Chief Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court.

The roving, roiling debate over local control of public affairs has not, with increased age, lost any of its vigor. From public education1 to immigration policy2 to fracking3 to shopping bags, the sides are always deeply divided.4 "Judges have no dog in this fight. Our duty is to apply the rules fairly and equally to both sides."5

The Texas Constitution states that city ordinances cannot conflict with state law.6 The Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act ("the Act") provides that "[a] local government... may not adopt an ordinance ... to ... prohibit or restrict, for solid waste management purposes, the sale or use of a container or package in a manner not authorized by state law".7 The sharply contested issue here is whether the Act preempts, and thus invalidates, a local antilitter ordinance prohibiting merchants from providing "single use" plastic and paper bags to customers for point-of-sale purchases.8 The trial court upheld the ordinance, but a divided court of appeals reversed, holding that it is preempted by the Act.9

Both sides of the debate and the many amici curiae who have weighed in assert public-policy arguments raising economic, environmental, and uniformity concerns.10 But those arguments are not ours to resolve. "The wisdom or expediency of the law is the Legislature's prerogative, not ours."11 We must take statutes as they are written,12 and the one before us is written quite clearly. Its limitation on local control encompasses the ordinance. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I

As part of a strategic plan to create a "trash-free" city, the City of Laredo adopted an ordinance to reduce litter from one-time-use plastic and paper bags ("the Ordinance").13 To discourage use of these bags, the Ordinance makes it unlawful for any "commercial establishment" to provide or sell certain plastic or paper "checkout bags" to customers.14 The ordinance applies to commercial enterprises that sell retail goods to the general public and includes the business's employees and associated independent contractors.15 A violation is punishable as a Class C misdemeanor with a fine of up to $2,000 per violation plus court costs and expenses.16

The Ordinance's stated objectives are:

The Ordinance declares that its purpose is to "reduce litter from discarded plastic bags" in order to "help bring the City one step closer to being a trash-free city".18 The Ordinance, in its words, "is not a ban on plastic bags, but an incremental implementation plan towards a cleaner city".19

Shortly before the Ordinance's effective date, the Laredo Merchants Association (the Merchants) sued the City to forestall its enforcement. The Merchants sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the Ordinance is preempted by Section 361.0961 of the Act and thus void under the Texas Constitution.20 That provision, as important here, expressly precludes a local government from prohibiting or restricting "the sale or use of a container or package" if the restraint is for "solid waste management purposes" and the "manner" of regulation is "not authorized by state law".21

The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Act does not clearly and unmistakably preempt a municipality from banning single-use bags. According to the City, the Act does not preempt its Ordinance because:

• the statutory terms "container" and "package" refer to a closed vessel or wrapping, not "bags";

• the Ordinance was not enacted for a "solid waste management purpose[]" because it regulates activities occurring before single-use bags become trash;

• the Ordinance is "authorized by" Texas Local Government Code Section 551.002, which generally permits a home-rule municipality, like the City, to enact regulations to protect streams and watersheds;22 and

• the Ordinance is a valid exercise of the City's police power.

In a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, the Merchants asserted that:

• a "bag" is a "container" within the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory term;

• nothing in the Solid Waste Disposal Act supports the City's circumscribed construction of "solid waste management purposes";

• the Ordinance's purpose, both stated and effective, is to systematically control the generation of a particular form of solid waste, which is a "solid waste management purpose[]"; and

• whether the City was exercising its police powers in enacting the Ordinance is irrelevant to the preemption inquiry.

The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied the Merchants' motion, holding, without elaboration, that the Ordinance is not void because reasonable constructions exist under which both the Act and the Ordinance could be effective.

A divided court of appeals reversed, rendered judgment declaring that the Act preempts the Ordinance, and remanded for consideration of the Merchants' claim for attorney fees.23 Relying on defined statutory terms and the plain meaning of undefined terms, the court concluded that a plastic or paper bag is a "container" or "package" within the Act's meaning; the Ordinance has a solid waste management purpose and effect; and the City is not empowered by state law to prohibit the sale or use of plastic and paper bags.24 The dissenting justice discerned implicit limits on the meaning of the term "container" from variant uses of that term elsewhere in the Act and from its structure.25 In the dissent's view, the Act's preemption provision "may reasonably be construed as applying to solid waste containers used to store, transport, process, or dispose of solid waste, particularly those used by solid waste facilities and those used in medical waste management."26 Thus, the dissent concluded, the Ordinance does not regulate solid waste containers, and the Act does not preempt it.27

