ROBERT J. SHELBY, District Judge.
Before the court are Special Master Dr. Bernard Grofman's Final Report and Addendum,
Plaintiffs Navajo Nation and several individual Tribe members (collectively, Navajo Nation) challenged the County Commission and School Board election districts in San Juan County, Utah, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
This case then entered its remedial phase. The court requested and San Juan County provided proposed remedial districts for both the School Board and County Commission. The court intended to adopt these districts if legally sound. The court eventually determined, however, that San Juan County's proposed remedial districts were also unconstitutional.
The court then ordered the appointment of a neutral Special Master, Dr. Bernard Grofman, to propose redistricting plans. The court now considers the remedial County Commission and School Board districts recommended by the Special Master. The court first sets forth the background necessary to address the issue currently before it—whether to adopt the Special Master's proposed remedial plans—and provides context for its decision. A more detailed background of this long-running case is set forth in the court's three prior substantive written decisions.
In 1983, the United States Department of Justice sued San Juan County in this court, arguing the existing at-large election system in the County violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Plaintiffs filed the original Complaint in this case in January 2012, nearly six years ago.
In a previous Order, the court determined County Commission District 3 was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The County argued its actions were necessary under the Consent Decree and Settlement and Order. But the court concluded nothing in the Consent Decree or Settlement and Order required the County to freeze District 3's boundaries in place. The Consent Decree did not set the number of districts to be established. It provided only that the redistricting plans that were to be developed could involve either "three or five single-member county commissioner districts."
In a separate Order, the court concluded the School Board election districts violated the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.
Having held both the County Commission and the School Board districts unconstitutional, the court then outlined a remedial process.
But in its July 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order, the court concluded the County's proposed remedial plans were legally infirm and could not be adopted.
In its Order outlining the remedial process, the court initially stated it would evaluate Navajo Nation's proposed remedial plans if the County failed to submit legally sound plans. And the court indicated it likely would then adopt Navajo Nation's plans if they were legally sound. But the court ultimately declined to evaluate Navajo Nation's proposed plans and instead appointed a neutral Special Master to recommend remedial plans for the County. As explained in the July 2017 Order, the court "believ[ed] adopting Navajo Nation's proposed redistricting plans—the product of an adversarial, litigation-driven process—could jeopardize, and possibly undermine confidence in, the legitimacy of the County's new legislative districts."
On September 29, 2017, the court appointed Dr. Bernard Grofman to serve as Special Master.
After Dr. Grofman developed an initial series of conceptual remedial plans, the court decided to solicit input from the parties and the public with the goal of improving the final proposed plans by identifying any mistakes early and addressing any concerns to the extent possible. Dr. Grofman provided a detailed Preliminary Report that set forth three conceptual plans for the County Commission districts (CC_A, CC_B, and CC_C) and two conceptual plans for the School Board districts (SB1 and SB2).
The court provided the Preliminary Report and the supporting technical files to the parties on November 9, 2017, and San Juan County made the materials publicly available on its website. The court then scheduled public meetings to gather feedback on the preliminary plans.
The meetings were well attended. The court received feedback in several ways. Many speakers at the public hearings provided feedback on the proposed plans to the entire group. Other attendees provided oral or written comments directly to court staff after the large group portion of each meeting ended. The court received several written resolutions from local elected officials and interested organizations. The court also established an email address to allow the public to provide written comments, and received around sixty emails providing feedback on the conceptual plans. All comments were compiled and sent to Dr. Grofman.
On November 29, 2017, Dr. Grofman provided his Final Report, which was sent to the parties along with the technical files that provided details of the recommended plans—County Commission plan D (CC_D) and School Board plan 3 (SB3). The County objected to the proposed plans and submitted a declaration from its expert, Kimball W. Brace, identifying claimed deficiencies.
Dr. Grofman incorporated feedback from the County and its expert by making technical revisions to his recommended plans and supplying an Addendum to the Final Report.
The court provided the updated plans to the parties and provided time for them to file any comments on or objections to these final revised plans.
Having provided an overview of the procedural history of the case and the remedial process, the court will now discuss Dr. Grofman's recommended plans and the process he employed to develop them.
Several background principles guided Dr. Grofman's redistricting efforts. First, Dr. Grofman's districting decisions were shaped by the constitutional requirement under the Equal Protection Clause that the new districts yield nearly equal population in each.
