OPINION

Price, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Womack, Johnson, Keasler, Cochran and Alcala, JJ., joined.

We granted the State's petition for discretionary review in this case in order to address several questions related to the appellate review of a juvenile court's waiver of its otherwise-exclusive jurisdiction over a person alleged to have committed a murder at the age of sixteen. What, exactly, is the appellate court's appropriate role in reviewing the adequacy of the juvenile court's statutorily required written order transferring the child to a criminal district court for prosecution as an adult? Ultimately, we hold that the court of appeals conducted an appropriate review of the juvenile court's transfer order, and we affirm its judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

A. State's Motion to Waive Jurisdiction and Trial

On November 19, 2008, the State filed a petition in the 313th Juvenile Court in Harris County alleging that the appellant engaged in delinquent conduct by committing an intentional or knowing murder. On the same date, the State also filed a motion for the juvenile court to waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer the appellant to criminal district court for prosecution as an adult, alleging as grounds for the transfer that, because of the seriousness of the offense alleged, ensuring the welfare of the community required waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. The juvenile court granted the State's request for a hearing on the motion and, pursuant to Section 54.02(d) of the Juvenile Justice Code in the Texas Family Code,1 ordered that the Chief Juvenile Probation Officer obtain a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the appellant's background and the circumstances of the alleged offenses.2 The juvenile court also ordered the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Authority of Harris County to conduct an examination and file its report.

At the hearing, the State called a single witness to testify: Detective Jason Meredith, the Deer Park Police officer who investigated the crime scene and interviewed a number of potential suspects, including the appellant. Meredith's testimony on direct examination took the form of a non-chronological account of his investigation of the murder, up to and including his interrogation of the appellant. At the end of his testimony, over no objection from the appellant, the State introduced the following documents: (1) a juvenile offense report revealing the appellant's "Previous Referral" for "MISCHIEF-$500/$1499.99," which, subsequent testimony would show, resulted from the appellant's alleged "keying" of another student's vehicle; (2) a "Juvenile Probation Certification Report" detailing the positive and negative behaviors, as well as the academic history, of the appellant while he was under the observation of the juvenile-justice system; and (3) a "Physician's Medical Assessment" prepared by the Harris County Juvenile Probation Health Services Division, which listed the findings of the appellant's physical — but not any psychological or behavioral — examination.

For his part, the appellant elicited testimony from seven witnesses. Various family members, friends, and acquaintances testified both generally and specifically about the appellant's disadvantaged upbringing, fractured family life, and positive personal qualities, including politeness and pliability to adult supervision. Various actors within the juvenile-justice system testified both generally and specifically about the appellant's constructive conduct within, and positive progression through, the juvenile-justice system, characterizing him as "one of the best kids [to] come through as far as his intelligence and obedience and the way he carries himself in the facility." The appellant also introduced into evidence, among other things, forensic psychiatrist Dr. Seth W. Silverman's detailed and thorough

It was Dr. Silverman's ultimate opinion that the appellant, as a "dependent, easily influenced individual" whose "thought process lacks sophistication" (a characteristic Silverman considered "indicative of immaturity") "would probably benefit from placement in a therapeutic environment specifically designed for adolescent offenders[.]" Silverman contrasted this environment to the "adult criminal justice programs[,]" which he deemed to have "few constructive, and possibly many destructive, influences to offer" the appellant. Silverman also noted that the appellant had, during his stint within the juvenile-justice system, already "responded to therapy."

At the close of evidence, and after both parties delivered closing arguments, the juvenile court granted the State's motion to waive jurisdiction. At the behest of the appellant's counsel, the court also made the following oral findings: (1) "that there is insufficient time to work with the juvenile in the juvenile system"; (2) "that the seriousness of the offense, murder, makes it inappropriate to deal with in this system"; (3) that "the respondent did have a prior criminal mischief probation"; (4) that the instant offense "actually occurr[ed] at the time respondent was on probation which ... makes the services and resources of the juvenile system look to be inadequate"; (5) "that because there is a co-respondent [certified to stand trial in the adult criminal courts], there is a logic in putting respondents, where they are a year apart or two years apart, together"; and (6) that "judicial economy, although not the driving factor, is an issue" because "sometimes it's more convenient to hear the same matter, even though there are different people involved, in the same court for the convenience of the witnesses, the attorneys, and the system in general."

The following day, the juvenile court signed and entered a written order waiving its jurisdiction. Closely following the language of the juvenile transfer statute, the order affirmed that the juvenile court had determined "that there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the OFFENSE alleged and that because of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceeding."3 The juvenile court again simply recited from the statute when it stated that:

The juvenile court also specifically found in its written order: (1) that the appellant "is of sufficient sophistication and maturity to have intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived all constitutional rights heretofore waived[,] ... to have aided in the preparation of HIS defense and to be responsible for HIS conduct;" (2) that the alleged offense "WAS against the person of another;" and that (3) "there is little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public and likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of" the appellant "by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court."

Per the trial court's order, the appellant's case was transferred to the jurisdiction of the 178th District Court in Harris County, where he stood trial, certified as an adult, against the first-degree felony charge of murder. The jury convicted the appellant and sentenced him to thirty years' confinement in the penitentiary.