We granted the City's petition for review,28 in part because similar ordinances have been enacted by other municipalities.29

II

A

As a home-rule municipality, the City of Laredo possesses the "full power of local self-government."30 But Article XI, Section 5(a) of the Texas Constitution provides that home-rule city ordinances must not "contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State."31 While home-rule cities have all power not denied by the Constitution or state law, and thus need not look to the Legislature for grants of authority, the Legislature can limit or withdraw that power by general law.32 Deciding whether uniform statewide regulation or nonregulation is preferable to a patchwork of local regulations is the Legislature's prerogative.33 The question is not whether the Legislature can preempt a local regulation like the Ordinance but whether it has.

A statutory limitation of local laws may be express or implied,34 but the Legislature's intent to impose the limitation "must `appear with unmistakable clarity.'"35 The mere "entry of the state into a field of legislation ... does not automatically preempt that field from city regulation".36 Rather, "local regulation, ancillary to and in harmony with the general scope and purpose of the state enactment, is acceptable."37 Absent an express limitation, if the general law and local regulation can coexist peacefully without stepping on each other's toes, both will be given effect or the latter will be invalid only to the extent of any inconsistency.38

In this case, legislative intent in the Act to preempt local law is clear. The Act states that "[a] local government or other political subdivision may not adopt" certain ordinances.39 The issue is whether the Ordinance falls within the Act's ambit.40 To decide that, we look, as usual, to the statutory text and the ordinary meanings of its words.41

B

The Act provides, "It is this state's policy and the purpose of [the Act] to safeguard the health, welfare, and physical property of the people and to protect the environment by controlling the management of solid waste".42 To that end, "the state's goal, through source reduction, [is] to eliminate the generation of municipal solid waste ... to the maximum extent that is technologically and economically feasible."43 According to the Act,

The Act thus describes a state interest in "controlling the management of solid waste"45 that is plenary. The Act's preemption of local control is narrow and specific, applying to ordinances that "prohibit or restrict, [1] for solid waste management purposes, [2] the sale or use of a container or package [3] in a manner not authorized by state law".46 The City argues that its Ordinance does not meet any of these elements. We address each in turn.

1

The Act does not define the phrase "solid waste management purposes" but does define its constituent parts. "[S]olid waste" means "discarded material", including "rubbish",47 which is "nonputrescible solid waste ... that consists of ... combustible waste materials, including paper ... [and] plastics".48 "`Management' means the systematic control of the activities of generation, source separation, collection, handling, storage, transportation, processing, treatment, recovery, or disposal of solid waste."49 The term "management" thus refers to institutional controls imposed at any point in the solid waste stream, from generation of solid waste to disposal.

The Ordinance's stated purpose and its intended effect are to control the generation of solid waste by reducing a source of solid waste on the front end so those single-use materials cannot be inappropriately discarded on the back end. The City contends that this is "source reduction", defined by the Act as "an activity or process that avoids the creation of municipal solid waste in the state by reducing waste at the source".50 The purpose of the Ordinance cannot be "solid waste management", the City argues, because at the moment of regulatory restraint, the bags have not yet been discarded and, therefore, are not yet "solid waste". But "management" includes "the systematic control of the ... generation ... of solid waste" as well as its handling after it is created.51 The Act does not define "generation", so we give the word its ordinary meaning — to generate is "to cause to be: bring into existence".52 The Ordinance's stated purposes are to reduce litter and eliminate trash — in sum, to manage solid waste, which the Act preempts. The Ordinance cannot fairly be read any other way.

But, the City argues, the Ordinance has other, independent, and distinct purposes for prohibiting the provision of single-use bags, such as preventing sewer blockages and flooding, promoting beautification, ameliorating the economic impact of this particular form of litter, and protecting water and wildlife. All of these salutary objectives pertain to the ancillary effects of reducing the generation of solid waste, which is a solid waste management purpose. The Ordinance's solid waste management cannot avoid preemption merely because it has other purposes.

We think it clear that the Ordinance was adopted for solid waste management purposes.

2

In the City's view, the Act does not clearly apply to new bags for point-of-sale purchases because the term "bag" is not used in the statute and the statute is contextually focused on trash, not new items. As the City sees it, no matter how likely or expeditiously single-use bags are destined to become trash, the Act's reach is limited to either (1) containers and packages that have already been discarded, or (2) containers and packages that store or transport garbage, like dumpsters. Again, the City's narrow construction is not supported by a plain reading of the statute.

