immunity under section 51.214 of the education code, they
Appellate jurisdiction is never presumed. Brashear v. Victoria Gardens of McKinney, L.L.C., 302 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.). This Court is obliged to determine issues affecting our jurisdiction over an appeal. Dillard's, Inc. v. Newman, 299 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. denied) (citing New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex.1990)). An appellate court reviews de novo whether it has jurisdiction over an appeal because jurisdiction is a legal question. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998); OAIC Commercial Assets, L.L.C. v. Stonegate Vill., L.P., 234 S.W.3d 726, 735 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied).
As a general rule, a judgment must be final before it can be appealed. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2001). Our jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals is a narrow exception to the general rule that we may only consider final judgments and orders. See Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex.2001). The statute controlling appeals from interlocutory orders, section 51.014(a) of the civil practice and remedies code, allows for interlocutory appeals only under limited circumstances. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(a). The applicability of section 51.014(a) is a question of law that we review de novo. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007).
Section 51.014(a)(5) of the civil practice and remedies code provides that a person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court denying a motion for summary judgment "that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5); see also Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 843 ("[T]here is no other way to read Section 51.014(a)(5) than to conclude that only `an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state' may appeal an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary judgment:"); Cen-Tex Childcare, Inc. v. Johnson, 339 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (in order to appeal pursuant to section 51.014(a)(5), appellant must be an "individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state"). Official immunity is a common law affirmative defense rendering officials immune from both liability and suit. See Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Tex.2004) (discussing immunity from suit); DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1995) (discussing immunity
The threshold issue for determination of appellants' entitlement to an interlocutory appeal of the denial of their motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of official immunity is whether appellants were officers or employees of the state or a political subdivision of the state. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5). It is undisputed that at the time of the incident at issue in this lawsuit, appellees were licensed by the Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education
Appellants do not contend they are employees of the state or a political subdivision of the state. Appellants contend that pursuant to section 51.214 of the education code, they have "official immunity equal to that of state employed peace officers" while on duty at Methodist Hospitals of Dallas. Accordingly, appellants assert that because they have official immunity equal to that of a state-employed peace officer, they should be considered government employees for purposes of section 51.014(a)(5) of the civil practice and remedies code.
The occupations code provides that "peace officer" means "a person elected, employed, or appointed as a peace officer under Article 2.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, or the law." TEX. OCC.CODE ANN. § 1701.001(4) (West 2012); see also Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf, Tex., 388 F.3d 522, 529 (5th Cir.2004) ("In order to be a peace officer in the State of Texas, an individual must be both licensed by the [Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education] and be utilized in a capacity that is designated by Texas statute.") (emphasis in original) (citing TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.12). Article 2.12(8) of the code of criminal procedure provides that "officers commissioned under Section 37.081, Education Code, or Subchapter E, Chapter 51, Education Code" are peace officers. TEX.CODE
In pertinent part, section 51.214 of the education code provides:
TEX. EDUC.CODE ANN. § 51.214 (West Supp. 2011); see also TEX. EDUC.CODE ANN. § 51.212(a)(1) (West Supp.2011) ("governing boards of private institutions of higher education, including private junior colleges, are authorized to employ and commission peace officers for the purpose of enforcing state law on the campuses of private institutions of higher education").
Appellants assert Methodist Hospitals of Dallas satisfied each prong of section 51.214 of the education code. According to appellants, Methodist Hospitals of Dallas is a private postsecondary educational institution under section 61.302 of the education code. Section 61.302 provides:
TEX. EDUC.CODE ANN. § 61.302(2) (West 2006). Appellants therefore argue that they are entitled to the immunities of a peace officer in connection with the work performed for Methodist Hospitals of Dallas.
To be entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defense of official immunity, appellants were required to show that they were peace officers commissioned under section 51.214 of the education code at the time of the events at issue in the underlying lawsuit. In support of this element of the affirmative defense of official
Appellees contend the statements quoted above from Stoyanoff's affidavit are conclusory and, therefore, not competent summary judgment proof. See Mercer v. Daoran Corp., 676 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex.1984) ("A legal conclusion in an affidavit is insufficient to raise an issue of fact in response to a motion for summary judgment or to establish the existence of fact in support of a motion for summary judgment."); Welch v. Milton, 185 S.W.3d 586, 594 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (conclusory statements are not proper summary judgment proof).
In their brief, appellants state "Methodist Charlton Medical Center — a medical complex owned by Methodist Hospitals of Dallas is a teaching and community hospital in Dallas, Texas" and "as a teaching hospital, Methodist [Hospitals of Dallas] furnished courses of instruction in person that would lead to a medical degree." Other than the conclusory statement by Stoyanoff that Methodist Hospitals of Dallas is a teaching hospital, nothing in the summary judgment proof was evidence that Methodist Charlton Medical Center is owned by Methodist Hospitals of Dallas, is a teaching and community hospital, or furnished courses of instruction that would lead to a medical degree.