B. The Appeal

Before the First Court of Appeals, the appellant complained that the juvenile court's stated "reasons for waiver" were supported by insufficient evidence and that the juvenile court therefore abused its discretion by waiving jurisdiction over the appellant.5 Specifically, the appellant contended that, by focusing on the appellant's ability to "intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive[] all constitutional rights heretofore waived," the juvenile court "misunderstood and misapplied the `sophistication and maturity' element" of Section 54.02(f) — and that, even if it did not, there was still "no evidence to support the [juvenile] court's sophistication and maturity finding" as expressed.6 Indeed, given that this Court opined in Hidalgo that the purpose of the Section 54.02(d) "psychological examination" is to "provide[] insight on the juvenile's sophistication, maturity, potential for rehabilitation, decision-making ability, metacognitive skills, psychological development, and other sociological and cultural factors[,]" the appellant found it troubling that "the State presented no evidence of this type whatsoever."7 The appellant also maintained that there was "no evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings relating to adequate protection [of] the public and likelihood of rehabilitation,"8 since "the only evidence was that" the appellant "is amenable to rehabilitation" and the "State presented no contrary evidence."9

In a published opinion, the court of appeals agreed with the appellant that the evidence supported neither the juvenile court's "sophistication-and-maturity" finding nor its "adequate-protection-of-the-public-and-likelihood-of-rehabilitation" finding.10 The court noted that an "appellate court reviews a juvenile court's decision to certify a juvenile defendant as an adult ... under an abuse of discretion standard" and cited another of its own opinions for the proposition that "if an appellate court finds the evidence factually or legally insufficient to support the juvenile court's order ... it will necessarily find the juvenile judge has abused his discretion."11 At the same time, the court of appeals recognized that "the juvenile court may order a transfer on the strength of any of the criteria listed in" Section 54.02(f).

Regarding the juvenile court's sophistication-and-maturity finding, while the State argued that "[the appellant]'s efforts to conceal the crime and avoid apprehension demonstrate that he knew the difference between right and wrong and that his conduct was wrong," the court of appeals pointed out that the "finding of the juvenile court ... was based on [the appellant]'s ability to waive his rights and assist counsel in preparing his defense, not an appreciation of the nature of his actions[.]"12 And since the State's evidence of the appellant's "efforts to conceal the crime" consisted primarily of the appellant's "text messages instructing [a compatriot] to not `say a word,' [and to] `[t]ell them ... you don't know where I live,'" the court of appeals determined that there was "no evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding that [the appellant] was sufficiently sophisticated and mature to waive his rights and assist in his defense."13

With respect to the juvenile court's finding that "there is little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public and likelihood of rehabilitation ... by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court[,]" the court of appeals found it significant that the appellant "had a sole misdemeanor conviction for `keying' a car, and while locked up in the juvenile facility was accused of four infractions."14 The court of appeals took this to be "more than a scintilla of evidence" to "support the court's finding" in this regard, and thus found the evidence to be at least "legally sufficient to support the court's determination" that the lack of "adequate protection of the public and likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation" weighed in favor of waiver.15 "However," the court of appeals continued, "careful consideration of all of the evidence[,]" including Dr. Silverman's report, led to the "further ... conclusion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the juvenile court's finding."16 Responding to the State's argument to the contrary, the court of appeals described the appellant's act of "keying a car" as "an undeniably low level misdemeanor mischief offense" and "hardly the sort of offense for which `there is little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public.'"17 The court of appeals was also influenced by the fact that the appellant's juvenile custodial officers testified that "he followed orders, attended classes, and was not aggressive or mean-spirited."18 Finally, the court of appeals was clearly influenced by Dr. Silverman's assessment that the appellant "would probably benefit from placement in a therapeutic environment specifically designed for adolescent offenders[.]"19

Thus, of the three "reasons for waiver" that the juvenile court specifically gave in its written order, the court of appeals determined that one reason, sophistication and maturity, was supported by legally insufficient evidence. It determined that another reason, the protection of the public and likelihood of rehabilitation, was supported by factually insufficient evidence. With respect to the juvenile court's third reason for waiving jurisdiction — that the appellant's offense constituted a crime against the person of another, and not a mere property crime — the court of appeals regarded this as an inadequate justification, by itself, for waiver. To transfer jurisdiction to the criminal court for this reason alone was, the court of appeals ultimately concluded, an abuse of discretion.20 The court of appeals reasoned that, "[i]f, as the State argues, the nature of the offense alone justified waiver, transfer would automatically be authorized in certain classes of `serious' crimes such as murder, and the subsection (f) factors would be rendered superfluous."21 Concluding that the juvenile court abused its discretion to waive jurisdiction, the court of appeals vacated the district court's judgment of conviction, dismissed the criminal proceedings, and declared the case to be still "pending in the juvenile court."22

C. The Petition for Discretionary Review

The State now challenges the court of appeals's ruling on four fronts. It argues that the court of appeals erred:

Review of these various assertions necessitates a fairly global exegesis of the statutory scheme for the waiver of juvenile-court jurisdiction in Texas, as well as the abundant case law that has been generated in the courts of appeals over the past half a century.