Second, Dr. Grofman gave little deference to the plans drawn by the County and undertook his line drawing de novo. He stated that based on the constitutional infirmities the court identified, and his review of the record,
Third, Dr. Grofman approached his redistricting work with the goal of avoiding the use of race as a predominant factor. He stated that because "the finding of a constitutional infirmity in both past and present County plans hinged on the use of race as a preponderant factor," he was especially careful how he considered race.
With these background principles in mind, Dr. Grofman next focused on "good government criteria" and on the unique geographic and demographic conditions of the County.
Further, Dr. Grofman worked to unpair incumbents, but did not prioritize this goal. In discussing his treatment of incumbents, he stated he "did not assign any priority to protecting incumbents in [his] initial line drawing," but at the court's request, he prepared an alternate version of the County Commission that unpaired present incumbents.
After drawing districts based on race-neutral redistricting principles, Dr. Grofman considered whether the racial composition of the resulting districts presented any potential Section 2 issues. Dr. Grofman stated that "[w]hile Section 2 issues re previous plans, have not yet been resolved by the Court, . . . it is my view that courts are under an obligation to avoid Section 2 violations in crafting court-drawn plans or evaluating proposed alternatives. I also believe that egregious packing of minority populations is a prima facie indicator of a potential Section 2 violation."
Dr. Grofman therefore considered race, but "only at the next to last stage, and only in a minimal fashion so as to avoid a potential constitutional violation of the Equal Protection clause or a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act . . . in terms of packing."
Dr. Grofman also opined that "were the Court to now wish to issue a ruling on the question of whether the conditions necessary for a Section 2 finding has been met, that the present evidentiary record is clearly sufficient for such purposes."
Having provided an overview of Dr. Grofman's general approach, the court will describe the development of his recommended remedial districts.
Dr. Grofman's final recommended plan for the County Commission, CC_D with technical corrections, is a variant on the conceptual CC_C contained in his preliminary report. The court now discusses the evolution of the final recommended County Commission plan.
In drawing CC_C, as with all conceptual county commission plans, Dr. Grofman "rel[ied] on good government criteria above all, e.g., keeping the city of Monticello whole, . . . not splitting the city of Blanding into more than two pieces, and not splitting Navajo Nation into more than two pieces."
In CC_D, Dr. Grofman again kept whole the City of Monticello and kept whole all census places within the county. He also kept the City of Blanding split into only two pieces, and kept Navajo Nation split into only two pieces.
In his Final Report, Dr. Grofman also explained why certain changes requested by the parties and the public were not made in his final County Commission plans. For instance, the County strongly opposed any County Commission plan that split the City of Blanding. Dr. Grofman explained that he was required to split the City of Blanding to avoid splitting Navajo Nation three ways (instead of two), to avoid creating an "ungainly district stretching diagonally between one corner of the County and another opposite corner," and to avoid splitting Monticello into two pieces.
In response to the Final Report, the County filed its Objection and the declaration of Mr. Brace. Dr. Grofman made several changes in response to Mr. Brace's critiques of the recommended plans. These alterations are detailed in Dr. Grofman's Addendum.
A map reflecting the Special Master's final recommended plan is attached as Exhibit B. Exhibit A includes a table with population totals for each district as well and the Native American and Native American voting age population percentages for each district.
School Board Plan SB2 is a variation of SB1. Thus, the court first discusses the development of SB1. Dr. Grofman developed conceptual School Board Plan SB1 based on good government criteria. Specifically, SB1 split Blanding into only the two segments mathematically required for population equality purposes;
When developing the conceptual School Board plans, Dr. Grofman also focused on location of schools, with the goal of distributing schools across the School Board districts.
After drawing SB1 and looking at the Native American population percentages that resulted in each of the districts, Dr. Grofman determined SB1 suffered from a likely Section 2 issue. Specifically, the plan had "a severe problem of racial packing in two of its five districts."
In SB3, Dr. Grofman again kept the City of Monticello whole; kept all census places in the County whole; divided the City of Blanding into only the two pieces that are mathematically required "by the fact that the city's population exceeds that of an ideally sized School Board district"; and divided "Navajo Nation in only the three pieces that are mathematically required given the fact that Navajo Nation's population exceeds that of two ideally sized School districts."
