MEMORANDUM OPINION

Kevin R. Huennekens, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.

This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion of the Liquidating Trustee to Determine Extent of Liability for Post-Confirmation Quarterly Fees Payable to the United States Trustee Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) and Memorandum in Support [ECF No. 14197] (the "Motion to Determine") filed by Alfred H. Siegel (the "Liquidating Trustee"), Trustee of the Circuit City Stores, Inc. Liquidating Trust (the "Liquidating Trust") and upon the United States Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Motion of the Liquidating Trustee to Determine Extent of Liability for Post-Confirmation Quarterly Fees Payable to the United States Trustee Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) and Memorandum in Support [ECF No. 14202] (the "Motion for Summary Judgment") filed by the Office of the United States Trustee (the "U.S. Trustee" and, together with the Liquidating Trustee, the "Parties"). At issue is the proper amount of quarterly fees assessable against the Liquidating Trust due to the recent amendment of section 1930 of title 28 of the United States Code. The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the General Order of Reference from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dated August 15, 1984. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). Venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. After considering the applicable statutory authority, the case law, the pleadings, and the arguments of counsel, the Court denies the relief requested in Motion for Summary Judgment and grants the relief requested in the Motion to Determine for the reasons set forth below.1

On November 10, 2008 (the "Petition Date"), Circuit City Stores, Inc. ("Circuit City") and certain affiliates (collectively, the "Debtors") filed voluntary petitions under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"). On September 14, 2010, the Court confirmed the Debtors' Modified Second Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation of Circuit City Stores, Inc. and Its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors in Possession and Its Official Committee of Creditors Holding General Unsecured Claims [ECF No. 8555, Ex. A] (the "Liquidating Plan").2 The Liquidating Plan provided for the formation of the Liquidating Trust, overseen by the Liquidating Trustee, to collect, administer, distribute, and liquidate all of the Debtors' remaining assets.3 Under the terms of the Liquidating Plan,

At the time the Liquidating Plan was confirmed in 2010, section 1930 of title 28 provided that the payment of quarterly fees to the U.S. Trustee would range between $6,500 and $30,000.5 In no event would the quarterly fee ever exceed $30,000 regardless of the amount of the disbursements for any given calendar quarter.

In October 2017, Congress amended section 1930 of title 28 of the United States Code to provide:

Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-72, § 1004, 131 Stat. 1224, 1232 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018)) (the "Bankruptcy Judgeship Act").6 The amendment increased the amount of the quarterly fees payable to the U.S. Trustee System from a minimum of $10,000 to a maximum of $250,000 for quarters where disbursements met or exceeded $1 million. Id. From January 1, 2018, onward, the U.S. Trustee program has assessed and continues to assess fees based upon the increased fee schedule for all pending chapter 11 cases.7

But the increase in quarterly fees does not apply to all debtors in all chapter 11 cases throughout the country. Unlike chapter 11 debtors in areas that are part of the U.S. Trustee program, chapter 11 debtors in the six federal judicial districts in Alabama and North Carolina that operate under the Bankruptcy Administrator Program (the "BA Districts") may only now be subject to the increased fees, but only under certain circumstances.8 The statute governing quarterly fees provides that "the Judicial Conference of the United States may require the debtor in a case under chapter 11 of title 11 [in the BA Districts] to pay fees equal to those imposed by paragraph (6) of this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(7) (emphasis added). In 2001, the Judicial Conference of the United States (the "JCUS"), acting according to this statutory authorization, approved a recommendation from its Bankruptcy Committee that quarterly fees be imposed in BA districts in the amounts specified in section 1930(a)(6).9 But after Congress amended section 1930(a)(6) in October 2017, the BA Districts did not simultaneously increase the quarterly fees payable under section 1930(a)(7).10 It was not until almost a year after Congress amended section 1930(a)(6), on September 13, 2018, that the JCUS Executive Committee approved imposing the increased quarterly fees in BA Districts "in the amounts specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(B) for cases filed on or after October 1, 2018."11 The resulting increase in quarterly fees payable in BA Districts "does not have retroactive application to pending cases."12 Debtors that filed chapter 11 petitions prior to October 2018 do not have to pay the increased amount of the quarterly fees.