II. THE LAW AND THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

A. Kent v. United States

The transfer of a juvenile offender from juvenile court to criminal court for prosecution as an adult should be regarded as the exception, not the rule; the operative principle is that, whenever feasible, children and adolescents below a certain age should be "protected and rehabilitated rather than subjected to the harshness of the criminal system[.]"23 Because the waiver of juvenile-court jurisdiction means the loss of that protected status, in Kent v. United States, the United States Supreme Court characterized the statutory transfer proceedings in the District of Columbia as "critically important," and held that any statutory mechanism for waiving juvenile-court jurisdiction must at least "measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."24 Among the requisites of a minimally fair transfer process, the Supreme Court tacitly assumed in Kent, is the opportunity for meaningful appellate review.25 The appellate court

In an appendix to its opinion in Kent, the Supreme Court included a policy memorandum promulgated by the District of Columbia Juvenile Court that describes "determinative factors" for guiding the juvenile court's discretion in deciding whether waiver of its jurisdiction over a particular juvenile offender is appropriate.27 The Texas Legislature soon incorporated those factors, albeit non-exclusively, into our own statutory scheme.28 Missing from the Supreme Court's Kent opinion, however, is any detailed description of a standard for appellate review of the juvenile court's transfer decision.

B. The Statutory Scheme

The Juvenile Justice Code of the Texas Family Code specifically provides that the designated juvenile court of each county has "exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings in all cases involving ... delinquent conduct ... engaged in by a person who was a child within the meaning of this title at the time the person engaged in the conduct."29 "Delinquent conduct" includes "conduct ... that violates a penal law of this state ... punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail;"30 and a "child," as defined by the Juvenile Justice Code, is any "person ... ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age[.]"31 Thus, any person accused of committing a felony offense between his tenth and seventeenth birthdays is subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of a juvenile court, meaning that the juvenile court has the "power to hear and decide" matters pertaining to the juvenile offender's case "before any other court[,]" including the criminal district court, can review them.32

The right of the juvenile offender to remain outside the jurisdiction of the criminal district court, however, is not absolute. Section 54.02 of the Juvenile Justice Code provides that, if certain conditions are met, the "juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to the appropriate district court ... for criminal proceedings[.]"33 Before it may exercise its discretion to waive jurisdiction over an alleged child offender, the juvenile court must find that

in the proper adult criminal court.34 "In making the determination required by Subsection [54.02](a)" — that is, whether the "welfare of the community" indeed requires adult criminal proceedings to be instituted against the juvenile,

These non-exclusive factors serve, we have said, to facilitate the juvenile court's balancing of "the potential danger to the public" posed by the particular juvenile offender "with the juvenile offender's amenability to treatment."36 Finally, should the juvenile court choose to exercise its discretion to waive jurisdiction over the child, then the Juvenile Justice Code directs it to "state specifically" in a written order "its reasons for waiver and [to] certify its action, including the written order and findings of the court."37

For the juvenile, there are a number of advantages to remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the adult criminal courts. Not the least of these advantages is that, with but a few exceptions, a "child may not be committed or transferred to a penal institution or other facility used primarily for the execution of sentences of persons convicted of crime, except ... after transfer for prosecution in criminal court under Section 54.02[.]"38 Indeed, a juvenile offender may not even be handed a sentence — "no disposition may be made" — upon his being "found to have engaged in delinquent conduct" unless and until the juvenile court or a jury determines that "the child is in need of rehabilitation or the protection of the public or the child requires that disposition be made."39 And we ourselves have acknowledged the goals of the criminal justice system and the juvenile-justice system to be fundamentally different, describing the former as more "retributive" than its "rehabilitative" juvenile counterpart.40

Prior to January 1, 1996, Section 56.01 of the Juvenile Justice Code provided, in one phrasing or another, that an appeal "from an order entered under ... Section 54.02 of this code respecting transfer of the child to criminal court for prosecution as an adult" could be taken "by or on behalf of a child" directly from the juvenile court to the proper court of appeals.41 What this meant in practical terms was that an alleged juvenile offender could complain immediately of the juvenile court's order waiving its jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, seek discretionary review from the Texas Supreme Court "as in civil cases generally."42 In 1995, however, the Legislature approved an amendment to the Juvenile Justice Code, effective January 1, 1996, in which the portion of Section 56.01(c) that provides for the direct, civil appealability of Section 54.02 waivers was struck.43 Contemporaneous with this amendment, the Legislature added Article 44.47 to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, providing in Section (b) thereof that a "defendant may appeal a transfer under [Section 54.02, Family Code] only in conjunction with the appeal of a conviction of... the offense for which the defendant was transferred to criminal court."44 What this means in practical terms is that an alleged juvenile offender may no longer immediately appeal from the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction; instead, he must wait until such time as he may be convicted in an adult criminal court to complain, on appeal, of some error in the juvenile court's transfer ruling. Although the Legislature designated an appeal from a juvenile court's Section 54.02 order to be a "criminal matter ... governed by [the Code of Criminal Procedure] and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure that apply to a criminal case[,]" it nevertheless expressly provided, in Article 44.47(d), that an appeal under Article 44.47(b) "may include any claims under the law that existed before January 1, 1996, that could have been raised on direct appeal in a transfer under Section 54.02, Family Code."45

What is lacking in our statutory scheme — as is lacking in Kent — is any express statement of the applicable standard of appellate review of the juvenile court's transfer order. In the absence of an explicit statutory standard of appellate review, the courts of appeals have filled the void with decisional law spelling out how they will go about providing the "meaningful review" contemplated by Kent.

