T.S. Ellis, III, United States District Judge.
Defendant, by counsel, has filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence imposed on him a decade ago on the ground that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), operates to invalidate his conviction for one count of using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At issue on the government's motion to dismiss is whether defendant's § 2255 motion is untimely pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Also at issue, assuming defendant's § 2255 motion is timely, is whether Johnson operates to invalidate defendant's § 924(c) conviction.
On December 12, 2006, defendant pled guilty to one count of using a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); the predicate offense for this count is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act robbery). Specifically, defendant admitted, inter alia, that on or about December 13, 2014, defendant possessed and discharged a firearm in furtherance of a cocaine-related robbery in Centreville, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia. On December 21, 2006, after defendant pled guilty to this crime, defendant received a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment, followed by five years' supervised release.
Pursuant to § 924(c), a defendant who "during and in relation to any crime of violence ... uses or carries a firearm ... shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence ... if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In order to prove a violation of § 924(c), the government must establish: (1) that the defendant possessed and discharged a firearm; and (2) that he did so during and in relation to a crime of violence. United States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917, 922 (4th Cir. 2014). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), a "crime of violence" is any felony:
Id. Subsection (A) and subsection (B) of § 924(c)(3) are commonly referred to as the "force clause" and the "residual clause," respectively.
On June 26, 2015, nearly six years after defendant's sentence was imposed, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), addressing the definition of "Violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Specifically, the Supreme Court in Johnson held that the ACCA residual clause — the provision that defines a "violent felony" to include an offense that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another," 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) — is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore that "imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the [ACCA] violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process." Id. at 2563. Thereafter, on April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court held that Johnson announced a new "substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review." Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1268, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016).
On June 23, 2016, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Welch, defendant filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence imposed on him for his § 924(c)
On July 14, 2016, the government filed a motion to dismiss defendant's § 2255 motion on the ground that collateral review of defendant's sentence or conviction is barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
The government's motion to dismiss raises a threshold issue as to whether defendant's § 2255 motion is timely. Because defendant filed his § 2255 motion approximately a decade after his sentences of conviction and judgment became final, his § 2255 motion would typically be barred by the one-year limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Yet, defendant contends that his § 2255 motion is timely because pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), the limitations period runs from June 26, 2015, the date Johnson was decided. In this regard, § 2255(f)(3) provides that a one-year limitations period runs from "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." Id.
The Fourth Circuit has explained that "to obtain the benefit of the limitations period stated in § 2255(f)(3), [a movant] must show: (1) that the Supreme Court recognized a new right; (2) that the right `has been ... made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review'; and (3) that [the movant] filed his motion within one year of the date on which the Supreme Court recognized the right." United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396, 398 (4th Cir.2012) (quoting § 2255(f)(3)). Importantly, however, there is a question as to the meaning of the term "right" as used in § 2255(f)(3). As neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has grappled with this question,
The Supreme Court has made clear that when interpreting a statute, "the starting point ... is the language itself." Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). In this regard, it is axiomatic that "[i]f the statutory language is plain," a court "must enforce it according to its terms." King v. Burwell, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015). At the same time, the Supreme Court has recently explained that statutory interpretation properly proceeds
Statutory analysis of § 2255(f)(3) properly begins with the text and the "fundamental" principle that "unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979). In this regard, the term "right" as used in § 2255(f)(3) is generally understood to refer to a legally protected interest that one may claim against another.
The choice between these alternatives is significant here. If "right" refers to a broad principle rather than a narrow application of that principle to a specific statute, then the "right" on which defendant relies is not "newly recognized," as § 2255(f)(3) requires, and therefore defendant cannot avail himself of § 2255(f)(3)'s limitations period. This is so because the broad principle at issue in Johnson — the Due Process Clause's requirement of fair notice of prohibited conduct — is hardly new. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in Johnson that "[t]he prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes is a well-recognized requirement." Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979)). Thus, the ambiguity as to the scope of the term "right" in § 2255(f)(3) must be resolved.
To that end, it is appropriate to turn to § 2255(f)(3)'s historical context. In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism
There can be no doubt that Congress was aware of the Teague framework when it enacted the AEDPA in 1996, as (i) Teague was — and is — the leading case on the non-retroactivity doctrine,
That Congress intended for § 2255(f)(3) to deviate in certain respects from the Teague framework finds further support in another phrase of that provision. Specifically, a qualifying "right" under § 2255(f)(3) must have been "recognized by the Supreme Court." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, § 2255(f)(3) applies only where the Supreme Court — rather than a lower court — has recognized a new right. By contrast, under the Teague framework existing at the time the AEDPA was enacted, a lower court decision could constitute a "new rule." See, e.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 344, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993) (concluding that a "rule announced" in a Seventh Circuit decision was "new" under the Teague framework). Thus, if Congress had said in § 2255(f)(3) that any new rule would reopen the one-year limitations period, then under Teague as understood in 1996, lower court rulings could have triggered § 2255(f)(3). Instead, Congress's language in § 2255(f)(3) triggers new filing periods only when rights are "newly recognized by the Supreme Court," which reflects that Congress intended for new filing periods to be available in fewer instances than whenever a new rule in the Teague sense is announced. This lends credence to the conclusion that Congress's choice of the term "right" rather than "rule" in § 2255(f)(3) was also a deviation from the Teague framework intended to limit application of § 2255(f)(3).