The Liquidating Trust's quarterly disbursements exceeded $1 million for every quarter of 2018. The U.S. Trustee program assessed and the Liquidating Trust paid the increased amount of the quarterly fees for each of those quarters in accordance with section 1930(a)(6)(B).13 On March 28, 2019, the Liquidating Trustee filed the Motion to Determine, asking the Court to order "the actual amount of UST Fees due since January 1, 2018 ... be determined based on the statutory rates in effect as of the Petition Date in this Case."14 The Motion to Determine advanced two primary arguments in support of its contention: (i) section 1930(a)(6)(B) "is unconstitutional as applied to this Case due to its lack of uniformity for the first three quarters of 2018"; and (ii) section 1930(a)(6)(B) "cannot be retroactively applied to the Trust for any relevant years."15 On May 9, 2019, the U.S. Trustee filed the Motion for Summary Judgment and its Response. The Motion for Summary Judgment asked the Court to dismiss the Motion to Determine because "the Motion [to Determine] seeks relief that can only be sought through an adversary complaint under Rule 7001" of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules").16 On June 5, 2019, the Liquidating Trustee filed the Liquidating Trust's Response to United States Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 14209]. On June 12, 2019, the Court conducted a hearing (the "Hearing") on the foregoing matters, at which time the Court denied the relief requested in the Motion for Summary Judgment and took the Motion to Determine under advisement.17

The Motion for Summary Judgment arguing for dismissal of the Motion to Determine on the grounds that it seeks "relief that can only be pursued through an adversary proceeding" exalts form over substance. Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 16. Bankruptcy Rule 2020, which provides for a proceeding against the U.S. Trustee to be brought as a contested matter, most likely applies to the Motion to Determine.18 Furthermore, Bankruptcy Rule 9014, which governs contested matters, makes most of the procedural rules included in Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules, which governs adversary proceedings, applicable to contested matters. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014(c). That list is not exhaustive. The Court is authorized to "direct that one or more of the other rules in Part VII shall apply" in any particular contested matter. Id. No lack of formality need be suffered by any party in any contested matter.

On the other hand, the Motion to Determine does seek the type of relief included in Bankruptcy Rule 7001, which must ordinarily be brought by complaint. The Motion to Determine requests a determination about the amount of quarterly fees due, a holding that section 1930(a)(6)(B) is unconstitutionally non-uniform, and a holding that section 1930(a)(6)(B) cannot not be retroactively applied to these cases. Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 1-2. The first form of relief is an attempt to "determine the validity of the government's `interest in property,'" which falls within the gambit of Bankruptcy Rule 7001(2). Mot. Summ. J. ¶ 15 (quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2)). The two other two requests seek "declaratory relief relating to [the Liquidating Trustee's] upcoming proceeding to `recover money or property'" and are covered by Bankruptcy Rules 7001(1) and 7001(9). Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(1)).

But notwithstanding the U.S. Trustee's assertions to the contrary, this procedural conundrum does not warrant dismissal of the Motion to Determine in any event. Rather, the Court can simply convert the contested matter to an adversary proceeding. See Phillips v. Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. (In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 318 B.R. 370 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss and ordering underlying motion converted to a complaint). Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the court to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of" the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see also Arrowsmith v. Lemberg Law, LLC (In re Health Diagnostics Lab., Inc.), 571 B.R. 182, 192 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017) (stating that section 105(a) is a "broad grant of power" (quoting Caesars Entm't Operating Co. v. BOKF, N.A. (In re Caesars Entm't Operating Co.), 808 F.3d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 2015))). This grant of power is broad enough to permit a court to "convert a contested matter to an adversary proceeding on its own motion." Wilborn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Wilborn), 401 B.R. 872, 892 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Costa v. Marotta, Gund, Budd & Dzera, LLC, 281 F. App'x 5, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Johnson v. Stemple (In re Stemple), 361 B.R. 778, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007)). Accordingly, the Court will deny the relief requested in the Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Motion to Determine, and it will instead convert this contested matter to an adversary proceeding.19

The Court turns next to the merits of the Motion to Determine and to the constitutionality of section 1930(a)(6)(B). The Liquidating Trustee first challenges the constitutionality of the amendment to section 1930(a)(6) on account of its retroactive application to cases pending prior to enactment. Without question, the amendment to section 1930(a)(6) dramatically increased the quarterly fees payable by the Liquidating Trust.20 In the seven years between entry of the order confirming the Liquidating Plan21 and the effective date of section 1930(a)(6)(B), the Liquidating Trust paid approximately $833,000 in quarterly fees. Hr'g Tr. 13:1-9, June 12, 2019, ECF No. 14214. In the first three quarters of 2018 alone, the Liquidating Trust paid approximately $632,000. Id. The Liquidating Trustee complains that this "exponential statutory increase" was not something he could have anticipated when the Liquidating Plan was confirmed over eight years ago. Mot. Determine. ¶ 12. If the Liquidating Trustee had been able to anticipate such a significant step-up in quarterly fees at the time of plan confirmation, "there might have been different decisions made in confirmation and how the case was going to proceed thereafter." Hr'g Tr. 13:24-14:5, June 12, 2019, ECF No. 14214. The Liquidating Plan fixed the rights of the Liquidating Trustee, the rights of the creditors, and the rights of all other parties, and the substantial increase in quarterly fees harms the holders of allowed general unsecured claims because "fewer assets will be available for distribution to the [Liquidating Trust's] beneficiaries." Mot. Determine ¶ 25.