C. The Consensus in the Courts of Appeals

In the absence of explicit provisions in the Juvenile Justice Code that define a standard for appellate review of juvenile transfer orders, the general consensus of the various courts of appeals has been as follows. The burden is on the petitioning party, the State, to produce evidence to inform the juvenile court's discretion as to whether waiving its otherwise-exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate in the particular case.46 Transfer of a juvenile offender to criminal court is appropriate only when the State can persuade the juvenile court, by a preponderance of the evidence,47 that the welfare of the community requires transfer of jurisdiction for criminal proceedings, either because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child (or both).48 In exercising its discretion, the juvenile court must consider all of the Kent factors as currently codified in Section 54.02(f) of the Juvenile Justice Code;49 "it is from the evidence concerning [the Section 54.02(f) ] factors that a [juvenile] court makes its final determination."50 But it need not find that each and every one of those factors favors transfer before it may exercise its discretion to waive jurisdiction.51 It may transfer the juvenile so long as it is satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child (or both) indicates that the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.52

With respect to the adequacy of the written order mandated by Section 54.02(h), the courts of appeals have generally agreed, first of all, that the written order must reflect the juvenile court's "reasons" for waiving jurisdiction.53 Despite the express edict of the statute (i.e., the written order "shall state specifically [the juvenile court's] reasons for waiver"), the courts of appeals have sometimes sanctioned orders that recited the reasons for transfer in terms no more specific than the bare statutory language, namely, that because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child, transfer is required to ensure the welfare of the community.54 In addition to specifying "reasons," the order should also expressly recite that the juvenile court actually took the Section 54.02(f) factors into account in making this determination.55 But it need make no particular findings of fact with respect to those factors,56 notwithstanding Section 54.02(h)'s pointed requirement that the juvenile court "certify its action, including the ... findings of the court[.]"

The courts of appeals have also uniformly agreed that, absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court should not set aside the juvenile court's order transferring jurisdiction.57 What they mean by "abuse of discretion" in this context is not altogether clear. Some courts of appeals have declared that the juvenile court's decision must simply be a guided one, not arbitrary or capricious.58 Even so, the courts of appeals have entertained various challenges to the legal and/or factual sufficiency of the evidence presented at the transfer hearing to support the juvenile court's decision to waive its jurisdiction.59 Some courts of appeals (like the court of appeals in this case) have examined the evidence to determine its sufficiency to support specific findings of fact with respect to the Section 54.02(f) factors,60 while mindful that not every factor must support transfer before the juvenile court may exercise its discretion to waive jurisdiction.61 Other courts of appeals have accepted the juvenile offender's invitation to measure the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's ultimate conclusion, pursuant to Section 54.02(a), that the seriousness of the offense or background of the child indicated the need for transfer in order to ensure the welfare of the community.62 No court of last resort in Texas, insofar as our research reveals, has yet spoken on these matters.

The State argues that the court of appeals in this case erred in four respects. First, the court of appeals erred to conduct a factual-sufficiency review, since appeal from a juvenile transfer order is now "a criminal matter" that is "governed" by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the rules of appellate procedure that apply to criminal cases.63 After all, this Court, in Brooks v. State, rejected factual sufficiency for purposes of criminal appeals.64 Second, the court of appeals erred to conclude that the seriousness of the offense could not, by itself, justify the juvenile court's transfer order. Third and fourth, the court of appeals erred by failing to take into account the reasons for waiver of jurisdiction that the juvenile court gave orally on the record, and, for that matter, any other justifications for transfer that may appear in the record, regardless of whether the juvenile court purported to rely on them, either orally on the record or in its written order. These are questions that the courts of appeals have never explicitly addressed.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Factual Sufficiency Under Section 54.02

The State argues that the court of appeals erred to apply a factual-sufficiency standard to the Section 54.02(f)(4) factor, regarding "the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court."65 Indeed, in a supplemental brief filed after oral argument in this Court, the State argues that the appropriate standard of appellate review ought to be a bare abuse-of-discretion standard, unencumbered by any inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence, either legal or factual, to support the juvenile court's transfer order. We disagree.