Dr. Grofman made several changes to SB2 based on feedback from the parties and the public to create SB3. First, as with the County Commission plans, Dr. Grofman worked to keep Navajo Chapters whole. In the School Board plan, he had to split the Aneth Chapter because its population and geographic features "made it impossible to place whole within [a] single School Board district."
As previously discussed, Dr. Grofman made changes to the districts in his Final Report in response to additional feedback from the County. These changes were minor and included small shifts to better align School Board districts and County Commission districts in Blanding.
A map reflecting the Special Master's final recommended School Board plan is attached as Exhibit C. Exhibit A includes a table providing the population totals for each district as well and the Native American and Native American voting age population percentages.
The court must now decide if the Special Master's recommended plans are constitutional, comply with the Voting Rights Act, and abide by traditional redistricting principles to the extent possible. The court stated in its Order Appointing a Special Master that it would "review all factual findings made or recommended by the Special Master for clear error, all legal conclusions made or recommended by the Special Master de novo, and review all procedural matters for an abuse of discretion."
As the court discussed in its prior decision, the Equal Protection Clause requires that election districts afford voters equal weight in their representation.
Dr. Grofman's recommended plans present only minimal variation. The recommended County Commission plan, CC_D with technical corrections, has a total population deviation of 0.69%.
As the court discussed in its prior decision, the Equal Protection Clause limits racial gerrymandering of legislative districts—"prevent[ing] a State, in the absence of sufficient justification, from separating its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race."
For strict scrutiny to apply, a plaintiff must show "race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district."
Dr. Grofman's remedial plans were drawn to cure the County's impermissible use of race in its previous redistricting attempts (in addition to the one-person, one-vote violation present in the School Board districts). As such, he was especially sensitive to avoid the use of race as a predominant factor in his redistricting process. Race entered into Dr. Grofman's line drawing calculation only at the final stage and only with respect to the School Board districts.
In objections to both Dr. Grofman's conceptual and final plans, the County nevertheless argues race was a predominant factor in his redistricting.
These troubling allegations that Dr. Grofman lied to the court, to the parties, and to the public about his consideration of race are conclusory and entirely unsubstantiated. The court asked the County at oral argument for any factual support for the serious and deeply concerning assertion that Dr. Grofman intentionally misled the court about his use of race, or any other matter. The County pointed only to the racial outcomes of the districts in the proposed plans and to some minor irregularities in the districts Mr. Brace identified. Dr. Grofman addresses these irregularities in his Addendum, correcting admitted mistakes and further refining his plans.
Further, Mr. Brace states that Dr. Grofman acknowledges in his Final Report that he used race-conscious line drawing to prepare plans that would result in two-thirds of the districts in both the County Commission and the School Board having Native American super majorities. Dr. Grofman acknowledged no such purpose. To the contrary, such a goal would directly contradict numerous statements in Dr. Grofman's submissions to the court. Instead, in his Final Report, Dr. Grofman explained that he adjusted the boundary between two School Board districts in order to avoid a potential Section 2 violation resulting from extreme packing. Overall, the County has failed to provide the type of direct or circumstantial evidence necessary to prove that race was the predominant factor in Dr. Grofman's redistricting decisions.
While the court relies on the adversarial process to highlight deficiencies in the Special Master's plans, it has an independent duty to ensure that any plans it adopts are legally sound. After carefully considering the record before it, the court concludes that race was not a predominant factor in Dr. Grofman's redistricting decisions.
First, as to the recommended County Commission districts, Dr. Grofman never used race to alter any of the district lines, let alone as a predominant factor. Instead, he started with the goal of keeping census places whole and limiting splits of cities and communities of interest. He then continued to refine his plans to address incumbency concerns and other issues presented by the County in response to his drafts.
Second, as to the School Board districts, Dr. Grofman did alter a district line based on race. As detailed in his Preliminary Report, Dr. Grofman shifted Bluff from District 5 to District 3 to reduce what he concluded was extreme packing in District 5. In SB1, District 5 had a Native American population of 96.1% and District 3 had a Native American population of 58.5%.
Regarding his development of SB2, Dr. Grofman explained that "[a]s in all my line drawing for the Court, race was not used as a preponderant criterion in SB2, but rather concern for geography and preservation of city and census place boundaries dominated. Race was only taken into account in redrawing the boundaries between two districts that were both already majority minority districts in SB1, and race was taken into account only so as to mitigate extreme racial packing."