If Congress intended for "right" and "rule" to have different meanings, as the foregoing analysis suggests, there is good reason to conclude that "right" should be interpreted as a broad principle rather than as a narrow application of a principle to a particular set of facts or to a particular statute. To begin with, the terms "right" and "rule," as generally understood, have distinct meanings. A "right" and "rule" as already noted, is generally understood to mean a protected interest that one may claim against another,
As already noted, the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have not yet grappled with the ambiguity of the term "right" in § 2255(f)(3).
Importantly, however, with respect to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson, the distinction between a right and a rule is material to the application of § 2255(f)(3). This is so because as already noted, the right in issue in Johnson was not a new right, but was instead the well-settled prohibition against unconstitutional vagueness in criminal statutes, whereas
Of course, there are also compelling reasons not to read "right" and "rule" as taking different meanings in § 2255. As just discussed, the subtle distinction between a right and a rule is cast into sharp relief only because the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson constitutes a retroactive rule that is not rooted in the recognition of a new constitutional right. Indeed, before Welch the Supreme Court had never held that a new constitutional rule based on procedural due process principles constituted a substantive rule for purposes of retroactivity on collateral review. See Br. of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 29, United States v. Welch, No. 15-6418. Thus, it is not implausible to suspect that Congress, when it enacted AEDPA, assumed that every new retroactive rule under Teague would always announce a new right, and thus that the terms "right" and "rule" were essentially congruent.
Of course, "the passage of time can undermine the premises behind a particular statute in ways that the enacting legislature did not expect." Nelson, supra, at 926-27. Here, Welch makes clear that if Congress enacted § 2255(f)(3) on the
For one, this construction avoids an anomalous result that would follow from the construction of § 2255(f)(3) articulated in Part II-A, supra. Specifically, under an interpretation of "right" that distinguishes that term from the term "rule" in the Teague sense, no defendant could bring a § 2255 motion relying on Johnson pursuant to § 2255(f)(3). Such a conclusion, though seemingly consistent with the text of the statute, would be at odds with the spirit of the Supreme Court's decision in Welch, which has the effect of enabling prisoners sentenced under the ACCA residual clause before Johnson was decided to bring collateral attacks on their sentences on the basis of Johnson. See Welch, 136 S.Ct. at 1268. Indeed, it could be argued that the Supreme Court in Welch rejected by implication a construction of the term "right" that precludes the effective vindication of most § 2255 motions premised on Johnson
In this regard, the result in Welch comports only with an interpretation of § 2255(f)(3) that takes the term "right" to mean "rule" in the Teague sense. In Welch, the petitioner had been sentenced pursuant to the ACCA residual clause in 2010, and did not file his § 2255 motion until December 2013, long after the expiration of the general one-year limitations period set forth in § 2255(f)(1). See id. at 1262-63. Thus, in Welch, the petitioner's § 2255 motion was timely only if petitioner was relying on § 2255(f)(3).
Moreover, equating the term "right" in § 2255(f)(3) with the term "rule" in the Teague sense finds further support in the operation of § 2255(f)(3). Specifically, § 2255(f)(3) operates in connection with the Teague non-retroactivity doctrine insofar as a "newly recognized" right opens a new one-year statutory window for prisoners only "if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." Id. In other words, the initiation of a new one-year limitations period pursuant to § 2255(f)(3) is a practical effect of a determination that under the Teague framework, a new rule announced by the Supreme Court is retroactive. For example, suppose at some point in the future, the Supreme Court holds, as defendant contends here, that the residual clause of § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague based on the rationale of Johnson. If a court subsequently concludes that this new Supreme Court holding is retroactive under Teague, then pursuant to § 2255(f)(3), a new one-year statutory window would open for prisoners serving sentences for § 924(c) convictions so long as the term "right" means "rule" as used in the Teague sense.
In sum, it is appropriate here to construe the term "right" in § 2255(f)(3) to mean "rule" as that term is used in the Teague framework. Accordingly, the question presented is whether a defendant convicted under the residual clause of § 924(c) may invoke the § 2255(f)(3) year-long limitations window triggered by the substantive rule announced in Johnson — that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. Defendant argues in essence that the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Johnson also extends to the residual clause of § 924(c), and thus that the Supreme Court announced a new rule made retroactively available to defendant's case, pursuant to § 2255(f)(3).