That the appeal of a transfer order is now regarded as a "criminal matter," under Article 44.47(c), does not in itself control the question of whether factual-sufficiency review is available on direct appeal.66 The juvenile transfer proceeding remains civil in character, governed by the Juvenile Justice Code; the proceedings do not become criminal unless and until the juvenile court waives its exclusive jurisdiction and transfers the child to a criminal court for prosecution as an adult. More to the point, the availability of factual-sufficiency review is, in any event, not so much a function of the character of the proceeding — civil versus criminal — as it is a function of the applicable burden of proof. As we have already pointed out, in a juvenile transfer proceeding, the burden is on the State to produce evidence that persuades the juvenile court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that waiver of its exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate. Facts which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence are ordinarily susceptible to appellate review for factual sufficiency.67 In arguing that factual-sufficiency review is unavailable, the State analogizes to the juvenile-adjudication proceedings.68 In that context, the courts of appeals have declined to conduct factual-sufficiency review, noting that adjudication proceedings are "quasi-criminal" in nature.69 But the burden of proof in a juvenile-adjudication proceeding is beyond a reasonable doubt,70 not a preponderance of the evidence. In that context, it is certainly arguable that our holding in Brooks applies.71 In the review of any issue that is subject to a burden of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt, however, the Texas Supreme Court has authorized the courts of appeals to conduct a factual-sufficiency review.72 The particular appellate standard for factual sufficiency depends upon the level of confidence applicable to the burden of proof — whether preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence — in the trial court.73 But the courts of appeals have continued to address issues of factual sufficiency when they are raised on appeal in all but the juvenile-adjudication context. Indeed, even in criminal cases, we have said that the courts of appeals may conduct factual-sufficiency reviews when confronted with fact issues for which the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.74 The court of appeals did not err to address the appellant's contention that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the juvenile court's finding with respect to Section 52.04(f)(4).75

Having said that, we do agree with the State's contention to the limited extent that it may argue that sufficiency review should not apply to appellate review of the ultimate question under Section 54.02(a)(3), that is, whether "because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings." The discretion of the juvenile court is at its apex when it makes this largely normative judgment.76 As long as the appellate court can determine that the juvenile court's judgment was based upon facts that are supported by the record, it should refrain from interfering with that judgment absent a scenario in which the facts identified in the transfer order, based on evidence produced at the transfer hearing as it relates to the non-exclusive Subsection (f) factors and beyond, bear no rational relation to the specific reasons the order gives to justify the conclusion that the seriousness of the offense and/or the juvenile's background warrant transfer. The appellate courts should conduct appellate review of the juvenile court's discretionary decision to waive jurisdiction in essentially the same way that the El Paso Court of Appeals has said that the juvenile court's discretion in determining juvenile dispositions should be scrutinized on appeal, to wit:

Similarly, we hold that, in evaluating a juvenile court's decision to waive its jurisdiction, an appellate court should first review the juvenile court's specific findings of fact regarding the Section 54.02(f) factors under "traditional sufficiency of the evidence review." But it should then review the juvenile court's ultimate waiver decision under an abuse of discretion standard. That is to say, in deciding whether the juvenile court erred to conclude that the seriousness of the offense alleged and/or the background of the juvenile called for criminal proceedings for the welfare of the community, the appellate court should simply ask, in light of its own analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Section 54.02(f) factors and any other relevant evidence, whether the juvenile court acted without reference to guiding rules or principles. In other words, was its transfer decision essentially arbitrary, given the evidence upon which it was based, or did it represent a reasonably principled application of the legislative criteria? And, of course, reviewing courts should bear in mind that not every Section 54.02(f) factor must weigh in favor of transfer to justify the juvenile court's discretionary decision to waive its jurisdiction.78

B. The Seriousness of the Offense

The State complains that the court of appeals should not have concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion for waiving jurisdiction based upon the seriousness of the offense. The State points out that the juvenile court made an explicit finding of fact in its transfer order that the appellant's alleged offense was committed against the person of another, under Section 54.02(f)(1). This finding of fact was amply supported by the record, the State contends, and was sufficient by itself to provide a legitimate basis for the trial court's discretionary decision to waive jurisdiction. The court of appeals rejected this contention because "[i]f, as the State argues, the nature of the offense alone justified waiver, transfer would automatically be authorized in certain classes of `serious' crimes such as murder, and the subsection (f) factors would be rendered superfluous."79 In support of the court of appeals's observation, the appellant reminds us that the Supreme Court in Kent seems to have disfavored the "routine waiver [of juvenile-court jurisdiction] in certain classes of alleged crime."80

The courts of appeals have long held that the offense that the juvenile is alleged to have committed, so long as it is substantiated by evidence at the transfer hearing and of a sufficiently egregious character, will justify the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction regardless of what the evidence may show with respect to the child's background and other Section 54.02(f) factors.81 This is different from holding that the mere category of offense the juvenile is alleged to have committed, without more, will serve to justify transfer. If that is the only consideration informing the juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction — the category of crime alleged, rather than the specifics of the particular offense — then we agree with the Supreme Court's intimation in Kent that the transfer decision would almost certainly be too ill-informed to constitute anything but an arbitrary decision.

The transfer order in this case made no findings about the specifics of the capital murder, finding no more than probable cause to believe that the appellant committed "the OFFENSE alleged." It gave as the juvenile court's sole reason for waiving jurisdiction that, "because of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings[,]" and then it simply recited "that the OFFENSE allege [sic] to have been committed WAS against the person of another[.]"82 The evidence at the hearing, of course, painted a much more graphic picture of the appellant's charged offense. Whether the court of appeals should have taken that evidence into account in evaluating the juvenile court's exercise of discretion depends upon whether the abuse-of-discretion evaluation must be limited to a review of the "specific reasons" and facts in support thereof that are expressly set out in the juvenile court's written transfer order as per Section 54.02(h), or whether the court of appeals may take into account other reasons and other facts not explicitly set out in the transfer order. We turn to that question next.

