Filed: Oct. 25, 2010
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: In re Arbitration Before Leo G. Bisson, No. S0724-10 CnC (Toor, J., Oct. 25, 2010) [The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.] VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CHITTENDEN UNIT CIVIL DIVISION ¦ IN RE ARBITRATION BEF0RE ¦ LEO G. BISSON ¦ ¦ DENNIS VANE, M.D. and NEIL HYMAN, ¦ M.D. ¦ Plaintiffs ¦ ¦ v. ¦ Docket No. S724-10 CnC ¦
Summary: In re Arbitration Before Leo G. Bisson, No. S0724-10 CnC (Toor, J., Oct. 25, 2010) [The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.] VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CHITTENDEN UNIT CIVIL DIVISION ¦ IN RE ARBITRATION BEF0RE ¦ LEO G. BISSON ¦ ¦ DENNIS VANE, M.D. and NEIL HYMAN, ¦ M.D. ¦ Plaintiffs ¦ ¦ v. ¦ Docket No. S724-10 CnC ¦ F..
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In re Arbitration Before Leo G. Bisson, No. S0724-10 CnC (Toor, J., Oct. 25, 2010)
[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the
accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]
VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
CHITTENDEN UNIT
CIVIL DIVISION
│
IN RE ARBITRATION BEF0RE │
LEO G. BISSON │
│
DENNIS VANE, M.D. and NEIL HYMAN, │
M.D. │
Plaintiffs │
│
v. │ Docket No. S724-10 CnC
│
FLETCHER ALLEN HEALTH CARE, │
INC. and FLETCHER ALLEN │
PROVIDER CORPORATION, │
Defendants │
│
RULING ON MOTIONS TO CONFIRM AND MODIFY ARBITRATION AWARD
This case was initiated by a motion to confirm an arbitration award. The plaintiffs
are doctors in a dispute with their employer over payment for unused vacation days.
Arbitration took place before Leo Bisson, Esq. and his decision was issued in April of
2010. The doctors, plaintiffs Vane and Hyman (Doctors), have filed a motion to confirm
the award as issued. Defendant Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) has filed a motion to
modify a portion of the award.
The Arbitrator’s Decision
The dispute between the parties relates to the meaning and enforceability of a
rather informal vacation policy that existed prior to the time that Surgical Associates, Inc.
merged with FAHC. The arbitrator concluded that Vane was entitled to half his claim, for
an award of $53,784.50, and that Hyman was entitled to take 350 hours as excess
vacation time during his employment at FAHC and that he would be entitled to financial
reimbursement, at his then-existing pay rate, for fifty percent of any remaining amount at
the time his employment terminates. The arbitrator denied all requests for interest, costs
or fees.
The Motions
The Doctors seek to confirm the arbitrator’s decision. FAHC seeks to have it
modified. Both sides agree to accept the actual relief awarded, but FAHC seeks
modification of the legal finding that it waived its right to enforce certain contract
provisions, presumably because that issue may also arise with regard to numerous other
doctors not parties to this case. FAHC’s position is that the ruling on that issue was
arbitrary and capricious. The Doctors’ position is that the court should not be reviewing
that question.
“[T]he standard of review of an arbitration award by the superior court . . . is very
limited. Vermont has a strong tradition of upholding arbitration awards whenever
possible.” Vermont Built, Inc., v. Krolick, 2008 VT 131, ¶13,
185 Vt. 139 (internal
quotation omitted). “[I]f courts were accorded a broad scope of review, then arbitration
would become merely another expensive and time consuming layer to the already
complex litigation process.” Brinckerhoff v. Brinckerhoff,
2005 VT 75, ¶5,
179 Vt. 532.
Courts do not “reweigh the evidence presented to the arbitrator or subject the merits of
the controversy to judicial review.” Matzen Constr., Inc. v. Leander Anderson Corp.,
152
Vt. 174, 177 (1989). The court “has no authority to review for an arbitrator’s legal
errors,” or “to review an arbitrator’s decision for manifest disregard of the law.” Krolick,
2008 VT 131, ¶13 n. 2, citing Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576 (2008).
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“The scope of the trial court’s review is limited to ensuring that the arbitration
proceedings fall within the boundaries of due process.” Matzen Const., 152 Vt. at177.
The parties agree in theory on the standard of review: the court can “modify or
vacate an arbitrator’s award only pursuant to statutory grounds or if the parties are denied
due process.” Krolick, 2008 VT 131, ¶ 139 (internal quotation omitted). However, they
differ over how that standard of review applies in this case.
FAHC argues that the award is arbitrary and capricious, and thus a violation of
due process which can be reviewed on a motion to modify an arbitration award. For this
latter proposition it cites two federal cases, Ainsworth v. Skunick, 960 F.2d 939 (11th
Cir. 1992) and Swift Industries, Inc. v. Botany Industries, Inc.,
466 F.2d 1125 (3rd Cir.
1972). Both cases, however, predated the Hall Street case, in which the United States
Supreme Court rejected the idea that “manifest disregard of the law” was a basis for
rejecting an arbitrator’s award. Hall
Street, 552 U.S. at 583-89. Although Ainsworth did
not equate “manifest disregard” with “arbitrary and capricious,” the court perceives the
two as essentially the same. While courts have distinguished between them as relating to
irrationality versus intentional failure to apply the law, there is little reasoned basis to say
that one is an appropriate ground for modification if the other is not.
In fact, in the wake of Hall Street, the Eleventh Circuit has itself rejected its
earlier position, as reflected in Ainsworth, that courts could review arbitration decisions
on “arbitrary and capricious” grounds. See, Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d
1313 (11th Cir. 2010). This court concludes that Hall Street’s elimination of the “manifest
disregard for the law” review must also be taken to eliminate any “arbitrary and
capricious” review.
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Even if the court can review an arbitrator’s decision under the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard, the court does not find the decision here to fit within that category.
A decision is arbitrary and capricious when it is “arrived at without reference to any
standards or principles.” In re Miserocchi, 170 Vt. 320, 325 (2000). “The United States
Supreme Court has defined an ‘arbitrary’ decision as one ‘[f]ixed or arrived at through an
exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or adjustment with reference to
principles, circumstances, or significance ....’” Lewandoski v. Vermont State Colleges,
142 Vt. 446, 453-54 (1983)(citation omitted). Here, there is nothing to suggest that the
arbitrator was acting out of caprice. He stated his reasons for finding waiver, and whether
he was right or wrong as a matter of law, he stated what he understood to be the law on
waiver and he applied that law to the facts he had found. Arbitration Decision ¶¶ 9-10. In
reality, all that FAHC points to is an alleged error of law: a finding of waiver without first
finding (1) an unequivocal waiver and (2) reasonable and detrimental reliance. Even if
true, this may have been an error of law, but it was far from arbitrary or capricious.
Order
The motion to modify the award is denied. The motion to confirm the award is
granted.
Dated at Burlington, Vermont this 21st day of October, 2010.
_____________________________
Helen M. Toor
Superior Court Judge
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