As the government correctly contends, the breadth of the rule established in Johnson does not cover § 924(c). Put simply, defendant may not avail himself of § 2255(f)(3), because the Supreme Court in Johnson did not announce a new rule with respect to the residual clause of § 924(c). Indeed, the only circuits that have squarely addressed the issue concluded that Johnson does not invalidate the residual clause of § 924(c). See United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 145, 2016 WL 4120667, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2016) (holding that Johnson is inapplicable to the residual clause of § 924(c) because "Section 924(c)(3)(B) does not involve the double-layered uncertainty present in Johnson"); United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 375-76 (6th Cir.2016) (holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson did not render the residual clause of § 924(c) unconstitutionally vague because that clause "is considerably narrower than the statute invalidated ... in Johnson, and because much of Johnson's analysis does not apply to [the residual clause of § 924(c)]"). And although the Fourth Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue, it has noted in dictum that although "the Supreme Court held unconstitutionally vague the [ACCA residual clause], ... the [Supreme] Court had no occasion to review the ... residual clause [of § 924(c)]." United
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc recently noted that it is unclear whether Johnson operates to invalidate the residual clause of § 924(c). See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 n. 1 (4th Cir.2016) (en banc). Recent district court decisions also reflect uncertainty whether the rationale of Johnson operates to invalidate the residual clause of § 924(c), as there is some question whether the categorical approach, a necessary premise to the result reached in Johnson,
In sum, defendant's argument — that the residual clause of § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague — simply was not a rule announced in Johnson. Accordingly, defendant's § 2255 motion must be dismissed as untimely because, although § 2255(f)(3) did grant a year-long window for defendants with Johnson claims, § 2255(f)(3) does not apply here.
Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant's § 2255 motion is timely pursuant to § 2255(f)(3), the motion nonetheless fails because contrary to defendant's contention, his conviction does not depend on the residual clause of § 924(c).
In opposition to the conclusion reached here, defendant contends that Hobbs Act robbery does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence pursuant to the force clause of § 924(c) because Hobbs Act robbery does not, in a strict sense, entail the use or threatened use of physical force against another. This argument fails because (i) the argument is premised on the flawed assumption that the "categorical
The "categorical approach," as developed in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598-602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607, does not apply when determining whether a crime to which a defendant pled guilty qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to § 924(c). Accordingly, the question whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a § 924(c) crime of violence depends on the facts to which defendant pled guilty, not on an abstract analysis of the elements of Hobbs Act robbery, as would be required under the categorical approach. See id.
In this regard, "it is important to recognize that the categorical approach is a judicially devised mode of analysis born and developed in the sentencing context for the purpose of ensuring that defendants are not punished for facts that are not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury" or that are not admitted by a defendant by virtue of a plea agreement. United States v. McDaniels, 147 F.Supp.3d 427, 430 (E.D.Va.2015). Indeed, the Supreme Court in Taylor introduced the categorical approach in the context of the ACCA. 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143. There, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court must employ a "categorical approach" in determining whether a crime counts as a predicate offense for purposes of an ACCA sentencing enhancement for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Specifically, Taylor teaches that a sentencing court may "`look only to the statutory definitions' — i.e., the elements — of a defendant's [prior offense] and not `to the particular facts underlying [the prior offense]'" in determining whether the prior offense constitutes an ACCA predicate offense. Descamps v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2283, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143).
The Supreme Court has also applied the categorical approach, as articulated in Taylor, in the context of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. Specifically, as the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen the government alleges that a state conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony' under the INA," the categorical approach applies when "determin[ing] whether the state offense is comparable to an offense listed in the INA." Moncrieffe v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (citing Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185-87, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007)). Importantly, the categorical approach applies in the context of the INA because the text of the INA, like the text of the ACCA, "asks what offense the noncitizen was [previously] `convicted' of, ... not what acts he committed." Id. at 1686 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). And as in the ACCA context, application of the categorical approach in the INA context avoids the practical difficulty of re-trying the factual basis for a prior conviction in a subsequent proceeding. Cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143.
Until recently, application of the categorical approach was limited to the ACCA sentencing context and to the INA context. Yet, in 2015, the Fourth Circuit, for the first time, applied the categorical approach in another context. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit applied the categorical approach in a case involving the question whether sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion qualified as a § 924(c) crime of violence. See United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 499 (4th Cir.2015). There, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the sex trafficking offense "allows for both violent and nonviolent means of commission," and therefore does not qualify as a § 924(c) crime of violence under the categorical approach. Id. at 499.