C. Appellate Review of the Reasons/Facts Cited in the Transfer Order

There is an inherent tension between the broad discretion that the juvenile court is afforded in making the normative judgment of whether to waive jurisdiction, on the one hand, and Kent's insistence upon the primacy of appellate review in order to assure that the juvenile court's broad discretion is not abused, on the other. The legislative response to this inherent tension was to mandate, in Section 54.02(h), that the juvenile court "shall state specifically in its order its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including the written order and findings of the court[.]"83 Although the committee that drafted the Juvenile Justice Code had recommended a version of this provision that would have required no more than a "brief" statement of the reasons justifying transfer, the Legislature deemed this insufficient: "The fact that the Legislature changed `briefly state' to `state specifically' indicates that it contemplated more than merely an adherence to printed forms and, indeed, contemplated a true relevation [sic] of reasons for making this discretionary decision."84 Moreover, Section 54.02(h) obviously contemplates that both the juvenile court's reasons for waiving its jurisdiction and the findings of fact that undergird those reasons should appear in the transfer order.85 In this way the Legislature has required that, in order to justify the broad discretion invested in the juvenile court, that court should take pains to "show its work," as it were, by spreading its deliberative process on the record, thereby providing a sure-footed and definite basis from which an appellate court can determine that its decision was in fact appropriately guided by the statutory criteria, principled, and reasonable — in short, that it is a decision demonstrably deserving of appellate imprimatur even if the appellate court might have reached a different result. This legislative purpose is not well served by a transfer order so lacking in specifics that the appellate court is forced to speculate as to the juvenile court's reasons for finding transfer to be appropriate or the facts the juvenile court found to substantiate those reasons.86 Section 54.02(h) requires the juvenile court to do the heavy lifting in this process if it expects its discretionary judgment to be ratified on appeal. By the same token, the juvenile court that shows its work should rarely be reversed.

Given this legislative regime, we think it only fitting that a reviewing court should measure sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's stated reasons for transfer by considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support the facts as they are expressly found by the juvenile court in its certified order. The appellate court should not be made to rummage through the record for facts that the juvenile court might have found, given the evidence developed at the transfer hearing, but did not include in its written transfer order. We therefore hold that, in conducting a review of the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the facts relevant to the Section 54.02(f) factors and any other relevant historical facts, which are meant to inform the juvenile court's discretion whether the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the juvenile warrants transfer for the welfare of the community, the appellate court must limit its sufficiency review to the facts that the juvenile court expressly relied upon, as required to be explicitly set out in the juvenile transfer order under Section 54.02(h).

D. Application of Law to Fact

The juvenile court did not "show its work" in the transfer order in this case. The only reason specifically stated on the face of the transfer order to justify waiver of juvenile jurisdiction is that the offense alleged is a serious one. The only fact specified in the written transfer order in support of this reason is that the offense that the appellant is alleged to have committed is an offense against the person of another. We agree with the court of appeals's conclusion that a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction based on this particular reason, fortified only by this fact, constitutes an abuse of discretion.

It is true that the juvenile court found other facts that would have been relevant to support transfer for the alternative reason that the appellant's background was such as to render waiver of juvenile jurisdiction appropriate. First, without going into any relevant detail, the juvenile court's order found that the appellant was sophisticated and mature enough to have been able to waive his constitutional rights effectively and assist in the preparation of his defense at trial, just as an adult would.87 Second, again without elaboration, the juvenile court found "little, if any" prospect of protecting the public and rehabilitating the appellant given its available resources. But, because the juvenile court did not cite the appellant's background as a reason for his transfer in its written order, these findings of fact are superfluous.

Moreover, even were we to regard the recitation of these conclusory facts in the written transfer order to constitute an acceptably implicit indication that the juvenile court also considered the appellant's background as a reason for the transfer, we would nonetheless uphold the court of appeals's judgment. First, with respect to the appellant's sophistication and maturity, we agree with the court of appeals that the evidence was legally insufficient to support such a finding, since the State offered no evidence at the juvenile hearing to inform the juvenile court's consideration of that Section 54.02(f) factor.88 Second, with respect to the prospects for protecting the public and rehabilitating the appellant, we are not at liberty to second-guess the court of appeals's conclusion that the juvenile court's finding regarding this Section 54.02(f) factor was supported by factually insufficient evidence in that it was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.89

IV. CONCLUSION

The court of appeals did not err to undertake a factual-sufficiency review of the evidence underlying the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction over the appellant. Because the juvenile court made no case-specific findings of fact with respect to the seriousness of the offense, we agree with the court of appeals that the evidence fails to support this as a valid reason for waiving juvenile-court jurisdiction. Even had the juvenile court cited the appellant's background as an alternative basis to justify his transfer, the court of appeals was correct to measure the sufficiency of the evidence to support this reason against the findings of fact made in the transfer order itself and to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support those findings. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.90

Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Hervey, J., joined.