Neither "container" nor "package" is statutorily defined, so we begin by looking to the words' ordinary meanings. A "container" is "an object that can be used to hold or transport something";53 "a receptacle (as a box or jar) or a formed or flexible covering for the packing or shipment of articles, goods, or commodities".54 The term "package" refers to "a commodity in its container: a unit of a product uniformly processed, wrapped, or sealed for distribution [like cigarettes or fruits and vegetables]"; "a covering wrapper or container ... [such as] a protective unit for storing or shipping a commodity";55 "an object or group of objects wrapped in paper or plastic, or packed in a box"; and "the box or bag in which things are packed."56 A "bag," commonly understood, is "a container made of paper, cloth, mesh, metal foil, plastic, or other flexible material... for properly holding, storing, carrying, shipping, or distributing any material or product".57 A single-use paper or plastic bag used to hold retail goods and commodities for transportation clearly falls within the ordinary meaning of "container". The Ordinance itself repeatedly characterizes bags as containers.58 Construing the term "container" to exclude bags is incompatible with the common use and understanding of that word.

But the common understanding of the words is only the beginning of the inquiry. We must also consider the statutory context to determine whether the Legislature intended a narrower or more specialized meaning than the words used would ordinarily carry. In their immediate context, the words "container" and "package" are not accompanied by words modifying or restricting the terms in the way the City suggests, neither in Section 361.0961(a)(1),59 which is at issue here, nor in subsection (a)(3), which prohibits local governments from "assess[ing] a fee or deposit on the sale or use of a container or package."60 By the latter provision, a "container or package" is something that can be sold or used for a fee or deposit, that is, something that is not already trash. While a discarded container might yet be sold, it would never be subject to a deposit, designed to secure its return.61 One would expect a deposit to be assessed on an item that was not trash at the time of assessment but likely to become trash, not the other way around.

The alternative limitation the City proposes — receptacles used to hold or transport solid waste — fares no better. The Act does use "container" in that sense but does not restrict the word to that meaning. The word "package" does not appear elsewhere in the Act, but "packaging" does, and its use is consistent with the ordinary understanding of the term, not as a solid waste receptacle.62 The phrase "container or package" suggests analogous meanings, contrary to the City's argument.

The Act is not concerned solely with discarded materials but also includes regulations applicable to the production, retail sale, and distribution of new consumer goods.63 If consumer products were to be excluded from the preemption provision, the Legislature would have said so, as it did by excluding consumer products elsewhere in the Act.64 As a fundamental statutory-construction principle, "[w]e presume that the Legislature chooses a statute's language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen."65 The only reasonable construction of the Act that accords with the statute as a whole is one that affords the terms container and package their ordinary meanings.

3

Finally, the City argues that the Ordinance escapes preemption because it is "authorized by state law"66 as shown by its consistency with various state general laws — laws regarding municipal authority to: protect water sources, the municipal water supply, and watersheds;67 regulate water systems in a manner that protects the municipality's interests;68 own, construct, operate, and maintain a water system;69 adopt and enforce rules pertaining to operating a drainage utility system;70 maintain and regulate the cleaning of sewers71 and establish "a water pollution control and abatement program for the city", including "the development and execution of reasonable and realistic plans for controlling and abating pollution".72 The City also cites laws imposing liability for damages caused by the operation of the municipality's sewer systems73 and authorizing cities to impose fines for unsanitary conditions.74

But the Act preempts local regulation "in a manner not authorized by state law".75 The question is not whether a municipality has the power to regulate. Home-rule cities already have the power of self-governance unless restricted by state law. If "authorized by law" in the preemption provision referred only to the power municipalities already have, the restriction would have no effect. But the preemption provision applies to local regulation when the manner is not authorized by state law. Manner is how something can be done, not merely if it can be.76 A manner must be stated by, and not merely implied from, a grant of authority. The clear, stated intent of the Act is to control the manner of regulating the sale or use of containers or packages for solid waste management purposes. To conclude otherwise would render the statute meaningless.77

By rescinding local control that would otherwise exist, the Act forbids home-rule cities from regulating that subject matter. By authorizing regulation only when municipalities are told how to permissibly regulate, the Act requires an express authorization. These circumstances are functionally analogous to how general-law municipalities operate under the law. General-law municipalities lack the power of self-government and must look to the Legislature for express grants of power.78 So too must a home-rule city whose self-governance has been legislatively abrogated.

