DWYER, J.
¶ 1 We granted discretionary review to decide the question of whether jurisdiction over a Korean resident could be obtained through use of the methods of service of process allowed for in Washington's nonresident motorist act, RCW 46.64.040. We answer in the negative.
¶ 2 On June 22, 2010, Keith and Cynthia Larson were involved in a motor vehicle collision with Kyungsik Yoon. The collision occurred in King County, Washington, which was where the Larsons resided. Yoon, on the other hand, was a resident of the Republic of Korea.
¶ 3 On June 10, 2013, the Larsons filed a complaint against Yoon in King County Superior Court. Therein, they alleged claims of negligence and loss of consortium. The complaint was filed less than two weeks before the statutory limitation period was set to expire. Upon filing of the complaint, however, the limitation period was tolled for 90 days, so long as valid service of process was effected on Yoon within the 90-day period. RCW 4.16.170.
¶ 4 On June 14, the Larsons served copies of the summons, complaint, and other documents on the Washington secretary of state.
¶ 5 Attorneys hired by Yoon's insurer appeared on his behalf. On November 20, Yoon moved for summary judgment. He asserted that he had not been validly served prior to the expiration of the applicable statutory limitation period. This was so, he argued, because the methods of service allowed for in RCW 46.64.040 were inconsistent with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 20 U.S.T. 361 (hereinafter Hague Convention) and, consequently, that RCW 46.64.040 was preempted by virtue of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI.
¶ 6 On December 27, Yoon's summary judgment motion was denied. His subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
¶ 7 Yoon sought discretionary review in this court. On May 19, 2014, an order granting discretionary review pursuant to RAP 2.3(b)(1)
¶ 8 The methods of service allowed for in RCW 46.64.040 are, as Yoon asserts, inconsistent with the Hague Convention, as adopted by the Republic of Korea. Consequently, RCW 46.64.040 is preempted by virtue of the supremacy clause, and substituted service pursuant to the statute is ineffective as matter of law. Because of this, and because the applicable statutory limitation period had expired at the time that Yoon moved for summary judgment, we hold that the trial court erred in ruling on Yoon's motion.
¶ 9 "A trial court's denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, with the appellate court engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court." Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 175 Wn.2d 402, 407, 282 P.3d 1069 (2012). "Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Keithly v. Sanders, 170 Wn.App. 683, 686, 285 P.3d 225 (2012) (citing CR 56(c)).
¶ 10 RCW 46.64.040 is Washington's non-resident motorist act. Generally speaking, it allows for substituted service on the Washington secretary of state when the person intended to be served is not an inhabitant of or cannot be found within Washington. It provides:
RCW 46.64.040.
¶ 11 Our Supreme Court has made known that only strict compliance with the requirements of RCW 46.64.040 will permit personal jurisdiction to be obtained over a nonresident. Martin v. Meier, 111 Wn.2d 471, 479, 760 P.2d 925 (1988); see also Omaits v. Raber, 56 Wn.App. 668, 670, 785 P.2d 462 (1990) ("Substantial compliance, however, is not enough. . . . RCW 46.64.040 must be strictly adhered to or no jurisdiction is obtained under the statute.") Strict compliance with the statute means that "both service of the secretary of state and mailing of notice of such service forthwith to the defendant must be accomplished, in addition to the other statutory requirements." Keithly, 170 Wash.App. at 693, 285 P.3d 225 (emphasis added). In other words, service of the summons on the secretary of state is not itself sufficient to constitute strict compliance with the statute and does not, by itself, obtain jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident motorist. Keithly, 170 Wash.App. at 692-93, 285 P.3d 225; Omaits, 56 Wash.App. at 669-70, 785 P.2d 462.
¶ 13 Article 1 of the Hague Convention provides that it applies in all cases "`where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.'" Broad, 141 Wash.2d at 675, 10 P.3d 371 (quoting Hague Convention, art. 1). "Service of process refers to a formal delivery of documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action." Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 700, 108 S.Ct. 2104. Article 2 directs each nation-state to designate a "central authority" to receive requests for service of process. Broad, 141 Wash.2d at 674, 10 P.3d 371. Article 4 "specifies that `the Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency . . . by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory.'" Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home, 186 Wn.App. 398, 345 P.3d 850, 854 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Hague Convention, art. 5(a)). However, "the Hague Convention `allows service to be effected without utilizing the Central Authority as long as the nation receiving service has not objected to the method used.'" Kim, 345 P.3d at 854 (quoting DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir.1981)).
¶ 14 The Republic of Korea is a signatory to the Hague Convention and has objected to certain methods of service otherwise authorized by the treaty. Of significance to the question before us is the Republic of Korea's objection to the methods of service set forth in Article 10 of the Hague Convention.
Reservations of Republic of Korea to Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2121 U.N.T.S. 294, 296-97.
¶ 15 As a consequence of the Republic of Korea's objection to Article 10, both the Larsons and the secretary of state were prohibited from serving Yoon directly in Korea using postal channels. Yet, in order to strictly comply with RCW 46.64.040, notice of the summons served on the secretary of state would have to be mailed directly to Yoon, either by the Larsons or the secretary of state.
¶ 16 Our conclusion is consistent with the applicable civil rule governing "Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country."
CR 4(i)(1) (emphasis added).
¶ 17 As explained herein, the methods for service allowed for in RCW 46.64.040 do not comply with an applicable treaty—the Hague Convention, as adopted by the Republic of Korea. Moreover, to the extent that the Larsons maintain that service was complete upon the secretary of state receiving the summons—an argument rejected in both Keithly and Omaits—the Larsons overlook the requirement imposed by rule that service be reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the defendant. Merely serving the secretary of state, without further complying with the statute's requirements of forwarding notice to Yoon of the secretary of state's receipt of the summons, is not behavior "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to give actual notice." CR 4(i)(1). It is, of course, for this very reason that RCW 46.64.040 requires more than mere service on the secretary of state for service to be complete. Martin, 111 Wash.2d at 479, 760 P.2d 925; Keithly, 170 Wash.App. at 692-93, 285 P.3d 225; Omaits, 56 Wash.App. at 669-70, 785 P.2d 462.
¶ 18 In view of the foregoing, we hold, as a matter of law, that service of process could not have been lawfully effected on Yoon in Korea pursuant to RCW 46.64.040. To the extent that the trial court's order denying Yoon's motion for summary judgment was based on its conclusion that proper service was had, the order is reversed. The cause is remanded for further proceedings.
¶ 19 Reversed.
We concur: VERELLEN, J. and LAU, J.
RAP 2.3(b)(1).