Meyers, J., dissented.

Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Hervey, J., joined.

For almost forty years, the tendency among the courts of appeals has been to hold that a juvenile transfer order need not specify in detail the facts supporting the order. The court of appeals in this case broke rank with the weight of that authority, and this Court now goes along with the court of appeals's unconventional holding. I would, instead, stick with the conventional path followed by most of the courts of appeals. In the present case, the transfer order complied with the statute by listing the reason for the transfer. Moreover, the order was effective if the reason given for transfer — seriousness of the offense — was supported by sufficient evidence. The evidence clearly supports the reason given.

A. What the Statute Requires

1. The Text

The Family Code provides that, for a child above a certain age who commits one of the types of offenses listed, a juvenile court may waive its jurisdiction if,

In making this determination, the juvenile court must consider, among other matters:

A juvenile court order waiving jurisdiction must "state specifically ... its reasons for waiver and certify its action."3

2. The Transfer Order Need not Detail the Facts

In construing a statute, we give effect to the plain meaning of its text unless the language of the statute is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly intended.4 None of the provisions quoted above require the juvenile court to recite the facts upon which its transfer holding is based. Rather, the statutory scheme merely directs the juvenile court to state the reasons for the waiver. And as the Court's opinion makes clear, the weight of authority in the courts of appeals suggests that the reasons in support of transfer may be conclusory, and transfer orders may simply recite the statutory language.5 The legislature's failure to change the statutory wording in light of this authority is some indication that the legislature approves of the construction given.6 Moreover, if the legislature had wanted to require the juvenile court to recite the facts that support its decision to transfer, the legislature could have easily drafted language to that effect.7

And even assuming the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Kent v. United States8 influenced the statutory scheme before us, that case did not hold that a juvenile court was required to set forth in its order the facts that supported its transfer decision. Rather, the Supreme Court simply held that the federal statute before it required the juvenile court "to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or considerations therefor."9 The Supreme Court expressly stated that it did not read the federal statute to require that the statement of reasons "be formal or that it should necessarily include conventional findings of fact."10 The Supreme Court did suggest that a "statement of relevant facts" was necessary for appellate review, but that suggestion was made in the context of a case in which no hearing was held,11 and, so, no evidence would have been heard on the matter. In the present case, there was a hearing, the record of which can be reviewed on appeal to determine whether the facts elicited at the hearing support the juvenile court's stated reason for the transfer.

3. The Four Statutory Factors are not Individually Subject to a Sufficiency Review

The court of appeals treated the four statutory factors outlined above as individually subject to a sufficiency review,12 and the Court upholds this approach as legitimate. But this approach artificially constrains a court's analysis beyond what the statute requires. If the legislature had wanted the factors listed to be supported by sufficient evidence and subject to a sufficiency review, it could have made them special issues, imposed a burden of proof with respect to the individual factors, or required that a finding be made on a particular factor or factors.13 But the statute does not require the juvenile court to find any particular factor true, and the factors are not exclusive. The juvenile transfer statute's closest analogues to a special issue are the "seriousness of the offense" and "background of the child" reasons for transfer. The four statutory factors appear to be mere non-exclusive guides in deciding whether one of those two reasons for a transfer exists. In that respect, the four statutory factors appear to play a role similar to that of the Keeton factors with respect to the future-dangerousness special issue in capital murder cases.14

Attempting to conduct a sufficiency review on the four factors individually creates myriad problems, especially when a factual sufficiency review is involved. If one conducts a factual sufficiency review of each factor individually, how does one account for the possible cumulative effect of multiple factors? That is, if two or more factors are supported by legally sufficient but factually insufficient evidence, must all of the factors be disregarded as insufficient, or can multiple factors that are individually supported by factually insufficient evidence nevertheless add up to sufficient evidence as a whole?

And conducting a sufficiency review of individual factors is not enough to resolve the transfer question because, at least in the Court's estimation, proof of an individual factor is not necessarily enough to support a transfer. If it were, appellant's transfer would clearly be supported because the first factor, whether the alleged offense is against a person or property, has been definitively established in the State's favor. Under the Court's reasoning, because proof of an individual factor is not necessarily enough, the appellate court must still decide whether the factors as a whole, and any other relevant factors, are sufficient to justify either the "seriousness of the offense" or "background of the child" reasons for transfer (or both). This results in a two-tiered approach to sufficiency: first analyzing the sufficiency of the individual factors, and then assessing the sufficiency of the factors as a whole. The closest analogue to this two-tiered approach is the test for constitutional speedy-trial violations, in which the individual factors are subject to a bifurcated standard of review and the balancing of those factors is subject to de novo review.15 But in that context, the factors are exclusive and, once a threshold showing is made, they must all be balanced against each other16 — neither of which is true of the statutory factors in the juvenile transfer context.