The Act's exemption does not save the Ordinance because the City has not identified a law authorizing the manner in which the City seeks to regulate. The general grants of regulatory authority the City relies on do not authorize the manner the City has chosen and, more to the point, do not supersede the express directive in the Act.

* * * * *

The court of appeals correctly held that the Act preempts the City's Ordinance. Its judgment remanding the case to the trial court to consider the Merchants' claims for attorney fees and costs79 is therefore

Affirmed.

Justice Guzman field a concurring opinion, in which Justice Lehrmann joined.

Justice Blacklock did not participate in the decision.

Justice Guzman, joined by Justice Lehrmann, concurring.

As judges, our role "is not to second-guess the policy choices that inform our statutes or to weigh the effectiveness of their results; rather, our task is to interpret those statutes in a manner that effectuates the Legislature's intent."1 The critical inquiry here is whether the Legislature, through clear and unmistakable language, expressed its intent to preempt local regulation,2 and it has.3 Our duty is to enforce the statute as we find it,4 so we have. The compelling public policy arguments advanced by both sides of the debate are acutely legislative concerns and, as such, are constitutionally removed from judicial purview.5

Even so, these complex public policy determinations have important ramifications for the environmental legacy the next generation will inherit. And allowing plastic debris — bags, Styrofoam cups, water bottles, and similar pollutants — to migrate unchecked into the environment carries grave consequences that must not be ignored. Though I join the Court's opinion, I write separately to highlight the urgency of the matter. As a society, we are at the point where complacency has become complicity.

Plastic is a miracle material with many beneficial purposes, but the speed at which plastic refuse is proliferating is taxing our waste-management capacities.6 Improperly discarded plastics have become a scourge on the environment and an economic drain. And due to their buoyancy and propensity for wind-blown incursion, single-use plastic bags — the target of the Laredo ordinance — are a particularly pernicious form of this non-biodegradable menace. The transitory usefulness of these disposable containers comes at a genuine cost — they clog our landfills, impede our recycling efforts, kill domestic animals and wildlife (in excruciating ways), hamper flood control efforts, sully our seas, and stain our vistas. As the amicus briefs vividly relate, these so-called urban tumbleweeds are a blight and a nuisance, creating public eyesores,7 harming the ecology and our economic industries,8 and imposing significant costs on taxpayers and municipalities for litter abatement.9 The optimal solution to the problem of single-use plastics may be unsettled, but the adverse impact of leaving the matter wholly unaddressed is undeniable.

For one thing, animals are known to eat plastics, to devastating effect. Recent news reports about the disturbing death of a pilot whale recounted that the whale, who washed ashore the coast of Thailand earlier this month, had 80 pieces of plastic trash weighing 17 pounds in its stomach and vomited 5 plastic bags before perishing.10 This tragic incident is sadly emblematic of an increasingly lethal pandemic.11

Texas ranchers, fishermen, and aquatic conservationists have witnessed first-hand the deleterious effects of single-use plastic bags on livestock, turtles, fish, birds, and other indigenous wildlife, who often become ensnared in plastic refuse and frequently mistake it for food. The consequences are horrific, and pending affirmative legislative action, many amici have weighed in to champion local efforts to combat the growing problem of single-use plastics.12 As they say, quite irrefutably, preserving the well-being of livestock and wildlife is a biological imperative that is also vitally important to Texas industries, tourism, and recreational activities that fuel our state and local economies. Our state is a natural wonder with a staggering array of geological features unmatched by any other territory in the union — a majestic beauty that sets the backdrop for and is the mainstay of many of our industries.

The Texas fishing industry, for example, is an economic powerhouse that creates thousands of jobs and involves millions of commercial and recreational participants, billions of dollars in retail sales, and at least a billion dollars in salaries and wages.13 Amici point out the various ways plastic-bag debris harms the fishing industry in significant ways — causing damage to boats from bags sucked into the engines, injuring fish and other sea life who ingest or become entangled in plastic rubbish, impairing navigation, and diminishing the recreational experience for wildlife tourists, among other things.14

Texas cattle ranchers are also alarmed about plastic-bag litter migrating into pastures and the danger — and economic consequences — of cattle consuming this refuse.15 As ruminate animals, cows are particularly susceptible to impaction from nondigestable foreign bodies, which creates a host of adverse physical consequences, including death.16 One amici described the cost-benefit analysis ranchers must undertake when plastic consumption by livestock is suspected:

Other agricultural industries, such as cotton farming, ginning, and related enterprises, similarly experience adverse economic consequences from wind-blown plastic refuse. In amicus briefing to this Court, the Texas Cotton Ginners' Association reports that "cotton harvests are increasingly contaminated by plastic carryout bag litter" because "errant plastic bags blowing in the wind frequently get snagged" near the bolls.18 The bags must be manually removed to prevent contamination, and few cotton farmers have the time or resources for this undertaking.19 Contamination of cotton bales results in deteriorated cotton quality and "directly influences the cotton's value."20 Consequently, the Association reports that members of the cotton industry "suffer financially from lower cotton prices due to increasingly contaminated bales."21

Taxpayers and municipalities also incur direct fiscal impacts arising from municipal efforts to ameliorate the effects of plastic-bag pollution. Before enacting the bag-ban ordinance, Laredo studied the effects and costs the city incurs from the use of single-use plastic bags, reporting an annual expense of at least $340,000 for plastic-bag remediation. A study of waste-management costs reveals that nine Texas cities representing more than 25% of the state's population — Austin, Corpus Christi, El Paso, Fort Worth, Houston, Laredo, Lufkin, Midland, and San Antonio — incur over $50 million annually for litter and illegal-dumping abatement and enforcement.22 Plastics of all varieties comprise a significant percentage of visible and micro litter.23

Still, it remains debatable whether laws trading one form of plastic bag for another — like Laredo's ordinance — are actually beneficial in the long run24 and whether any modest impact on litter abatement is outweighed by countervailing concerns, including enhanced risk of food-borne illness from bacteria in reusable grocery bags, environmental consequences from plastic-bag substitutes, and increased economic burdens on consumers and business owners.25

As to the requirements imposed by Laredo's bag-ban ordinance, a local merchant testified it is economically infeasible and practically impossible for small businesses to acquire bags that satisfy the ordinance's criteria; moreover, compared to single-use plastic bags, branding the ordinance-approved bags as a marketing tool is cost prohibitive, which impacts revenues.26 The store owner also testified that bags are necessary to prevent shoplifting, but an expectation that customers will bring or purchase reusable bags may not be realistic for border-town businesses that sell souvenirs and other small items and tchotchkes. Bag bans also preclude vendors from using existing stores of single-use plastic bags, resulting in losses that small businesses may not be able to absorb.

Lack of uniform regulation in matters of state-wide importance is also a significant concern. Local plastic-bag ordinances have non-local effects, including regulating non-local businesses, incentivizing the production of alternative materials that may carry their own environmental consequences, and determining the products that will ultimately end up in Texas landfills. At least eleven other Texas cities have adopted regulations limiting the use of plastic bags and authorizing alternatives,27 but the regulations are not uniform, which can create compliance challenges for non-local businesses. Depending on the locality, handles may or may not be required on bag alternatives,28 and the percentage of post-consumer recycled material in allowable bags may also differ.29 Labeling requirements also vary by locality: reusable bags are acceptable in some cities only if they visibly display words to the effect that the bags are reusable and recyclable30 while bags in others must display the country of origin, manufacturer, and a statement that the bag does not contain certain toxins.31 Minimum thickness of acceptable carry-out plastic bags likewise varies by jurisdiction — 2.25 mil thick in Kermit; 4 mil thick in Austin, Brownsville, Corpus Christi, Laredo, and Sunset Valley; and in South Padre Island, any thickness that qualifies as not being "intended and constructed for single use."32 And, under at least one ordinance, stores are affirmatively required to either carry or provide certain types of bags.33 All these variations come with associated costs of production and compliance. A patchwork of disparate local regulations has the practical effect of allowing the most restrictive local ordinance to set the state-wide standard.

As with many issues of regulatory concern, a solution satisfactory to all is no doubt elusive. But the legislative branch, not the judiciary, bears the unenviable task of making complicated policy decisions that balance the benefits of uniform regulation and the myriad burdens (financial or otherwise) that may be imposed on taxpayers, businesses, and the environment. Having expressly reserved the power to make such decisions, the ball is sequestered in the Legislature's court. I urge the Legislature to take direct ameliorative action or, as Section 361.0961(a)(1) contemplates, create a specific exception to preemption of local control. Standing idle in the face of an ongoing assault on our delicate ecosystem will not forestall a day of environmental reckoning — it will invite one.