The court concludes that race was not the predominant factor in any district in Dr. Grofman's recommended School Board plan. While race clearly resulted in the shifting of Bluff to reduce the extreme packing of District 5, race did not subordinate any traditional race-neutral districting principles. To the contrary, it appears this was necessary to avoid a plan that presented a potential prima facie Section 2 violation.
For this reason, even if race did predominate in District 3 and District 5 of the School Board districts, the court concludes that the race-based decision to shift Bluff to unpack School Board District 5 and avoid a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act would satisfy strict scrutiny review—meaning it was narrowly tailored to address a compelling government interest. Under strict scrutiny review, "[w]hen a State invokes the VRA to justify race-based districting, it must show (to meet the `narrow tailoring' requirement) that it had a `strong basis in evidence' for concluding that the statute required its action."
Dr. Grofman had compelling reasons to believe
The County also appears to assert a second type of vote-dilution objection grounded in the Equal Protection Clause—asserting that Dr. Grofman's plans so impair non-Native Americans' right to vote that they raise constitutional issues. As discussed in the court's previous Order, this type of vote dilution claim would require the County to prove discriminatory purpose.
Finally, the County argued in a conclusory manner that the Special Master's conceptual County Commission districts were unconstitutionally politically gerrymandered, minimizing Republican voting strength.
In sum, the court concludes Dr. Grofman's recommended plans comply with the Constitution. The recommended remedial plans meet the one-person, one-vote requirement and are not racially gerrymandered. Race was not the predominant factor in any of Dr. Grofman's recommended County Commission or School Board districts. And even if race was the predominant factor in School Board District 5 and District 3, Dr. Grofman's race based decisions were narrowly tailored to address a potential violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Finally, the County's additional constitutional objections, based on vote dilution and political gerrymandering, are not well taken.
Any redistricting plan the court adopts must also comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits State and local governments from restricting the right to vote based on race.
In the recommended County Commission plan, District 1 has a 10.2% Native American Voting Age Population (VAP), District 2 has a 63.7% Native American VAP, and District 3 has a 78.5% Native American VAP.
Based on the evidence in the record, and for the reasons explained by Dr. Grofman, neither the recommended County Commission nor the School Board plans present any apparent Section 2 issues. The court concludes the recommended plans will allow Native Americans equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. In the recommended County Commission plan, District 3 appears to be a safe seat for the Native Americans' candidate of choice. In the recommended School Board plan, District 4 and District 5 appear to be safe seats for the Native Americans' candidate of choice.
Both the County Commission and School Board plans include a more racially-mixed swing district: County Commission District 2 and School Board District 3. Based on his analysis of the record evidence, Dr. Grofman observed that the election contests in the swing districts are likely to be competitive and are too close for him to call. Specifically, he stated he "conclude[d] that the Native American community is certainly not guaranteed to elect a candidate of choice in the 64.4% Native American voting age population district (District 3) in [the] proposed SB3 School Board plan (a non-partisan election); and similarly, the Native American community is certainly not guaranteed to elect a candidate of choice in the 63.4% Native American voting age population district (District 2) in [the] proposed County Commission plan D (an election for partisan office). Rather, [he] regard[s] elections in both districts as competitive ones, and ones in which [he] would regard the outcomes as too close to call."
Navajo Nation does not argue that Dr. Grofman's proposed districts present any Section 2 issues. The County does. It argues "the Voting Rights Act is race neutral," and the court "must give due consideration to white voters being the minority entitled to protection."
The court has previously addressed the County's argument that Dr. Grofman's proposed plans violate the Equal Protection Clause, concluding that race did not predominate in Dr. Grofman's redistricting efforts and that the County has not provided any evidence of discriminatory intent. And the County's Voting Rights Act argument is based on a faulty factual premise—that Dr. Grofman sought to maximize Native American voting strength and created a County Commission plan that guarantees two Native American commissioners, thus diluting the voting strength of the County's white voters. As just discussed, Dr. Grofman concluded the racially mixed district in the County Commission plan was too close to call and definitely not a guaranteed seat for the Native American candidate of choice. The County has submitted no evidence to the contrary.