Moreover, the nature of at least two of the four statutory factors suggests that a sufficiency review of the individual factors is inappropriate. The first statutory factor — whether the alleged offense was against person or property — is just a question of law. The question is simply whether the offense alleged is a crime against a person, a crime against property, or a crime that falls within neither of those categories. The answer to that question can be resolved by looking solely to the State's charges. The fourth statutory factor — the prospects of protecting the public and rehabilitating the child — calls for predictions, and as such, would not seem to be the sort of issue that would be subject to a factual sufficiency review.17

Finally, the non-exclusivity of the four statutory factors also raises the issue of the juvenile court importing its own factors and how we would conduct a sufficiency review in that context. This is not a mere hypothetical question because, in the present case, the transfer order included two factual conclusions that are not covered by the four statutory factors: (1) that appellant was charged with murder and (2) that there was probable cause to believe the offense had been committed. The first is undeniably true as a legal matter and the second is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. The fact that a trial court can import its own factors suggests that conducting a sufficiency review of an individual factor is myopic at best. The real, relevant question is whether the matters considered by the trial court are sufficient to justify a transfer on the basis of the seriousness of the offense or of the background of the child.

4. Factors Two and Four are Relevant to the Seriousness-of-the-Offense Reason for Transfer

The Court also errs when it concludes that the second and fourth statutory factors are relevant only to the "background of child" reason for transfer. The statutory language does not limit the purpose for which the four statutory factors may be considered, and the second and fourth factors in particular may well be relevant to the "seriousness of the offense" reason for transfer. The second factor — the sophistication and maturity of the child — relates to the seriousness-of-the-offense reason for transfer in two ways. First, the more sophisticated and mature the child, the more blameworthy his conduct is likely to be.18 Blameworthiness is a legitimate factor in determining the seriousness of an offense.19 Second, the circumstances of the offense can be used to assess the sophistication and maturity of the child, at least in some respects.20

With respect to the fourth factor, the circumstances of the crime and the background of the child are both relevant to determining whether society can be protected and the child can be rehabilitated. As we have explained in the capital murder context, the circumstances of the offense are highly relevant to determining whether a defendant poses a future danger to society, and sometimes are sufficient by themselves to do so.21 The protection-of-public/rehabilitation issue in the juvenile context is much like the inquiry into the future-dangerousness special issue.

B. The Statute Was Satisfied

The juvenile court's transfer order states that "because of the seriousness of the offense, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceeding."22 Under § 54.02(a)(3), this by itself was a sufficient reason to justify a transfer, if it is adequately supported by the record.

Moreover, the transfer order stated that the juvenile court had considered the four statutory factors, and the transfer order found three of those factors in the State's favor. With regard to the first factor, the court found and that this offense was one against the person. With regard to the second statutory factor, the juvenile court found that appellant was "of sufficient sophistication and maturity to have intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived all constitutional rights heretofore waived[,] ... to have aided in the preparation of his defense and to be responsible for his conduct."23 And with regard to fourth statutory factor, the juvenile court stated that, based on the evidence and reports presented, "there is little if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public and likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of [appellant] by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court." The transfer order also pointed out that appellant was charged with murder and concluded that there was probable cause to believe that the offense had been committed.

The evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates the seriousness of appellant's offense. Appellant pretended to be a drug seller and set up a fake drug deal in order to accomplish a robbery. He pursued and shot the victim as the victim fled. Appellant sent instructions by text message to a co-conspirator both before and after the offense. Text messages sent before the crime asked a co-conspirator if he was ready to begin and to bring a gun. In text messages after the crime, appellant attempted to cover up his involvement, saying: "Don't say a word." "Tell them my name is Crazy, and you don't know where I live."

The offense appellant was charged with — murder — is one of the most serious crimes in the Penal Code, but under the evidence presented, appellant's conduct — a murder in the course of a robbery — could have been charged as capital murder, the offense that carries the most serious punishment in this state.24 Appellant showed forethought in planning a robbery by setting up a fake drug deal and giving instructions to his accomplice. He showed aggressiveness in pursuing the fleeing victim. And he attempted to cover up his involvement in the crime by admonishing his accomplice to refer to appellant only by a nickname and say he was unaware of where appellant lived. This evidence showed a crime that was serious, not only because of its effect, but also because of how it was conducted — with aggression and forethought and without apparent remorse.

This Court and the court of appeals not only arrive at the wrong result by applying the wrong standards; there are other flaws in those courts' analyses. In analyzing the sophistication-and-maturity factor, the court of appeals and this Court focus on appellant's ability to waive his constitutional rights and assist in his defense. But that was not the only aspect of sophistication and maturity described in the juvenile court's order. Overlooked by the court of appeals and this Court is the fact that the juvenile court also found appellant to have sufficient sophistication and maturity to be responsible for his conduct. That latter conclusion is amplysupported by the evidence in the record. And in connection with the fourth statutory factor, the court of appeals gave short shrift to the State's legitimate arguments regarding the circumstances of the offense and inaccurately accused the State of conflating various subsections of the statute.25 Given the flaws in the court of appeals's opinion and its clearly erroneous conclusions, we should not be affirming its decision today.

C. Conclusion

I would hold that the court of appeals improperly overturned the juvenile court's decision and that the juvenile court did not err in transferring appellant to adult criminal court. I respectfully dissent.