In her affidavit, Stoyanoff makes the additional conclusory statement that Methodist Hospitals of Dallas operates as a component part of a general academic teaching institution. Section 61.003(3) of the education code defines "general academic teaching institution" as:
TEX. EDUC.CODE ANN. § 61.003(3) (West 2011). Methodist Hospitals of Dallas is not included in the definition of "general academic teaching institution" as contained in section 61.003(3) of the education code, and appellants' summary judgment proof fails to establish the identity of a general academic teaching institution as to which Methodist Hospitals of Dallas "operates as a component part."
Finally, Stoyanoff's affidavit makes the conclusory statement that "Methodist [Hospitals of Dallas] provides security services for an institution of higher education." Section 61.003(8) of the education code defines "institution of higher education" to be "any public technical institute, public junior college, public senior college or university, medical or dental unit, public state college, or other agency of higher education as defined in this section." TEX. EDUC.CODE ANN. § 61.003(8). Education Code section 61.003(5) defines "medical and dental unit" to mean:
TEX. EDUC.CODE ANN. § 61.003(5). "Other agency of higher education" means:
TEX. EDUC.CODE ANN. § 61.003(6). Methodist Hospitals of Dallas is not included in
Appellants rely on Klein v. Hernandez, 315 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.2010), for the proposition that the Texas Supreme Court has held the legislature, by statute, can extend state employee immunity to privately employed persons, and they assert Klein's "reasoning would apply to the Appellants, as commissioned peace officers" under section 51.214 of the education code. Klein is unavailing to appellants because they have not shown on this record they are entitled to the immunities of government peace officers, and because the education code does not expressly designate their employer a government agency or designate them government officers or employees.
In Klein, a patient brought suit against a private medical school and a resident physician, Dr. Klein, for medical malpractice. The issue was whether a resident physician working at a public hospital, Ben Taub General Hospital (Ben Taub), under an agreement with his private medical school, could take an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(5) of the civil practice and remedies code of a trial court order denying a motion for summary judgment based on official immunity. Dr. Klein contended that section 312.007(a) of the health and safety code classified him as a state employee for purposes of his work at Ben Taub. Section 312.007(a) provides:
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 312.007(a) (West 2010)(emphasis added).
Ben Taub is a part of the Harris County Hospital District (the Harris County District), a political subdivision of the State. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 281.002(a) (West 2010) (county with at least 190,000 inhabitants that does not own or operate a hospital system for indigent or needy persons may create countywide hospital district). The Harris County District and its hospitals are "governmental units." Klein, 315 S.W.3d at 7; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 101.001(3) (West 2011) (defining "governmental unit"). Baylor College of Medicine, a private, nonprofit medical school, is also a "supported medical school," which means that it has contracts with the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board and receives state funding specifically allocated for training physicians who provide medical care at public hospitals such as Ben Taub. Klein, 315 S.W.3d at 2, 7; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 312.002(6) (West 2010) ("supported medical or dental school" means "medical school or dental school organized as non-profit
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that "by statute, a resident physician at a private medical school is to be treated like a state employee for purposes of [civil practice and remedies code] section 51.014(5) when the underlying litigation arises from a residency program coordinated through a supported medical school at a public hospital." Klein, 315 S.W.3d at 2. Health and safety code section 312.002(6) expressly made Baylor College of Medicine a "state agency" for certain purposes, including its services at Ben Taub. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 312.002(6). The health and safety code also expressly made Dr. Klein a state employee for the same purposes. Klein, 315 S.W.3d at 8; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 312.007(a). As an employee of a state agency, complaining about the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of immunity. Dr. Klein was entitled to bring an interlocutory appeal "like any other state employee." Klein, 315 S.W.3d at 8.
The law governing this appeal is materially different than the law applied by the Supreme Court in Klein. In Klein, the Court observed that the health and safety code expressly classified Baylor College of Medicine as a state agency for certain purposes, including liability, and expressly classified resident physicians like Dr. Klein as state agency employees for certain purposes, including liability. In contrast to Klein, the language of section 51.214 of the education code does not expressly classify a private postsecondary educational institution as a state agency, or expressly classify peace officers commissioned under that section as state employees, for purposes of liability or any other purpose.
In Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex.2011), the Texas Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment proof failed to establish as a matter of law that a resident physician was an employee of a governmental unit. Id. at 375. Dr. Reddy,
Based on this record, we conclude appellants failed to conclusively demonstrate as a matter of law that they were peace officers commissioned under section 51.214 of the education code and therefore entitled to bring an interlocutory appeal from the denial of their summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of official immunity. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5). Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal.
We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX.R.APP. P. 42.3(a). By separate order issued in conjunction with
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 101.001(2).
TEX. HEALTH & Safety Code Ann. § 312.004 (West 2010). Section 312.005 states that to be effective, a contract under section 312.004 must be submitted to the Texas Board of Health (the Board), and the commissioner of health shall review the contract on behalf of the Board and shall approve the contract if the commissioner finds the contract furthers the purposes of chapter 312. Id. at § 312.005(a) & (b) (West.2010).