The court now turns to the legal soundness of the County's argument. The County cites United States v. Brown
The court accepts for purposes of this Order that Section 2 can operate to protect the County's white citizens in the context of both an intent case and a results case, although there is no binding precedent to that effect, and Brown stands most strongly for applying Section 2 to white voters in cases of intentional discrimination. The County, however, has failed to provide any evidence of intentional discrimination of the Special Master against the County's white citizens—other than that already discussed and dismissed by the court. Because there is no evidence of intentional discrimination, the court concludes that Dr. Grofman's recommended plans are not subject to an intent based Section 2 claim.
The County has also failed to provide any evidence that Dr. Grofman's recommended districts are susceptible to a results-based Section 2 challenge on behalf of the County's white citizens—that is, evidence that based on the totality of the circumstances, the districts proposed by Dr. Grofman would provide white voters less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice. At oral argument, the court specifically addressed with the County the Gingles factors and several of the Senate Factors to assess whether there was any evidence to support a potential Section 2 challenge to the recommended districts. The County could cite to no specific evidence supporting a finding that Native Americans vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable them to defeat the white citizens' preferred candidate—one of the three Gingles factors. The County mentioned Navajo Nation's bloc voting analysis but did not discuss how it might apply in this posture. The County also acknowledged there was no evidence of several of the Senate Factors.
The County argued that the Gingles and Senate factors should not apply here because the court is considering whether Dr. Grofman's recommended maps present a prospective Section 2 issue—not whether there is a historic Section 2 issue in the County. But the County provided no legal authority for this proposition. The County is correct that the court's analysis is forward looking, asking whether these recommended districts comply with Section 2. But that forward looking analysis is inextricably linked to the totality of the circumstances test for a Section 2 violation—which requires a history of discrimination.
While there is ample evidence in the record of historic discrimination against Native Americans in the county, coupled with the Special Master's expert opinion that this history of discrimination likely is sufficient to establish a historic Section 2 violation, the record is devoid of any such evidence concerning the County's white population. It would have been inappropriate for Dr. Grofman to make race-based modifications to his districts to address a potential Section 2 issue as to the County's white population where there is no evidence any such issue exists.
Further, even if there was evidence of a potential Section 2 issue relating to the County's white citizens, it is not clear how the recommended maps should be modified to address this issue. The County offers no guidance other than to suggest the court should order Dr. Grofman to draw new plans that "do not run afoul of these principles."
The County also argues that Dr. Grofman's recommended plans "violate the principle of proportionality in the apportionment of election districts,"
This argument also appears to be in tension with the County's argument that its white citizens, as the protected minority group under Section 2, require greater than proportional representation. The County seems to claim that the court must create swing districts that exactly mirror the County's population demographics through the setting of racial goals or benchmarks, as Mr. Brace did when crafting the County's proposed remedial plans.
But creating districts this way would require the court to set a racial quota for the swing districts and guarantee that race was a dominant consideration—if not the predominant factor in the development of these districts. The County's argument also conflates proportional population with proportional representation. It would seem that proportional representation in this instance would call for the creation of competitive swing districts, which is what Dr. Grofman asserts the recommended plans ultimately provide. Competitive swing districts are not necessarily those in which the respective populations equal that of the County's overall population—52% Native American and 48% non-Native American. Instead, it appears that a district that is 52% Native American and 48% non-Native American likely would be a safe seat for a white candidate in San Juan County. If the swing districts were so drawn, the resulting plans could arguably create districts that maximize white voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice. In sum, the court concludes the proposed redistricting plans comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
The court also concludes that Dr. Grofman's recommended County Commission and School Board plans abide by traditional redistricting principles to the extent possible given the constitutional and statutory constraints. Below, the court discusses Dr. Grofman's treatment of several traditional redistricting principles. A more complete discussion of these concepts is found in Dr. Grofman's Preliminary Report, his Final Report, and his Addendum to the Final Report.
Preliminarily, the court observes that Dr. Grofman concluded he was required to make substantial changes from the County's proposed remedial districts. He therefore did not attempt to make minor changes to the districts, but instead performed his line drawing de novo. The County did not timely and meaningfully object to Dr. Grofman's de novo line drawing.