Congress may give a law retroactive effect by "expressly prescrib[ing] the statute's proper reach." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). When Congress does so, "this is the end of the analysis." Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 708 (4th Cir. 2000). If Congress does not define a statute's temporal reach, "the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (emphasis in original). Making this determination "is not always a simple or mechanical task." Id. at 268, 114 S.Ct. 1483. The decision "comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event." Id. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483.

The Court's analysis is controlled by a prior decision of this Court in In re AH. Robins Co., 219 B.R. 145 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998). In that case, the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, sitting together, examined whether a 1996 amendment to section 1930(a)(6), which required chapter 11 debtors to pay quarterly fees post-confirmation, operated retroactively. Id. at 146. Prior to enactment of the 1996 amendment, chapter 11 debtors only paid quarterly fees up until the time of plan confirmation. Id. at 146-47. The 1996 amendment provided that quarterly fees would continue to accrue post-confirmation. Id. Initially, it was not clear whether the 1996 amendment only applied to cases filed after the amendment's effective date or whether it applied to all cases pending on the amendment's effective date. Id. To deal with the "staggering amount of litigation" and "widespread disparity among the courts in their attempts to apply" the 1996 amendment, Congress intervened. Id. at 147. "[T]hrough clarifying legislation [adopted on September 30, 1996, Congress]... made it known that the Amendment [was] to apply to all cases." Id. (emphasis in original).

Similar to the case at bar, the debtors in In re A.H. Robins Co. had been operating under a confirmed plan for many years at the time of the 1996 amendment and challenged the amendment's constitutionality based on its retroactive application. Judge Shelley of this Court, with Judge Merhige of the District Court concurring, determined that the 1996 amendment was supported by a rational legislative purpose and was "substantively prospective in nature," in that it "only require[d] the payment of fees from the date of the Amendment forward."22 Id. at 148. The Court compared post-confirmation quarterly fees to "taxes arising post confirmation, or any similar post-confirmation expenses." Id. (citing In re Maruko, Inc., 206 B.R. 225, 229 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997)). The quarterly fee was no more than an "administrative expense attendant to an open case." Id. (quoting In re McLean Square Assocs., 201 B.R. 436, 441 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996)).

Like the 1996 amendment, the 2018 amendment to section 1930(a)(6) imposed an increase in the quarterly fees to be paid in chapter 11 cases. The Court finds that Congress did not expressly prescribe the reach of the 2018 amendment to section 1930(a)(6), nor did it indicate its intent for the 2018 amendment to section 1930(a)(6) to apply retroactively through other means. Accordingly, it is left to the Court to determine whether the statute's application to cases pending on its effective date is impermissibly retroactive. The holding in In re A.H. Robins Co. mandates it is not. A mere increase in the quarterly U.S. Trustee fee is not substantively retroactive. It is more akin to "taxes arising post confirmation, or any similar post-confirmation expenses." Id. (citing In re Maruko, 206 B.R. at 229)); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269 n.24, 114 S.Ct. 1483 ("Even uncontroversially prospective statutes may unsettle expectations and impose burdens on past conduct: a new property tax or zoning regulation may upset the reasonable expectations that prompted those affected to acquire property ...."). Based upon its prior precedent, the Court holds that section 1930(a)(6)(B) does not violate the antiretroactivity principle as the law is substantively prospective.

The Court turns next to whether the amendment to section 1930(a)(6) is unconstitutional based on non-uniformity. The fees assessed under section 1930(a)(6)(B) may be classified either as a tax or as a user fee for chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under either form of classification, the quarterly fees must be applied uniformly.

As a tax, Congress may "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises... but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The proviso to this constitutional grant of authority to Congress is known as the "Uniformity Clause." The Uniformity Clause was intended to prevent the federal government from "us[ing] its power over commerce to the disadvantage of particular States" and engaging in "the regionalism that had marked the Confederation." United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 81, 103 S.Ct. 2239, 76 L.Ed.2d 427 (1983). The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test when any law is challenged under the Uniformity Clause. Where Congress elects to define the subject of a tax or duty in non-geographic terms, "the Uniformity Clause is satisfied," but where Congress frames its tax or duty in geographic terms, a court must "examine the classification closely to see if there is actual geographic discrimination." Id. at 84-85, 103 S.Ct. 2239.

The Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution endows Congress with the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Accordingly, if the quarterly fee is characterized as a user fee attendant to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, it must still be applied uniformly under the Bankruptcy Clause. The uniformity mandated by the Bankruptcy Clause "is geographical, and not personal." Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188, 22 S.Ct. 857, 46 S.Ct. 1113 (1902). While the Bankruptcy Clause "is not an Equal Protection Clause for bankrupts," "[t]o survive scrutiny under the Bankruptcy Clause, a law must at least apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors." Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 470 n.11, 473, 102 S.Ct. 1169, 71 L.Ed.2d 335 (1982).

For the first three quarters of 2018, newly adopted section 1930(a)(6)(B) increased quarterly fees assessed against chapter 11 debtors in only 88 of the 94 federal judicial districts throughout the country. It was not until October 1, 2018, that the JCUS approved the imposition of quarterly fees on chapter 11 debtors in the BA Districts "in the amounts specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(B)." 2018 JCUS Report, supra note 11, at 11-12. The Bankruptcy Judgeship Act offered no justification for excluding the BA Districts from the fee step-up. "Under any standard of review, when Congress provides no justification for enacting a non-uniform law, its decision can only be considered to be irrational and arbitrary." In re Buffets, 597 B.R. at 595 (quoting St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1525, 1532 (9th Cir. 1994), amended by 46 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1995)). Section 1930(a)(6)(B) contravened the Uniformity Clause through "actual geographic discrimination" for the first three quarters of 2018. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85, 103 S.Ct. 2239.

Although the increased fees are now uniformly charged nationwide for debtors filing chapter 11 cases on or after October 1, 2018, debtors in pending cases filed before October 1, 2018 are still experiencing geographic discrimination without a discernable explanation. JCUS determined that "the quarterly fee calculation changes in 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(B) should apply in BA districts beginning in the first quarter of the fiscal year 2019 (that is, for any chapter 11 case filed on or after October 1, 2018, and not for cases then pending)." Resp. Ex. C, at 20 (emphasis added). The fee increase "does not have retroactive application to pending cases" in BA Districts. N.D. Ala. Fee Notice, supra note 12, 1 n.1.23

The geographic discrimination that remains ongoing is particularly apparent in the case at bar. Had the Debtors filed their chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions a mere 140 miles south in Raleigh, North Carolina,24 the Debtors would be paying substantially lower quarterly fees than they are paying now. This is the type of "regionalism" the Uniformity Clause was intended to prevent. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 81, 103 S.Ct. 2239. As the BA Districts do not apply section 1930(a)(6)(B)'s fee increase to pending cases, the fee increase cannot constitutionally be applied to pending cases outside of the BA Districts. The Court holds that section 1930(a)(6)(B) remains unconstitutionally non-uniform as applied to pending cases.

The court in In re Buffets confined its analysis to whether section 1930(a)(6)(B) violated the Constitution's Uniformity Clause. This Court holds that section 1930(a)(6)(B) also violates the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause. The Bankruptcy Clause requires bankruptcy laws to be geographically uniform. Moyses, 186 U.S. at 188, 22 S.Ct. 857. Section 1930(a)(6)(B) is not geographically uniform because qualifying chapter 11 debtors with cases pending prior to October of 2018 have been and continue to be assessed lower quarterly fees in two regions of the country (Alabama and North Carolina) than have similarly situated debtors throughout the rest of the country. Although the Bankruptcy Clause "is not an Equal Protection Clause," Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 470 n.11, 102 S.Ct. 1169, it does require bankruptcy laws to "at least apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors," id. at 473, 102 S.Ct. 1169. As the amendment to section 1930(a)(6) does not apply uniformly both to chapter 11 debtors with pending cases in BA districts and to chapter 11 debtors with pending cases in U.S. Trustee districts, it is unconstitutional under the Bankruptcy Clause.

Regardless of whether the quarterly fees are classified as a tax or as a user fee for bankruptcy, the amendment to section 1930(a)(6) is unconstitutional. If the quarterly fees are treated as a tax, the amendment violates the Uniformity Clause. If the quarterly fees are considered as a bankruptcy user fee, the amendment violates the Bankruptcy Clause. The cost of a given bankruptcy proceeding for similarly situated debtors must be consistent in every judicial district throughout the country. Therefore, the Court will grant the Motion to Determine. The quarterly fees due and payable by the Liquidating Trust since January 1, 2018, must be determined based on the prior version of the statute.25 The Court makes no finding as to the Liquidating Trustee's ability to recover any overpayments based upon the Courts ruling but acknowledges that rights and defenses of both Parties are reserved.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the amendment to section 1930(a)(6), while prospective in nature, is unconstitutional as applied to this case due to its lack of uniformity with respect to chapter 11 bankruptcy cases pending prior to October of 2018. The Court will issue a separate order denying the Motion for Summary Judgment, converting this contested matter to an adversary proceeding, and granting the Motion to Determine.