Defendant argues that because the Fourth Circuit applied the categorical approach in Fuertes, it follows that the categorical approach must be applied to all determinations whether a crime qualifies as a § 924(c) crime of violence. Yet, contrary to defendant's contention, a close examination of Fuertes reveals that the holding of Fuertes is significantly narrower than defendant suggests and that Fuertes does not compel application of the categorical approach to § 924(c) in the present case.
Importantly, the § 924(c) issue arose in Fuertes as a result of a jury instruction. Id. at 497. Specifically, the defendant filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial with respect to his § 924(c) conviction on the ground that the
On appeal, the jury instruction in Fuertes presented two issues: (i) whether a district court may instruct a jury that a predicate offense categorically qualified as a § 924(c) crime of violence, and (ii) assuming a district court may so instruct a jury, whether the district court's instruction that the particular sex offense in issue categorically qualified as a § 924(c) crime of violence amounted to plain error. Importantly, the Fourth Circuit had no occasion to address the first question, as the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had committed plain error with respect to the second question, and accordingly the Fourth Circuit vacated the defendant's § 924(c) conviction and remanded for entry of acquittal on that count. Id. at 499-501.
In this regard, it is inappropriate — and indeed perhaps unconstitutional — to apply the categorical approach to determine whether a predicate offense is a "crime of violence" in the context of § 924(c) jury instructions, and by extension in the context of the entry of a guilty plea. This is so because the phrase "crime of violence" is an element of § 924(c) — rather than a sentenQing enhancement — and therefore "must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." See Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2158, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). Some offenses may be categorically crimes of violence, while others may be categorically not crimes of violence; that is, the commission of some crimes may always be violent, while the commission of other may never be violent
Moreover, there is no need to apply the categorical approach in the present case because the practical considerations that gave rise to the categorical approach in the ACCA sentencing context — which also justify application of the categorical approach in INA context-are not present here. Specifically, in the contexts of the ACCA and the INA, the categorical approach is necessary to avoid the difficult, often impossible, situations where courts would be required to re-try the factual bases for prior convictions. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Such practical difficulties are not present where, as here, the factual basis for the predicate offense in issue is initially presented — either during trial or during a plea hearing — along with the § 924(c) charge against the defendant.
In sum, the "categorical approach," as developed in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598-602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, does not apply when determining whether a crime to which a defendant pled guilty qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to § 924(c). Accordingly, the question whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a § 924(c) crime of violence depends on the facts to which defendant pled guilty, not on an abstract analysis of the elements of Hobbs Act robbery, as would be required under the categorical approach. See id.
In this regard, there can be no doubt that the underlying facts of the Hobbs Act robbery that served as predicate offense for defendant's § 924(c) convictions qualify as crimes of violence pursuant to the force clause of § 924(c) because defendant's crime entailed "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Indeed, with respect to defendant's Hobbs Act robbery offense, defendant admitted that defendant possessed and discharged a firearm in furtherance of a cocaine-related robbery.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the categorical approach applies here, under that approach, Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to the force clause of § 924(c) because the definition of Hobbs Act robbery — "the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury ... to his person or property," 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (b) — entails "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
Importantly, however, as several courts have recognized, the Supreme Court recently rejected the rationale of Torres-Miguel in United States v. Castleman, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1415, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 (2014).
Moreover, Hobbs Act robbery clearly qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause of § 924(c) because the definition of Hobbs Act robbery tracks the definition
Ample case law confirms the conclusion that Hobbs Act robbery can serve as a crime of violence as defined by the force clause of § 924(c). Indeed, a Hobbs Act robbery served as the predicate offense for a § 924(c) conviction in a Supreme Court case decided after Torres-Miguel. See Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155, 2162-63 (reviewing a § 924(c) conviction for which Hobbs Act robbery served as the predicate offense and holding that each element of the § 924(c) offense had to be submitted to the jury). Moreover, other circuits have consistently affirmed § 924(c) convictions where the predicate offense is a Hobbs Act robbery,
Thus, even assuming that the categorical approach applies here, Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence pursuant to the force clause of § 924(c) because the definition of Hobbs Act robbery entails "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Specifically, Hobbs Act robbery is defined as "the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury ... to his person or property." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b).
In sum, assuming, arguendo, that defendant's Johnson claim is timely pursuant to § 2255(1), his § 2255 motion nonetheless fails because defendant's § 924(c) conviction does not depend on the residual clause of § 924(c); instead, defendant's § 924(c) conviction is based on a Hobbs Act robbery
Accordingly, the government's motion to dismiss must be granted, and defendant's § 2255 motion must be denied because that motion is untimely pursuant to § 2255(f)(3) and because defendant's § 924(c) conviction does not depend on the residual clause of § 924(c).
An appropriate Order has issued.