Dr. Grofman also minimized unnecessary splits of longstanding political units to the extent possible given the unique demographic and geographic constraints present in San Juan County. As discussed, his recommended County Commission plan keeps Monticello whole, splits the City of Blanding in only two parts, splits Navajo Nation in only two parts, and keeps all census places whole. Dr. Grofman's recommended School Board plan keeps Monticello whole, splits the City of Blanding into only the two mathematically required parts, splits Navajo Nation into only the three mathematically required parts, and keeps all census places whole. Dr. Grofman's final recommended plans also minimize splits to Navajo Chapters, in response to public comments on his preliminary plans.
Further, in his Final Report Dr. Grofman addresses the strong sentiment expressed that Blanding should not be split, and discusses his reasons for dividing that community. Recognizing that splitting Blanding represents a shift from how this community was historically treated in previous County Commission plans, the court is satisfied that Dr. Grofman took all reasonable steps to minimize the divisions of Blanding. The County objected to Dr. Grofman's recommended County Commission plan because it divided Blanding into three parts. Dr. Grofman addressed this objection in his Addendum, explaining that he had inadvertently included a handful of low population census blocks (totaling approximately 16 residents) in the wrong district in a way as to inadvertently create a three-way split of Blanding.
Dr. Grofman also unpaired incumbents. This is a traditional redistricting principle that legislatures often stress, but one that redistricting courts consider only minimally if at all.
Additionally, Dr. Grofman sought to limit administrative burdens. The County objected to both the conceptual plans and the plans contained in the Final Report because of the administrative burden they would place on the County. The County argues new districts must be drawn on precinct lines because the County does not know the physical address of a large portion of its residents. Therefore, determining what districts these voters are in when new districts lines are drawn on census lines will be extremely burdensome.
The court is mindful of the administrative burden the use of census blocks will place on the County. The court is required, however, to ensure that population variation under oneperson, one-vote is de minimus, a constitutional requirement the court cannot satisfy if it adopts districts drawn on the basis of precinct lines. Census blocks must be used instead. Dr. Grofman addressed this issue extensively in his filings with the court.
While using census lines, Dr. Grofman modified his plans to attempt to reduce the administrative burden on the County, working to better align the County Commission district lines with the School Board lines.
The County utilizes a staggered election scheme where a subset of the seats on the County Commission and School Board come up for election every two years, with each elected member serving a four-year term. Based on the court's review of the County's publicly posted voting results, it appears the staggered seats up for election in 2018 would include only existing County Commission Districts 2 and 3 and School Board Districts 4 and 5.
Dr. Grofman recommends elections in all districts because the boundaries of the present districts and recommended districts overlap. Therefore, if an election was not held in all districts it "would create confusion as to which representative represented which voters."
The court is mindful that "[r]elief in redistricting cases is `fashioned in the light of wellknown principles of equity.'"
The court concludes that ordering special elections in this case is necessary, workable, and fair. It is necessary to order special elections where the remedial districts vary so much from the constitutionally infirm districts they replace. To do otherwise would create an unworkable result—leaving citizens in the County confused about who represents them. Further, this result is fair as it ensures all citizens are represented by officials elected pursuant to legally sound districts.
Turning to the factors outlined by the Supreme Court, first, the constitutional violations these remedial districts remedy are severe and longstanding—as detailed in the court's previous Orders.
In its Opposition to Plaintiffs' recently filed Motion for Entry of Judgment, the County for the first time "opposes the entry of Judgment that would order that all incumbents stand for election on 2018."
Finally, the court understands it must act with proper judicial restraint and respect state sovereignty. The court does so here where it acts to remedy serious constitutional violations, and the County did not meaningfully object. The special elections are specifically aimed at remedying constitutional violations that have affected the County's voters for decades. It is critically important that the officials representing the citizens of San Juan County are elected under constitutional districts—not districts that have been racially gerrymandered. The County's objections do not explain how such elections would burden the County, nor does the County address the rights of its citizens to have officials elected from constitutional districts. The court adopts Dr. Grofman's recommendation that elections be held in all districts in 2018, with the current staggering to continue thereafter.
In sum, the court concludes Dr. Grofman's recommended remedial districts comply with the Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, and traditional redistricting principles to the extent possible. The court therefore adopts these districts and orders their use in the upcoming elections in November 2018. The court also adopts Dr. Grofman's recommendation that elections be held for all the districts in both the County Commission and School Board in 2018.
SO ORDERED.
